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Abstract 
 
Sadae (‘serving the great’) was the core of Joseon Korea’s relations with 
Ming/Qing China for over five centuries, from 1392 until 1910. Since the end of 
the colonial period under the Japanese rule (1910–45), the legacies of Sadae have 
continued to influence the foreign policy of both Korean states towards the great 
powers. The Korean interpretation of Sadae diverges from that of the Chinese, so 
Sadae needs to be studied in more detail in order to comprehensively understand 
Korea’s relations with the great powers throughout history. Such an understanding 
is imperative to the analysis of contemporary international relations (IR) in 
Northeast Asia, because it can help us avoid over-generalised conclusions such as 
predictions that a Sinocentric order will inevitably re-emerge in the region. 
 
This thesis adopts a constructivist-cum-realist approach to study both the 
ideational and material factors that are related to Sadae’s formation and practice. 
It uses a research methodology of historical inquiry in order to analyse historical 
evidence concerning Joseon–Ming/Qing relations. The primary source of data for 
the thesis is The Annals of the Joseon Dynasty. 
 
The main policy implication of this study is that Sadae was a multi-faceted 
concept and it was implemented in different ways by Joseon political elites. The 
thesis thus suggests that the possibility for a re-emergence of the pre-modern 
Sinocentric order in the Asia–Pacific region is minimal because China is not able 
to offer an ideology that can appeal to others like Confucianism did in the past. 
The Korean experience of managing its relations with the great powers, however, 
is of significant value to those middle powers that are facing or will be facing a 
trilateral dilemma as a result of Sino–US competition. 
 
Theoretically, the main implication is that the constructivist-cum-realist approach 
proposed in this thesis can provide scholars who specialise in the IR of Northeast 
Asia with a comprehensive and balanced analytical framework for examining 
events in the region. This approach will help them better analyse not only state 
security and international trade, but also historical complexity and cultural nuance 
in interstate relations. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Korea–Great Power(s) Relations in Historical and Cultural Context 
 
The Korean Peninsula has been strategically important to great powers’ rivalry 
since the pre-modern time. For over six centuries, Korea was and is deeply 
involved in every competition between the great powers in the region: Ming 
China and feudal Japan (late 16th century), Ming and Qing (early to mid 17th 
century), Qing China and modern Japan (mid to late 19th century), modern Japan 
and Tsar Russia (late 19th to early 20th century), the two ideologically different 
blocs of capitalism and communism (during the Cold War), and the United States 
and China (at present and at least in near future). Managing the relations with 
great powers thus has been dominating the working agenda of the 
country/countries on the peninsula. From the realists’ perspective, the goal of 
Korea’s foreign policy should focus on surviving in the ‘fights between the 
whales’, and to bandwagon with either the incumbent or the rising great may seem 
to be the only course of action that is left for Korea. However, a substantial 
amount of evidence in the Korean history indicated that material forces (i.e. 
military and economic power) were not the only factor that determined the 
making of Korea’s relations with the great powers; ideational concerns (i.e. 
historical and cultural influence) also contributed to the shaping of the 
Korea–great power(s) relations – and this has to be understood with a 
constructivist approach. In this thesis, it is therefore suggested that a better way to 
study the Korea–great power(s) relations is to employ a conceptual approach that 
combines realism and constructivism, whereby factors of either the material or the 
ideational aspect that contribute to the making of Korea’s foreign policy towards 
the great power(s) will not be neglected in the analysis of Northeast Asian 
interstate relations. This hybrid approach can help to avoid drawing 
over-generalised conclusions such as that of Kang (2003, p.67), who expected the 
re-emerging of a hierarchical Sinocentric order in modern East Asia and believed 
that ‘if the system is experiencing a return to a pattern of hierarchy, the result may 
be increased stability’ in the region. 
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To examine the Korea–great power(s) relations in history, one has to study the 
practice of Sadae* (serving the great, ٣ε), because it remained as the core of 
Korea’s foreign relations towards the great powers for centuries. It was a policy 
formally initiated with the establishment of the Joseon Dynasty in 1392 that 
defined the Joseon–Ming relationship, and it was terminated officially with the 
signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 that proclaimed the independence of 
Korea. As a practice that is well known in China and Korea, however, Sadae is 
interpreted differently in these two countries. While Sadae is viewed in China as a 
spontaneous action of the Koreans driven by their admiration for China’s 
supremacy, Sadae in Korea is considered a pragmatic strategy employed by the 
Koreans to use China in order to serve Korea’s national interests. 
 
Due to the competing interpretations of Sadae, the concept needs to be studied in 
more detail. How the practice of Sadae varied over time during the five centuries 
of the Joseon Dynasty is the research question of this thesis, and the central 
argument is that Sadae was not a single-dimensional concept; it was complex. By 
adopting a constructivist-cum-realist approach, this research analyses the rationale 
of Sadae and examines the historical records related to the implementation of 
Sadae in Joseon’s foreign relations, revealing the three different faces of Sadae 
and leading to the conclusion that in order to comprehensively understand the 
Korea–great power(s) relations, it is imperative to consider the impact of both 
ideational and material factors. 
 
This introductory chapter is composed of three sections. The first section 
illustrates the impact of history and culture on the interstate relations in Northeast 
Asia, followed by the second section that outlines the concept of Sadae in Korea’s 
foreign relations with the great powers. The final section explains the 
methodology of this research and describes the thesis structure. 
 
1.1 History and Culture in Northeast Asian International Relations 
 
Northeast Asia is a region made of countries with millennium-old histories that 
                                                 
* This thesis adopts the Revised Romanisation System approved by the Korean Government in 
2000. 
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have nurtured deeply rooted national cultures, for which its historical and cultural 
traditions are different from those of the West (Kang, 2003, p.84). Northeast 
Asian international relations are woven not only by the material threads of power 
politics but also by the ideational threads of historical and cultural influences. 
Studying the local history and culture therefore ‘can provide a way of distilling 
and making concrete and relevant the distinctive historical experiences of 
different nations and elites. In a region as culturally diverse as Asia, grasping this 
essence is a critical perspective’ (Pyle, 2007a, p.9). To study the international 
relations of Northeast Asia, the impact of history and culture should be considered 
as important as the material forces. 
 
History: the Past that is Inseparable from the Present in Northeast Asian IR 
Continuity is a prominent feature of Northeast Asian international relations 
because there are unfinished businesses in the region that connect the past with 
the present. Chun (2010, pp.69–87) described the close link between the present 
and the past in Northeast Asia, believing that transformations and continuities in 
history had complicated the present situation in the post-modern period. Such 
complexity can be observed in the rise of China, the country that has been making 
every endeavour to achieve national revitalisation so as to compensate its losses 
during the ‘century of humiliation’, and on the Korean Peninsula, where the goal 
of unification is still among the top priorities for both Korean states to establish a 
truly independent, autonomous sovereign state, which originally belonged to the 
Koreans but taken away first by the Japanese annexation in 1910, and again by the 
intervention of the USA and the USSR in 1945. 
 
What has been reminding the Northeast Asian people of these unresolved issues is 
the sustaining of historical memory. Until this day, the Japanese government still 
maintains the pre-war nationalist narratives and never truly offered the apologies 
that are considered satisfactory to its neighbours, which had compounded the 
victims’ agony and fury, making the impacts of history even stronger in present 
time. In the keynote speech delivered at the United Nations on 28 September 2012, 
South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung-hwan said, 
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‘It requires a sound historical consciousness and heartfelt soul-searching on any past 
wrongdoings in order for solid peace and stability to be established between nations. A 
country's true valor is proven when it confronts the dark side of its history and 
endeavors to rectify past wrongdoings.’ (Yonhap News Agency, 2012) 
 
While the Chinese and the Koreans tend to focus on Japan’s past for the war 
crimes it had committed, the Japanese, believing that everything was already 
settled on the battle ground, refuse to confront with its past – trust is therefore 
never genuinely established among Northeast Asian states (Kristof, 1998, 
pp.38–44). Since little hope is expected for reconciliation, exclusionist 
nationalism is nonetheless growing steadily in these countries, exacerbating the 
security dilemma in the region (Pyle, 2007b, pp.31–36). 
 
Historical memory is also sustained via school education in Northeast Asian 
countries, offsetting the power of time that could have diluted the enmity among 
old-time adversaries. In China, both Korean states, and Japan, it is a common 
practice that the history study at school is used to perpetuate historical memory 
for future generations. Wang (2008, p.800) points to the fact that in China, it is 
compulsory for children to receive patriotic education since primary school, 
studying history with the official version that focuses on the ‘century of 
humiliation’ during which the glory of China was deprived by the imperial West 
and Japan. In Japan, however, the government downplays its militarist past by 
asking textbook publishers to remove the brutal war crimes committed by 
Japanese military personnel so that fewer people of the younger generations 
would know about the wrongdoings in the past (Kristof, 1998, p.41). This is also 
one of the sources that have produced discord between Japan and South Korea: in 
order to shape the view of future generations, each government insisted to 
incorporate the version of its own into the school textbooks that illustrates the role 
of Japan differently during the colonial period of 1910–1945 (i.e. the Koreans see 
the Japanese as invaders, while the Japanese consider themselves as modernizers 
of Korea) – and the goal of the state-sponsored Japan–ROK Joint History 
Research Committee to reconcile the diverging views on history between the two 
countries becomes literally unreachable (Shin, 2011, pp.4–5). 
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Without a master version to illustrate the region’s past, history is therefore turned 
into a political tool to serve contemporary purposes in Northeast Asia. ‘Whose 
side of the story gets told is often far more important than any objective facts or 
events’ (Kang, 2010b, p.165). As the legitimacy of the ruling regime in each 
Northeast Asian state and the formation of national identity are, to a certain extent, 
tied to its national history, no government can afford to compromise in this 
zero-sum game (Gries et al., 2009, p.455). As the nationalistic sentiment becomes 
intensified among the new-born generations who have not even experienced the 
wars in person (Fukuyama, 2007, p.38), future tensions derived from historical 
disputes seem inevitable. 
 
In particular, historical factors constitute an indispensible part of Korea’s foreign 
relations in Northeast Asia. Although South Korea and Japan are both key allies to 
the United States in the Asia-Pacific, the relations between the two have not been 
unproblematic. In addition to the territory disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima, South 
Korea has been demanding compensations for the victims, including the vast 
number of civilians, prisoners of war, forced labours, and the ‘comfort women’, 
all of whom were treated inhumanely by the Japanese military personnel during 
the wars. However, the Japanese government has been refusing to make 
adequately apology, and the bilateral relations has exacerbated in recent years 
with the growing assertiveness of the hawkish nationalists in Japan, as seen in the 
policies of the Shinzo Abe administration. In return, South Korean President Park 
Geun-hye, who blamed the revisionist stance of the Abe administration for 
causing the ‘Asia’s paradox’ (The Wall Street Journal, 2012), chose to align her 
country with China against Japan: she refused to hold bilateral talks with Shinzo 
Abe over half of her tenure since she assumed office in February 2013 (Channel 
NewsAsia, 2015); she raised the request during her state visit to China in June 
2013 that a memorial hall to be built in Harbin to honour Korean patriot Ahn 
Jung-geun (but considered a terrorist in Japan) who assassinated Japan’s first 
Prime Minister Ito Hirobumi on 26 October 1909 (The Wall Street Journal, 2014); 
and she attended the military parade in Beijing on 3 September 2015 despite the 
fact that all the heads of state from the West turned down China’s invitation (The 
Guardian, 2015). 
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However, this does not necessarily mean that South Korea is switching partner. 
Centuries of Sino–Korea relations in history actually provide sufficient evidence 
to prove that the Koreans may not be willing to follow the lead of China. 
Although Joseon Korea was frequently described (by the Chinese, mostly) as an 
exemplar tribute state to Ming/Qing China, a pattern of interstate relations that 
resembles the suzerain–vassal Sinocentric order, no matter how benign the 
hegemon’s motive is going to be, may not be re-emerging in spite of China’s 
rise – and to understand the reasons behind, one needs to study the intersubjective 
culture that was shared by these two countries in history. 
 
Culture: the Uniqueness of Northeast Asian Experience in IR 
Culture is closely related to history, as the formation of a culture is an evolving 
process that usually takes long period of time. When the people of two countries 
interact with each other peacefully, practices that are mutually accepted will 
become the foundation on which shared culture is to be nurtured. Accordingly, 
countries are given new identities within the framework of the shared culture, 
shaping new national interests and state behaviours. In other words, a state that is 
not self-isolated tends to have its identity socially constructed as a result of being 
culturally influenced during its interaction with other states – national identity is 
therefore a cultural product of international relations. 
 
Nevertheless, culture used to be neglected in the study of IR. With cultural factors 
left out from analysis, states were deemed ‘irrational’ if they did not behave the 
way that rationalists commonly expected (Stuart-Fox, 2004, p.119–120). After 
being marginalised by mainstream theorists for decades, culture emerged in IR 
studies by the effort of post-colonialism that emphasised the uniqueness of 
endogenous culture in developing countries that were under colonial rule. In the 
development of post-colonial identity, culture was moved from periphery to the 
centre, challenging the mainstream schools of thoughts in IR studies that have 
deliberately ignored the impacts of culture (Darby & Paolini, 1994, p.384). 
 
Evidently, the post-colonial world has witnessed the ascending importance of 
non-Western cultures in international relations accompanied by the return of Asia 
to the core of world politics in recent decades. In spite of the impact generated by 
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the force of globalisation, Asian and Western societies are not the same because 
of the different values people cherish (Zakaria & Lee, 1994, pp.113–4). However, 
although with potential cultural clashes, socialisation between Asia and the West 
is unavoidable for the reasons that countries in Asia have gained prominent 
political status in the international society with their rising material power, and the 
contemporary world issues tend to be transnational that need to be multilaterally 
discussed and collectively managed by countries from both Asia and the West 
(Jacquin, Oros & Verweij, 1993, p.377). It hence requires the mentality that is 
capable of understanding and accommodating cultural particularity to manage the 
international issues that go beyond the transatlantic boundary. As a result, foreign 
policy analysts started to recognise the effects of culture on the making of foreign 
policies in recent decades (Lapid, 1996, p.3). 
 
In East Asia, although realists still insist that no international politics is 
determined by culture even in this culturally rich region (Ross, 2006, p.358), 
international actors are now taking cultural factors into consideration when 
defining security interests (Katzenstein, 1996, p.2). In cases that the rationalist 
models do not work well in explaining states’ behaviours in East Asia, these East 
Asian states ought not to be labelled as irrational actors; they simply play different 
games with different preferences (Bennett & Stam, cited in Kang, 2003/04, 
pp.176–7). 
 
To understand the level of significance of cultural influence on interstate relations 
in Northeast Asia, socialisation between/among these states in history has to be 
studied in detail. As they inherited millennium-old civilisation, China, Korea and 
Japan have developed cultures of their own. These cultures, nevertheless, are not 
exactly the same as the Western culture. This adds complexities to those who opt 
to understand international relations with perspectives traditionally developed in 
the West. Simply comparing the situation in the region with that in Europe and 
then drawing conclusions on East Asia’s future merely based upon the 
understanding of Europe, or even assuming East Asia will invariably follow the 
European trajectory, is therefore considered oversimplification (Zakaria & Lee, 
1994, p.121; Kang, 2003/04, p.169). On the topic of balancing for instance, it has 
been empirically tested and proved by Bennett & Stam (as cited in Kang, 2003/04, 
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p.176) that there is ‘no support for the argument that (Asian) behavior will 
converge on that of Europe. In fact, all of the regions outside of Europe appear to 
diverge from the European pattern (of classical balance of power)’. 
 
Moreover, the culture of each Northeast Asian state may have shared a 
homogenous origin 2000 years ago; but after centuries of evolution, heterogeneity 
of cultural norms and practices does exist nowadays among these countries. This 
means that there are possibly a number of different types of Asian cultures in the 
region, which may seem confusing or even misleading to people in the West if 
they attempt to assess Northeast Asian states’ behaviours but without a thorough 
understanding of the different types of Northeast Asian cultures. 
 
It is commonly believed that in ancient time, China was the hub of civilisation to 
countries in the region, and both Korea and Japan had been profoundly influenced 
by the Chinese culture. However, it would be oversimplifying the issue if one 
thinks that to study Northeast Asia is to study China, or simply by studying China 
one can understand Korea and Japan and the relations among the three. Those 
who predict the future of international relations in Northeast Asia by focusing 
solely on the development of China neglects the cultural differences (not just 
differences in economic and military capabilities) among the Northeast Asian 
states. Assuming the re-emergence of a Sinocentric order or the prevalence of 
Sinicised civilisation in the region fails to take the national cultures and identities 
of Japan and the two Korean states into consideration. Consequently, their 
preferences could be overlooked, their intentions could be misunderstood, their 
responses could be misread and their future actions could be wrongly forecasted. 
Such mistakes could be made not only by the policy-makers in the West who have 
limited knowledge about Northeast Asia; but also by those in China who choose 
to focus on the Chinese version of Northeast Asian history that overwhelmingly 
glorifies the greatness of ancient China. Therefore, how the intersubjective culture 
shared by China and its neighbouring states had influenced the interstate relations 
in the region since pre-modern time needs to be studied in the historical context – 
and it must be studied from not only the perspective of China, but also those of 
Korea and Japan. 
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1.2 Sadae: the Core of Korea–Great Power(s) Relations in History 
 
From the Joseon Dynasty to the present, Korean foreign relations with great 
powers have been influenced by historical experiences and characterised with 
cultural features. There would be chances for misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation if historical and cultural factors are dismissed in the analysis of 
Korean foreign policies. Material factors that concern national security and 
commercial trade still account for the rationale of policy-making; but they are not 
everything. Located right next to the hegemon and for several times involved in 
the great power rivalries, Korea managed to master its fate with something other 
than its military and economic power. 
 
Hence, if only the factors related to military and economic power are concerned, 
as claimed by the realists, Korea would be labelled as a minor country that signals 
little implication to world politics and be ignored. However, without the minor, 
there would not be the major. Without studying how the secondary powers such as 
Korea interact with the great power(s), understanding of international relations 
would unlikely be complete – to thoroughly understand international relations in 
Northeast Asia, therefore, Korean foreign relations with the great power(s) need 
to be studied with all factors, material and non-material, being taken into 
consideration. 
 
An Overview of Sadae 
Sadae was implemented as an official policy towards China throughout the Joseon 
Dynasty, during which the influence of Chinese culture on Korea became 
‘dominant, direct, and pervasive’ (Kang, 2010, p.33). At that time, China was 
popularly deemed as the cultural centre of Asia, and many of the educated 
Koreans were drawn to the superiority of Chinese civilisation – with 
Confucianism in particular. In Constructivist term, Confucianism became the 
intersubjective culture that was commonly shared by the Chinese and the Koreans. 
Fundamentally, it was their faith in Confucianism that had made the Koreans 
accept the existence of a Sinic world and the identity of a vassal state accorded to 
Joseon in the hierarchical Sinocentric order. 
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To obtain a higher ranking of their national status, the Koreans were motivated to 
Sinicise themselves – they voluntarily and actively studied Chinese culture and 
emulated Chinese practices (Kang, 2010, pp.33–37). The study of Chinese 
language and philosophy was therefore placed at the core of education in Joseon: 
Chinese literatures and the philosophical canons of Confucianism became the 
textbooks in schools across the country. The Koreans not only absorbed the 
Confucian ideas and norms; they also developed political institutions by exactly 
copying those in China, including the design of civil service examination and 
bureaucratic governance. Consequently, the Joseon society was literally 
Confucianised, and Joseon achieved the highly regarded status of Sojunghwa 
(little China, λύ๮), which was closest to that of the hegemonic China in the 
‘civilisation–barbarian’ Sinocentric order. 
 
A Confucianised Joseon society thus became the primary source to produce 
generations of Confucian political elites, who revered and accepted Confucianism 
as their state ideology. When they became the court officials responsible for 
making Joseon’s foreign policy, they chose to practice Sadae. They followed the 
principles of Confucian propriety and performed the duties a vassal state (as the 
junior) was required to towards the suzerain (as the senior). 
 
The implementation of Sadae was justified by a mix of two themes in 
Confucianism. On one hand, based upon the Confucian virtue of loyalty and filial 
piety, a junior must respect and serve his senior with utmost sincerity as in the 
relationship of a son to his father. Within the structure of the Sinocentric order, 
this concept was expanded to the relationship between China and its vassals. 
China took up the role of the ‘father’ to be respected and served by the vassals 
that were ‘sons’ to China. Therefore in the Confucian world, it would be morally 
wrong if a vassal failed to serve its suzerain faithfully, for which it would be 
condemned and punished by the ‘Heaven’. 
 
On the other hand, it was the pragmatic advocacy of Mencius about interstate 
relationship between the strong and the weak that had cultivated the idea of Sadae: 
he suggested that ‘it is wise for minor states to protect themselves by serving the 
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major states’ (Mencius, cited in Dobson, 1963, p.14). Serving the great hence was 
a rational decision based on a cost-benefit calculation that should be adopted by a 
minor state like Joseon, in view of its geographical proximity to China and the 
huge gap between the two countries in terms of military and economic power. Yi 
Seong-gye (Taejo, founder of Joseon) explicitly made Sadae the core of Joseon’s 
foreign relations with Ming, which effectively preserved the peace that Joseon 
enjoyed with China for five centuries (Kim, 2005, p.4). 
 
Sadae was practiced within the framework of tribute system. In the system, with 
Ming (Qing from 1637) China being the suzerain, the Chinese emperor conferred 
investiture to legitimise the ruling status of the Joseon kings; with Joseon being 
the vassal state, the Joseon kings dispatched embassies that carried tributes to the 
Chinese court and kowtowed to the Chinese emperor, acknowledging China’s 
supreme position in the Sinic world – the ‘father–son’ relationship was therefore 
established. By such relationship, the ‘son’ (Joseon) would respect and serve the 
‘father’ (China), and the ‘father’ would take care of the ‘son’. However, with 
researches at a deeper level, it is found that there were different motives to 
practice Sadae, which is to be illustrated in detail in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6. 
 
Reasons to Study Sadae 
In general, Sadae needs to be studied due to the importance of understanding how 
a middle power like Korea can manage to survive in the face of a great power. By 
manoeuvring both material and ideational factors in its relations with China for 
centuries, Korea has accumulated wealth of experience in dealing with the great 
powers. Learning the rationale and the application of Sadae can provide useful 
insights to middle powers with relatively shorter history on how to build and 
manage relations with great powers, especially the rising China. It helps to remind 
them, during the process of making foreign policies, of the importance not to 
make oversimplified assumptions and overlook subtleties, and the need to 
cautiously clarify ambiguities and avoid misinterpretations. 
 
In particular, Sadae has to be researched in greater detail to demonstrate its 
variation in practice. It ought not to be denied that some rituals of Sadae were 
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carried out in the same way for 500 years, such as requesting investiture from the 
Chinese emperor to legitimise the enthronement of a Joseon king and sending 
tribute missions to China every year. However, simply asserting that Joseon 
practiced Sadae towards China over a span of five centuries is oversimplifying the 
bilateral relations between the two countries. As discussed in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, 
and Chapter 6, there are numerous examples to prove that a substantial amount of 
Joseon political elites chose to serve the great power merely for the purpose of 
pursuing the national intersts of Joseon. Their practice of Sadae reflected little 
about the normative tenets of Confucianism; it was instead sustained by the 
pragmatic formula of cost-benefit calculation. When process-tracing the motives 
of the Joseon political elites under different domestic and international political 
contexts, one would notice that Sadae was indeed practiced differently. 
 
Nevertheless, Sadae has been described as a one-dimensional concept by most of 
the contemporary Korean and Chinese scholars – ideational to the Chinese and 
pragmatic to the Koreans. Both of these two extreme views dismiss the details in 
the practice of Sadae, and they only produce partial explanations for a political 
phenomenon in the past (contemporary literatures on Sadae written by Chinese 
and Korean scholars are reviewed in detail in Section 3 of Chapter 2). It may not 
be convincing when such explanations are invoked to analyse present interstate 
relations, needlessly to mention predicting the future situation. Political forecasts 
such as the re-emergence of a modern Sinocentric order in East Asia would hence 
appear to be a Chauvinistic thinking on the part of China, or a misunderstanding 
on the part of the West resulted from unfamiliarity with the East Asian history and 
culture. This is evident in David C. Kang’s prediction that the pre-modern 
Sinocentric order would return to East Asia, because it is based on an 
over-generalised description of Joseon’s relations with China in history. Such 
reasoning hinted that Sadae as the core of Joseon–great power(s) relations was not 
thoroughly studied (and as a matter of fact, the term of Sadae was not even 
mentioned in his 2010 book of East Asia before the West: Five Centuries of Trade 
and Tribute). If the different faces of Sadae are fully unveiled, one would not be 
so sure about the resurgence of a regional order that is based on the Pax Sinica 
model of ‘benign hegemon–faithful followers’ in East Asia. This makes it all the 
more important to study Sadae in greater depth. 
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1.3 Research Methodology and Thesis Structure 
 
Research Methodology 
This thesis adopts the research methodology of historical inquiry. In spite of the 
problematic relationship between history and IR studies (Lawson, 2010, p.204; 
Smith, 1999, p.3; Quirk, 2008, p.519; Jervis, 1991/92, p.42), historical inquiry is 
important to IR studies because apart from changes in international politics there 
are continuities, which refer to ‘the gradual evolution of structures or processes 
such that the present retains key features of the past’, and IR scholars need to 
study history because what appears new may actually have its roots in the past 
(Mansbach & Taylor, 2012, p.XXV). If history is the base upon which future is 
predicted, historical evidence has to be carefully examined so that the credibility 
of such reasoning can be verified. This implies that historical complexity should 
not be dismissed in order to build parsimonious theoretical models. Instead, it 
must be scrutinized in detail so as to explore the root that may well explain the 
cause of state behaviour in present-time interstate relations. 
 
To the constructivists, history is vital to understand the formation of national 
identity. History is made of interactions among people and countries in the past. 
Unlike future that is yet to take place with uncertainties, history is concrete 
because it has happened. To people who have learned about, needlessly to 
mention those who have experienced in person, the events in the past, it is 
difficult to deny the impacts generated from historical legacies. To states that have 
interacted in the past, what they have done to each other shapes the social 
structure (Wendt, 1995, p.77) and by reciprocal interaction, states’ identities are 
defined (Wendt, 1992, p.406). In other words, the identity of ‘self’ is created and 
reinforced by what happened between ‘self’ and ‘other’ in the past. The national 
identity of a state thus has to be studied within the historical context of the state 
(Katzenstein, 1996, pp.24–25). Historical experience is a process of repeated 
socialisations among people of different nations and countries; the more intensive, 
frequent and closer to present time these interactions are, the stronger the impacts 
there will be to shape the identities of states. This is the reason why ‘history 
matters’, as argued by Wendt (1995, p.77, emphasis in original). 
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In particular for the importance of history to the study of Asian international 
relations, Kang (2003/04, p.180) advocates that ‘scholars of Asian international 
relations need to pay more attention to the empirical record, both historical and 
modern’. He criticises the inconsistent thus problematic approach of those who 
are willing to explore the historical roots of European politics but reluctant to 
engage and study East Asian history, and he questions their biased conclusions for 
being Eurocentric by illustrating the failure of Western IR theories in explaining 
the non-balancing behaviours of states in East Asia (Kang, 2003/04, p.174). 
Fortunately, there are prominent scholars in the field of IR who have taken the 
time and efforts to study Asian history when undertaking their researches, to name 
a few for example: Alastair Iain Johnston and his Cultural Realism (1995), 
Roland Bleiker and his Divided Korea (2005), Brantly Womack and his China 
and Vietnam (2006), David C. Kang and his East Asia before the West (2010), 
along with others such as Peter J. Katzenstein, Gilbert Rozman, Peter Hays Gries 
and Jae Ho Chung who have attempted to explain international relations in East 
Asia by paying close attention to the local history. Rather than being dismissive of 
Asian history as unreliable and subjective materials, they freed themselves from 
Eurocentric prejudice and seriously looked into the narratives and evidence, 
traced the historical roots of Asian politics, and illustrated the rationale of foreign 
policies making in Asian countries. 
 
In the spirit of these IR scholars, historical inquiry is adopted in this research. 
Generally speaking, this method is considered appropriate because it takes the 
study of detailed historical records to unveil the different faces of Sadae and to 
comprehensively understand the Korean experience of managing its relations with 
the great power(s) for centuries. Specifically, there are four reasons: 1) both Korea 
and China are countries of millennia of history, which provides researchers with 
abundant amount of historical evidence; 2) to study the historical and cultural 
imprints on Joseon’s interactions with the great power(s) will be instrumental to 
having a good grasp of the Korean foreign relations in contemporary time – as 
Samuel S. Kim emphasised that history matters in understanding the formation of 
Korea’s national identity when assessing the relations between the two Korean 
states and the great powers (Kim, 2006, p.24); 3) historical complexity and 
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cultural nuance are vital in searching for the truth about controversial issues (such 
as Sadae), thus to study historical materials in detail can avoid simplification and 
generalisation that will usually leap to unreliable conclusions; and 4) historical 
and cultural influences are intangible thus difficult to be quantified for hypothesis 
confirmation or falsification – as Pyle (2007a, p.9) commented, ‘the discernment 
and explanation of a national style is more art than science’. 
 
To accurately capture the distinct features of Korea–great power(s) relations in the 
past, historical inquiry in this research is conducted based on primary instead of 
secondary sources – in order not to make over-simplified conclusions as David C. 
Kang did. Although being an advocate of historical study in IR, he ‘did not spend 
years in dusty archives in Hanoi, Tokyo, Beijing, and Seoul’ (Kang, 2010b, p.XI) 
and simply relied on secondary historical literature to illustrate the Sinocentric 
world order in pre-modern East Asia. This leaves some key questions unanswered: 
why did Joseon Korea accept the subordinate status and willingly serve Ming 
China at the first place? For a period of more than five centuries, did every Joseon 
king serve China invariably? With changes at the system level that altered the 
distribution of power in the region, did Joseon’s policy towards China remain the 
same? In other words, Kang’s analysis on the tribute system is problematic in the 
sense that he over-generalised the Sinocentric order, because he overlooked the 
historical complexities and cultural nuances in Joseon’s practice of Sadae towards 
China. Only when historical materials of primary sources are studied in detail can 
the question of how the practice of Sadae varied over time be adequately 
answered. 
 
Hence in this thesis, the Ri Dynasty Annals of Korea (also known as ‘Annals of 
the Joseon Dynasty’, hereafter RDAK in all in-text references) are chosen to serve 
as the chief primary source for the reason that, the 1893-volume annals, listed in 
UNESCO's Memory of the World register, are the original records written by 
Joseon royal historiographers who documented what happened in the Joseon court 
every day throughout the 518 years of the Joseon Dynasty. On a daily basis, the 
historiographers recorded information related to every aspect of both domestic 
affairs and foreign relations. It is the completeness (all records were kept intact, 
even during social upheaval such as the Japanese and the Manchu invasions) and 
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impartiality (Joseon historiographers were trained to faithfully record all 
information without bias according to the Confucian principles of integrity, not 
even the monarchs were allowed to interfere with their work) of the annals that 
they are selected to be the key primary source of research materials for this study. 
The annals used in this research is a reprint by the Research Institute for Oriental 
Cultures of Gakushuin University in Tokyo, Japan, published during the period 
from 1953 to 1967. 
 
Materials of other primary sources, such as memoirs, letters and diaries written by 
the Joseon policymakers and social elites, are also used to support the analyses of 
Joseon foreign relations with the great powers. As for secondary information, 
books and journal articles written by contemporary IR scholars are studied to 
examine Korea’s foreign policies towards the great powers mainly for the period 
from the early 1900s to the present. 
 
Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of eight chapters. The first chapter is an introduction of the 
research that delineates the Joseon policy of Sadae in historical and cultural 
context, and Chapter 2 covers the literature review of the two mainstream 
theoretical perspectives in IR study, that is, realism and constructivism, on Korean 
foreign relations with the great powers. In consideration of the dual (i.e. ideational 
and material) aspects of Sadae, a new approach to study Northeast Asian IR, 
namely, the constructivist-cum-realist approach, is also introduced in the chapter. 
 
Chapter 3 explores the origin of Sadae as a product of shared Confucian culture in 
China and Korea during the pre-modern era. By explaining the background, 
rationale and practice of Sadae, it is revealed that Sadae actually comprised both 
ideational and material considerations. When Sadae was applied in the making of 
government policy (especially foreign policy) at a particular time, the concern of 
either righteousness or pragmatism would prevail, leading to different ways of 
implementing the policy of Sadae. The historical evidence is then analysed in the 
following three chapters according to the changing power polarity in Northeast 
Asia: Chapter 4 focuses on the period from 1392 to 1608, during which a unipolar 
order was sustained by Ming China’s preponderance, Chapter 5 looks into 
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Joseon’s implementation of Sadae during the period from 1608 to 1800 – the time 
when a bipolar order occurred and eventually a power transition took place from 
Ming to Qing, and Chapter 6 studies the decline of Sadae in the modern era from 
1800 to 1910, during which an emerging multipolar order gradually appeared with 
the intrusion of Western powers and the rise of modernised Japan. 
 
Chapter 7 turns to discuss the legacies of Sadae in the contemporary era from 
1910 (when Korea was annexed by Japan) to the present time. The underpinned 
logic of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae (using the great, Ҕε) is examined, followed 
by the analysis of the combined application of these two legacies of Sadae in the 
two Korean states’ foreign relations with the great powers respectively from the 
onset of the Cold War to the Post-Cold War years. 
 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the findings of Sadae in this 
research by reviewing its rise and fall, based on which the concept of Sadae is 
described in an impartial and elaborated fashion. It implies that both material and 
non-material factors matter in Northeast Asian international relations. As 
contributions of this research to the field of IR, it is suggested that apart from 
security and economy, history and culture can be developed as another arena for 
middle powers like the two Korean states to interact with the great powers such as 
America and China. Academically, this research proposes a 
constructivist-cum-realist approach to study Northeast Asian IR with a balanced 
perspective (that will not neglect the local experience) and a comprehensive 
analytical framework (that is supported by established IR theories with universal 
values of reference). 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Realist and Constructivist Literatures, 
and the Hybrid Approach to Studying Sadae 
 
There have been significant amount of writings on the international relations of 
Northeast Asia in general and those related to the Korean Peninsula in particular. 
Against the backdrop of the wrestling between the two great powers, the United 
States and China, these writings illustrate how the middle powers respond to the 
American intention to sustain and enhance its dominance in the region by 
containing and engaging China simultaneously. Written with different 
perspectives, this body of works encompasses the intellectual diversity in which 
different issues are placed with emphasis, different problems are identified and 
different approaches for problem-solving are explored. 
 
Among others, realism is favoured by many for its contentions that appear most 
fitting to the situation in Northeast Asia. In their view, 1) a power transition is in 
progress by which American primacy is challenged by the ascending China, 2) 
states in Northeast Asia remain the primary actors that prioritise national security 
and the development of material (i.e. military and economic) power in order to 
survive in a region that lacks effective mechanisms to resolve interstate conflicts, 
and 3) states’ behaviours (either balancing or bandwagoning) are mainly 
determined by the structural forces at the system level (i.e. distribution of power) 
in Northeast Asia. 
 
Analyses with a constructivist approach to examine the interstate relations in 
Northeast Asia emerged in academia in the past two decades. With focuses that 
differed from those of rationalism, these studies assessed the behaviour of the 
Northeast Asian states by the non-material factors such as identity, psychology, 
and culture. Not confining themselves within the boundary of power politics, 
these scholars looked into the intersubjective ideas developed from interactions 
between/among states to explain how ideational forces influenced interstate 
relations just as powerful as material ones. Due to the fact that the Northeast 
Asian experience is not exactly the same as that of the West, constructivism is 
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able to offer refreshing and insightful opinions other than those provided by 
realism. 
 
As for liberalism, the liberal views explain some of the phenomena in the region. 
However, their arguments do not sound as convincing as those of the realists – for 
applying the foundational principles of liberalism, i.e. the Kantian tripod for peace, 
in the Northeast Asian interstate relations, look problematic. First, democratic 
peace is questioned in the example of the ROK–Japan relations, and after all, not 
all states in the region adopt the Western political system of liberal democracy. 
Second, economic interdependence does not look promising enough to effectively 
prevent interstate conflicts in Northeast Asia, as shown in the example of the 
Sino–Japanese relations. Third, international institutions in Northeast Asia are not 
producing the level of pacifying influence as prominent as those in other regions 
of the world (such as EU and ASEAN), as seen in the example of APEC. 
Notwithstanding these problems, the liberal forces have been contributing to the 
preserving of peace and facilitating of progress in the region, for which the 
significance of liberalism ought to be acknowledged. However, in view of the 
impact of material power on interstate relations and the ideational forces (i.e. 
Confucianism) that constructed the institutional framework in which Sadae 
embedded in pre-modern Northeast Asia, this thesis chose to review the literatures 
written with realist and constructivist perspectives. 
 
This chapter is composed with three sections. The first and the second sections of 
this chapter reviews the literatures written with the perspectives of realism and 
constructivism respectively on international relations in world politics and 
particularly those in Northeast Asia. The third section describes the necessity to 
employ a combined approach of constructivism and realism in the study of 
Northeast Asian IR. 
 
2.1 Realism 
 
To the realists, international relations are about power politics at the system level, 
where factors associated with the unit level are usually deemed irrelevant, and 
East Asia is of no exception. In spite of the cultural differences between East Asia 
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and Europe often claimed by some IR scholars of East Asian studies, when 
examining the responses of secondary states to China’s rise, Ross (2006, pp.357–8) 
concluded, based on the concept of balance-of-power, that the uniqueness of East 
Asian culture did not matter and realism was still the theory with universal 
applicability to explain interactions among the East Asian states. To summarise 
the positions of classical and structural realists, there are two main contentions of 
realism: first, states are the key actors in world politics and they struggle for 
survival within an anarchical international system, and second, it is the structural 
forces of international politics that exerts influence on states’ behaviour. 
 
Anarchy, State, and Survival 
Realists believe that states are the most important actors in international relations, 
especially the great powers (Waltz, 1979, p.73), and all of them struggle for 
power to survive and thrive in an international system characterised by anarchy. 
This commonly leads to two views: 1) pursuing national security becomes the top 
priority of states in the making of foreign policy; and 2) states have no choice but 
to be self-interested, making conflicts inevitable and cooperation difficult among 
states. In the absence of a world government to provide conditions for order, 
states will have to seek security on their own. Governments of all states will have 
to formulate policies to assure the safety of their people and to the realists, the 
measures include strengthening the military power to make it difficult for the state 
to be attacked by others (as advocated by defensive realists), and pursuing 
systemic dominance by maximising a state’s power so that other states will be 
deterred by its hegemonic primacy (as asserted by offensive realists). 
 
Northeast Asia appears to be a convenient example for the realists to prove their 
points of view. While a supranational governing body is in place in the integrated 
Europe, Northeast Asia still lacks an overarching regional authority. Throughout 
the post-World War Two years, each of the states in the region had been 
consolidating its power and emphasising the importance of national security in its 
foreign policy (Betts, 1993/94, p.36). Facing the growing economic and military 
power of China, Japan adjusts its defence policy and seeks to enhance its military 
power. Since the mid 2000s, the Japanese government has been discussing the 
permission of its JSDF (Japan Self-Defence Forces) to participate in collective 
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defence and even the possession of nuclear weapons – as Ross (2006, pp.388–9) 
commented, Japan, justified by the rise of China, set itself on the path to 
re-emerge as a normal military power since the end of World War Two. The same 
applies to North Korea as well – the Kim regime has persistently pursued the 
development of nuclear weapons, even when faced with prolonged poverty in the 
country, for the goal of increasing its military power to counter any aggressive 
moves by America and South Korea – the core theme of its Songun (military-first, 
Ӄै) policy. 
 
As for China, it has been rapidly and massively enhancing its military power 
supported by its economic gains in the past two decades. Although Beijing 
repeatedly claims that the purpose of such development is only for national 
defence, America and the neighbouring states of China suspect that the genuine 
and ultimate goal of China is to achieve regional dominance. When coupled with 
the realists’ zero-sum concept of relative gains, the aggrandisement of a state’s 
power unavoidably alerts other states as a threat to their security and therefore 
they find it imperative to build up their military – generating security dilemma 
(Herz, 1950, p.157; Jervis, 1978, pp.169–70). The resulting spiral of insecurity 
produced by security dilemma generally leads to conflicts among states. Therefore, 
in his analysis on the Asian interstate relations 20 years ago, Friedberg (1993/94, 
pp.15–27) asserted that the region was ready for states to compete for power 
among themselves. 
 
States’ Behaviour and Structural Forces 
Anarchy as the enduring feature of the international system makes the causes of 
war reside at the system level instead of that of human or state. To survive is the 
common goal of all states and there are no differentiations in their functions. In 
international relations, states first and foremost respond to changes occurred in the 
international system and therefore their behaviours are basically influenced by the 
structural forces of international politics (Waltz, 1959, p.160). 
 
This understanding hence leads to the concept of power distribution (exhibited as 
polarity), and the realists believe that it is the distribution of power that shapes the 
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behaviour of states. It is important to them because it implies the level of stability 
in world politics and explains the rationale behind a state’s decision to balance 
against or to bandwagon with a great power. They believe that a multipolar order, 
without a dominant power to regulate states’ behaviour, tends to be unstable as all 
states will become less disciplined in their use of force to pursue their interests. 
Therefore, a bipolar order, in which states tend to be prudent when choosing sides 
in a world with equal distribution of power between two hegemons, allows clarity 
in analysis and prediction and hence generates stability (Waltz, 1964, pp.882–7). 
 
As for a unipolar order, defensive realists believe that it tends to create conditions 
for an unchecked dominant power to indulge its unrestrained expansion of power 
and influence, by which the system will be changed to fit the national interests of 
its own (Jervis, 2006, pp.9–10). Therefore, unipolarity will breed resentment and 
resistance among other states towards the hegemon, leading to unstable situation 
in which balancing behaviours of other states against the hegemon will occur 
(Voeten, 2004, pp.730–3). However, offensive realists believe that an 
international order of unipolarity is more stable than that of bipolarity or 
multipolarity. Wohlforth (1999, pp.9–28) asserts that American power in all 
aspects is a hegemon of absolute preponderance, and because of this, no other 
states would miscalculate the probable costs and benefits and irrationally 
challenge America’s primacy – peace is therefore maintained. As in the case of 
East Asia, it is believed that the presence of the United States troops is a vital 
stabling force that has been maintaining peace in the region (Heisbourg, 
1999/2000, pp.15–16). 
 
However, China’s rise has caused wariness to its neighbours and the United States. 
Alliances forged in the past are being consolidated within the American 
‘hub-and-spokes’ system, and new coalitions are formed between the United 
States and countries like Vietnam to balance against China. In particular, Japan’s 
China policy typically embodies the concept of balance of power. Facing the 
potential threats posed by a more assertive China backed by its growing material 
power, Japan calls for serious attention of the American government to the 
US–Japan alliance, which is considered of paramount importance to Japan to 
prevent China from dominating the region (Funabashi, 2008, pp.113–4). Apart 
23 
 
from North Korea and Myanmar that are commonly deemed bandwagoners by 
many East Asian IR scholars, most of the other East Asian states, out of economic 
concerns, choose to adopt the strategy of accommodation towards China – a 
policy option that locates closer to bandwagoning on the spectrum with its two 
ends represented by the strategies of balancing against China and bandwagoning 
with China respectively (Ross, 2006, pp.379–87; Tow & Rigby, 2011, p.160; 
McDougall, 2012, p.17). 
 
Power Transition in Northeast Asia 
Power distribution in Northeast Asia has been changing in the past three decades. 
The traditional setting after 1945 until the end of the 1970s in the region is an 
alliance system with the United States as the dominant power leading the middle 
powers of Japan and South Korea against countries of the Soviet bloc in Northeast 
Asia. During the 1980s, Japan once demonstrated its capacity as a great economic 
power; but it was not able to sustain its strength thus started to decline from the 
mid 1990s. South Korea’s economy grows much stronger in comparison with that 
of North Korea, yet the state remains a middle power sheltered under American 
primacy. The one that has caught worldwide attention is China; its economy has 
been growing steadily and rapidly in the past 30 years with its opening up to the 
global market. In 2010, China replaced Japan as the second largest economy in 
the world after the United States in terms of nominal GDP. Supported by its rapid 
economic growth, China is able to massively increase its Comprehensive National 
Power in various areas, notably in its military power. Sustained at a speed of 
double-digit increment continuously throughout the past 20 years, China’s 
military spending reaches US$145 billion in 2015 (Reuters, 2015), arousing 
concerns of its neighbours and the United States. The topic of power transition 
hence comes to the spotlight, hotly debated among policymakers and academic 
researchers as whether the transition is in process or is to occur in future (and how 
soon). 
 
Although there are sceptical views about the occurrence of power transition in 
East Asia by questioning the ability of China (Goldstein, 1997/98, pp.42–54; 
Brooks & Wohlforth, 2002, pp.21–29; Beeson, 2009, pp.110–2) and the will of 
China (Johnston & Evans, 1999, pp.264–5; Van Ness, 2002, pp.141–2; Foot, 2006, 
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pp.83–90; Ikenberry, 2008, pp.28–33; Ikenberry, 2011, pp.63–65) to challenge 
America, the steady rise of China and its growing assertiveness keeps supporting 
the belief that at least a power transition in East Asia is inevitable. In line with the 
assertions made by Bernstein & Munro (1997, pp.18–19), a group of advocates of 
Power Transition Theory following the tradition of A.F.K. Organski believe that 
China is going to be a challenger to American primacy, and with the continuing 
economic growth and the consolidation of the central government’s power since 
the turn of the century, the advent of an ascending China to challenge American 
primacy seems unstoppable (Tammen et al., 2000, pp.155–6). 
 
Mearsheimer (2001, p.402; 2005, p.50) also concludes that with its increasing 
economic power China would become revisionist and strive for the dominance in 
East Asia. It is further concurred by Kim (2002, pp.668–9), who draws the 
conclusion that power transition in East Asia is inevitable because of the stronger 
China that is not satisfied with the status quo and advocating the solution of 
strategic alignment or de-alignment. This is proved by Chan (2013) with empirical 
evidence in a number of international issue areas that China is initiating new rules, 
although the impact of such changes on the America-led international order 
remains limited and incremental so far. This is why Hoge Jr. (2004, pp.6–7) calls 
for changes in American policy priorities in order to well prepare for a new 
regional power arrangement in East Asia as a result of China’s rapid rise. In spite 
of the close economic link between China and the United States and the bilateral 
cooperation in the issue of anti-terrorism, realists tend to believe that the 
Sino–USA relations are still zero-summed and the gains of China actually come at 
the expense of the America’s (Lanteigne, 2009, p.94). 
 
Such view is justified with the evidence that 1) the focus of American military 
forces is placed in the Middle East, and this overstretching of military power 
reduces the strength of US primacy in East Asia; 2) the war against terror drains 
the economic resources of America and exacerbates its recession, which 
weakened the economic ties between the USA and the East Asian nations; and 3) 
with its steadily growing economic power, China is actively involving itself in 
interstate affairs, particularly in the development-oriented East Asia, where the 
monopolistic influence of America is gradually waning. 
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In response to this process of power transition, the middle powers in the region 
have adjusted their foreign policies towards China and the United States. The 
geographical proximity between China and its Northeast Asian neighbours, the 
sheer size of China’s economy and its implications to the regional and global 
markets, and the growing power of the Chinese military forces that has elevated 
China to a great power only second to the United States in the region – all of these 
factors justify that it is reasonable, necessary and imperative for Japan, South 
Korea and North Korea to recalibrate their positions in the region from a setting of 
unipolarity to bipolarity. Yet adjustments have to be made with multi-dimensional 
instead of linear thinking, for the reason that Sino–USA relations are not at all 
short of complexities (Shambaugh, 2008, pp.301–3). 
 
South Korea turns out to be a typical example. Kim (2004, pp.103–6) highlights 
the changing foreign policies of South Korea during the first decade since the 
normalisation of the Sino–ROK relations. Except for the aspect of security that 
Seoul still relies on its military alliance with the United States, the economy of 
South Korea has been deeply intertwined with that of China, both governments 
share similar stance on the approach of resolving North Korean nuclear crisis, and 
the exchange at the non-government level (including tourists, students, and 
scholars, etc.) becomes extraordinarily active – in sum, in the midst of declining 
US primacy in East Asia, the geopolitical and geoeconomic role of China on the 
Korean Peninsula has changed and become pivotal. 
 
In the study of Sadae, if the concept were to be analysed completely from a realist 
perspective, the way of thinking of the Joseon political elites would appear rather 
straightforward: as a minor country located right next to the hegemon, Joseon 
should prioritise the task to ensure its survival by bandwagoning with Ming. 
When a bipolar order emerged with the rising Qing, Joseon should switch to serve 
Qing, especially when Ming’s decline became inevitable. After the completion of 
power transition from Ming to Qing, Joseon should not have any hesitation to 
serve Qing because Qing’s material power was second to no one in the region. 
However, in the historical evidence discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, none of these 
came out as simple as they should be – realism alone is therefore not sufficient to 
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explain Joseon’s Sadae. 
 
2.2 Constructivism 
 
Constructivism is developed in response to the limitations of the rationalist 
theories in analysing international politics after the end of the Cold War. 
Constructivists ground their theories in the belief that world politics is ‘socially 
constructed’ (Wendt, 1995, p.71). Refuting the neorealist view that political 
reality is purely made of and completely driven by material forces, constructivists 
assert that it is the ideas of actors that matter most, as how they perceive each 
other; the self-help international system is not exogenously determined by nature, 
and ‘anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992, p.395). 
 
Non-Material Factors 
By breaking the confinement of material concerns, constructivism opens up a new 
arena to study international relations. Ideational factors, ranging from social 
identity to religious culture, become new focuses to analyse states’ behaviour. For 
example, Lebow went as far as to examine human motives to study war and peace 
between/among states with a ‘first-image’ perspective. Supported by historical 
evidence from ancient Greece to the present world, Lebow (2008, pp.558–67) 
assessed the role of human motives in constructing state identity. He emphasised 
the human strive for esteem and looked into the psychological profile of the 
political elites in Western history, inducing that global order/disorder was 
determined by the combined human drives of appetite, spirit and reason, and the 
level of fear that resulted from the situation in which reason lost control over 
appetite and/or spirit (Lebow, 2008, pp.508–15). A further research by him 
(Lebow, 2010, p.268), supported by empirical data of wars from 1648 to present, 
elaborated his stress on standing and honour (Lebow, 2008, p.555) and 
reconfirmed his assertion that it was mostly the psychological pursuit of honour 
and standing that had caused military conflicts in Western history until the end of 
World War Two. 
 
The non-material perspective to study interstate relations has enriched the 
intellectual value of the discipline of IR – more explanations have been offered 
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from non-traditional angles to understand the making of foreign policy. How such 
approach was justified in the first place can be seen in the analogy of British and 
Soviet missiles created by Wendt (1992, p.397): the constructivists believed that 
physical assets per se did not signal meaning; it was the subjective understanding 
and philosophical belief of actors that presupposed the relations among actors and 
imposed meaning on those objective entities (Tannenwald, 2005, p.19). Therefore, 
to the constructivists, it is fundamentally important to see the material world as 
interpreted by intersubjective knowledge that is commonly shared among people, 
which distinguish constructivist sociality from neorealist materiality (Wendt, 1995, 
p.73). 
 
Intersubjective Ideas 
To the constructivists, shared ideas are imperative to the understanding of actors’ 
behaviour because they shape the formation of actors’ identities. Hence all kinds 
of ideas, such as ideologies, systems of shared belief, and normative beliefs, must 
be taken into analyses to explain international relations (Tannenwald, 2005, p.15). 
Intersubjective understanding exists not only among actors but also between 
structure and actors, as reflected in the arguments of Wendt (1992, pp.403–7) to 
counter the neorealist assertion of taking self-help as a constitutive feature of 
anarchy. This entails a two-fold implication (Copeland, 2000, p.190): on one hand, 
the structure plays the additional role of defining/redefining the identities and 
interests of the actors through interaction, contrasting the neorealist view of the 
dominant role of structure in distributing material power; on the other hand, the 
interacting practices among the actors also affect the shared ideas that determine 
the structure, suggesting the mutual influence and constitution of structures and 
agents as ‘the constructivist emphasis on how agency and interaction produce and 
reproduce structures of shared knowledge over time’ (Wendt, 1995, p.76). 
 
Unlike neorealist view that treats all states (the agent) functionally 
undifferentiated under anarchy (the structure), constructivists acknowledge the 
difficulties of making social change yet do not deny the possibility for change to 
occur: according to constructivism, identity is not given but is formed through 
interaction among states and therefore identities of states are not fixed and 
possibly subject to change. As long as the different identities of states and their 
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impacts on shaping states’ behaviours are recognised, change is not impossible 
(Hopf, 1998, pp.180–1). Studying identity, therefore, becomes a central theme of 
constructivism. 
 
Identity in the Study of IR 
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, the United States got confused in 
defining its national interest due to the vanishing of its identity as a defender of 
freedom in the absence of the old adversary: the Soviet Union (Wendt, 1992, 
pp.398–9). National identity, to constructivists, provides the very source for a 
state to shape its preferences, whereby informing the state’s actions (Hopf, 1998, 
p.175). Two approaches to study identity are typically found among the 
constructivists: one focuses at the system level and the other at the unit level. 
Wendt (1992, p.423) acknowledges the influence exerted by domestic factors but 
chooses to explore identity-formation with a ‘third-image’ perspective. He 
illustrates three causal mechanisms to examine how states’ identities are shaped in 
the process of socialisation among states (Wendt, 1994, pp.389–91): structural 
contexts that may intersubjectively either prevent or promote the formation of 
identities; systemic processes through which identity formation is facilitated by 
increasing interdependence and the transnational convergence of domestic values; 
and strategic practice that includes both behavioural and rhetorical interaction. 
 
Different from analyses of systemic constructivists, the works of other scholars 
such as Johnston (on China) and Hopf (on Russia) typically reveals the concerns 
of the unit-level constructivists. Among others, Peter J. Katzenstein is commonly 
deemed as a prominent figure of this stream. Instead of settling for the systemic 
view that portrays similar socialisation effects among states, Katzenstein 
emphasises the necessity to understand the distinctive domestic factors in local 
societies that have been constructing the national identity within cultural and 
historical contexts (Gourevitch et al., 2008, pp.893–4). He acknowledges the 
heterogeneity in norms across regions (Katzenstein, 1993, pp.76–77), and takes 
the efforts to explore and compare the historical background and cultural practice 
of different countries, as seen in his works on Germany and Japan (Katzenstein, 
1993; Katzenstein & Okawara, 1993; Katzenstein, 2003), that have influenced the 
formation of state identity – for he believes that ‘international actors and their 
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changing identities are important causal factors that help shape the interests of 
political actors which inform the policies they pursue and the international 
outcomes these policies generate’ (Katzenstein, 1997, p.31). Katzenstein’s quest 
for tracing the origin of identity formation extends to fields such as race that have 
received less attention: he attributes the cause for different US foreign policies in 
Europe (multilateralism) and Asia (bilateralism) to racial discrimination, (i.e. 
same and superior community with European states, but different and inferior 
community with Asian countries) of US government officials in charge of foreign 
affairs (Hemmer & Katzenstein, 2002, p.598). 
 
A Different Approach to Studying IR in Northeast Asia 
It is due to the knowledge of various fields the constructivists embrace in their 
research that makes constructivism look more like an approach instead of a theory 
(Hopf, 1998, p.196). It is an analytical tool; a tool to reveal problems that would 
be solved by other theories (Kratochwil, 1996, p.206). However, it is exactly 
because of the flexibility provided by constructivism that allows both scholars and 
practitioners to understand world politics with different and unconventional 
perspectives by employing knowledge of a diversified range of disciplines – and 
such spirit is evident in the intellectual stance of analytical eclecticism 
(Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001/02, p.154, pp.181–2, 184–5; Sil & Katzenstein, 
2010, p.412) to address the complexities in world politics nowadays. There have 
been pervasive writings in the past decades that have adopted the constructivist 
approach in analysing international politics in Northeast Asia. For instance, Peter 
Hays Gries employed the knowledge of psychology, history and culture to 
examine how the ‘face nationalism’ shapes the formation of China’s national 
identity and influences China’s state behaviours in its foreign relations, and 
Alastair Iain Johnston studied the cultural factors associated with China’s foreign 
relations in pre-modern history to illustrate the application of China’s cultural 
realism in its contemporary policy on national security. In the rest of this section, 
the selected works on Korean foreign relations written with a constructivist 
perspective by Roland Bleiker and David C. Kang are to be reviewed respectively. 
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Roland Bleiker on Identity 
Roland Bleiker looked into the security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula, not 
from the mainstream realist angle but with a constructivist perspective. He 
attempted to explain the hostile material reality in the Demilitarised Zone by 
focusing on the ideational dimension to look for the origin of the enmity. He 
attributed the enduring crises on the peninsula to the continuity of ‘either-or’ Cold 
War mentalities reflected on both sides – North Korea and the United States. The 
anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism mindset of North Korea is obvious, but those 
in Washington denouncing North Korea as ‘rogue state’ are also driven by the 
dualistic thinking of ‘either friend or foe’ (Bleiker, 2003, p.721). With the ‘Evil 
Empire’ fading away at the end of the Cold War, the United States has to redefine 
its identity. Labelling countries such as North Korea as ‘rogue states’ produces the 
effect of creating an evil ‘other’ and sustaining a good ‘self’ (Bleiker, 2005, 
pp.52–53). The structural pattern of the Cold War is a conflictual one that 
typically signals a zero-sum implication: the goal of A is to terminate the 
existence of B and vice versa. Consequently, the type of anarchy created by such 
intersubjective structure turns out to be, as Wendt (1994, p.389) described, a 
Hobbesian anarchy. 
 
In such anarchy, security dilemma exacerbates not because of weapons (the 
material aspect) but as a result of how one interprets the intentions of others 
(Wendt, 1999, p.265). The core of the security dilemmas, therefore, resides in the 
antagonistic identities that have been socially constructed by both sides 
throughout the decades-long tensions on the peninsula (Bleiker, 2005, p.10). On 
one hand, both Korean states demonise each other though state-controlled 
education, mass media and public discourses, even linking ideological 
identification with freedom and imprisonment to build entrenched negative 
identity towards the other (Bleiker, 2005, pp.10–15). On the other hand, the 
United States has been projecting the evil image and constructing antagonistic 
identity of North Korea, generating no less fear to the North than the North has 
been doing to the South and America, and the worse is that policy-makers in 
Washington have not been fully aware of such effects (Bleiker, 2003, pp.728–9). 
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As a result, this repeated, negative socialisation reinforces the concepts of self and 
perceptions towards other through the process of reciprocal typification, creating 
the social structure that in turn leaves enduring imprints on identity-formation 
(Wendt, 1992, pp.405–6). It has taken decades to mould such antagonistic 
identities and the common understanding about the hostile other has become 
deeply and persistently implanted in people’s minds, and the implication of this is 
that swift change is unlikely to occur (Bleiker, 2005, p.23). Nevertheless, 
‘changing the practices will change the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes 
the system’ (Wendt, 1992, p.407). To break such deadlock, as Bleiker (2005, 
pp.63–78) suggested, it is necessary for both sides to acknowledge and accept the 
differences at all levels between the two, thereby promoting a peaceful 
environment for positive engagement with non-state face-to-face contacts and 
dialogues. The key, highlighted by Bleiker (2005, pp.95–114), is the willingness 
of both sides to allow the co-existence of different worldviews for genuine 
reconciliation. 
 
David C. Kang on Pax Sinica 
David C. Kang is one of the prominent IR scholars on Northeast Asian affairs 
since the turn of the century. By examining the formation of identity in terms of 
status that defines the interstate relations between China, Korea and Japan within 
the Confucian Sinocentric order of hierarchy from 1300s to 1900s, Kang 
endeavoured to explain the pre-modern international relations in Northeast Asia 
and to illustrate their modern and post-modern implications. Kang (2001, p.123) 
started with the reality in Northeast Asia in the past 20 years and pointed to the 
absence of war in the region. In contrary to the neo-realist assertions, Kang (2003, 
pp.68–70; 2004, p.338) argued that China was a status quo power and few states 
in the region displayed balancing behaviour against China. With an alternative 
perspective to the Eurocentric view, he attributed the stability to the traditional 
regional order of hierarchy in East Asia (Kang, 2003, p.66). 
 
Such type of hierarchy, as Kang described, ‘accords all states within the system a 
place and a means of interacting with each other… allows for substantial 
autonomy and freedom among the lesser states’ (Kang, 2001, p.129). He argued 
that hierarchy in the Sinocentric order was different from that in the Westphalian 
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order: in the West, states were formally equal in sovereignty but informally 
unequal due to the unequal distribution of material power (Kang, 2004, pp.339–40; 
Kang, 2005, p.75). In Northeast Asia on the contrary, Kang (2003, p.67) 
contended that, until the intrusion of Western powers in the 19th century, the 
peaceful international order within the region was maintained within a 
hierarchical structure based upon Confucian Sinocentrism, in which relationship 
between China and any one of the other states was formally unequal (as China 
resided at the apex of the hierarchy) but relationship among other states were 
informally equal. Consequently, the regional order yielded six centuries of 
stability in the region with the occurrence of only one war (i.e. the Imjin War) 
while the history of Europe at the time was recorded with numerous military 
conflicts (Kang, 2001, p.123). 
 
Kang attempted to explain this phenomenon from a different angle in contrast 
with those of the neo-realists: culture. He deemed the peaceful Sinocentric order 
as a product of the Confucian culture (Kang, 2003, p.67) – pre-modern Northeast 
Asia was composed of Sinicised states (China, Korea, Japan and Ryukyu) that 
intersubjectively shared a Confucian worldview and accepted interstate 
relationship defined by hierarchy – together they formed and maintained an 
international society not merely based upon (material) power but also on culture 
(Kang, 2010a, p.593). The Sinocentric order was sustained within the operational 
framework of a tribute system, and Kang (2012, p.60) noticed that the core of the 
system was the norms that emphasised the Confucian understanding of 
relationship between a senior and a junior, as embodied in the hierarchical 
relationship between the dominant state (China) and the secondary states (Korea, 
Japan, and Ryukyu). 
 
On one hand, the secondary states acknowledged the central and supreme position 
of the Chinese emperor and showed respect to the authoritative status of China by 
dispatching tribute embassies to the Chinese court and to kowtow to the Chinese 
emperor (Kang, 2005, p.61). On the other hand, the dominant state conferred 
investiture to legitimise the rulers of the secondary states (Kang, 2001, pp.136–7) 
and took care of these vassal states by means of protecting them from external 
threats (national security), permitting tribute and other forms of trades (economic 
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prosperity) and facilitating cultural exchanges (imports of superior philosophies, 
advanced technologies, sophisticated social practices and institutions for public 
administrations) – benefits that were far greater than the costs of balancing against 
China (Kang, 2001, p.138; Kang, 2004, pp.346–7; Kang, 2005, p.62). 
 
Kang (2010c, pp.546–9) then turned to the pivotal role of status – he emphasised 
the social nature of status, and he believed that states treasured their status that 
were acknowledged by other states, which made the question of how the 
Northeast Asian states in the pre-modern time reached consensus on what 
constituted status become a crucial topic in his works. Eventually, it was the very 
essence of Confucian advocacies of senior/junior relationship from which Kang 
linked his explanation of stability in pre-modern Northeast Asia with the 
constructivist logic of ‘identity (defined by status) → interest (informed by 
identity) → behaviour (shaped by interest)’ reasoning. Based upon two of the 
fundamental virtues, filial piety and loyalty, advocated in Confucianism, the 
projection of the more knowledgeable senior versus the less experienced junior 
legitimised the authoritative status of the senior over the subordinative status of 
the junior, and this commonly shared hierarchical view of status also constituted 
the identities of the Northeast Asian states within the Sinocentric world (Gries, 
2005, p.13; Kang, 2010a, pp.596–9, pp.616–7). 
 
An important implication of this, as Kang (2010a, p.602; 2010b, pp.105–6) noted, 
was that within the Sinocentric order, the status of a state was determined not by 
its material (especially military) power; it was judged by the extent to which a 
state was Sinicised. This was why China viewed Korea (and Korea also believed 
itself) holding a higher rank of status than that of Japan, even though Japan was 
more militarily powerful than Korea (Kang, 2010a, p.605; Kang, 2010b, p.109). 
When such ranking of status was explicitly defined and commonly accepted, the 
identities of all states within the Sinocentric world were constructed and settled. 
To the dominant state, as long as its authoritative status is respected, it would have 
no need to pursue conquest towards its vassal states (Kang, 2005, p.57) or to 
interfere in their domestic affairs and foreign relations (Kang, 2007, p.214); to the 
secondary states, as long as they acknowledged China’s suzerainty and paid 
tribute to the Chinese emperor, they would enjoy high level of autonomy in their 
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state affairs (Kang, 2001, p.133; Kang, 2005, p.72) and ample benefits provided 
by China (Kang, 2001, p.131) and therefore they would have no desire to 
challenge and fight against China (Kang, 2003/04, p.176). 
 
The logic behind this phenomenon, as Kang explained, was that the problem of 
asymmetric information about state preferences was solved – because: 1) the 
intersubjective norms cultivated by shared Confucian culture facilitated 
communication among states (Kang, 2001, p.132); and 2) the clearly defined 
ranking of status made states’ intentions no longer unknown to one another. When 
a state’s preference was understood, its behaviour could be predicted. Repeated 
interactions and frequent communication facilitated by intersubjective culture 
therefore would ameliorate the security dilemma between states – this explained 
how war was avoided and peace was maintained in pre-modern Northeast Asia 
(Kang, 2004, pp.342–3). However, the basic premise of all the reasoning was that 
China remained militarily powerful, materially wealthy and cultural superior. A 
strong China enabled the establishment and sustained the continuity of the 
Sinocentric system; a weak China jeopardised the vitality of the Sinocentric order, 
leading to its collapse and eventually instability of the region (Kang, 2001, 
pp.131–2; Kang, 2003, p.83; Kang, 2003/04, pp.175–6; Kang, 2005, pp.71–74). 
 
Kang’s analysis also solved Johnston’s puzzle of the Chinese strategic culture. 
Johnston identified and explained the rationale of the two distinct cultures in 
China, the idealist culture of Confucian and the realist culture of parabellum. 
However, he did not explain why the parabellum strategy was applied to the 
nomads while the Confucian approach was adopted in the interstate relations with 
the East Asian nations (Kang, 2010b, p.92). To address this issue, Kang (2007, 
p.220; 2010b, p.112) captured the dichotomy of civilisation–barbarian in the 
Confucian worldview that defined the Sinocentric order, and linked culture with 
international relations: states were categorised into two segments according to 
their identities – Sinicised and not Sinicised. Those who shared the common 
culture of Confucianism were treated as ‘in-group’ members within the Sinic core, 
such as the Sinicised states of Korea and Ryukyu, and China peacefully 
incorporated these states into the tribute system (Kang, 2001, p.134); those who 
refused to be assimilated by Confucian civilisation were considered anomalies as 
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‘out-group’ savages, such as the nomads to the northern border of China, and 
China actively prepared for war with the nomadic tribes to defend its border, and 
sometimes even aggressively waged wars against them (Kang, 2010a, pp.617–9). 
 
Therefore, with a constructivist approach to study East Asian IR from the angles 
of history, culture, and identity, Kang predicted the future order of the region in a 
way rather different from the realists. He suggested the resurgence of Pax Sinica, 
by which East Asian states are going to accommodate China and will lead to 
peace and stability in the region (Kang, 2001, p.126, p.142, pp.158–9). Kang’s 
opinion was echoed by Mansourov (2006, p.57), who asserted that ‘Korea is 
likely to go the way China will go’. 
 
In the study of Sadae, if the concept were to be analysed with purely a 
constructivist approach, the Joseon political elites would emphasise more on the 
ideational factor, that is, the intersubjective idea of Confucianism that defined the 
identity of Joseon and its relations with the others within a world order that was 
institutionalised by Confucian Sinocentrism. The constructivist logic hence may 
lead to the reasoning of: to keep the national identity of Sojunghwa intact, Joseon 
would 1) unwaveringly serve Ming with utmost sincerity according to the 
Confucian principle of propriety during Ming’s unipolar order; 2) uphold the 
Confucian principle of righteousness and assist Ming in the rivalry between Ming 
and Qing; and 3) not learn from the Manchu, the inferior barbarians, and not serve 
Qing the way they used to serve Ming even after Qing became the hegemon. 
Nonetheless, there were plenty of Joseon political elites throughout the Joseon 
history who never ignored the existence of political reality thus the merits of 
pragmatism, and rationally steered Joseon along a path that was not exactly a 
Confucianised state should have experienced – the constructivist approach hence 
is able to explain some, but not all of Joseon’s relations with the great powers. 
 
2.3 The Constructivist-cum-Realist Approach to Studying Sadae 
 
Since the turn of the century, a good number of scholars and policymakers in 
China have been confidently talking about the return of the Sinocentric order in 
East Asia with remarks like ‘if the tribute system benefited everyone in the past, 
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this argument suggests, a 21st-century China-led East Asia will be in everyone’s 
interest as well’ (Gries, 2005, p.12). Such thinking, as Stuart-Fox (2004, pp.128–9) 
concluded, embodied ‘a preoccupation with status based on the hierarchy of 
power’ and ‘a conviction of the superiority of Chinese example’ that made many 
Chinese think China would become the leader in Northeast Asia again – as seen in 
the work of Yan Xuetong, who discussed the Chinese understanding of hegemony 
two millennia ago and made suggestion on how China could lead the world again 
in the 21st century (Yan, 2011, p.240, pp.244–6). This is why Chung (2012, p.228) 
called China ‘…a continental nation… with Sinocentric DNA’. 
 
To the Chinese scholars, Joseon’s choice of Sadae was made simply based on an 
ideational reason: the Koreans’ admiration for China’s superior culture that was 
nurtured by the philosophy of Confucianism. Mohwa (admiring China, ኀ๮) was 
hence considered the motive that drove the Joseon political elites to serve a 
country of cultural greatness (Cui, 2003, p.47; Sun, 2007, pp.33–50; Jin, 2011, 
pp.73–74; Liu, 2011, p.64). Based on the intersubjective culture of Confucianism, 
Joseon endeavoured to emulate anything Chinese on a voluntary basis and strived 
to achieve the status of Sojunghwa with regard to all the domestic practices (Sang, 
2003, p.52; Li & Hao, 2005, pp.91–93; Liu, 2006, pp.139–40; Gao, 2009, p.128; 
Wang, 2014, p.55; Zhang, 2014, p.69); in its relations with China, Joseon 
faithfully served its suzerain by strictly adhering to the Confucian principles of 
propriety (He, 1998, p.36; Chen, 2007, pp.430–3; Gu, 2008, p.54; Diao, 2009, 
p.84; Chen, 2015, p.6). In the eyes of the Chinese scholars, the Koreans were 
proud of their practice of Sadae because this was how Joseon became a civilised 
country only second to China (Miao, 2002, p.67; Wang, 2013, p.33). Moreover, 
the Chinese scholars tended to emphasise that Joseon was a beneficiary in its 
tributary relations with China: Joseon’s national security was guaranteed by China, 
Joseon’s economy was improved by trading with China, and Joseon’s culture and 
technology were fostered by importing and learning from China (Gao, 2005, 
pp.74–76; Jian, 2009, pp.139–40; Li, 2009, p.52). 
 
Nonetheless, the Korean scholars expressed very different opinions about Sadae. 
There were basically two views: 1) Sadae was a pragmatic strategy employed by 
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Joseon; and 2) those practiced Sadae strictly according to Confucian code of 
ethics should be condemned for being servile to a foreign power and creating 
vassalism that had disgraced Korea. Sadae hence was described by some scholars 
as a means that practically secured the autonomy of Joseon in its making of 
domestic and foreign policies (Park, 2013, p.287) and assured Joseon’s national 
security and the monarchs’ ruling legitimacy (Jung, 2006, pp.80–87). To other 
scholars, Sadae was despised as ‘flunkeyism’ (Choe, 1980, p.7), ‘toadyism’ 
(Hwang, 2004, p.107), ‘yield to the big ones’ (Lee, 1997, p.95), and ‘subservience 
to big power’ (Nahm, 1988, p.120) – in sum, Sadae has become a ‘highly 
stigmatized label in Korean politics’ (Lee, 2007, p.477). Moreover, the Korean 
scholars were prone to stressing that Joseon was in fact a victim with its vassalage 
status towards China: 
 
‘The past Korea–China relationship … was often regarded as that between a master 
and a servant … This tributary relationship with China was a shame to Korea … this 
humiliating relationship … Because of the requirement for tribute by China, Korea 
had to suffer economic losses … Confucianism and other Chinese thought hindered 
the development of Korea, especially the development of modern Korea.’ (Hwang, 
1973, pp.10–11) 
 
Chun (1997, pp.202–36) also falsified the notion that Joseon received significant 
economic gain via the tribute system by calculating in detail the economic loss 
Joseon had to suffer in its implementation of Sadae. He criticised the Chinese for 
using a deceptive means (i.e. asserting that Joseon benefited economically from 
serving China) to distort historical facts and to confuse the future generations. 
Sadae hence was severely condemned by the Korean scholars to the extent that, in 
the writings on anti-Americanism, those pro-America administrations in Seoul 
were also accused of being subservient to Washington the same as Joseon being a 
subordinate vassal to China (Han, 1980, pp.1082–3). 
 
Fundamentally, to the Korean scholars, Joseon was not an exemplar tribute state 
to China. Sadae was merely an option for Joseon to obtain practical benefits 
(security and trade) from China and it had nothing to do with respect and 
admiration (Cha, 2011, pp.53–55). Among others, discussions of Sadae in the 
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book on Korean history written by Kang Man Gil (1993, p.62) probably best 
represented the Korean view on this concept: first of all, Sadae was supposed to 
be a pragmatic strategy that was adopted for the purposes of 1) protecting Joseon 
from being invaded by foreign powers, and 2) learning advance culture by 
peaceful means. Based on such premises, therefore, Sadae should never become 
associated with the sense of loyalty and righteousness as advocated in 
Confucianism; it ought to be implemented strictly out of functional concern. By 
invoking the example of Injo (the Joseon king who fought Qing to profess 
Joseon’s loyalty towards Ming), Kang criticised those who pledged their 
allegiance to the Chinese emperor in their practice of Sadae as ‘muddle-headed’, 
for which their failure was inevitable. 
 
Alternatively, some Korean scholars simply chose not to mention Sadae at all in 
writing Korean history. When describing Joseon’s relations with Ming in his book 
A Review of Korean History (Vol.2 Joseon Era), Han Young Woo (2010, 
pp.44–45) talked about the duties of Joseon in the tribute system but the Joseon 
policy of Sadae towards Ming was omitted. The reason why the Ming court 
treated the Joseon missions preferably compared with those from other vassal 
states was simply because Ming recognised Joseon as the Eastern Land of 
Propriety – however, why Joseon gained such reputation was not explained. 
Similar situation can be also found in other books, such as The History of Korea 
written by Han Woo-keun in 1970. 
 
To comprehensively understand the Northeast Asian interstate relations in history, 
it is therefore proposed in this research that Sadae should be studied with a 
combined approach of constructivism and realism. It gives an equal weight to 
both the ideational and the material aspects thus factors of neither aspect will be 
over-emphasised or downplayed in the research: on one hand, the existence of an 
intersubjective understanding of Confucianism shared by the Chinese and the 
Koreans in history requires researches with a constructivist instead of a rationalist 
approach to assess the impact of ideational factors derived from the Confucian 
rule of propriety. The rationale behind the discussions in the writings of the 
constructivists is therefore relevant and supportive to the analysis of Sadae. For 
instance, amity between Ming and Joseon can be explained as the result of the 
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identities of ‘senior’ and ‘junior’ accorded to the two countries, while enmity 
between the Koreans and the Manchu was difficult to be resolved because the 
Koreans thought they enjoyed a more prestigious identity than that of the Manchu 
within the Sinocentric order – this matched the view of Bleiker that interstate 
relations are shaped by state identity. Another example can be found in the 
influence of Sadae on Korean nationalism: Sadae was refuted in the Korean 
society during the second half of the 19th century by those who strongly felt that 
their national pride had been hurt by practicing Sadae for centuries. Charged with 
modern nationalism, they turned ‘anti-Sadae’ into ‘anti-China’ and initiated 
de-Sinicisation in Korea – this is in line with the belief of Gries that nationalist 
sentiment derived from historical experience can become a crucial factor that 
determines the making of foreign policy at present time. 
 
On the other hand, the strategic location of Korea, the gap in material power 
between China and Korea, the competition between/among countries in order to 
dominate the region were all key factors that determined Joseon’s relations with 
the great power(s), and these material factors must be examined within a realist 
analytical framework so as to understand how a middle power managed to survive 
right next to the hegemon and in the midst of great powers’ rivalry. The major 
contentions of realism hence are useful to ensure the completeness of studying 
Sadae. For example, during the five centuries of the Joseon dynasty, distribution 
of power did not remain the same: the polarity in Northeast Asia experienced a 
unipolar order (Ming), a bipolar order (Ming vs. Qing), another unipolar order 
(Qing), and an emerging multipolar order (Qing, Japan, Russia, and other Western 
powers). Such changes in the structural forces were important factors to the 
Joseon policymakers, the rationalists in particular – and survival had always been 
the sole criterion for them to justify their primary concern on national security. 
Reality was still reality; it might have allowed room for ideational forces to 
generate impact on the making of foreign policy in Northeast Asia, but it certainly 
preserved the opportunity for material forces to manoeuvre in the arena of 
interstate relations. Therefore, a combined approach of constructivism and realism 
can ensure that factors of either ideational (Confucianism, that is unique in East 
Asia) or material (power politics, that is universal around the world) aspect will 
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not be neglected in the study of Sadae, whereby an ‘Asian universalism’, termed 
by Acharya (2008, p.75), in the study of IR will be developed. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter reviews the realist and the constructivist literatures that illustrate the 
major contentions of these two schools of thoughts in the study of IR in general 
and their applications in the analyses of Northeast Asian interstate relations in 
particular. The relevance of both to the study of Korean foreign relations is 
acknowledged, yet adopting either one of them alone will not be sufficient to 
explain the rationale behind the making of Korean foreign policy towards the 
great powers. 
 
This is the reason why researches on Sadae, the core of Korea–great power(s) 
relations in history, need a new perspective. By summarising the opinions of the 
contemporary Chinese and Korean scholars expressed in their writings on Sadae, 
the necessity of employing a combined approach of constructivism and realism is 
depicted. In the following chapter, the background, rationale and practice of 
Sadae will be analysed, whereby the concept of Sadae will be preliminarily 
defined. The definition will be further refined based on the discussions on the 
historical evidence to be illustrated in Chapter 4, Chapter 5, and Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Background, Rationale and Practice of Sadae 
 
The emergence of Sadae in Korean foreign policy can be traced back to the period 
of the Three Kingdoms (57 BC–668 AD) in Korean history, during which Tang 
China (618–907) was the great power that Silla chose to serve for the purpose of 
defeating the neighbouring Goguryeo and Baekje (Kim, 1964, p.112). The 
practice of Sadae was seen later in the foreign relations of Goryeo (918–1392) 
towards Song China (960–1279) (Toqto'a, 1977, p.14035) and Yuan China 
(1271–1368) (Song, 1976, p.71). However, it was in the interstate relations 
between Joseon (1392–1910) and Ming (1368–1644)/Qing (1644–1912) China 
that Sadae was officially announced as the core principle of Joseon’s foreign 
policies towards China and became institutionalised for diplomatic interactions 
between the two countries for five centuries. 
 
In view of the power disparity and the geographical proximity between 
Ming/Qing China and Joseon Korea, plus the existence of an aggressive Japan in 
the region at the time, it would be an incomplete study of Sadae to exclude the 
analysis of power politics. Material factors such as military capabilities and 
economic gains were forces that drove the rational thinking of the Joseon elites to 
keep serving China, which makes the realist view relevant and logical in 
explaining Joseon’s behaviour. However, there was also the influence of 
ideational factors that differentiated the construction and operation of the 
interstate relations in the pre-modern Northeast Asia from those of the other 
countries in the world. The prominence and prevalence of Confucian influence in 
East Asia since the late 14th century was a key factor that conceptualised the idea 
of Sadae and turned it into an ethical norm in foreign relations between China and 
other countries in the region. This is the part that requires a constructivist 
approach to examine the impacts of intersubjective culture on the making of 
foreign policies in the region. 
 
Sadae therefore is a concept composed of both ideational and material elements. 
The equal influence of both or stronger influence of one over the other depended 
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on specific social contexts (domestic and/or foreign situation) in which the Joseon 
political elites experienced. Solely highlighting the ideational aspect (and ignoring 
the material factors, i.e. Korea served China out of sheer admiration) to describe 
Sadae would exhibit Sinocentric biases, while over-emphasising the material 
aspect (and downplaying the ideational factors, i.e. Korea served China as a 
pragmatic strategy) to explain Sadae would reflect nationalistic irrationality. It is 
hence imperative to examine Sadae in historical contexts with a 
constructivist-cum-realist approach, so as to ensure a comprehensive and balanced 
understanding of the concept in the Joseon–great power(s) relations. 
 
This chapter consists of four sections. The first section is to illustrate the 
background of Sadae that includes the logic of Confucian Sinocentrism and the 
proliferation of Confucianism in Korea. The second section is to explain the 
rationale of Sadae that includes both the ideational (moral) aspect and the material 
(strategic) aspect of the concept. The third section is to depict Sadae in practice 
that includes the Confucianisation of the Joseon society and the operation of the 
tribute system. The final section offers a definition of Sadae that is supported by 
the three different motives to serve the great. 
 
3.1 Background of Sadae 
 
Sadae is a product of Confucian worldview. The reason why Korea took a junior 
role to treat China as a senior was because of the Sinocentric world order 
Confucianism constructed. It was acknowledged as a fact that Korea was 
geographically smaller, militarily weaker, and technologically less advanced in 
comparison with China; but what truly distinguished China from Korea at that 
time was its cultural achievement. China was placed at the heart of the Sinocentric 
order as a result of its cultural superiority (in terms of Confucianism). Other 
countries, based on how much they developed their cultures according to the 
Confucian criteria, were ranked as ‘less civilised’ or ‘barbaric’ countries in the 
system. This order defined the identity of China as a senior to all other countries 
in the Sinocentric world, and Korea became one of the juniors that were required 
to respect and serve China according to Confucian propriety. With Korean 
Confucian scholars passionately promoting Confucianism since the 10th century, 
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the idea of a Sinocentric order became pervasively accepted in the Korean society 
in the late 14th century. At the time when Goryeo was replaced by Joseon, 
Confucianism was formally established as the national ideology in Korea and 
became the guiding principle that directed literally every aspect of government 
policy, including foreign relations. 
 
3.1.1 Confucian Sinocentrism 
 
The Sinocentric World Order 
The phrase Sadae consists of two parts: ‘sa’ and ‘dae’, with ‘sa’ meaning ‘to 
serve’ and ‘dae’ meaning ‘the great’. It conveys a prescriptive message about how 
a ‘junior’ should think and behave towards a ‘senior’. Using the term Sadae hence 
implies an unequal relationship between a dyad of two countries. The reason why 
Joseon accepted the role of ‘junior’ in its relations with China actually went 
beyond the realist thinking in terms of geographical size, military capability and 
economic power. It was related to the rules of the Sinocentric world order that 
ranked cultural achievement in Confucianism on top of everything else. 
 
One of the themes that constitute the core of Confucianism is propriety. 
Confucian philosopher Xunzi (312–230 BC) believed that ‘without the rule of 
propriety, men cannot exist, nothing can be achieved, and countries will be 
chaotic’. Propriety advocates that a man needs to cultivate himself with the sense 
of knowing what is proper and improper, and a country with its people that 
behave according to propriety is a country of civilised culture. To Confucius, the 
Zhou Dynasty (1046–771 BC) was politically stable and economically prosperous 
because the people of Zhou strictly adhered to the codes of propriety and their 
conducts were highly civilised. By comparison, people of the ethnic groups living 
outside the territories of Zhou were considered less civilised because they knew 
little about propriety. These ethnic groups referred to nomads and tribes living to 
the north, west, south of China, and people inhabiting on the Korean Peninsula 
and the islands of Japan. 
 
The distinction between ‘Hua’ (China, which represented civilisation) and ‘Yi’ 
(barbarian) therefore was measured by whether a country possessed the qualities 
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of Confucian culture, with propriety being the most important yardstick. 
According to the civilisation–barbarian categorisation, China was placed at the 
centre with its superior Confucian culture. Other countries formed by the ethnic 
groups, in spite of their military power or material wealth, were positioned below 
China by the level of their attainments of Confucian culture. This conception 
became the ideational base to establish the Sinocentric world order in East Asia 
for centuries to come. 
 
Benign Hierarchy 
With the implication of a superior China and the inferior barbarians in terms of 
culture, the Sinocentric order was typically characterised by the feature of 
hierarchy. In such world order, China was defined as a ‘senior’ and other 
countries were considered as ‘juniors’ as a result of China’s advanced culture. 
Being the home of Confucianism and the country that was most sophisticatedly 
developed in terms of Confucian civilisation, China’s superior status in the 
Sinocentric world order was existential, inevitable, and insurmountable. However, 
different from the modern concept of Westphalian equality that is deemed as a 
positive rule for the co-existence of states, hierarchy was nothing negative in the 
theories of Confucianism. To the contrary, hierarchy was viewed as a guarantee of 
social order. 
 
In Confucian propriety, it was stressed that one ought to be aware of his role and 
rank so as to think and behave properly. Confucius believed in the importance to 
‘let the prince be a prince, the minister a minister, the father a father and the son a 
son’, otherwise the society would be as chaotic as ‘one may have a dish of millet 
in front of one and yet not know if one will live to eat it’. As exemplified in the 
relations of prince–minister and father–son, they were not equal: the prince was 
the senior to the minister, and the father was the senior to the son. Although 
unequal, such hierarchical relation did not necessarily imply the senior oppressing 
or exploiting the junior. According to the Confucian codes of ethics, while the 
junior was required to respect and serve the senior, it was the senior’s 
responsibility to look after the junior. 
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In the Sinocentric world order, the relationship between the emperor of China and 
the king of the vassal state was defined as that between a prince and his minister. 
Officially between the two countries, the suzerain–vassal relationship was 
typically hierarchical. Yet morally, the relationship was supposed to be a cordial 
one. As Mencius advocated, ‘when a prince regards his ministers as his hands and 
feet, his ministers look upon him as their heart and belly’. Hence, the hierarchical 
Sinocentric world order was humanely projected as a benign framework to appeal 
to, rather than a coercive system imposed upon, the other barbaric countries 
around China. 
 
Transformability: from Barbarian to Civilisation 
A hierarchical order creates the issue of ranking. Confucian cultural achievement 
determined a country’s status yet the status could be changed – and this is another 
important feature of the Sinocentric world order: barbarians could become less 
barbaric and more civilised. The key to such transformation was Sinicisation. 
Mencius believed that Chinese culture could assimilate the barbarians, 
transforming them into civilised countries and upgrading their status in the 
ranking within the Sinocentric world order. In other words, the barbarians could 
be Sinicised if they were educated by Confucianism – which implied that the 
status of a barbaric country was not fixed. 
 
This was an important message to those barbarians who desired to elevate their 
national identities to a more civilised level in the system, with Joseon being the 
most active country. Getting closer to the status of China gave those teachable (i.e. 
transformable) barbarians a sense of national pride and a hope of making their 
countries better (to be more civilised, then likely becoming more prosperous) – in 
sum, by Sinicising themselves, they could become as great as China. Such belief 
provided them with an incentive to study the Confucian culture and emulate 
Chinese practices. On interstate relations, such thinking implied that for less 
civilised countries to rise in the Sinocentric system, they would strive to increase 
their cultural instead of military power. While cultural power was supposed to be 
developed through intellectual learning rather than by crude force, the Sinocentric 
world order would be a peaceful one in which all states (except China, the one at 
the apex) competed for more prestigious status in a non-violent fashion. 
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Such idea appealed to both China and most of the vassal states, as military actions 
were costly and success was never guaranteed. To China, there had been lessons 
to learn from: the military campaign initiated by Emperor Taizong of the Tang 
Dynasty against Goguryeo in 645 failed, so did Kublai Khan’s two invasions of 
Japan in 1274 and 1281 (Holcombe, 2011, p.111, p.139) – and these were typical 
examples to prove the ineffectiveness of military conquering when dealing with 
countries located outside the Middle Kingdom. To the vassal states, it would be 
unwise and irrational for countries like Ryukyu or Annam to provoke China as 
well – except Japan and Manchu. Japan under Toyotomi Hideyoshi and Manchu 
under Nurhaci grew powerful and became dissatisfied with the Sinocentric order. 
In the words of the contemporary Power Transition Theory, they became 
revisionist powers, broke the conventional practice (i.e. peaceful contest for 
status), and challenged the system with military forces. However, other than these 
two exceptional examples, the regional peace in Northeast Asia was maintained 
for centuries within an interstate order that was sustained by not only military 
power but also cultural influence. 
 
Pax Sinica: Rule by Propriety 
Confucianism advocates humaneness, and the way to train oneself to become 
humane is to observe the principle of propriety. Confucius reminded people ‘not 
to look at, listen to, speak of, or act upon things that were not in conformity to the 
codes of propriety’. Applied in politics, propriety became the guiding principle for 
the princes: ‘a prince should employ his minister according to the rules of 
propriety; ministers should serve their prince with faithfulness’. Since the 
relationship between the suzerain and the vassals in the Sinocentric order was that 
between a prince and his ministers, the Chinese emperor ought to rule the 
barbarians by propriety, not force. As long as the ‘Son of Heaven’ could exercise 
virtuous rule over the vassals by propriety, their aggressiveness would be avoided 
and therefore order would be maintained. 
 
Confucius believed that ‘if a prince governs his people by virtue and keeps order 
by propriety, people will have the sense of shame and will become morally good’. 
If the Chinese emperor was a sage monarch who treated the barbarians humanely, 
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his authority would be more easily accepted by the barbarians. Moreover, the 
barbarians would be encouraged to study Confucianism and to voluntarily emulate 
the Chinese practices so that admiration, instead of ambition, would provide them 
with the drive to ‘move up the ladder’ in the Sinocentric order, thereby making 
them obeying, instead of challenging, China. This was the reason why the 
pacifying approach of cultural assimilation was preferably adopted (although the 
military power was unquestionably needed as one of the essential guarantees to 
uphold China’s supremacy). Pax Sinica therefore was sustained by two pillars: for 
China, it had to demonstrate its will and ability to rule the vassals by propriety; for 
the vassals, they must willingly accept the Chinese rule and the status accorded to 
them within the system, and to respect and serve China faithfully. 
 
3.1.2 Proliferation of Confucianism in Korea 
 
Introduction of Neo-Confucianism in Korea 
Confucianism was introduced to Korea during the 4th century BC (Yu, 1989, p.13), 
yet throughout the following centuries Korea was also influenced by Buddhism 
and Taoism. During the later years of the Goryeo dynasty, Buddhism overtook 
Confucianism and became the most prominent philosophy in the Korean society. 
A group of Korean Confucian scholars at that time wished to revive Confucianism 
as they noticed the social problems resulted from the inflation of Buddhism. They 
turned to Chinese philosophy for solutions – and the school of thoughts called 
Neo-Confucianism developed by the Southern Song Chinese philosopher Zhuxi 
(1130–1200) caught their attention. 
 
Among the various doctrines advocated by Neo-Confucianism, this was 
particularly favoured by the Korean Confucian scholars: it criticised Buddhism 
for promoting abstract ideas that had encouraged retreat from reality on one hand, 
and celibacy that had broken the bonds between individual, family, and country 
on the other. To people who believed in Neo-Confucianism, nothing was more 
important than self-cultivation (by the moral principles of humaneness, 
righteousness, propriety, knowledge, and integrity) in order to take care of their 
family and serve their country. In contrast to Buddhism that tended to make a man 
idle as a passive, self-centred thinker, Neo-Confucianism encouraged a man to 
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become an active, loyal (to king and father in particular) thinker–actor. To those 
Korean Confucian scholars who had been witnessing the corrupted and decadent 
Goryeo society inflated by Buddhist belief since the late 13th century, 
Neo-Confucianism convincingly appeared to be an effective solution (Lee, 1984, 
p.166). 
  
During the century since 1289, Neo-Confucianism was introduced to the Korean 
Peninsula and widely promoted in Goryeo with the tireless efforts of An Hyang 
(1243–1306), Baik Yi-jeong (1260–1340), Yi Je-hyun (1287–1367), and Yi Saek 
(1328–1396), all of whom were renowned Confucian scholar-officials in Korea 
(Jeong, 1996, v.161, pp.628–30, p.637, pp.713–24; Jeong, 1996, v.162, pp.55–69). 
When Yi Saek served as the head of Sungkyunkwan (the highest educational 
institution, ԋ֡ᓔ), the number of students admitted to study Neo-Confucianism 
was significantly increased and as a result, a lot more formally-trained 
Neo-Confucian scholars were produced (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, 
p.275). Among others, two of the most important Neo-Confucian scholar-officials 
then ascended to the spotlight of the following dynastic change in Korea: Jeong 
Mongju (1337–1392) and Jeong Do-jeon (1342–1398). 
 
Jeong Mongju was highly regarded as a master of Neo-Confucianism in Goryeo 
for his in-depth understanding of the philosophy (Jeong, 1996, v.162, pp.96–106). 
He was one of the professors teaching Neo-Confucianism in Sungkyunkwan and 
known for his dedication in promoting the philosophy nationwide. He was critical 
of what Buddhism had done to his country, but on the issue whether the Goryeo 
Dynasty should be replaced by a new one he chose to follow the Confucian code 
of ethics on loyalty and refused to collaborate with the followers of Yi Seong-gye 
(i.e. Taejo) on their plot to overthrow the Goryeo court (Kim, 2005, pp.71–72). 
His loyalty to the Goryeo monarch eventually led to his death: he was 
assassinated by the reformists only three months before the founding of the new 
Joseon Dynasty (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.70). Jeong was 
later considered a martyr who loyally devoted himself to the Confucian principle 
of righteousness on the relationship between a prince and his minister (Kim, 2005, 
p.78). His idea on loyalty thus became the base on which the ideational aspect of 
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Sadae was later developed, being referred to the guiding principle for the 
loyalists. 
 
Jeong Do-jeon was also a student of Yi Saek, and a Neo-Confucian scholar 
severely criticising Buddhism as well. However, his fate was much different from 
that of Jeong Mongju: he was the leading scholar-official who aided Yi Seong-gye 
to overthrow the Goryeo dynasty, and became the most powerful minister during 
the reign of Taejo. 
 
Confucianism as National Ideology!
As professed in his works, Jeong Do-jeon was famous for his firm stance and 
comprehensive approach in refuting Buddhism (Jeong, 1996, v.162, pp.138–52). 
Jeong strongly believed that it was both morally and practically right to replace 
Buddhism with Neo-Confucianism as Korea’s national ideology. His thoughts 
were highly appreciated by Yi Seong-gye, who was still a general of the Goryeo 
court at the time. Yet what truly impressed Yi was Jeong’s advocacy of radically 
reforming Goryeo by toppling the Goryeo royalty while at the same time, he 
believed that such an act of treason could still be justified by Confucian doctrines: 
it was the incompetent and evil prince that had desecrated the ‘Mandate of 
Heaven’ so that the truly loyal ministers ought to replace the wicked king with a 
virtuous ruler. To Yi Seong-gye, Jeong’s ideas would effectively legitimise his 
forthcoming coup against the Goryeo king. 
 
As the top political adviser of Yi Seong-gye, Jeong teamed up with other 
reformists, including Jo Jun (1346–1405) and Gwon Geun (1352–1409), 
supported Yi Seong-gye in completing the dynasty change in 1392 (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.72–73). As prime minister, Jeong started to 
build a Confucian state by establishing the political system and making policies 
according to the Confucian principles (Kim, 2005, pp.72–73). Since then, 
Confucianism officially became the national ideology of Joseon for the next five 
centuries. The philosophy indoctrinated the Koreans’ thinking and its ideas 
permeated to all walks of life in Joseon. Confucianism was revered as the 
essential source of social norm and the ethical base on which people’s behaviour 
was measured. Until the days of the two Neo-Confucian sages of Yi Hwang 
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(1501–1570) and Yi I (1536–1584), Confucianism was further refined and 
eventually internalised in the Joseon society (Lee, 1984, pp.217–8). 
 
3.2 Rationale of Sadae 
 
The two types of political orientation illustrated in the cases of Jeong Mongju and 
Jeong Do-jeon in the above section hence explain the dualistic nature of Sadae: 
the ideational and the material aspects. With the existence of a Sinocentric order 
in Northeast Asia and the prevalence of Confucianism in Joseon, Sadae emerged 
as a viable option of foreign policy for the Joseon political elites. The motive to 
adopt the policy however differed according to the policymakers who had 
different understanding and interpretation of Sadae. On one hand, the loyalists, 
who were motivated by their genuine admiration of China’s superior culture and 
their unwavering belief in Confucianism, insisted on the moral dimension of 
Sadae and served the great faithfully. On the other, the rationalists, who were 
driven by pragmatic calculations to gain material benefits, stressed the practical 
side of Sadae and used the great strategically. Hence, there were two different sets 
of rationale behind the concept of Sadae, and this is the reason why a 
constructivist-cum-realist approach is needed for the study of Sadae in the 
Korea–great power(s) relations. 
 
3.2.1 Ideational Aspect of Sadae 
 
Interstate Socialisation 
The interaction of cultural exchange between China and Korea in the pre-modern 
era was the sort of socialisation that produced the intersubjective idea of 
Confucianism for people of both countries. Although Confucianism was a foreign 
philosophy to Korea, it was popularised in the Korean society because the 
Koreans were greatly appealed to the normative themes of Confucianism and they 
absorbed its doctrines and regarded them as the moral principles for 
self-cultivation. Confucianism hence was not forcefully imposed on the Koreans; 
it was voluntarily accepted. It not only established the norms of the Joseon society 
but also shaped the value of the Koreans, especially the intellectuals. 
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The intellectuals, many of whom would become scholar-officials in the 
government, were deeply drawn to Confucianism because they viewed it as a 
political ideology that could train them to become gentlemen of moral exemplar 
and realise their ambition to serve their country. In their view, it was 
Confucianism that turned China into the most civilised and powerful country in 
the world they knew of. They chose to accept the philosophy because this was 
also what they wanted for Korea – civilisation, power and prosperity. Therefore, 
they accepted, studied, perfected, honoured, applied, and upheld Confucianism – 
and becoming even more dedicated than the Chinese (Kang, 2010b, p.37). 
 
Consequently, the Koreans saw the world through the lens of Confucianism, and 
the Sinocentric order became the model by which the Koreans understood the 
world. They accepted the gradation of status in the system and the hierarchical 
relationship between China and Korea, because Confucianism stated that a senior 
and a junior were bound together by mutual obligations and reciprocal duties. As 
they acknowledged the line drawn between a civilised and a barbaric country (i.e. 
achievement in Confucian culture), the Koreans came to accept their national 
identity: Dongyi (Barbarians in the East, ܿӮ). 
 
National Identity 
To the Koreans, accepting Confucianism meant accepting the Confucian 
explanation of how the world order should be organised, and accepting the 
Sinocentric order meant accepting the national identity assigned to Korea in the 
system. This was the logic that made even the pejorative term of Dongyi sound 
acceptable to the Koreans (Song, 2011). However, Korea was not the only one 
inferior to China: there were a number of other ‘barbarians’ in the system whose 
identity were ranked even lower than that of Korea – Japan, the Jurchens, the 
Mongols, Ryukyu, Annam, etc. – they came after Korea because the Confucian 
culture of Korea was more advanced than that of those countries. 
 
Hence, within this hierarchical structure, it implied that as long as Korea was able 
to maintain its attainments in Confucian culture at a level higher than those of the 
other barbarians, Korea would become the centre of another (though smaller) 
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civilisation–barbarian order, only the mighty China would not be included in this 
Korea-centred sphere, which was the only difference from the greater Sinocentric 
order. From the Koreans’ perspective, Korea could take up the role of a senior and 
the other barbarians within the smaller Korea-centric order would become juniors 
to Korea: Korea as the suzerain would receive tributes from its vassals and their 
kings would kowtow to the Korean monarch, and the Korean court would look 
after the benefits of its vassals – a pattern that would be no different from the one 
seen in the Sinocentric order (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.163). 
 
Therefore, Korea was granted the double identities in the Confucian world system: 
a junior to China, but a senior to all others. Yet the later role was contingent on 
the condition that Korea had to be the most Confucianised state only second to 
China. According to Mencius’ view, a barbaric country could be transformed into 
a civilised one as long as it was willing to be transformed. The identity of a 
teachable barbarian could be changed by the process of Confucianisation. Dongyi 
as it may be referred to, Korea had the potential and will to be transformed into a 
civilised country: Korea was next to China, Confucianism was imported from 
China to Korea long ago since the period of the Three Kingdoms, and above all, 
Confucianism had been popularly accepted in Joseon as the code of ethics 
(particularly, the literati adopted it as their personal philosophy). In other words, 
the national identity of Joseon could be changed from a barbaric to a civilised 
nation – and with dedicated efforts, Joseon could even become Sojunghwa. 
 
National Interest 
Accepting the national identity of Joseon in the Sinocentric order, the Confucian 
scholar-officials emphasised on enhancing ideational instead of material power. In 
their understanding of Confucianism, the national interest of Joseon was, as 
informed by its national identity, to become and remain as the one second only to 
China in the Sinocentric order. Based on the civilisation–barbarian dichotomy, 
Joseon must strive to be as close as possible to China in terms of cultural 
attainments in Confucianism. This was the only way to secure Joseon’s national 
identity as the only junior to China and at the same time, as a senior to all other 
barbarians within the Sinocentric order. 
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Such national interest of Joseon was not idealistic; it was ideational. Idealistic 
national interest is utopian because it runs against the political reality. To become 
and remain as Sojunghwa was not idealistic because it was highly attainable to the 
Koreans (especially with the strong will and remarkable capability of the 
intellectuals). It was simply ideational because it was defined within an ideational 
context: the Sinocentric world order that was ideational. This was an international 
order constructed on an ideational logic (i.e. the Confucian civilisation–barbarian 
dichotomy) and governed by an ideational principle (i.e. Confucian propriety). It 
was a country’s cultural attainments in Confucianism, instead of its military 
and/or economic power, that determined its status and identity. The non-violent 
nature of the Confucian Sinocentric order premised the ideational interaction 
among states, the ideational classification of state identity, and the ideational 
formation of national interest. In Joseon, such ideational national interest 
profoundly influenced the state behaviour in its foreign relations. 
 
State Behaviour 
Since becoming and remaining as Sojunghwa was defined as its national interest, 
correspondingly, Joseon’s state behaviour was to practice Sadae by way of 
Sinicising Joseon thoroughly and serving China faithfully (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong 
Sillok, 1956, p.225). To fully Sinicise the country, the Joseon court adopted 
policies that facilitated the learning of anything Chinese in the Joseon society. 
Encouraged by the government and driven by the motive of Mohwa, lots of 
Joseon intellectuals travelled to China to study Confucian culture and Chinese 
experience so as to broaden their horizons. Many Joseon kings also actively 
promoted Chinese culture by way of importing books from China: they ordered to 
ask for (books to be conferred by the Chinese court) and to purchase (books from 
local booksellers) massive amount of Confucian classics so as to print and 
distribute the books in Joseon nationwide (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, 
p.341, p.369; RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.636–7; RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong 
Sillok, 1956, p.372; RDAK, vol. 12, Munjong/Danjong Sillok, 1957, p.200; RDAK, 
vol. 15, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.618). At the same time, the Joseon government 
endeavoured to emulate the practices of Chinese governance. The Joseon political 
elites (the monarch and the scholar-officials alike) implemented their plans of 
reform through restructuring the original bureaucratic departments and 
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establishment of some new administrative institutions – all by copying the 
practice of China (RDAK, vol. 23, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.648). They were 
simply convinced that Joseon would become and remain as Sojunghwa as long as 
they emulated the successful practice of China. 
 
In its foreign policy towards China, the Joseon court considered it of paramount 
importance to strictly adhere to the Confucian ethics when practicing Sadae 
(RDAK, vol. 28, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.565). Different from other vassal states, in 
the case of Joseon, it was more than admiring and emulating China: as the 
Koreans fully accepted the doctrines of Confucianism, they believed that it was 
morally right to serve the China subserviently – particularly to the loyalists, 
Joseon must faithfully observe the Confucian code of ethics in its relations with 
China as a son to his father (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.3). Only by 
serving China devotedly in the most exemplary (Confucian) fashion could Joseon 
become and remain as Sojunghwa and a moral senior to all other barbarians 
(RDAK, vol. 42, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.395). Hence, serving China was not a 
slavish act; it was an ethical act that demonstrated to other member states within 
the Sinocentric system that Joseon had been transformed from a barbaric to a 
civilised country, and all the kowtowing-sort of behaviours could be duly justified 
by the Confucian principle of propriety. In sum, Sadae was the ultimate state 
behaviour informed by the national interest and identity of Joseon, as a result of 
the intersubjective idea of Confucianism through cultural socialisation between 
Joseon and China. 
 
3.2.2 Material Aspect of Sadae 
 
Power disparity between China and Joseon 
The material aspect of Sadae derived from the Joseon elites’ concerns of the 
political reality. Above all, the presence of a mighty China was an unarguable fact 
to Joseon. Except for a few periods in history that the central power of the 
dynastic rule weakened and China became fragmented, China basically remained 
as the most powerful country in East Asia until the 19th century. In terms of 
geographical size, number of population, reserve of natural resources, and 
national productivity, no country in the region was able to match with China. 
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During the early years of the Ming Dynasty, the military power of China, 
supported by its prosperous economy and advanced technology, surpassed that of 
any country in East Asia. 
 
In the case of Joseon, the country shared the border on land with China, and the 
maritime distance between Joseon and China posed little challenge to the Ming’s 
fleets considering the Chinese technology of building seagoing vessels and marine 
navigation. Ming’s military capability was clear to Joseon: the defeat of the 
Mongols and Zhenghe’s expeditionary voyages unquestionably proved that the 
preeminent power of Ming’s army and navy was unsurmountable. As for the 
Joseon military forces, it had been weak in the later years of the Goryeo rule. 
They had not seen many actions in years even at the dynastic change: it was a 
bloodless coup instead of a civil war. Besides, though Taejo was a military 
general, he left much of the ruling power to the scholar-officials after establishing 
the new dynasty – all of these meant that the combat capability of the Joseon 
forces was rather low and not ready for battles against Ming of any scale. 
 
There had been a number of wars between China and Korea before, but victories 
went to the Koreans only in a handful of them. The Joseon political elites 
perfectly understood that Joseon was not Goguryeo; for them to repeat the 
military triumph of Goguryeo over Sui and Tang China would be an illusion if 
Joseon clashed with Ming. Had wars broken out between the two, Joseon would 
be hopelessly defeated – and this would be a catastrophe to the newly founded 
dynasty. Therefore, for Joseon, a minor state located right next to the superpower, 
peace with the hegemon was the top priority on the agenda of national security – 
and the policy of Sadae would effectively please the Ming court and assure the 
Chinese emperor of Joseon’s loyalty and obedience to the hegemon (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.44). Especially to the rationalists, Sadae was a 
means for a minor state to achieve the end of peace with the superpower. 
 
Distribution of Power in Northeast Asia 
The supremacy of Ming lasted until the Tumu Crisis in 1449, in which the Ming 
troops were defeated by the Mongolian tribe of Oirats (and the Zhengtong 
Emperor of Ming was captured). Ming started its gradual decline ever since. 
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During the century from 1521 to 1620, Ming had to frequently deal with the 
frontier conflicts with the Mongolian cavalry to the north and the seaside combats 
with the Japanese pirates to the east and southeast (RDAK, vol. 26, Myeongjong 
Sillok, 1960, p.587). Although the power of Ming was on the wane, the Ming 
troops were still capable of rescuing Joseon in the Imjin War (1592–8) and 
eventually defeated Japan, the first barbarian to challenge the Sinocentric order – 
yet the victory was costly to Ming. 
 
In addition to Japan, Manchu also ascended to the status of great power in the two 
decades between the 1590s to the 1610s, during which Nurhaci defeated all the 
rival ethnic groups and unified the Jurchen tribes. In 1616, Nurhaci established the 
dynasty of Later Jin (which was renamed to ‘Qing’ by his son Hong Taiji in 1636) 
and crowned himself as king in Mukden. He then developed the administrative 
system of ‘Eight Banners’, based upon which the Manchurian military forces were 
formally organised and drilled. Later Jin soon became a militarily strong country 
driven by expansionist ambitions. In 1618, Nurhaci officially declared his 
intention to challenge Ming’s dominant status in the Sinocentric system and 
started to launch military attacks against the Ming troops in the following years, 
paving the way for his descendants to end the rule of Ming in 1644 (Holcombe, 
2011, pp.167–70). 
 
Joseon in the Process of Power Transition: ‘Shrimp between Whales’ 
A century after the founding of the Ming Dynasty, the certainty of China’s central 
position within the Sinocentric order became questionable. China’s supreme status 
appeared to be shaky; yet it was not because of its cultural attainments in 
Confucianism got surpassed by any of the barbarians in the system – some 
revisionist members just became militarily stronger and dissatisfied with the status 
quo. They did not wish to abolish the system; they just aimed to take the central 
place of Ming so that they would become the hegemon. Ming, though in decline, 
struggled to stay at the top and it took almost 200 years for Ming to step down 
from the apex since the Tumu Crisis in 1449. 
 
Hence, Ming, Japan and Manchu strengthened their military forces and fought 
with each other, fiercely competing for the seat of supreme power in the system – 
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except Joseon. Joseon was not Japan: the political power in Japan was centralised 
in the hands of the shoguns and warriors, which was not as civilised as Joseon, 
with scholar-officials dominating the making of policies. Joseon was not Manchu 
either: the Jurchens were tribal barbarians who respected nothing but naked 
violence, which was not as civilised as Joseon at all, with everything handled 
according to the Confucian principle of propriety. Joseon was never China, or was 
never supposed to be China: (Han) China was the eternal senior to Joseon, and it 
would be a sin if Joseon had the idea to replace China. Hence, in the fight for 
hegemony in Northeast Asia, the role that Joseon was able to take up was not a 
belligerent; Joseon became a ‘shrimp’ between the fight of ‘whales’. 
 
To the political elites who were responsible for making foreign policy, their 
cognition of international politics was built upon and limited to the Confucian 
explanation of the world order and its normative logic of propriety. Sadae 
therefore was the only policy option they knew of and adhered to. While Sadae 
was supposed to be ‘serving one great’ (because it was unethical to serve two 
great powers according to Confucian principles), Joseon had to decide which great 
to serve. Yet the situation was complicated and the result was unclear most of the 
time in the turbulent ages – hence the national interest of becoming and remaining 
as Sojunghwa would have to be put aside: the top priority was switched to state 
survival in an anarchical world (as it was unknown which country would become 
the hegemon). Especially to the rationalists, choosing which great to serve must 
be justified by the goal of ‘not getting crushed in the fight between whales’. 
 
Yongdae: for Balancing and Bandwagoning 
Rationalists in the Joseon court understood Sadae as a means to achieve the end of 
Joseon’s security. To them, serving a great that was not (Han) China could still be 
justified by the reason that the switch could save Joseon and the lives of its people 
(which was humane and proper). As advocated by Mencius that it was wise for a 
small country to serve a big one for the purpose of self-protection, it would be 
irrational for Joseon to align itself with a declining great in the fight against a 
rising great. In other words, no matter which great was to be served, it was simply 
because that selected great could be used for the purpose of ensuring Joseon’s 
survival – Sadae hence was interpreted as Yongdae. This was a functionalist 
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approach to interpret Sadae, and it was considered the material aspect of Sadae. 
Consequently, Sadae was reduced to pure rituals and formalities that were merely 
nominal, and a simple cost–benefit calculation became the policy-making process 
of Sadae that aimed to maximise Joseon’s gain. 
 
The resulting state behaviour was very much in line with what is described by the 
realists. To deal with the revisionist Japan, the Joseon court finally decided to 
seek military assistance from China so that it could joined forces with Ming to 
balance against the rising Japan. The strategy worked and Joseon was saved, 
although the Korean Peninsula was devastatingly ruined (RDAK, vol. 28, Seonjo 
Sillok, 1961, p.120). As in the case of Manchu, the Joseon king Gwanghaegun 
opted for bandwagoning with the ascending Manchu. His strategy was severely 
condemned by the loyalists and eventually led to a coup that had him deposed 
(RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.823–5). However, the pro-Ming 
policies advocated by King Injo and the loyalists later brought two Manchu 
invasions of Joseon in 1627 and 1636–7. The consequences were devastating: 
Joseon had to bear the humiliation of forced surrender, signing unequal treaties 
with harsh terms, and recognising Qing as Joseon’s new suzerain (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.211–2). 
 
Therefore, when examining the Sadae policy in the Korea–great power(s) 
relations, it is important to notice that the motives of adopting the policy could be 
different (either to serve or to use the great), although the diplomatic practice 
(such as paying tributes and kowtowing to the Chinese emperor) might appear 
similar or even identical. It depended on the thinking of the policymakers: 
unwaveringly abiding by the Confucian principle in Sadae or flexibly turning the 
moral Sadae into the pragmatic Yongdae determined whether the ideational or the 
material aspect would truly represent the act of Sadae. 
 
3.3 Sadae in Practice 
 
Sadae was highly regarded as a Confucian virtue and widely taught in Joseon. The 
indoctrination of Sadae was carried out as part of the process of Confucianisation 
of the Joseon society. Like other Confucian thoughts, Sadae became one of the 
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key moral principles in the Joseon society to illustrate the importance of 
propriety – a social norm was therefore established, and it helped to produce 
generations of intellectuals who would think and behave in a Confucian way. Like 
in China, most of these Confucian scholars would seek government employment 
by passing Gwageo (civil service examination, ࣽᖐ). While the major subjects to 
be tested in the examination were related to Confucianism, the Confucian classics 
became the compulsory texts that all candidates must study in great depth. Once 
passed, they would be appointed to bureaucratic positions and became 
scholar-officials. Those with strong language ability in Chinese usually would 
take up the positions in Yejo (Ministry of Rites, ᘶఆ) that was in charge of 
foreign affairs, ensuring that Sadae was adequately observed in every single 
practice within the framework of the tribute system when interacting with China. 
 
3.3.1 Confucianisation of the Domestic Society 
 
Cultivating a Confucian Social Norm 
The Korean society in the later years of the Goryeo Dynasty was penetrated by 
Buddhism. When Yi Seong-gye and the scholar-officials headed by Jeong 
Do-jeon built the new dynasty of their own, they disconnected Buddhism from 
state politics and the Joseon society so that their revolution, though comparatively 
peaceful, would still appear revolutionary. More importantly, it could be 
justified – and Confucianism was chosen because of its opposite views to 
Buddhism on attitude of life and individual–society relation. On one hand, they 
mercilessly condemned Buddhism, accusing it as the cause that had led to the 
decadent rule of the Goryeo court and the poverty of the people. On the other, 
they decisively promoted Confucianism: for instance, the practice of Gyeongyeon 
(࿶ᆈ) for Joseon kings to study the canonical works of Confucianism was 
initiated when the new dynasty was founded (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong 
Sillok, 1953, pp.137–8); Joseon Gyunggukjeon (the Joseon Code of Government 
Administration, රᗲ࿶୯ڂ) written by Jeong Do-jeon stipulated the strict 
compliance with regulations defined by Confucian propriety (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.249); books at introductory level like Iphaktoseol 
(Diagrams and Explanations upon Entering Learning, ΕᏢკᇥ) written by 
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Gwon Geun were published for beginners to study Confucianism as Joseon’s 
national ideology (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.503); and Taejong 
ordered the printing of the Confucian classics and had them distributed in even 
remote areas to facilitate Confucianisation in Joseon (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong 
Sillok, 1954, p.282). 
 
What they did served a crucial purpose: to construct a new social norm for the 
new dynasty. The Confucian social norm regulated people’s thinking and 
behaviour, and it provided an effective cognitive context in which people’s values 
were shaped. To the Joseon political elites, they needed the Confucian social norm 
to nurture Confucian literati so that they would have the Confucian 
scholar-officials to humanely govern the Confucian state and to faithfully manage 
its foreign relations with China, generation after generation. 
 
Civil Service Examination 
Gwageo in Korea was an emulation of the civil service examination system in 
Tang China, and the first official Gwageo was administered by the Goryeo court 
in 958 (Kim, 2005, p.55). During the Joseon Dynasty, Gwageo was 
comprehensively systemised. It consisted of three categories: mungwa (literature, 
Ўࣽ ), mugwa (martial art and military strategy, ݓࣽ ), and japgwa 
(miscellaneous subjects, ᚇࣽ). While mugwa was designed to identify potentials 
for military positions and japgwa was used to recruit general staff (such as 
medical personnel and translators) of the government, mungwa aimed to select the 
most talented for the policy-making positions at high level (Peterson & Margulies, 
2010, p.80). The key subject of mungwa was Confucianism. Candidates would be 
shortlisted by three stages of assessment, during which they were tested on their 
knowledge of the Confucian classics, their mastery of the Chinese language in the 
forms of poetry and prose, and their application of Confucianism in political 
analysis (Seth, 2006, p.130). It was obvious that those who passed all these 
assessments must be highly well-versed in Confucianism. 
 
Gwageo was the only channel of political advancement for literati in Joseon, and 
it was regularly scheduled once in every three years for the conventional 
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examinations (and numerous others on ad hoc basis such as the celebrations of the 
royal family). In the five centuries of the Joseon dynasty, a total of approximately 
14,600 candidates passed the mungwa of Gwageo and became scholar-officials in 
the government (Seth, 2006, p.160). With their remarkable attainments in 
Confucianism, all the Confucian principles, including Sadae, were duly observed 
in the process of policy-making. 
 
Bureaucratic Administration 
Confucianisation was also implemented in the establishment of Joseon’s 
bureaucratic administration. By emulating most of the governance structure and 
functional features of those of the Ming Court, the political elites in Joseon 
effectively constructed an administrative Sojunghwa. 
 
In the central government, the top official was Yeonguijeong (Chief State 
Councillor, ሦ᝼ࡹ ) of Uijeongbu (State Council, ᝼ࡹ۬ ). Together with 
Jwauijeong and Uuijeong (First and Second Associate State Councillor, Ѱѓ᝼
ࡹ), the three served as the most important political advisors to the king. 
Uijeongbu supervised the operation of Yukjo (the Six Ministries, Ϥఆ) that 
oversaw the administration of six areas of public affairs: personnel, taxation, rites, 
defence, justice, and public construction (Seth, 2006, p.127). Such bureaucratic 
structure of the central government was simply a replica of that in China, and each 
position was moulded according to a corresponding one in the system operated in 
the Ming court: Yeonguijeong was equivalent to Chengxiang (the Prime Minister), 
and Yukjo were exactly the same as Liubu (the Six Ministries) – even the court 
dresses of the Joseon officials were also designed after those of their counterparts 
in China. The structure and operation of the local government were also similar to 
those of China (Kang, 2010b, p.37). 
 
Such emulation unquestionably demonstrated that the Joseon court truly admired 
and believed in the superior Chinese efficiency in public administration. It helped 
to facilitate cordial relations between Joseon and China because in the interaction 
between the two governments, mismatching would be reduced thus 
communications became streamlined. After all, the Chinese emperors were much 
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pleased to see that the Chinese practice was popularly accepted in Joseon in the 
sense that the effectiveness of the Sinocentric system was proved: as long as it 
followed the footsteps of China, a barbaric nation like Joseon would be 
transformed into a civilised country. 
 
The Language of Chinese 
To the Koreans, since the founding of the Joseon dynasty, studying the language 
of Chinese had been crucial to civilise Joseon and to carry out the policy of Sadae 
towards China (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.283–4). Chinese 
therefore became the most important foreign language in Joseon (RDAK, vol. 13, 
Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.200). Throughout the five-century rule of Joseon, Chinese had 
been the official language used in all official documents, and it had been 
popularly used by members of the aristocracy as a symbol of social status to 
distinguish themselves from the commoners (Seth, 2006, p.173). 
 
The language of Chinese was taught and studied systematically in Joseon. 
Textbooks written for introductory and intermediate levels were printed and 
distributed nationwide (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.298, p.453; RDAK, 
vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.14, p.366; RDAK, vol. 15, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, 
p.301; RDAK, vol. 51, Sungjo Sillok, 1966, p.12). At an advanced level, students 
focused on the study of the canonical works of Confucianism to prepare for 
Gwageo. In 1407, Gwon Geun proposed an additional subject in Gwageo to 
Taejong to test the candidates on their proficiency in reading and writing Chinese 
official documents due to the important need of practicing Sadae with Ming – 
making it all the more imperative for the Korean literati to study Chinese (RDAK, 
vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.26–29). 
 
The concern of Gwon was not merely based on the Korean’s admiration for China: 
inadequate language ability of the Joseon diplomats in Chinese had brought 
serious troubles to the relations between Ming and Joseon. In the early years of 
the dynasty, there were not many Korean who could speak and write Chinese 
professionally (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.625). The implementation of 
Sadae thus created an urgent need of government officials who were proficient in 
Chinese, and translation was deemed an important task in handling the 
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Joseon–China relations (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.665). Both 
Sayogwon (Bureau of Official Interpreters, љ᝿ଣ) and Seungmunwon (Bureau 
of Diplomatic Correspondence, ܍Ўଣ) were established to teach the language 
of Chinese and to train professional interpreters and secretaries in translating and 
writing Chinese documents (Song, 1999). The study and use of Chinese soon 
became an indispensable element in Joseon’s practice of Sadae towards China. 
 
3.3.2 Foreign Relations within the Tribute System 
 
Status of Joseon 
The practice of Sadae defined the role of Joseon in its relations with China: in the 
Sinocentric order, the Joseon king was a ‘minister’ to the Chinese emperor 
(RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.61). In operation, the title of the Joseon 
monarch was limited to the level of ‘king’, which was lower than ‘emperor’, the 
title of the Chinese ruler. In the diplomatic documents prepared for the Ming court, 
the terms that the Joseon king was allowed to use (such as those for the title of the 
crown prince, the capital city, and the edict issued by the monarch, etc.) had to be 
lower in rank according to the Ming court (i.e. usually at the level equivalent to 
that of a royal prince in China). Moreover, the format of all the official documents 
sent from Joseon to China was determined by the Chinese Ministry of Rite 
(RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.84, p.527). 
 
At the interstate level, Joseon was a vassal to Ming. As Hongwu Emperor 
declared that Ming had no intention to rule Joseon directly (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.141–2), Joseon enjoyed a high degree of 
autonomy in self-rule – yet despite such autonomy, the enthronement of a Joseon 
king would not be legitimate unless an investiture was received from the Chinese 
emperor. The establishment of the crown prince was of no exception either – his 
right to inherit the kingship was also subject to the approval of the Chinese 
emperor (Kang, 2010b, p.56). In addition, the subordinate status of Joseon was 
also reflected in the employment of Yeonho (era name, ԃဦ), which was the 
regnal title of the monarch. By the Chinese culture, this title was a symbol of the 
legitimate rule of a newly enthroned monarch, and the historians would record 
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history with the era names as chronicle references. In Joseon however, no matter 
which king ascended to the throne, unlike the Chinese emperor who would 
typically adopt a new title for his reign, the Joseon king was not allowed to name 
the regnal title for himself – the Joseon monarch simply had to follow the Chinese 
imperial court and used the era name of the Chinese emperor for the Joseon 
calendar (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.135). 
 
Therefore, it would not be unreasonable to say that the sovereign power of the 
Joseon king was partly, or at least nominally, discounted as a result of the Sadae 
policy towards China – yet to Joseon, it was accepted because this was how 
Confucian propriety should be practiced. As long as it was able to maintain the 
identity of Sojunghwa, Joseon would enjoy a ranking only second to China, which 
meant a more prestigious status than that of any other member state in the system. 
 
Obligations of Joseon 
Above all others, the most important obligation of a vassal state was to send 
tribute missions to the suzerain regularly. It was commonly perceived that among 
others, Joseon was the most faithful vassal to China as reflected in the remarkable 
number of tribute missions – over the course of 277 years of the Ming dynasty, 
the Joseon court dispatched a total of 1,252 tribute missions to China (Gao, 2005, 
p.69). When the Joseon dynasty was newly founded in the late 14th century, 
Hongwu Emperor of Ming set the number of tribute missions from Joseon at the 
frequency of once in every three years (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 
1953, p.447). Before long the Joseon court voluntarily increased the number to 
once in a year and eventually three times in a year, including 1) Jeongjosa (҅ර
٬) that was sent to pay respect to the Ming emperor on the New Year’s Day; 2) 
Seongjeolsa (ဃ࿯٬) that was sent to congratulate the Ming emperor on his 
birthday, and Cheonchusa (ίࣿ٬) that was sent to celebrate the birthday of the 
crown prince (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.452). 
 
In fact, the Joseon court dispatched a lot more tribute missions on ad hoc 
occasions than on regular basis. For any occasion that the Joseon court considered 
it necessary and proper, a special tribute embassy would be dispatched to China, 
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bringing tributes such as ginseng, precious furs, and fine-quality paper (RDAK, 
vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.286–7; RDAK, vol. 17, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, 
pp.80–81). For example, a Jinhasa (຾ລ٬) would be sent to congratulate the 
Chinese court whenever there was an event that made the whole nation rejoiced 
(such as the birth of a royal family member and a military victory over the 
nomadic tribes), and a Saunsa (ᖴৱ٬) would be sent to express the gratitude of 
the Joseon court to the generosity of the ‘Son of Heaven’ whenever the Chinese 
emperor sent the Joseon king any gifts (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, 
p.340). Although there was a variety of reasons for Joseon to send tribute 
missions to China, in one occasion the Joseon court must dispatch a tribute 
mission: when a new Joseon king was enthroned – because his rule had to be 
recognised and legitimised by the Chinese emperor, who had to be informed of 
the enthronement as soon as possible (RDAK, vol. 26, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, 
pp.193–5). 
 
Other than paying tributes and kowtowing to the Chinese emperor, another 
obligation of Joseon as a vassal was to provide military support when required by 
China. It was considered proper because it was a moral duty for a ‘minister’ to 
assist his ‘prince’ when the ‘prince’ was fighting a war. It happened more 
frequently during Ming than Qing, and for a number of times when Ming 
launched military campaigns against the Jurchens, Joseon was instructed to supply 
Ming with soldiers, war horses, and cattle. In contrast to Ming, Qing seldom 
issued such order to Joseon (except during the final years of Ming, Qing 
instructed Joseon to send troops to join its military assaults against Ming). 
 
Privileges of Joseon 
As a vassal state, Joseon was granted a number of privileges from China, with 
some of which being uniquely conferred to Joseon as an exemplary obedient and 
loyal vassal. For instance, a copy of the Chinese royal calendar would be given to 
the Joseon tribute envoy (but not to those from other vassals) on the New Year’s 
Day, which was a special award to demonstrate how the Chinese emperor valued 
the sincerity of the Koreans and the efforts they took to understand and respect the 
culture of its suzerain (Cha, 2011, p.43). 
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Chaek bong (investiture of kingship from the suzerain to its vassals, н࠾) 
received from the Chinese emperor was an important privilege to the Joseon 
monarch, especially to those who took the crown in abnormal situations (e.g. 
someone usurped the throne by staging a coup). In such cases, the investiture 
became crucial to the legitimacy of the newly enthroned king. Doubtful as the 
succession might appear in the eyes of the commoners, the power of the king 
would no longer be questioned and challenged as long as the investiture from the 
‘Son of Heaven’ was secured – if the legitimate rule of the new king was 
recognised by the Chinese emperor, it implied that the enthronement, by all means, 
had been endorsed by the ‘Mandate of Heaven’ (Kang, 2010a, p.613). 
 
Another privilege Joseon received in the tribute system was a guarantee of 
non-aggression from China. In the early decades after the Ming Dynasty was 
founded, the military capability of the Ming forces was much more powerful than 
that of the other East Asian countries. For Joseon, its geographical proximity with 
China and its weak military forces exposed it to the risk of being easily invaded 
by Ming. Therefore, by becoming a vassal state of Ming, Joseon (along with other 
14 vassals) received the privilege of enjoying peace with the hegemon – it would 
not be invaded by Ming (as promised by Hongwu Emperor), so long as it behaved 
properly and served Ming wholeheartedly according to the Confucian ethics (Zhu, 
1996, pp.167–8). 
 
As professed in the Confucian doctrines, while it was the obligation of the junior 
to respect and serve the senior, it is also the responsibility of the senior to look 
after the junior. Within the framework of the tribute system, the well-being of 
Joseon was taken care of by Ming. In terms of national security, when Joseon was 
threatened and attacked by another state, China would protect Joseon by providing 
military support, which was typically evident in the Imjin War when Joseon was 
invaded by the Japanese (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, pp.579–80). In 
terms of economic benefits, Joseon was granted the right to trade with China. 
While the Ming court held a negative view on foreign trade in general (as evident 
in its policy of ‘Sea Ban’ that forbade all types of trading activities with foreigners 
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except the officially approved tribute trades), Joseon was given the privilege to 
conduct official trades (by embassy officials privately) and private trades (by 
commoners) in addition to tribute trades (public trades between states by the order 
of the government) (Kang, 2010b, p.109). Besides, Joseon also received material 
aids from China in time of natural disasters – for instance, Joseon suffered a 
nationwide famine in 1697 and Kangxi Emperor of Qing immediately dispatched 
shipments of approximately 900 tons of rice as food relief to Joseon (RDAK, vol. 
40, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.236, p.245, pp.252–3). 
 
3.4 Understanding the Different Faces of Sadae 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, Sadae was a policy that had been 
implemented in different ways by the Joseon policymakers. Some of them 
unequivocally concerned the ideational aspect of Sadae: they took pride in 
upholding the Confucian ethics of righteousness and felt a bond of commitment, 
loyalty, and a moral obligation to obey China. To these loyalists, Sadae was a 
pure faith of morality influenced by the Confucian culture. However, some others 
chose to focus on the material aspect of Sadae by advocating pragmatism in their 
strategies to secure the national interest of Joseon. In the eyes of these rationalists, 
Sadae was a pragmatic strategy invented for the sole purpose of obtaining 
material benefits via serving the great. As for the rest, they vacillated between 
being loyal and being rational when practicing Sadae, and changed their stance 
from time to time on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, Sadae has to be examined 
by the different motives of the Joseon political elites and the different issues they 
had to deal with at the time. Simply defining Sadae as ‘serving the great’ only 
describes a policy adopted by a minor state towards a major power; it does not 
reveal the true motive behind or illustrate the impact of situational factors. 
 
The Loyalists: ‘What Should Be’ 
Factors related to the policymakers, such as personal value and experience, 
appeared to be most important to motivate the loyalists to practice Sadae 
faithfully according to the Confucian morality. To this category of Joseon elites, 
external factors, such as the situation in China (e.g. behaviour of the emperor, 
decision of the imperial court) and in Joseon (e.g. livelihood of the Koreans, 
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social turmoil resulted from wars), or the change of power polarity in the region, 
generated little or even no impact on the level of their sincerity to serve the great. 
In a sense, they represented the ideational forces in Joseon politics. 
 
The loyalists understood the relationship between the prince and his minister as 
the one between a father and his son. Although Confucius emphasised the 
normative implication for both parties, the loyalists focused on the obligation of 
the junior. As a son ought to practice filial piety towards his father no matter what, 
a minister should faithfully devote himself in serving his prince in any 
circumstances. Loyalty thus was praised as a highly important virtue, and to the 
loyalists, it became a moral obligation for Joseon to serve China faithfully. 
Manifestation of their loyal Sadae mainly can be seen in four situations: 1) 
continuing to serve the great with sincerity even when the Chinese emperor’s 
behaviour deviated from the Confucian norms, 2) upholding the suzerain–vassal 
relations even when the suzerain was losing its hegemonic power, 3) taking 
voluntary actions to serve China, and 4) demonstrating unwavering loyalty even 
when Joseon was in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis a revisionist power that 
challenged China. 
 
First, in the situation when a decision of the Chinese emperor was not made 
properly according to the Confucian ethics, even though it was deemed 
controversial in China, the loyalists would take action to support the Chinese 
emperor – as they believed that the vassal should not make comment on the 
emperor’s behaviour; whether it was right or wrong. Second, in the situation when 
the suzerain was defeated by an alien power to the extent that the security of the 
imperial court was gravely threatened, which implied that the very existence of 
the suzerain could be eliminated, the loyalists did not take advantage of such 
opportunity to terminate the suzerain–vassal relations, and chose to uphold the 
Confucian ethics and not to betray their suzerain. 
 
Third, the loyalists would justify the implementation of some policies based on 
the Confucian principles of propriety, even though it was not compulsory as 
required by the Chinese court. On the occasion of some celebrating or mourning 
events in China, although Joseon was not required to do anything, the loyalists 
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would dispatch ad hoc tribute missions to Beijing, or to suspend all trading and 
entertaining activities for a few days in Joseon nationwide. Fourth, at the time 
when Joseon was invaded by a rising power that aimed to replace the incumbent 
great and was forced to acknowledge the challenger as Joseon’s new suzerain, the 
loyalists refused to comply with such order, even at the expense of having 
themselves killed and their country eliminated. 
 
The Rationalists: ‘What Works’!
The rationalists also acknowledged that the relationship between the prince and 
his minister resembled the one between a father and his son. They did not wish to 
challenge the Confucian understanding of the senior–junior relationship, yet they 
did not see the junior’s loyalty to the senior as absolute: Sadae was not equal to 
blind loyalty to China. This reflected their belief in Xunzi’s idea: ‘one should do 
what is morally right instead of blindly following the prince and the father, if they 
act against humaneness and righteousness’. Hence they would examine the 
idea/behaviour of the senior first: whether the senior was humane and righteous 
determined whether the junior’s loyalty was required. Besides, they also embraced 
the view of Xunzi that people should be proactive in reality because it was the 
human efforts that were counted: ‘Rather than waiting for opportunity, we should 
create one and use it according to the circumstances’ – and this became the 
principle for the rationalists when dealing with uncertain situations. Hence, in the 
name of serving the great, the rationalists used the great. 
 
In the process of policymaking, situational factors (such as the changing 
distribution of power in the region), instead of ideational doctrines, were often 
invoked to justify their ideas and actions that deviated from the norm of 
Confucian ethics. To secure Joseon’s national interest, to the rationalists, was far 
more important than protecting the well-being of China or safeguarding the 
reputation of Joseon. Their pragmatic view was most clearly seen during the 
power transition from Ming to Qing. In the fierce debates with the loyalists on 
whether Joseon should abandon the declining Ming and switch to serve the rising 
Qing, the rationalists strongly suggested to recognise Qing as the legitimate ruler 
of China and the new suzerain to Joseon. They believed that it was not proper to 
unwisely act against the trend: Joseon was not militarily strong enough to resist 
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Qing’s invasion and the Koreans would be brutally slaughtered. In their eyes, 
Joseon still would be playing the role of a vassal state; only the role of the 
suzerain would be taken up by Qing. The Ming regime lost the control of China 
simply because it failed to perform the duties of a humane ruler – it was thus not 
improper to be ousted. 
 
The rationalists emphasised the practical use of the Confucian theories to solve 
real problems. When facing the reality that the survival of Joseon became 
questionable, to the rationalists, holding on to the idealistic thought of 
righteousness would not resolve the crisis; flexibly applying Confucianism would 
be an effective approach to minimise losses in reality. Their pragmatic thoughts, 
to a certain extent, also influenced those of the school of Silhak (practical learning, 
ჴᏢ), who accepted the fact that the barbaric Manchu had transformed to a group 
of civilised people that was no different from the Han-Chinese. Hence it was not 
necessary to resist Qing; Joseon should learn anything useful from Qing when 
serving the new great (Kim, 2012, pp.263–4). 
 
The In-betweens 
In addition to the loyalists and the rationalists, there were those who vacillated 
between serving and using the great. On every issue that the interests of the two 
countries appeared plainly incompatible, they had to cope with the dilemma of 
choosing side: to serve the great unconditionally (thus safeguard Joseon’s 
reputation as an exemplar vassal) or to use the great strategically (as to protect the 
interests of Joseon and the Koreans). In consequence, they had to painfully gauge 
the costs and benefits of both material and non-material nature, and made a 
decision that might not be consistent with their personal values. Joseon kings like 
Sejong, Seongjong, and Injo had personally experienced the struggle of trying to 
strike a balance between their conscience (that was shaped by Confucian ethics) 
and their duty (to effectively respond to the political reality as national leaders). 
Eventually, they had to choose one and sacrifice the other. Nonetheless, such kind 
of dilemma only strengthens the argument about the multi-faceted nature of Sadae: 
it was a concept that consisted of both ideational and material elements. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter explored the cultural root of Sadae as a product of shared Confucian 
ideology in China and Joseon, explained the rationale of Sadae that comprised the 
ideational and material considerations, described the application of Sadae in 
Joseon’s relations with China, and illustrated the different motives of the Joseon 
policymakers in their practice of Sadae. 
 
This chapter also serves as the conceptual basis for the next three chapters, in 
which Sadae in Joseon–great power(s) relations during the pre-modern and 
modern time is studied: Chapter 4 looks into Joseon’s Sadae in Ming’s unipolar 
era from 1392 to 1608, Chapter 5 illustrates Joseon’s Sadae during the power 
transition from Ming to Qing in Northeast Asia from 1608 to 1800, and Chapter 6 
examines the decline of Sadae amidst an emerging order of multipolarity in the 
region from 1800 to 1910. Within the analytical framework of polarity in 
international relations, the different motives of the key political actors and the 
subsequent practice of Sadae are studied with a combined approach of 
constructivism and realism. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Sadae in the Era of Ming’s Unipolar Order (1392–1608) 
 
With the previous chapter having introduced the background of Sadae, examined 
its rationale, and described how the concept is applied in practice, Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 are going to study the historical evidence pertaining to Sadae in 
Joseon–China relations during the pre-modern era that covers the period from 
1392 to 1800. The interplay of the ideational (moral) aspect and the material 
(strategic) aspect of Sadae in the making of Joseon foreign policy towards the 
great power(s) is to be analysed within the framework of polarity that depicts the 
regional order of Northeast Asia during the four centuries since the founding of 
the Joseon Dynasty. While the material power was clearly centralised first in the 
hands of Ming China and later transferred to those of Qing China, not every 
political elite of the Joseon court simply chose to follow a linear pattern that 
bandwagoned the great power in the unipolar and bipolar order as described by 
the realists. Some (the rationalists) turned to the pragmatic implementation of 
Sadae to resolve the interstate problems, yet some (the loyalists) adhered to the 
ethical principles of Sadae to address the bilateral issues. A 
constructivist-cum-realist approach is therefore adopted to explain how the 
Joseon–great power(s) relations were established and maintained in the 
pre-modern time. 
 
There were 22 kings in Joseon history, and six of them (i.e. Jeongjong, Munjong, 
Danjong, Yejong, Injong, and Gyeongjong) are excluded from the following 
analyses for the reason that none of them reigned over five years. Besides, little 
attention had been paid to the Joseon–Ming relations apart from the routine 
practice of Sadae during the reigns of these six kings – most of the daily issues 
were related to domestic affairs. 
 
Years of reign of the other 16 kings add up to 395 years in total, which represents 
96.8% of the period to be discussed. These 16 kings and the major court officials, 
with a focus on their orientation in the making of foreign policies (i.e. 
pro-righteousness or pro-pragmatism), are analysed in time sequence. Based upon 
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the distribution of power (polarity) in Northeast Asia that emerged within these 
408 years, the time period is broken down into two main parts: in this chapter, 
Sadae is examined within a unipolar order in which Ming was the sole great 
power in Northeast Asia from 1392 to 1608. In the next chapter, Sadae is analysed 
first in a transitional period characterised by a bipolar order in which Manchu rose 
to great-power status and challenged Ming from the early 17th century to the fall 
of Ming in 1644, followed by a unique period (an imaginary bipolar order over a 
century, with the fallen Ming vs. Qing) in which Joseon refused to accept (though 
not openly) Qing’s supremacy and chose to secretly serve the fallen Ming, and 
finally a unipolar period from the late 1770s to 1800 during which Joseon ceased 
to view the Manchu as barbarians and began to serve Qing faithfully. 
 
This chapter, with historical evidence drawn from the ruling years of nine Joseon 
kings during the two centuries of Ming’s predominance, looks into the different 
motives of the Korean political elites when making Joseon’s foreign policy 
towards Ming, whereby the interplay of the moral and strategic forces in this 
unipolar period is revealed. Based upon the historical records, it is found that the 
reigns of these nine Joseon kings can be categorised into three segments according 
to the different ‘whys’ (thus different ‘hows’) to serve Ming: the 
pro-righteousness that includes Jungjong, the pro-pragmatism that includes Taejo, 
Taejong, Sejo, Yeonsangun, Myeongjong, and Seonjo, and the in-between that 
includes Sejong and Seongjong. It is therefore proved that, even in a unipolar 
order, Sadae was practiced based upon a mix of ideational and material concerns. 
 
Analyses in this and the next chapter are conducted mainly based on the original 
records documented in The Ri Dynasty Annals of Korea. No groundless 
speculation is made and no anecdotal information is invoked; only solid evidence 
is used as the primary source of material in this research. 
 
4.1 The Reign of Taejo (1392–8) 
 
Since the time when he was still a general of the Goryeo court, Taejo’s motto had 
been the Mencius philosophy of ‘A minor state should never turn against a major 
state. By serving the major state, the minor state would be able to survive’ (RDAK, 
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vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.42–44). Taejo invoked this motto of his 
in almost every memorial he wrote to Hongwu Emperor. This belief implied that 
in the thinking of Taejo, from the very beginning of his reign, Sadae was not the 
end; it was a means – a political tool to achieve his ultimate goals of ensuring the 
survival of Joseon in general, and the legitimisation of his rule of the new dynasty 
in particular. 
 
Taejo became the first king of Joseon through a coup d'état that overthrew the 
Goryeo court and founded the new dynasty, thus his top priority was to legitimise 
his reign with the investiture to be granted by the Ming emperor. On the very next 
day (18 July 1392) after his enthronement, Taejo immediately dispatched an 
envoy to inform the Ming court of the dynastic change (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.77–79). He was so anxious to receive the 
acknowledgement of Hongwu Emperor that he even sent an envoy to Nanjing and 
humbly asked the emperor to name the new dynasty on 29 November 1392 
(RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.142–3). To further demonstrate 
his sincerity of Sadae, Taejo ordered to establish Sayogwon in the following year 
as an official institution for the Koreans to study the language of Chinese (RDAK, 
vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.200). 
 
However, things did not go well as Taejo wished. Around mid 1393, rumours that 
reached the Ming court made Hongwu Emperor believe that Taejo was in fact a 
dishonest and ungrateful person who usurped the throne of the Goryeo king – and 
on 23 May 1393, Taejo received an imperial edict issued by the emperor that 
reprimanded Taejo and threatened to use military force against Joseon. Taejo was 
outraged in court and criticised that Hongwu Emperor became Son of Heaven by 
way of nothing but crude violence, accusing Hongwu for threatening Joseon like 
an adult threatening a child. Nevertheless, Taejo swiftly calmed down and decided 
to remain humble and cautious to plan for the response. On 1 June 1393, Taejo 
dispatched an envoy to carry his memorial to the throne, defending himself by 
clarifying the rumours one by one in detail (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 
1953, pp.171–6). Unexpectedly, in July Hongwu Emperor issued an imperial 
order to forbid the entry of Joseon embassies to China. Taejo then sent another 
memorial to the throne on 2 August, modestly requesting the emperor’s 
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permission to allow the resumption of Joseon embassies to Ming (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.188–90). 
 
As little improvement was seen in the bilateral relations, Taejo sent a lengthy 
memorial to the throne on 19 February 1394, hoping that this would clarify the 
rumours against him (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.219–25), 
yet the reply of Hongwu Emperor was his imperial order on 25 April that 
instructed Taejo to send his oldest or second son as a political hostage to China 
(RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, p.246). On 1 June 1394, Taejo, to 
his sadness, reluctantly sent his most capable son, Yi Bang-won (later King 
Taejong), to China. Fortunately, the detailed explanation provided by Yi 
Bang-won and his gracious manner pleased the emperor, and Yi Bang-won was 
allowed to return to Joseon on 19 November (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong 
Sillok, 1953, p.252, p.283). However, Taejo still did not receive the imperial 
investiture that he had been desperately seeking from Ming. 
 
A year later, recovery of the Joseon–Ming relations turned gloomy again: there 
came the crisis of the Joseon memorial to the throne to celebrate the New Year 
festival in 1396. Because of the Joseon official document that was written in poor 
Chinese, Hongwu Emperor detected a trace of blasphemy in the writing and thus 
felt insulted. In early February 1396, the emperor demanded apology from the 
Joseon king, and insisted that the Joseon officials responsible for writing the 
documents to be sent to China for punishment (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong 
Sillok, 1953, p.355). Gwon Geun volunteered for the job of going to China and 
explaining the issue to Hongwu Emperor in person – he and three court officials 
left for China in July 1396 (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, 
pp.374–6). With his superb knowledge of Chinese literature and Confucian 
philosophy, Gwon deeply impressed the emperor in their conversations and the 
exchange of composing poetries. In March 1397, Gwon was released by the 
emperor, but the other three Joseon officials were detained in China (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.402–9). Unfortunately, the three Joseon officials 
were later executed in November 1397 by the Ming court for their attempt to 
escape from detention (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.444–5). 
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Nonetheless, the Ming court signalled no intention to take this as the end of the 
crisis. It further ordered Taejo in May 1398 to turn in another three Joseon court 
officials, who were also suspected for involvement in the writing of the 
problematic memorial to the throne (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, 
pp.486–9). This summon enraged some of the Joseon court officials headed by 
Pyon Chung-rang. In the memorial they wrote to Taejo, they criticised the Ming 
court for having unreasonably and offensively treated Joseon, and advocated not 
to send the three officials as to demonstrate Joseon’s autonomous power (RDAK, 
vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.492–4). However, Taejo obeyed Ming’s 
order and sent those three officials to China on 3 June 1398 (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.505–6). 
 
As noticed in the evidence illustrated above, Taejo served Ming, though 
sometimes even grudgingly, for the reasons of protecting Joseon from Ming’s 
invasion and legitimising his personal rule of the new regime. The level of 
sincerity demonstrated in Sadae implemented by Taejo and many of his ministers 
was low, as they dared to openly criticise Hongwu Emperor and the Ming court. 
Their behaviour was a violation of the Confucian principles of propriety – as the 
junior was supposed to respect the senior. What Ming was to them turned out to 
be, not an authoritative and a respectable senior for them to serve, but only the 
source of obtaining what they desired. 
 
To ensure the attainment of the imperial investiture (although he never received it 
throughout his reign until his abdication in September 1398), Taejo had no choice 
but to pragmatically settle with the status of a vassal state for Joseon, behaving 
humbly and performing the duties as required in the Sinocentric system towards 
Ming. Albeit the Confucian culture was commonly shared in China and Korea, it 
was the political reality that determined the orientation of the Joseon 
policymakers at that time: personal and/or national pride would have to give way 
to the strategic use of the great power for securing personal and/or national 
interests – thus during the reign of Taejo, the true motive of Sadae was to use the 
great. 
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4.2 The Reign of Taejong (1400–18) 
 
Taejong was the fifth son of Taejo, and he came to power by executing two coup 
d'état: in the first one (August 1398) Taejong killed his younger brother, the 
crown prince, forced Taejo to abdicate, and enthroned one of his elder brothers 
(the second son of Taejo) as Jeongjong, the second king of Joseon (RDAK, vol. 1, 
Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.520–33, pp.542–4). Taejong launched the 
second coup in January 1400, in which he sent another of his elder brother (the 
fourth son of Taejo) into exile whereby he prompted Jeongjong to appoint him as 
the heir (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.647–54, pp.658–60). 
Finally in November, he became the third king of Joseon after Jeongjong 
abdicated the throne (RDAK, vol. 1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.740–2). 
 
What Taejong did before his enthronement therefore indicated that he was a 
Machiavellian politician. His pragmatic thinking and behaviour towards Ming 
throughout his 18 years of reign was also a typical reflection of Yongdae: to serve 
Ming was the means to protect Joseon from being invaded by the hegemon that 
was at the time headed by the bellicose Yongle Emperor. Most notably, among all 
the Joseon monarchs in history, Taejong was the only king who explicitly explain 
his reason to practice Sadae as: he served the great power sincerely according to 
the Confucian principle of propriety because he was in awe of Heaven, not the 
great power itself (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.544; RDAK, vol. 4, 
Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.111, pp.309–11). 
 
On one hand, Taejong never disobeyed a single order of Yongle Emperor (most 
typically found in the case of sending horses to China) so that Joseon was never 
‘punished’ by Ming; but on the other hand, he continuously took the 
precautionary measures in national defence against any possible military attack 
from Ming – just in case Yongle Emperor was not pleased with Joseon and 
decided to use military forces. Moreover, to reiterate his stance of serving the 
great for fear of Heaven (instead of the great), Taejong openly and repeatedly 
gave negative comments on the emperor’s personality and criticised his decisions 
in front of the Joseon court officials, an act that was basically not acceptable 
according to the Confucian ethics. 
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To the Ming court, Taejong performed all the duties as required in the tribute 
system. Three days after receiving the imperial decree about the enthronement of 
Yongle Emperor, Taejong dispatched a congratulatory envoy to China on 15 
October, 1402 (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.233–5). On 8 April 1403, 
Taejong received the investiture issued by the emperor, along with an imperial 
order that the Ming court would purchase 2,193 horses from Joseon – and Taejong 
immediately ordered his officials to process on the deal (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong 
Sillok, 1954, pp.286–90), although Taejong once explicitly told the Ming envoy 
(that was sent by Jianwen Emperor in October 1401) less than two years ago that 
Joseon was not a country that produced horses (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 
1954, pp.101–2). 
 
After having successfully conquered Vietnam, Yongle Emperor issued an imperial 
decree to Joseon on 1 May 1407 to explain the reason of Ming’s invasion. 
Taejong duly sent an envoy to China to congratulate the emperor’s victory on 9 
May (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.40–45, p.46). Later in August, 
Yongle Emperor once again mentioned the reason of Ming’s invasion to a Joseon 
special mission in person, and at the same time, ordered another purchase of 3,000 
horses (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.119–21). When another tribute 
mission of Cheonchusa returned to Joseon on 11 September, Taejong came to 
know that the Joseon envoy was repeatedly lectured by the emperor on the reason 
why Ming invaded Vietnam (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.130). Taejong 
obeyed the imperial order and sent the 3,000 horses to Ming on 16 April 1408 
(RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.219) – for he realized, as early as in April 
1407 when the news of Ming’s military operation in Vietnam reached the Joseon 
court, that it was imperative to serve the great (Yongle Emperor in particular) 
faithfully; otherwise Joseon would be reprimanded and punished by Ming’s 
military forces (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.32). 
 
On 12 October 1409, Taejong received the news about Yongle Emperor’s military 
campaign against the Mongols and nine days later, the emperor’s order arrived 
and instructed Joseon to offer horses (and Ming would pay for them) as many as 
possible to support Ming’s military operation. Taejong’s response was to send 
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10,000 horses to Ming in the coming January before Yongle Emperor launched 
the campaign in February (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.530–1, 
pp.533–4). However, Saganwon (Office of Censors, љᒇଣ ) was strongly 
opposed to Taejong’s decision and asked the king to balance between Sadae and 
Joseon’s national interests of present and future – for horses were vital to national 
defence, and to send 10,000 horses within three months of time would exceed 
Joseon’s capacity. Nevertheless, after urged by the Ming court twice on 6 
November 1409 and 6 February 1410, Taejong managed to send 10,000 horses to 
Ming on 7 March 1410 (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.539–43, pp.586–7, 
p.603). Later Taejong gave further explanation to his decision, claiming that this 
was the correct way to practice Sadae (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, 
p.331). 
 
In March 1413, Taejong came to know about Yongle Emperor’s intention to 
invade Japan from the Jeongjosa who returned to Joseon (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong 
Sillok, 1954, pp.378–9). While Joseon had been in official contact with Japan 
since the reign of Taejo (RDAK, vol.1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, pp.280–1, 
pp.321–2) and Joseon was later scolded by the Ming Ministry of Rite for being 
dishonest in reporting Joseon’s interaction with Japan back in January 1406 
(RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.627–8), the Joseon court feared that 
Yongle Emperor might launch a military campaign against Joseon when passing 
by the Korean Peninsula thus suggested to elevate the alert state of defence. Some 
court officials even proposed to ally with Japan against the probable invasion of 
Ming. However, Taejong believed that Joseon should assist Ming in its military 
campaign against Japan because he did not dare to act against the will of Heaven 
(RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.428–9). 
 
Taejong had been worried so much about the possibility of Ming’s invasion due to 
Joseon’s association with Japan ever since (RDAK, vol. 5, Taejong Sillok, 1955, 
p.114, pp.646–7) – this actually implied that Joseon, at least until his reign, did 
not serve Ming faithfully. Although he did not think that Joseon was in imminent 
danger of being invaded (according to his analysis, Ming’s forces were exhausted 
with the consecutive military campaigns against Vietnam and the Mongols), 
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Taejong nonetheless ordered to raise the level of readiness for military action 
against possible Ming invasions. While some of the court officials expressed their 
concern that Joseon’s manoeuvre of troops could arouse the emperor’s suspicion, 
Taejong affirmatively said that it was absolutely normal for a country to prepare 
for its national defence (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.423–4, pp.428–9). 
 
Taejong’s thinking was based upon a realistic factor: Yongle Emperor would not 
hesitate to use force anytime he was not satisfied with the vassal states’ Sadae, 
which had been clearly proven a number of times. In spite of the Joseon’s 
subservience, Yongle Emperor ordered to establish military commission in 
Manchuria a couple of years after his enthronement, which was deemed by the 
Joseon court as a measurement to check the power of Joseon (RDAK, vol. 2, 
Taejong Sillok, 1954, pp.734–9). To Taejong, even the emperor’s repeated 
explanations of the reason of invading Vietnam could be a warning message 
implicitly signalled by the emperor, and Yongle Emperor’s unusual act of 
showing the imperial letters to reprimand Japan and Ryukyu in November 1417 to 
the Joseon envoy members simply reconfirmed Taejong’s view (RDAK, vol. 5, 
Taejong Sillok, 1955, pp.591–3). 
 
To deal with such an aggressive emperor in the supposedly non-aggressive 
Sinocentric system, Taejong’s strategy to ensure Joseon’s security was 
two-dimensional: serve Ming by obeying Yongle Emperor’s orders, but prepare 
for war with Ming at the same time – and Taejong openly explained this idea of 
his to the Joseon court officials twice: on 8 April 1407 (RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong 
Sillok, 1954, pp.32–33) and on 20 June 1414 (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, 
pp.610–1), which appeared to be a rather consistent realist policy in the 
Joseon–Ming relations throughout his reign. 
 
Furthermore, a unique feature of the Joseon–Ming relations under Taejong’s rule 
was the king’s open remarks in the Joseon court that discussed negatively about 
the Yongle Emperor’s personality and criticised what the emperor had done – a 
phenomenon that could be hardly found in any other cases before the fall of Ming 
in 1644. As a matter of fact, Taejong and Yongle Emperor did meet cordially with 
each other in Beijing back in 1394, a time when both of them were still princes, 
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yet neither of them was crown prince (RDAK, vol.1, Taejo/Jeongjong Sillok, 1953, 
p.283), which was the only time throughout the Joseon–Ming history that the 
(future) heads of the two countries ever saw each other in person and had such a 
detailed talk. However, the impact of this meeting was uncertain, as on how much 
the mysteriousness and sacredness of the future Son of Heaven was discounted by 
such a close encounter. What Taejong said in the following occasions was clear 
evidence to prove his ‘un-Confucian’ way of Sadae: 
 
y On 11 September 1404, when discussing with some of the major court 
officials about the different styles of rule between Jianwen Emperor and 
Yongle Emperor, Taejong gave the bold comment that in his eyes, 
Jianwen was humane but Yongle was cruel and bloodthirsty – for 
Yongle killed thousands of Jianwen’s supporters after he took the throne 
from Jianwen (RDAK, vol. 2, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.463). 
y On 8 April 1407, Taejong openly criticised Yongle Emperor for not 
being humble or prudent on Ming’s decision to invade Vietnam (RDAK, 
vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.32), and on 20 June 1414, he further 
commented that it was a mistake that Yongle Emperor launched the 
invasion (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.611). 
y On 23 February 1410, Taejong explicitly expressed his view that the 
emperor was neither right nor wise to initiate military campaigns against 
the Mongols while the Mongols did not even attack Ming’s border, and 
it would become a laughingstock if the Ming troops were to be defeated 
(RDAK, vol. 3, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.591). 
y On 26 July 1413, in front of his court officials, Taejong even directly 
pointed to the fact that Yongle Emperor enthroned himself without the 
imperial edict of his father, Hongwu Emperor (because Yongle, as the 
Prince of Yan, launched a civil war in 1399 against Jianwen Emperor, 
his own nephew. Yongle led his troops and defeated those of Jianwen, 
had the capital besieged, forced Jianwen to suicide, and eventually took 
over the throne in 1402), which implied the questionable succession of 
Yongle to the throne (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.429). 
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Taejong therefore was considered one of those Joseon monarchs that exhibited the 
tendency of pro-pragmatism for the reason that he and his rationalist followers 
viewed Sadae as a means, instead of an end, to obtain the goal of assuring the 
national security of Joseon. The aggressive personality of Yongle Emperor was a 
crucial factor at the individual level, yet the distribution of power (with Ming 
being the unipole) in Northeast Asia at the time was also an indispensible factor at 
the system level that had determined Joseon’s subservience to Ming. To Taejong, 
power politics was cloaked in the Confucian ethics of senior–junior relationship 
simply in the name of rule of propriety advocated in a Sinicised world order. 
Hence the Joseon political elites had few choices but to serve Ming carefully so 
that Joseon would be able to avoid military conflicts with Ming, albeit Taejong 
kept referring to the additional layer in his logic of Sadae: it was Heaven that he 
feared, not Ming – a notion supported by the king’s recurrent remarks 
disrespectful to Yongle Emperor. 
 
4.3 The Reign of Sejong (1418–50) 
 
During his 32 years of rule, Sejong, from time to time, was caught in the dilemma 
of choosing between righteousness and pragmatism when managing the 
Joseon–Ming relations. To Sejong, serving Ming faithfully was undoubtedly a 
virtue (thus an obligation of the vassal state) according to Confucianism, which 
was the state ideology that prevailed in Joseon at the time. Sejong wanted to be 
recognised by the Ming court as a loyal vassal king, as he had been taught to 
abide by the Confucian ethics that it was morally right to serve the great 
whole-heartedly. However, when the consequence of Sadae was negative 
(sometimes even disastrous) to the people of Joseon (though the monarch might 
obtain a favourable name of an exemplar vassal king), Sadae stood opposite to the 
interests of Joseon. A king who ignored his people’s well-being was also not the 
sort of leader Sejong wanted to be – for he did care about his subjects. As a result, 
Sejong would give comments and take actions that were contradicting to what he 
had said and done earlier on the issues related to Joseon–Ming relations. 
Moreover, in the Joseon court, there were always court officials, either the 
loyalists or the rationalists, who supported Sejong’s decisions that were made in 
his pendulum-like fashion. 
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Only five months after Sejong’s enthronement, Jwauijeong Ho Cho (1369–1439) 
expressed his view against that of the loyalists in a court debate on 11 January 
1419. He bluntly refuted the Sadae idea of emulating the political system of Ming 
because he thought the Ming emperor was autocratic thus inefficient in his rule, 
and he even criticised Yongle Emperor for believing in Buddhism. Hence, his 
suggestion to Sejong was that Joseon might emulate some of the Chinese practice, 
but definitely not all. The 22-year-old king agreed with Ho and rejected the 
loyalists’ idea (RDAK, vol. 6, Sejong Sillok, 1955, p.177). Ho Cho again on 3 July 
1423 said to Sejong that Joseon should not follow all the principles of propriety 
practiced in China (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.301). Ho later criticised 
Ming’s legal system on 3 November 1432 and persuaded Sejong not to emulate 
the Chinese practice – and the king agreed with his analysis (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong 
Sillok, 1956, p.215). Ho’s impact on Sejong was profound in the sense that years 
later, when the king explained his administration policy on personnel to the court 
officials on 7 July 1443, he said there were so many things of Ming that Joseon 
should never emulate (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.315–6). 
 
However, Sejong grew up on Confucian classics thus the formation of his 
worldview was heavily influenced by Confucian ethics. On the issue of Sadae, 
Sejong considered it imperative to serve the great simply because it would be 
unethical for the vassal not to serve its suzerain faithfully. Therefore, when Sejong 
had to respond to Yongle Emperor’s edict to purchase 10,000 horses for the first 
time on 21 September 1421, he immediately ordered the court officials to 
assemble this huge amount of horses from the capital area and all provinces of 
Joseon (RDAK, vol. 6, Sejong Sillok, 1955, pp.798–9). For a country that did not 
produce horses (in Taejong’s words), this was a task of great challenge – but in 
lesss than four months, 10,000 horses were sent to Ming on 13 January 1422 
(RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.222). 
 
Yet only a year later, Yongle Emperor ordered to purchase another 10,000 horses 
from Joseon on 1 August 1423 for his military campaign against the Mongols. 
While most of the court officials said Joseon had no choice but to obey the 
imperial order, Ho Cho openly criticised that the emperor had been bellicose and 
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most of what he had done was inhumane. Ho explained to Sejong about the 
immediate and future consequences to Joseon, which he believed to be serious, of 
sending Ming another huge amount of horses, and hence he proposed to cut the 
number by half if Joseon really had to obey the emperor’s order (RDAK, vol. 7, 
Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.304). However, Sejong ordered to assemble horses from 
every household in Joseon and eventually sent 10,000 horses in 17 shipments to 
Ming as required by Yongle Emperor by 16 March 1424 (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong 
Sillok, 1956, p.341). 
 
Sending large amount of horses to Ming had been a political hot potato that 
Sejong had to deal with during his reign. It caused great disturbance to the daily 
life of the Koreans and serious damage to Joseon’s military capability, for horses 
at the time were vital to agriculture and defence. Yet disobeying Ming’s order was 
deemed unethical by Sejong and he was truly reluctant to have his reputation 
tainted by not serving the great faithfully. Sejong later again obeyed the order of 
Xuande Emperor on 21 April 1427 and sent 5,000 horses in nine shipments to 
Ming within only three months by 20 July 1427 (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 
1956, p.534, p.549). However, the imperial order later expanded to further include 
not just horses but also cattle. When the emperor ordered to purchase 10,000 
cattle on 29 May 1432, the pro-righteousness court officials believed that although 
it would likely destroy the farming in Joseon, the court should not ask Ming for 
either exemption or deduction and ought to obey the imperial order simply 
because of the Sadae principles. In Sejong’s view as well, the emperor’s edict 
simply left no other choices to the Joseon court. He finally made the decision on 
11 July 1432 to send 6,000 cattle first and deliver the rest later. By 5 August 1432, 
6,000 cattle in six shipments were sent to Ming, and the other 4,000 were later 
exempted by Xuande Emperor (as the emperor was informed that Joseon was not 
a country to produce cattle) on 6 October 1432 (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, 
p.182, pp.184–5, p.192, p.199, p.210). 
 
Xuande Emperor might appear to be quite considerate in the case of cattle, but he 
was rather rigid on the issue of gerfalcon. The emperor had a special hobby of 
keeping this rare breed of falcon as his pet, and gerfalcon could be found in Korea 
but the number was fairly limited. Whether Joseon should comply with the 
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emperor’s order to send gerfalcons became the topic of debate between Sejong 
and the pro-pragmatism court officials beginning in 1426 and lasted for years until 
1432. In September 1426, the rationalists presented a few reasons of why Joseon 
should not send tribute gerfalcon: first, it was difficult to hunt gerfalcons and 
many of them died after being captured. Second, gerfalcons were rare species and 
Joseon would not be able to keep sending them to China in the long run. Third, 
the emperor ordered the hunting of gerfalcons in China before and it disturbed 
people’s daily life in many Chinese provinces, and the Koreans would suffer in 
the same way if the court obeyed the order. Fourth, Joseon should not obey such 
an inhumane order of the emperor and make its people suffer from it. However, 
Sejong’s view was different: to him, the cardinal principle was to serve Ming with 
utmost sincerity. Since the fact that gerfalcon could be found in Korea was known 
to the emperor, it would be dishonest to deny it. The king said he was well aware 
of the serious consequences of obeying the order to the Koreans, but according to 
the principles of Confucian righteousness, their suffering was minor; serving the 
great faithfully was a lot more important by comparison. Moreover, it was not 
appropriate for a vassal state to comment whether the decision of the emperor was 
morally right or not (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.509). 
 
In July 1427, in his response to the proposal of Saheonbu (Office of Inspector 
General, љᏦ۬ ) that pledged to stop sending tribute gerfalcons, Sejong 
compared how much the Koreans had greatly suffered resulted from the sending 
of 25,000 horses in the previous years, and concluded that the burdens put on the 
Koreans this time was only a small fraction of it – they were merely sending some 
gerfalcons to the Ming court. Sadae was the most important task and hence the 
tribute gerfalcons must be sent (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.550). Sejong 
even felt uneasy when the captured gerfalcons were not able to be delivered to 
Ming simply because the tribute route was blocked by the Jurchen tribes in 
November 1428 (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.622). As a result, in April 
1430, Xuande Emperor praised Sejong for serving the great with utmost sincerity, 
as the king never disobeyed a single imperial order (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 
1956, p.21). 
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However, when the hunting of gerfalcons became a heavier burden to the Koreans 
in 1431 and 1432, the local government officials of Hamgyong Province, upset by 
witnessing the suffering of the Koreans on one hand and encouraged by the 
rationalists in the Joseon court on the other, deliberately released the captured 
gerfalcons. Such action soon led to the decline in number of the gerfalcons 
captured, which made the Ming envoy start to hunt gerfalcons by themselves in 
Hamgyong Province. Sejong scolded those local officials who made the decision 
on their own to release the captured gerfalcons, for he believed that their 
behaviour had led to two serious consequences: first, it provided the Ming court 
with an excuse to send hunting teams directly to Joseon since the Koreans were 
not able to catch gerfalcons, and the daily life of the Koreans and the 
administration of local governments would be greatly disturbed. Second, Sejong 
could not tolerate that his reputation of Sadae was tainted by such dishonest 
behaviour. The king emotionally said to his court officials that he could swear to 
Heaven that his allegiance to the Chinese emperor was always kept at the highest 
level, but now he was disgraced. Sejong then issued an order to the officials of 
Hamgyong Province that no captured gerfalcons could be released and they must 
be sent to Ming immediately. The king also intended to punish those local 
officials, only gave up the thought while being bombarded by the rationalists’ idea 
that pragmatism was imperative for a national leader to effectively rule his 
country. Though Sejong was terribly upset about his tainted reputation, he was 
also deeply troubled by the fact that his people were heavily burdened with 
Ming’s orders for livestock before and now gerfalcons. It became often that the 
king was not able to fall asleep well after midnight, still staying in the palace in 
which he worked in daytime (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.127, 
pp.217–8). 
 
Such dilemma was a proof to indicate that Sejong was also carrying pragmatic 
thoughts in dealing with Ming. In fact, the king did take actions to protect 
Joseon’s interests in some cases. One of them was about the tribute gold and 
silver. Since the reign of Taejong, the Koreans had been suffering from extracting 
gold and silver because no matter how hard they tried the search usually ended up 
with fruitless result – Joseon was actually not a country with rich mineral reserve 
of gold and silver (RDAK, vol. 4, Taejong Sillok, 1954, p.137, p.163, p.332). On 
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18 August 1429, Sejong wrote in his memorial to the throne to ask for the 
exemption of paying tribute gold and silver. Though the head of Ming Ministry of 
Personnel objected to Sejong’s request, Xuande Emperor agreed to exempt 
Joseon’s duty to send tribute gold and silver permanently. After receiving the 
edict on 13 December 1429, Sejong was glad but he reiterated his conviction of 
doing anything possible to serve the great wholeheartedly. He later asked the 
court officials whether Joseon should send horses instead as substitute tribute 
every year to Ming – only was refuted by Ho Cho again and the idea was 
abandoned (RDAK, vol. 7, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.663–4, pp.676–9). 
 
Another example to prove Sejong’s willingness to employ pragmatism was the 
issue of dealing with the Ming envoy. It happened from time to time that some of 
the Ming embassy members would ask for gifts of different sorts from the Joseon 
court when they were staying in the country, and the Joseon officials would fulfil 
their requests most of the time in order to please them. Xuande Emperor 
considered it as an act of blackmail and in his December 1429 edict he forbade the 
Joseon court to give any gifts to the Ming envoy. However, in August 1430 when 
a Ming envoy was sent to Joseon, two of the senior embassy members demanded 
favours from the Joseon officials by threatening to smear the king and the court in 
front of the emperor after they returned to China. When the loyalists followed the 
emperor’s order and refused to bribe them, the Ming envoys were enraged. At 
first, Sejong thought it was right to refuse their requests – he believed that Joseon 
should not be dishonest and disobey the emperor’s order, even at the costs of 
being slandered by these corrupted Ming envoys. Yet a while later, Sejong gave 
the order to fulfil the demands of the Ming envoys with the reason that he had to 
think pragmatically to safeguard Joseon and its people’s interests; blindly 
adhering to the Confucian ethics of righteousness would not work in this case – as 
usual, he did not simply issue the order without repeatedly emphasising his firm 
belief in serving the great faithfully (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.678, 
p.39, p.72, p.127). 
 
A typical manifestation of Sejong’s pro-pragmatism tendency was his creation of 
the Joseon Hangul (ᗬӷ, Korean alphabet, which remained in use until today) in 
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late 1443 (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.358). After years of observation, 
Sejong came to realise that the language of Chinese (written Chinese in particular) 
was too difficult for the Joseon commoners to read and write. The king believed 
that if the literacy level of the Koreans was to be increased, a simpler set of 
alphabets would be needed such that basic education would be popularised among 
the commoners. However, at a time when using the language of Chinese was a 
symbol to express loyalty to Ming, Sejong’s creation of Hangul was unthinkable 
to the loyalists. Headed by Choe Malli (a deputy minister responsible for 
education), the loyalists severely criticised Sejong’s creation as a regression of 
civilisation by which Joseon would be reduced to a state of barbarian. They were 
shocked by Sejong’s decision as they saw it as an act to defy Ming. Not using the 
language of the suzerain but a language the vassal created by itself was an outright 
violation of the Confucian principles of propriety thus it was morally wrong. 
Nonetheless, Sejong defended his decision with the reason that Hangul was 
designed for the benefits of the Koreans: every commoner would have the 
opportunity to be educated. He criticised the loyalists for their lack of in-depth 
understanding of Joseon’s state affairs and a long-term vision for the benefits of 
Joseon. The king even put Choe Malli and other court officials who were openly 
opposed to his decision in jail – although for one day only – simply as a warning 
to other loyalists (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.368–9). 
 
Sejong later officially introduced Hangul as the language to be used by Joseon 
commoners on 29 September 1446, and Donggukjeongun (ܿ୯҅ᜩ), a book of 
six volumes about the phonetic system of Hangul was compiled and sent for mass 
printing on 29 September 1447 (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.529–30, 
pp.585–6). On 8 November 1446, Eonmuncheong (the Ministry of Hangul, ᒆЎ
᡺), was also established for further researches of the newly created language 
(RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.539) – but it was later abolished by 
Jungjong, the pro-righteousness king who served Ming with extraordinary 
sincerity, on 4 September 1506 – only two days after his enthronement (RDAK, 
vol. 20, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.4). 
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In spite of his occasional pragmatic thoughts, Sejong did concern so much about 
his reputation about Sadae. He was delighted to hear the words of Ming envoy 
praising Joseon as a country of Confucian propriety and righteousness by 
emulating everything in China (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.415). To a 
certain extent, Sejong deserved such praise because he had been actively 
involving himself in every issue related to Sadae (RDAK, vol. 8, Sejong Sillok, 
1956, p.188). However, Sejong found himself caught in the dilemma of choosing 
between pro-righteousness and pro-pragmatism again (and for the last time) 
during Ming’s Tumu Crisis in 1449 (a year before his death). 
 
When the news of the Tumu Crisis reached the Joseon court, Sejong ordered to 
dispatch a special mission to Ming on 19 August 1449 for the purpose of showing 
Joseon’s allegiance to Ming: even when Ming was in such national crisis, Joseon 
pledged to serve Ming and would never serve the Oirat Mongols – and Sejong 
believed that this was why Joseon was popularly renowned for its sincerity in 
Sadae (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.691), for which he lectured the court 
officials that a minister should not employ pragmatism when serving his prince; 
he should serve with pure honesty and sincerity. However, Sejong did something 
exactly opposite to what he said three weeks later: an edict of Zhengtong Emperor 
arrived in Joseon on 9 September, in which the emperor instructed Sejong to send 
more than 100,000 well-trained soldiers to support Ming’s military campaign 
against the Oirat Mongols. Considering the consequence of obeying this imperial 
order to Joseon, Sejong secretly kept the edict for himself and did not announce to 
the Joseon court – hence, no Joseon troops were sent to Ming (RDAK, vol. 9, 
Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.695). 
 
On 29 September, Sejong came to know that the Ming forces were completely 
defeated. The king then decided to dispatch two special missions to Ming 
immediately: one to console the Ming court for the capture of Zhengtong Emperor 
by the Oirat Mongols, and the other one to congratulate the enthronement of 
Jingtai Emperor (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.696). Yet three weeks later, 
when they learned that the Oirat Mongols were planning to return Zhengtong 
Emperor to China, Sejong and the court officials became panic about what they 
should do next – with two living emperors there could be a fight between the two 
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to compete for the throne – but the first worry of Sejong and the court officials 
was the calendar era: they were not certain about which emperor’s regnal year 
should be adopted in the official documents to be sent to the Ming court. The final 
decision of Sejong was to instruct the Joseon envoy to pretend that they had no 
idea about the return of Zhengtong Emperor, and to leave the regnal year of 
Jingtai Emperor on the documents (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.698). 
 
However, the real problem came two months later. On 22 December 1449, the 
Joseon envoy returned with an imperial edict from Jingtai Emperor: the Joseon 
court was ordered to dispatch troops and 20,000 to 30,000 horses to support 
Ming’s military campaign against the Mongols. The rationalists proposed to send 
5,000 horses, but Sejong thought that at this moment of Ming’s unprecedented 
crisis, the Ming court would question Joseon’s loyalty in Sadae if Joseon was not 
able to fully comply with the imperial order. The king then invoked two historical 
examples: the Silla court sent envoy to console Emperor Xuanzong of Tang when 
the emperor fled to Sichuan due to the An Lushan Rebellion, and the Goryeo 
court kept paying tribute to Southern Song even the envoy had to cross the sea (as 
the original tribute route on land was controlled by the Jurchens). Hence, this was 
exactly the moment to prove Joseon’s allegiance to Ming. Sejong nevertheless 
suggested the number of 10,000 instead, considering the negative consequences to 
Joseon and its people (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, p.701). 
 
Situation then changed for both better and worse on 5 January 1450: the emperor 
exempted the dispatch of Joseon troops as the Ming forces had expelled the 
Mongol cavalry from China, but the emperor ordered the Joseon court to send 
Ming 30,000 horses or more. Moreover, Jingtai Emperor added a reminder: 
Sejong must obey the imperial order to show Joseon’s loyalty in serving Ming. 
Pressed by the rationalists and influenced by his own pragmatic thoughts, Sejong 
reluctantly decided to send only 5,000 horses to Ming on 11 January and a special 
envoy was sent to the Ming court to explain the reason. Yet two days later, Sejong 
felt intensively uneasy about failing to send horses to Ming with the amount 
required by the newly enthroned emperor. The king ordered his ministers to 
carefully choose the 5,000 horses, and the first shipment of 500 horses (the Joseon 
Ministry of Rite actually suggested 100 horses only, but was rejected by Sejong) 
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was sent on 21 January 1450 (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.703–4). 
Anyway, the sending of 5,000 horses, together with tribute missions, had caused 
serious troubles to the Koreans who lived in the province of Pyongan that 
bordered Ming China (RDAK, vol. 9, Sejong Sillok, 1956, pp.707–9). 
 
Throughout his reign, Sejong was frequently torn between the Confucian ethics of 
propriety and the pragmatic concerns of political reality. He viewed it as his 
obligation to serve the great in a world order ruled by Confucian propriety thus he 
must prioritise Ming’s interests, yet he also considered it his duty to protect the 
interests of Joseon and its people as the leader of the country. When these two 
interests diverged, Sejong had to choose one between the two; yet it always turned 
out to be a painful decision for the king to abandon the other – he was sometimes 
a loyalist, yet he was a rationalist some other times, for which he was segmented 
in the category of the ‘in-betweens’. 
 
4.4 The Reign of Sejo (1455–68) 
 
Sejo was another Joseon king who ascended the throne through coup d'état. On 10 
October 1453, Sejo launched a coup against his own nephew, Danjong, and acted 
as a de facto ruler for two years (RDAK, vol.12, Munjong/Danjong Sillok, 1957, 
pp.410–4). On the 11th day of the intercalary June in 1455, Sejo forced the 
14-year-old king to abdicate (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, pp.7–8), put the 
dethroned king in exile, and had him executed on 21 October 1457 (RDAK, vol. 
13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.181). 
 
On the Joseon–Ming relations, Sejo adopted the ideas of Yang Song-ji (1415–82), 
his favourite court official, since the beginning of his reign. On 5 July 1455 (less 
than a month after Sejo took the throne), Yang suggested to Sejo that: first, if the 
king wished to take reference on the way of ruling, he should learn from the 
previous Joseon kings instead of the emperors of China. Second, except the 
dressing code of the court officials, Joseon did not have to emulate everything of 
China – and this also applied to the issue of language: except for the interpreters, 
people of Joseon should speak Korean instead of Chinese. Third, Joseon should 
reduce the number of tribute missions to Ming so that the Koreans’ life would not 
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be disturbed. After reading Yang’s proposal, Sejo praised Yang’s ideas and 
endorsed his recommendations (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, pp.16–18). 
 
Although he did not serve Ming whole-heartedly according to the Confucian 
principles of propriety, Sejo did not hesitate to apply the hierarchical concept of 
‘senior–junior’ to Joseon’s relations with other less-civilised countries. On 29 July 
1457, Sejo openly claimed that Japan and Jurchen were Joseon’s vassal states and 
the Japanese and the Jurchens were his subjects (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, 
p.163). On 13 April 1458, Sejo further announced that as long as the barbarians 
served Joseon sincerely (and he said they would because he believed that the 
barbarians deeply admired Joseon), he would look after their benefits as a senior 
ought to (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.217). To put his words in action, 
Sejo later met with the Jurchen missions, conferred titles to their tribal leaders, 
and bestowed gifts on them, even though a special envoy from Ming came to 
Joseon on 8 April 1459 at the order of Tianshun Emperor to warn Sejo for his 
unsanctioned association with the Jurchens. On one hand the king told the Jurchen 
missions that he wished to establish amicable relations with their tribes despite 
that Ming did not approve of his decision; on the other he explained to the Joseon 
court officials that he did it for the benefits of Joseon because by doing so the 
Jurchens would be more hostile to Ming but become deeply obliged to Joseon – 
thus maintaining peace with Joseon (RDAK, vol. 13, Sejo Sillok, 1957, pp.269–72). 
Furthermore, Sejo later issued an order that protected the Jurchens’ interests but 
violated Ming’s instruction: it had been the order of the Ming court to Joseon that 
if any Chinese, who were seized by the Jurchens and became their slaves, escaped 
from Jurchen and entered Joseon, the Joseon court should immediately send these 
Chinese back to Ming. However, Sejo boldly defied Ming’s instruction and 
ordered the return of those Chinese escapees to the Jurchens if their Jurchen 
masters approached the Joseon officials at the border to inquire their whereabouts 
within 10 days (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.54). 
 
Nonetheless, when the Jurchens later started to make harassing raids in the border 
territories of Joseon, Sejo was not reluctant to use military forces to punish the 
disobedient junior. In early August 1467, while also being annoyed by the 
Jurchens, the Ming court planned to launch a military campaign against the 
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Jurchens (RDAK, vol. 14, Sejo Sillok, 1957, pp.232–3). When Chenghua 
Emperor’s imperial edict finally arrived at the Joseon court on 14 September, Sejo 
immediately mobilised an army of 10,000 Joseon soldiers to participate in Ming’s 
campaign against the Jurchens (RDAK, vol. 14, Sejo Sillok, 1957, pp.241–3). 
 
It should be noted that even for an operation like this, in which the Joseon troops 
were supposed to collaborate with the Ming forces, Sejo instructed the Joseon 
commanding general before his departure: 1) if the Ming commander suggested 
the Joseon soldiers to be merged with the Ming troops, he should refuse with the 
reasons that Joseon soldiers did not understand Chinese language and by the order 
of Sejo, the Joseon army was responsible for providing assistance only after the 
main strike against the enemy; 2) if the Ming commander asked for more Joseon 
troops, he should refuse with the reason that Sejo believed an army of 10,000 
soldiers was sufficient to defeat the Jurchens; 3) if the Ming forces were unable to 
crush the Jurchen cavalry, he should hold the Joseon regiment and avoid engaging 
the Jurchens directly. He must wait until the Ming troops were likely to win the 
battle and then attack – eventually, Sejo’s plan was not necessary to be carried out 
because the Ming–Joseon Joint Forces defeated the Jurchen within two weeks of 
time. On 10 October, Sejo was delighted to know that the Joseon troops 
successfully attacked the enemy stronghold on 26 September and killed the 
Jurchen leader and his son (RDAK, vol. 14, Sejo Sillok, 1957, p.236, pp.251–2). 
 
During the 13 years of Sejo’s rule, Sadae was practiced basically as a ritual 
between Joseon and Ming. Joseon tribute missions, regular or ad hoc, were 
dispatched to China strictly according to the rules of the tribute system – no more, 
no less. The Ming court duly issued investitures to confirm the legitimacy of the 
key Joseon royal members that included even Sejo, who questionably enthroned 
himself. Sejo did not serve Ming enthusiastically because he did not think it was 
necessary for him to do so: in reality the Ming court focused more on its domestic 
issues under the rule of Tianshun Emperor thus barely interfered with the vassal 
states’ affairs and posed no threat to Joseon. After all, the king himself was a 
pragmatic ruler – in his logic, Joseon’s purpose to serve the great was to obtain 
what he or his country was entitled to out of this ideational system of the 
Sinocentric order. The way of Sejo’s Sadae indicated that in his view, his personal 
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interests or Joseon’s national interests were much more important than those of 
Ming – hence the great was indeed to be used, not merely to be served. 
 
4.5 The Reign of Seongjong (1469–94) 
 
During Seongjong’s reign, serving the great and safeguarding Joseon’s interests 
also appeared to be incompatible from time to time. Seongjong, with experience 
similar to that of Sejong, often faced the dilemma of making the choice between 
morality and strategy – and this again provided the loyalists and the rationalists 
with the opportunities to compete against each other over the making of Joseon’s 
policies towards Ming. 
 
Seongjong also believed in the importance of Confucian propriety, and he was 
serious about serving Ming faithfully as well. In July 1484, he approved the 
proposal of Han Chi-hyeong (1434–1502), the pro-righteousness head of 
Saheonbu, that Joseon should voluntarily send Ming more tribute goods that could 
be collected easily. Since Joseon’s request to be exempted from paying tribute 
gold and silver was granted by the Ming emperor (interpreted by the loyalists as 
an example of how the senior kindly looked after the junior), Seongjong agreed 
that Joseon ought to be grateful hence they should send more of other tribute 
goods as compensation to Ming (RDAK, vol. 17, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.188). 
In general, Seongjong endeavoured to follow every practice of Ming, for which 
Joseon was highly regarded as Sojunghwa by the Ming envoy (RDAK, vol. 17, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.550). 
 
In order to serve Ming sincerely, Seongjong even went to great lengths to correct 
the improper practice of his predecessor (i.e. Sejo) on the issue of returning the 
Chinese escapees from Jurchen who entered Joseon’s territory. On 12 February 
1477, Seongjong received the report of an incident that a Chinese who got away 
from Jurchen arrived in a border city of Joseon. The Joseon officials at the border 
detained the Chinese escapee but then sent him back to Jurchen. Seongjong 
criticised the way those officials handled the case because they were supposed to 
send the Chinese escapee to China instead of Jurchen according to Ming’s 
instruction. Their decision thus violated Ming’s regulation and the principles of 
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propriety in the practice of Sadae, for which the king decided to punish those 
officials (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.18). A month later, some 
rationalists explained to Seongjong that it was Sejo who issued the order to bend 
the rules (i.e. the Chinese escapees to be returned to Jurchen if their Jurchen 
masters came to inquire their whereabouts within 10 days): Sejo’s concern was 
border security – if Joseon did not return the escapees, the Jurchens would be 
enraged and then they would attack the Joseon border. However, Seongjong did 
not think so. In his view, the Joseon border being attacked by the Jurchens was 
only a minor issue; by comparison, the Joseon court being reprimanded by the 
emperor for disobeying imperial orders was a much more serious problem. 
Seongjong thus ordered that from then on, the Chinese escapees must not be 
returned to Jurchen (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.27–28). 
 
Nevertheless, the rationalists did not give up. In early May, they debated against 
the loyalists on the ground that border security was an important issue sufficient 
to warrant Sejo’s decision to alter Ming’s regulation. The loyalists refuted the 
rationalists’ argument by stressing the importance of Confucian ethics: Joseon as 
a vassal state should unwaveringly obey any order issued by Ming without 
employing the insincere thoughts of pragmatism. Seongjong chose to support the 
loyalists, saying that Sejo’s practice must be corrected. At the time of the debate, 
reports from Joseon border arrived: more Chinese escapees had entered Joseon’s 
territory. The rationalists then made use of the situation and put greater pressure 
on Seongjong, but the king refused to change his mind. He said that even if 
Joseon and Jurchen went into war, Jurchen had nothing but fury; Joseon however, 
possessed righteousness thus Joseon’s action would be justified – yet Seongjong 
was not blind to the negative consequences to Joseon if war occurred between the 
two. He issued another order to the military commander at the border and 
instructed him to explain to the Jurchens that it was morally not right that the 
Jurchens captured the Chinese and enslaved them, and that Joseon returned the 
escapees to Ming was something Joseon had to do, according to the ethical 
principles of Sadae – such decision was indeed made against Joseon’s wish. At 
the same time, the king also gave the instruction to enhance border defence, in 
case the Jurchens could not understand Joseon’s situation (RDAK, vol. 16, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.54–55). 
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In spite of his adherence to the Confucian principles while practicing Sadae, it did 
not necessarily mean that Seongjong lacked the mentality of pragmatism. The 
pragmatic thoughts drew Seongjong’s attention to the well-being of Joseon and its 
people, which pushed the king into the dilemma of choosing Sadae or protecting 
Joseon’s interests. The most typical example was found in the late 1470s, when 
Chenghua Emperor launched a military campaign against Jurchen, and Joseon 
was ordered to dispatch troops to assist Ming. On 23 August 1478, the Joseon 
court received the information that Chenghua Emperor was planning a military 
campaign against Jurchen. During the first debate in the Joseon court about 
whether Joseon should obey Ming’s order to send troops to join the invasion, the 
rationalists presented their analysis: first, people living in the Pyongan Province 
(that bordered China) had been suffering from famine for years, and Joseon 
simply could not afford to have unrest in this region. Second, if Ming defeated 
Jurchen, benefits of victory would go to Ming instead of Joseon; if Ming was 
defeated by Jurchen, it would be inevitable for Joseon to share the losses. Third, 
winning or losing, Joseon would have a new enemy (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong 
Sillok, 1958, p.245–7). 
 
Seongjong also noticed that Joseon did not have the capability at the time to 
provide Ming with any military assistance, but he believed it was unethical to 
disobey Ming’s order. The loyalists, headed by Yeonguijeong Jeong Chang-son 
(1402–87, one of those who were opposed to Sejong’s creation of Hangul) and No 
Sa-sin (1427–98, one of the senior court officials), insisted that Joseon should not 
disobey Ming’s order because Ming had been very kind to Joseon. However, the 
rationalists, led by Yi Geuk-bae (1422–95, student of Ho Cho, and he was later 
promoted to Yeonguijeong), criticised that the loyalists’ blind obedience had made 
them ignorant about Joseon’s real situation. When Seongjong expressed his worry 
that Joseon’s disobedience might enrage the Ming court, Yi Geuk-bae responded 
that he did not think Ming would attack Joseon simply because Ming was upset. 
Seongjong then asked whether it was possible to give a positive reply to Ming but 
hold the troops within the Joseon border for the moment. Yi Geuk-bae believed 
that it was a feasible tactic and there was nothing wrong about it from a military 
strategic point of view (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.248). 
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The debate lasted for over a year, and in spite of the rationalists’ strong objection, 
Seongjong finally decided to go with the loyalists but the reason was that he could 
not find any convincing excuse to disobey Ming’s order. The king then suggested 
that Joseon should send 10,000 soldiers to join Ming’s campaign (RDAK, vol. 16, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.373–4). Yet the rationalists kept writing to Seongjong 
that the fight between Ming and Jurchen was no different from a quarrel between 
one’s neighbours, and what one should wisely do was to close his door and stayed 
out of the fight. It hence would be an act of stupidity for Joseon to sacrifice the 
lives of its own people for the benefits of other country. Joining Ming’s campaign 
would destroy the non-antagonistic relations between Joseon and Jurchen, which 
would bring disasters to Joseon in the long run. The pragmatic thoughts gradually 
changed Seongjong’s mind, and the king began to incline to the option of 
postponing the date of Joseon troops’ departure for Ming (RDAK, vol. 16, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.378–9). 
 
On the 9th day of the intercalary October in 1479, Seongjong appointed General 
Eo Yu-so (1434–89, one of the rationalists who was opposed to sending Joseon 
troops to join Ming’s campaign) as the commander-in-chief of the Joseon 
regiment with 10,000 soldiers and granted him full authority to make decisions in 
the field (i.e. General Eo was allowed to act without having to ask for 
Seongjong’s approval). The appointment of a pro-pragmatism general was an 
unusual move of the king, and the explicitly mentioned remarks about leaving all 
decisions to be made by General Eo simply added to the suspicion that Seongjong 
might not wish the Joseon troops to engage the Jurchen cavalry in the battlefield 
(RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, p.380). 
 
Two days later, Chenghua Emperor’s edict arrived in the Joseon court, in which 
the emperor’s order of requiring the dispatch of Joseon troops was announced. 
Seongjong then expressed his concern about the weather to the Ming envoy, 
saying that it would be a huge disadvantage for the Joseon troops to march in 
heavy snow. Besides, the logistics of supplying food and equipment would be 
extremely difficult in winter. Although the Ming envoy repeatedly explained the 
need of strategic deployment and insisted that the Joseon troops must meet with 
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the Ming forces on 25th of the month, Seongjong kept saying that it was too soon, 
especially with the poor weather. Eventually, the Ming envoy had to leave with 
frustration caused by Seongjong’s circumlocutory remarks (RDAK, vol. 16, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.380–1). Seongjong later sent a message on 21st of the 
month to Eo Yu-so, expressing the king’s deep worry about the safety of the 
Joseon soldiers in such an adverse weather (heavy snow started on the 20th), and 
asked the general not to attack recklessly and to retreat if necessary. Seongjong 
reminded Eo to judge the situation cautiously and try to achieve the ultimate goal 
of minimising the loss of Joseon soldiers (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, 
p.386). 
 
On 13 November 1479, the Joseon court received Eo’s report that the general 
ordered a halt of the Joseon regiment’s march at the waterfront of the Yalu River 
on the Korean side. Eo’s reason was that the water had not completely frozen so it 
was difficult for the troops to cross the river. The loyalists soon gathered in the 
court to fiercely condemn Eo’s decision, saying that the Ming court would not 
accept such ‘ridiculous’ excuse and Eo had totally damaged Joseon’s reputation as 
a faithful vassal in the practice of Sadae. However, Seongjong silenced the 
loyalists by saying that his conscience would not allow him to send those Joseon 
soldiers to die, even though he was aware that Joseon would be reprimanded by 
Ming for violating Confucian ethics. Seongjong then sent a special mission to 
Ming to explain Eo’s decision by the difficulties of: first, crossing the river by 
boat was unlikely because there were blocks of ice floating in the river. Second, 
the Koreans did not know how to make floating bridges (RDAK, vol. 16, 
Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.392–3). 
 
On 18 November, the loyalists called for punishing Eo Yu-so, pressed Seongjong 
to order the crossing of Yalu River, and reminded the king again of the serious 
consequences of cheating. Feeling uneasy about violating Confucian ethics, 
Seongjong finally agreed to order 3,000 instead of 10,000 soldiers, under the 
command of Jwauijeong Yun P'il-sang (1427–1504, one of the loyalists), to cross 
the Yalu River. Yet the pro-rationalist Saganwon tried again the next day, telling 
Seongjong about the negative consequences of sending Joseon soldiers to join 
Ming’s military campaign. The king refused to change his order, defending it with 
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the Confucian ethics of righteousness. However, Seongjong found himself deeply 
troubled by the dilemma. He expressed his painful thoughts openly in the court 
that he felt terribly sad about having to send Joseon soldiers to the battlefield 
because he could not defy Ming’s order (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, 
pp.394–7). 
 
On 20 December 1479, Seongjong received the report of Yun P'il-sang about a 
successful raid he orchestrated against the Jurchens. The king was deliriously 
happy to know that 1,000 Joseon soldiers participated in the raid and the total 
death toll was only three. While the loyalists kept pressing Seongjong to penalise 
Eo Yu-so, the king only suspended the general from active duty and refused to 
further punish him. At the end, the rationalists still kept criticising Sadae by such 
a way that risked people’s lives and drained the country’s resources (RDAK, vol. 
16, Seongjong Sillok, 1958, pp.409–11); yet in the Ming court, Seongjong and the 
loyalists were highly praised and rewarded for serving Ming sincerely, as seen in 
Chenghua Emperor’s edict to Joseon on 1 May 1480 (RDAK, vol. 16, Seongjong 
Sillok, 1958, p.433). 
 
Owing to Ming’s military power that had won its victory in the campaign against 
the Jurchen, Seongjong’s pragmatic ideas and actions were downplayed thus 
neglected by the Ming court; plus Seongjong’s past record of faithful Sadae, the 
king and the rationalists thus were able to escape from Ming’s chastisement. 
Nevertheless, Seongjong and the loyalists did plant another seed of hatred in the 
hearts of the Jurchens – it was therefore not unreasonable to say that Joseon’s 
long-term national interest to maintain peace with the ferocious Jurchens, to a 
certain extent, was jeopardised by its Sadae towards Ming. This could be viewed 
as an example to prove that the practice of Sadae did not necessarily ensure 
Joseon’s national security, which explained why some Joseon kings, such as 
Sejong and Seongjong, found it so difficult to choose between righteousness and 
pragmatism. 
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4.6 The Reign of Yeonsangun (1494–1506) 
 
Yeonsangun’s reign was largely characterised by the domestic turmoils of 
political purges and his tyrannical rule. However, evidence could still be found to 
prove that sincerity of the Joseon court to serve Ming was reduced to the level of 
encouraging the act of deception – lying to the Ming court outright. The 
justification was simple: Joseon’s national interests outweighed those of Ming. 
 
The most typical example took place in 1503, a time when Joseon became famous 
for its technique to produce strong bows and arrows. Hongzhi Emperor of Ming 
came to be aware of this reputation of Joseon and he ordered to purchase bows 
and arrows made in Joseon. When the Ming envoy arrived in Hanseong on 20 
April 1503, Yeonguijeong Sung Jun (1436–1504) presented his analysis to 
Yeonsangun: strong bows and arrows were imperative to Joseon’s national 
security. If the technique was released to the Chinese, Joseon would lose the 
advantage of defending the country with such kind of secret weapons against 
probable invasion of Ming in future. Hence, he suggested that the king should 
order the Joseon manufacturers not to make the weapons as strong as they ought 
to be; to simply make them look nice would be good enough to mislead the Ming 
envoy. Yeonsangun approved Sung’s suggestion immediately, only having to 
withdraw his approval after being opposed by the loyalists who believed that it 
would be morally wrong to deceive the Ming emperor (RDAK, vol. 19, 
Yeonsangun Diaries, 1958, pp.634–5). 
 
Two days later, Sung Jun and a couple of his supporters approached Yeonsangun 
again. This time he pointed to the concept of Sadae, saying that there was a 
difference between a minister serving his prince and a vassal serving its suzerain. 
They looked alike but in fact they were different: a minister should follow his 
prince even if the country perished. A vassal, however, should not perish together 
with the fall of its suzerain, and hence it would be absolutely reasonable for a 
vassal to keep some of its secrets and not to reveal everything to its suzerain. 
Convinced by Sung’s comparison of propriety and strategy, Yeonsangun issued 
the final order of not to make the bows and arrows as strong as they should be for 
the Chinese. Moreover, he seriously warned the Joseon interpreters that they 
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would be punished if they failed to keep his order from the Ming envoy (RDAK, 
vol. 19, Yeonsangun Diaries, 1958, p.635). 
 
Therefore, it was evident that over a century after the founding of the Joseon 
dynasty, the Confucian concept of Sadae still had not been truly established in the 
mindset of the Joseon political elites. In spite of the prevalence of Confucianism 
in Joseon, to those such as Yeonsangun and Sung Jun, it was simply not necessary 
for a vassal like Joseon to serve its suzerain in the way a loyal minister served his 
prince. On the surface, they would strive to make the king’s memorial to the 
throne as exquisite as possible such that no other vassal states would be able to 
match with Joseon’s utmost sincerity in Sadae (RDAK, vol. 19, Yeonsangun 
Diaries, 1958, p.509); yet they would also disobey the imperial orders by lying 
and cheating with little hesitation. To those who opted for pragmatism, normative 
obligations were excluded from consideration when making foreign policy, and 
national interests remained as their primary concern. Prioritisation of pursuing 
national interests was the result of rationally and cautiously weighing the benefits 
againsts the costs, instead of invariably following the ethical principles of 
Confucian propriety. 
 
4.7 The Reign of Jungjong (1506–44) 
 
During Jungjong’s reign, the loyalists, championed by the king himself, had been 
instrumental to the successful implementation of ideational Sadae. Though met 
with persistent objections from the rationalists, Jungjong tirelessly defended the 
loyalists’ stance of pro-righteousness and served Ming faithfully. 
 
To Jungjong and the loyalists, rule of propriety (Sadae in particular) was crucial 
to the survival and prosperity of Joseon (RDAK, vol. 21, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, 
p.283), for which the Joseon court issued order to print Confucianism classics for 
nationwide distribution and to facilitate the establishment of bookstores so that all 
of the Koreans would be able to learn Confucianism (RDAK, vol. 21, Jungjong 
Sillok, 1959, p.415). On the issue of dispatching tribute missions, the Joseon court 
always kept the schedule punctually such that the Joseon embassy would reach 
Beijing on time, or sometimes even earlier than the local (i.e. the provincial) 
102 
 
Chinese delegations (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, p.204). As for 
Jungjong himself, in order to demonstrate his utmost sincerity towards the Ming 
emperor, he went to the extreme detail as to pick and check the tribute horses in 
person before they were sent to China (RDAK, vol. 20, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, 
p.548), and to ask people with outstanding skill of calligraphy to sign for him on 
his memorials to the throne (RDAK, vol. 20, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, pp.650–1) – 
for the king believed that a tribute horse with flaw or a signature with poor 
handwriting would show disrespect to the Son of Heaven. 
 
During Jungjong’s reign, ideational Sadae was typically exhibited in two Joseon 
practices: first, taking voluntary actions. Without any imperial edicts or official 
notices from the Ming court, Joseon would take voluntary actions in any 
occasions that Jungjong and the loyalists considered necessary (as a result of 
which, many ad hoc tribute missions were dispatched to Ming in addition to the 
regular ones). Second, responding to controversial issues. Jungjong would send 
special tribute missions to Ming to support the emperor on issues that the Joseon 
court was not supposed to (in fact, other vassal states or even the Chinese 
governors of local provinces would choose to remain silent in those occasions). 
 
On 2 October 1528, the Ming empress passed away. The Ming court did not 
inform Joseon of the empress’ death, but a Joseon tribute embassy that happened 
to be in Beijing at the moment sent a letter to Jungjong and reported the news. 
Upon receiving the letter on 26 November, although without precedent, Jungjong 
approved the proposal raised by Yejo that in memory of the deceased empress, 
Joseon should voluntarily cease all trading activities in the market, forbid all 
forms of entertainment and the slaughtering of animals, and suspend wedding 
ceremonies for three days (RDAK, vol. 22, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.581). 
 
Another example took place in 1539. When the news of Jiajing Emperor’s tour to 
the southern province of Huguang (to bury the empress dowager) reached the 
Joseon court in February, Jungjong immediately suggested the despatch of a 
special mission to Huguang to inquire after the emperor’s health. In the following 
three months, the rationalists were strongly opposed to the king’s suggestion with 
the reasons of: 1) lack of precedent: a vassal state never sent tribute mission on 
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such occasion; 2) travelling expenditure: Huguang was located in the hinterland 
that was far from Beijing; and 3) potential problems in future: once started, Joseon 
would have to dispatch a special mission to Ming every time when the emperor 
travelled to places far away from Beijing (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, 
pp.94–95, p.100, pp.106–7, pp.119–22, pp.127–9, pp.132–4). 
 
However, Jungjong did not give in and kept debating with them on the ground 
that: 1) Sadae should be faithfully practiced according to the principles of 
propriety at all costs; 2) a vassal state should never comment on the behaviour of 
the Ming emperor (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, p.95, pp.127–8). 
Eventually, Jungjong and the court officials compromised on the solution of 
sending a special mission, which was to be combined with another tribute mission 
for cost-saving, to Beijing (instead of Huguang) on 16 May to inquire after Jiajing 
Emperor’s health after his return to the capital city. As a result, this special 
mission greatly pleased Jiajing Emperor, which in turn reinforced Jungjong’s 
determination to practice Sadae wholeheartedly (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 
1960, p.134, p.181, p.183). A similar incident happened in 1542. After receiving a 
letter on 17 November written by the Joseon Cheonchusa in Beijing and knowing 
that Jiajing Emperor survived in an attempted assassination, Jungjong, after a 
month-long debate with the rationalists, managed to dispatch a special envoy to 
inquire after the emperor’s health on 28 December (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong 
Sillok, 1960, pp.478–81, p.486). 
 
Throughout his reign, Jungjong tried not to miss any opportunities to send special 
tribute missions to Ming, even on occasions that were highly controversial in 
China. When Jungjong became aware of the decade-long Great Rites Controversy 
in Ming (against his ministers who were orthodox Confucian scholar-officials, 
Jiajing Emperor elevated the status of his biological father posthumously from a 
prince to an emperor), he proposed to send a special mission to congratulate 
Jiajing Emperor, but only had to withdraw his proposal in December 1527 due to 
the objection raised by Yeonguijeong, his two associates, and the key officials of 
Yejo with the reason that a vassal should not involve in an ethically controversial 
domestic issue of Ming that split its court into two rivalry groups. However, when 
he came to know that Jiajing Emperor later purged most of the court officials who 
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were against him in the Great Rites Controversy a year later, Jungjong openly 
expressed his view to the court officials that Joseon should not discuss the 
morality of the Chinese affairs and it would have been proper to dispatch a 
congratulatory envoy to Ming (RDAK, vol. 22, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.425, 
pp.541–2, p.549). 
 
In January 1537, Jungjong proposed again to send a special mission to 
congratulate Jiajing Emperor’s completion of building the Nine-Temple (in which 
the spirit tablets of nine previous emperors were enshrined) and the emperor’s 
decision to confer additional royal titles to his two empress dowagers. After 
debating with the rationalists for two months, Jungjong defended his proposal 
against repeated objections (mainly from the State Councillors and officials of 
Saganwon) and finally dispatched a special tribute mission, which was to be 
combined with another tribute mission, on 27 March (RDAK, vol. 23, Jungjong 
Sillok, 1959, p.535, p.541, pp.543–4, pp.553–4, p.578). 
 
Jungjong succeeded again in November 1538 and February 1539 by sending 
special envoys to congratulate the further elevation of the status of Jiajing 
Emperor’s biological parents (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, p.67, p.90), 
which extraordinarily delighted the emperor because, other than the Joseon 
envoys, the emperor received no congratulatory delegations at all from abroad; 
even within China, the emperor only received a memorial to the throne from the 
Zhejiang local authorities (RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, pp.126–7). In 
September 1541, though again strongly opposed by Saheonbu, Jungjong 
voluntarily sent a special mission to console Jiajing Emperor when he came to 
know that the Nine-Temple was destroyed by fire – and again none of the local 
feudal lords in China offered consolation to the emperor in this incident (RDAK, 
vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 1960, p.336). Controversial as those occasions might be, 
Jungjong unequivocally implemented the Sadae policy simply because he was 
convinced that it was morally right for Joseon to serve Ming faithfully and 
unconditionally. 
 
Consequently, the frequency of tribute missions dispatched to Ming became so 
high that it caused tremendous financial burden to the Joseon court and serious 
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disturbance to the life of the Koreans living in the northwest province of Pyongan 
(RDAK, vol. 23, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.554, RDAK, vol. 24, Jungjong Sillok, 
1960, p.331). It even annoyed those Chinese who lived adjacent to the tribute 
route; they started to speculate the motive of the Joseon court and thought that the 
Koreans actually travelled to China for trade benefits instead of paying tributes, 
and the situation exacerbated to the extent that in 1523 a question was asked in a 
Chinese imperial examination about the Joseon embassies coming to China for 
commercial purpose but in the name of propriety and in the disguise of tribute 
missions (RDAK, vol. 22, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.65). 
 
Jungjong was criticised by the rationalists that too many tribute missions had been 
sent to Ming and Joseon’s reputation as a ‘kingdom of propriety and 
righteousness’ was severely damaged (RDAK, vol. 22, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, 
p.132, RDAK, vol. 23, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, pp.65–66, p.78). However, Jungjong 
insisted that, even at the expense of being sneered at and criticised by the Chinese, 
Sadae should be unwaveringly practiced against all odds (RDAK, vol. 22, 
Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.537, pp. 585–6). He believed that as long as the Joseon 
court could ensure that the right officials (‘right’ in the sense that they faithfully 
abided by the Confucian principles of ethics) were selected and appointed as 
envoy to Ming, the excessive private trades accompanying the tribute missions 
would be curtailed, thus the frequent dispatch of Joseon tribute missions would 
not be resented by the Chinese (RDAK, vol. 23, Jungjong Sillok, 1959, p.205). 
 
As seen in the above evidence, to Jungjong and the loyalists, Joseon should serve 
Ming in the way a son serving his father – as advocated in Confucianism. Such 
relationship based on the junior’s filial piety towards the senior was purely 
voluntary and unconditional, which was further reinforced by the belief that 
Joseon as a vassal state should never judge the morality of Ming’s affairs. Ming 
was materially powerful, yet they chose to focus on maintaining Joseon’s identity 
as a civilised and faithful vassal in the Confucian world of propriety – and such 
national interest determined Joseon’s behaviour of sincere Sadae. Taking the role 
of a loyal junior, Joseon under Jungjong’s rule constructed an exemplary model of 
Korea–great power relation that can be viewed as a manifestation of the 
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constructivists’ logic of socialisationÆidentityÆinterestÆbehaviour, instead of 
the realists’ concern of power politics. 
 
4.8 The Reign of Myeongjong (1545–67) 
 
Myeongjong ascended the throne at the age of 11, and he died at 33 in 1567 – 
hence many of the decisions about government policy during his reign were made 
by the key officials of the Joseon court. To these court officials, the legacies of 
nearly four decades’ rule of Jungjong had produced a rather negative perception 
of Sadae: they believed that Jungjong’s faithful Sadae actually brought more costs 
than benefits to Joseon – in terms of increasing financial burden, damage of 
Joseon’s reputation, and even harm to Joseon’s national pride. Consequently, they 
challenged and then changed many Sadae practices of Jungjong, favouring 
pragmatism over propriety, and prioritising the national interests of Joseon instead 
of those of Ming. 
 
Only three years after Myeongjong’s enthronement, the rationalists began to 
criticise the practice of sending too many tribute missions to Ming. To solve the 
problems caused, they advocated a sharp reduction of tribute missions, because 
both the Koreans (especially those residing in the Pyongan Province that bordered 
Ming) and the Chinese (who worked in the relay stations along the tribute mission 
route) resented the non-stop tribute envoys (those dispatched on ad hoc basis in 
particular). They believed that unless for matters of absolute importance and 
urgency, special envoys should not be sent at all or to be combined with the 
regular missions. They emphasised that Joseon was not a local province of Ming; 
it was a vassal state and a vassal state did not have to perform that many duties for 
the emperor as the local Chinese authorities were required to (RDAK, vol. 25, 
Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.343). 
 
As a result, Saheonbu was opposed to sending a special mission to console the 
emperor on the conflagration of the royal palace on 5 October 1557, insisting that 
the accident was different from that of the Nine-Temple (which was destroyed by 
fire in 1541). Besides, Saheonbu criticised that Jungjong’s decision 16 years ago 
to dispatch a special envoy to console Jiajing Emperor was in fact a joke – 
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because in the eyes of the Ming court officials, it only indicated that the Joseon 
court was ignorant about the Confucian propriety (RDAK, vol. 26, Myeongjong 
Sillok, 1960, p.193). Yeonguijeong Yun Won-hyung (1509–65) also voiced out his 
objection on the next day, and he was later joined by the rationalists headed by Yi 
Jun-gyeong (1499–1572, the next Yeonguijeong of Myeongjong) with the claim 
that if Joseon had its role confused with that of the Chinese local authorities when 
serving the great, the future problems would come endlessly to Joseon (RDAK, vol. 
26, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, pp.193–5). 
 
To put a halt to those Sadae practices that were deemed unnecessary, the 
rationalists focused on blaming the numerous tribute missions for having stained 
Joseon’s reputation as a faithful Confucian state. On 20 April 1552, Saganwon 
raised the issue of private trades secretively conducted by interpreters who 
travelled with the tribute missions to China, which, in the view of Saganwon, was 
the reason that had jeopardised Joseon’s reputation as a nation of ‘propriety and 
righteousness’. Saganwon even proposed to suspend buying goods from China 
(except the purchase of materials used by the royal family members, medicines, 
and books), while pointing to the fruitless efforts of Jungjong who also attempted 
to save Joseon’s reputation: Saganwon criticised that the shameful activities of 
private trades continued for 40 years during Jungjong’s reign simply because 
there had been too many tribute missions, which provided ample opportunities for 
the interpreters to engage in the private trades (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 
1960, pp.549–50). The rationalists considered it an important task to abandon 
these blind acts of Sadae and switch the focus of policymaking back to securing 
Joseon’s benefits. 
 
A typical example to prove the pragmatic thinking of these rationalists was the 
1552–4 Jeju Waelan (the unrest in Jeju caused by the Japanese pirates, ᔮԀআ
໶). In May 1552, Waegu (Japanese pirates, আஊ) raided the southern coastline 
of Joseon, and it was found out by Joseon officials that not all of these pirates 
were Japanese – a good number of them were actually Chinese, who partnered 
with the Japanese pirates in raids on not only Korean but also Chinese coastal 
areas (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.555, pp.562–3, pp.673–4). 
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After some of these pirates (with a mixture of Japanese and Chinese) were 
captured by the Joseon authorities, how to deal with the captured pirates became a 
dilemma for the Joseon court: for those of Chinese ethnicity, they would be sent 
to the Ming court for trial, but for those of Japanese ethnicity, it would be a duty 
for Joseon (as a vassal state) to send them to the Ming court as well for 
punishment. However, the Joseon court was worried that when such news reached 
Japan (which was highly possible due to the frequent exchange of personnel 
between Joseon and Japan), it would infuriate the Japan court and the Japanese 
might retaliate against Joseon; if the Joseon court simply returned the captured 
pirates of Japanese ethnicity to Japan, it would be an act of unfaithfulness that 
violated the ethical principles of Sadae (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, 
p.683). 
 
On 18 July 1554, Saheonbu tried to persuade the king that Joseon should not 
simply abide by the Confucian principles of ethics on Sadae; a minor country 
chose to serve a major power simply for the purpose of protecting its people 
(Saheonbu articulated this logic by invoking Mencius’ words). If Sadae 
eventually brought disaster to its people, the minor country would gain nothing 
but only the name of a loyal vassal. Saheonbu even referred to the example of 
Goryeo’s foreign relations with Jurchen and Song China: while Goryeo served 
both countries simultaneously but lying to one about serving the other, such 
unethical behaviour indeed saved the Koreans from being invaded by either power 
and the dynasty sustained for five centuries – and this was the merit of 
pragmatism; a minor country could hardly survive if blindly following the ethical 
code of conduct. Therefore, Joseon should learn from Goryeo and return the 
captured Japanese pirates to Japan without reporting to the Ming court, thereby 
Japan would not be enraged and Joseon’s security would be assured. The 
20-year-old king thought this was a good solution to resolve the dilemma, and 
Yeonguijeong Shim Yeon-won (1491–1558) and other key officials joined to 
support the proposal of Saheonbu on the next day, although they said they felt 
uneasy for choosing pragmatism over righteousness to secure Joseon’s national 
interests (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, pp.685–7). 
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The pragmatic way of thinking, as reflected in the Joseon court officials during 
Myeongjong’s reign, had reached an unprecedented height in the sense of 
distorting and abusing the Confucian principles of propriety regarding Sadae since 
the founding of the Joseon dynasty. Among others, Jwauijeong Jeong Yu-gil 
(1515–88) went to the extreme: he openly voiced out a nationalistic assertion to 
abandon the practice of Sadae. 
 
Jeong Yu-gil was the son of Jeong Sa-ryong (1491–1570), who was also a 
prominent yet controversial political figure of the Joseon court – for he once set a 
question in the civil service examination that asked the examinees to discuss 
whether Joseon should serve Ming as a vassal state and pay tributes to Ming – and 
it shocked the Joseon court (RDAK, vol. 26, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, pp.232–4). 
With a political stance similar to his father’s, Jeong Yu-gil was even more explicit 
about his view of pragmatic politics. On the issue of whether Joseon should return 
the captured pirates with Japanese ethnicity in July 1554, Jeong advocated the 
return of these pirates to Japan without reporting to the Ming court (five days 
earlier than the proposal of Saheonbu). His points included: first, pragmatism was 
much more important than righteousness in interstate relations and good 
reputation should not be pursued at the costs of bringing disaster to the people. 
Second, there was difference between a vassal serving its suzerain and a minister 
serving his prince (echoing the view of Sung Jun during Yeonsangun’s reign 50 
years ago). Third, Joseon might inform Ming only when Joseon could control 
Ming (i.e. when Joseon was stronger than Ming) – hence Joseon should not report 
its decision to the Ming court (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.683). 
 
On 30 October 1554, Jeong Yu-gil openly expressed his view in the Joseon court 
that although Sadae was practiced for the purpose of self-protection, Joseon 
should not serve Ming at such great costs. He thought that Joseon had been 
serving Ming irrationally and slavishly: while Joseon had been serving Ming 
faithfully (even though with huge financial costs), the Ming court rudely treated 
Joseon as a ‘domestic servant’, giving orders to Joseon as it liked and punishing 
Joseon as it wished – the Koreans thus were deprived of their dignity. Therefore, 
Jeong concluded that Joseon ought to abandon the practice of Sadae towards 
Ming (RDAK, vol. 25, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.708). 
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This was certainly an early, if not the first, articulation of Korean nationalism. 
Korea declared its independence and permanently severed its tribute relations with 
China 340 years later; yet back in 1554, Jeong Yu-gil’s remarks would have been 
condemned by the orthodox Confucian scholars and the loyalists in the Joseon 
court. However, Jeong Yu-gil was not punished by his words; he was promoted 
steadily all the way up to the key position of Jwauijeong. His father, Jeong 
Sa-ryong, had similar experience as well: he was demoted in August 1558 but was 
reinstated only after three months. On 6 May 1562, Jeong Sa-ryong was even 
promoted to become one of the court officials with the highest rank (RDAK, vol. 
26, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.234, p.243, p.373). 
 
The 22 years of Myeongjong’s rule had witnessed another peak of pragmatism 
and its influence in making Joseon’s policy towards Ming. Sadae during 
Jungjong’s reign might have reached the extreme of pro-righteousness, and then 
like a pendulum, the thinking of the political elites swung to the other extreme of 
pro-pragmatism. The reasons could be: 1) the costs incurred to Joseon (of various 
sorts, e.g. social, economic, and psychological costs) had outweighed the benefits 
it received by Sadae; and 2) Ming had other concerns at the time: Jiajing Emperor 
ignored his official duties (because he was in an obsessive search for medicines to 
prolong his life) and the Ming court was tied up with the crises emerging to the 
south with the Japanese pirates and to the north with the Jurchen tribes (RDAK, 
vol. 26, Myeongjong Sillok, 1960, p.587), which made Ming too busy to discipline 
Joseon for its unfaithful Sadae, thus provided the opportunity for the rationalists 
to exercise control in policymaking. However, the loyalists did not vanish; the 
influence of Confucian principles of propriety continued to wield its ideational 
power in Joseon – and the loyalists rose again later during Seonjo’s reign to 
wrestle with the rationalists on the issue of Sadae. 
 
4.9 The Reign of Seonjo (1567–1608) 
 
During Seonjo’s reign, Joseon experienced the Imjin War (1592–8), in which 
Japan attempted to challenge the Sinocentric order by the first step to occupy 
Joseon and the second step to invade Ming. Seonjo, throughout the six years of 
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the war, always maintained Joseon’s identity as Ming’s vassal and never thought 
of surrendering to Japan. In his logic, as long as Joseon adhered to serving Ming, 
Ming would and should rescue Joseon – saving its vassal (a loyal one in particular) 
was supposed to be the duty of a suzerain. 
 
The rationalists’ influence was again a factor. During the early years of Seonjo’s 
reign, the rationalists continued to criticise, as they did during Myeongjong’s rule, 
the practice of frequently sending tribute missions to Ming that had caused serious 
troubles to the Koreans and Joseon’s reputation (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 
1961, p.23). As for the king, Seonjo himself was not enthusiastic about the 
Chinese practice as well. On 1 November 1574, when Jo Heon (1544–92), one of 
the most prominent loyalists at the time, presented an eight-point proposal to 
Seonjo after he came back from a trip to Ming and explained in great detail (with 
lots of information he collected in China for months) about why Joseon should 
emulate China’s advanced system and civilised practice, Seonjo simply rejected 
the idea and replied to Jo that the situation (such as customs) in Joseon was 
different from that in Ming; there would be unpleasant surprise and discord if 
Joseon was to copy everything Chinese (RDAK, vol. 31, Revised Sillok of Seonjo, 
1961, pp.50–56). 
 
Seonjo’s response thus discouraged Jo Heon and he gave up presenting another 
16-point proposal with the similar theme (but in greater detail) – only years later, 
the king turned down Jo’s suggestion again. On 1 December 1587, Jo Heon wrote 
to Seonjo and asked the king to stop socialising with Japan on the ground that it 
was not morally right for Joseon to build a relationship with another vassal of 
Ming (especially a disobedient vassal like Japan) according to the Confucian 
principles of propriety. Seonjo fiercely criticised Jo’s idea and ordered Jo’s 
memorial to the throne to be burned (RDAK, vol. 31, Revised Sillok of Seonjo, 
1961, pp.176–9). 
 
On 1 March 1591, the Joseon court received a letter from Toyotomi Hideyoshi 
(the most powerful feudal lord in Japan at the time), in which Hideyoshi clearly 
stated his intention to invade and annex China. Upon knowing the contents of the 
letter, Jo Heon wrote to Seonjo again with an analysis of Hideyoshi’s strategy (the 
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Japanese would occupy Joseon first), an illustration of the Confucian ethics that 
determined Joseon’s action (to protect Ming and fight against Japan), and a 
proposal about taking precautions against the Japanese invasion (reporting to 
Ming immediately, strengthening national defence, etc.). To Jo’s disappointment, 
however, the king once again rejected his ideas outright (RDAK, vol. 31, Revised 
Sillok of Seonjo, 1961, pp.205–9). 
 
Seonjo and the rationalists in fact had another concern: how Joseon could avoid 
enraging Hideyoshi (so that Japan would bypass Joseon on its way to invade 
Ming). Hence Seonjo focused on the questions of whether Joseon should report 
the letter to Ming and if yes, how Joseon should report to Ming about the letter’s 
contents (i.e. all or some of the contents). They feared that once Japan came to 
know about Joseon’s action (i.e. reporting the letter to Ming) the Japanese would 
turn to attack Joseon. As there were Japanese merchants travelling between ports 
in Japan and the Chinese province of Fujian, it was almost certain that Japan 
would learn about Joseon’s action. 
 
Pressed by the loyalists, on 1 May 1591, Seonjo and the rationalists chose to 
report only some of the contents of the letter to the Ming court, but not about the 
letter – they planned to pretend that the Joseon court received such information 
from those Koreans who escaped from Japan, for they did not want the Ming 
court to know about the correspondence between Joseon and Japan. They even 
instructed the Joseon envoy not to mention anything about Hideyoshi’s plan if the 
Ming court was unaware of the news. In fact, the Ming court was already 
informed about it – from the sources of those Chinese who travelled to Japan, and 
the special mission dispatched by the Ryukyu court to Ming. Some of the Ming 
court officials began to suspect that Joseon might collaborate with Japan against 
Ming. After the Joseon envoy entered China and learned about the situation, he 
finally told the Ming court that he came to inform Ming of Japan’s plan to invade 
China – not by Hideyoshi’s letter but by words of a Korean escapee from Japan 
(RDAK, vol. 31, Revised Sillok of Seonjo, 1961, pp.209–10). Ming’s suspicion on 
Joseon grew nonetheless, and it was cleared only after more than a year later – on 
2 July 1592, Seonjo showed Hideyoshi’s letter to Ming’s envoy and defended 
himself in tears that Japan invaded Joseon simply because he refused to 
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collaborate with Hideyoshi to attack Ming (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, 
pp.347–8). 
 
The rationalists’ influence remained significant even after the Japanese troops 
occupied the southern half of the Korean Peninsula that included the capital city 
of Hanseong. When Seonjo fled to Pyongyang in late May 1592, the loyalists 
made the suggestion of asking for military assistance from Ming but the 
rationalists were opposed to such idea. They believed that the Ming troops would 
also ruin Joseon and occupy the lands that were not yet taken by the Japanese. 
They even sent a Joseon court official to greet the Ming envoy and to describe 
how Joseon was badly destroyed by the Japanese intruders – for which Joseon 
was not able to accommodate Ming’s troops for long in the country (RDAK, vol. 
27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.332). 
 
However, Seonjo was shocked by the swift advancing of the Japanese troops. 
After he ran to the city of Nyeongbyeon in the northern province of Pyongan, he 
decided to flee to China on 13 June 1592. He said that the Japanese would hunt 
him down wherever he fled to within Joseon. He would not die in the hands of the 
Japanese, and Ming would admit him and help him to regain the control of his 
country – because that was what a suzerain was supposed to do, as seen in the 
case of Vietnam in the early 1400s. A week later, Seonjo kept fleeing to the north 
and arriving in Uiju (located to the south of the Yalu River). The king agreed to 
stay there only because news from China arrived: the Ming court decided to 
rescue Joseon because Joseon was Ming’s vassal and it had been serving Ming 
faithfully in the past – although the Ming court was surprised and puzzled by the 
high velocity of Joseon’s defeat (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, pp.335–6, 
p.341, pp.352–3). 
 
On 2 September 1592, Wanli Emperor’s edict arrived in Uiju: the emperor 
dispatched an army of 100,000 soldiers to rescue Joseon, but he also instructed 
Seonjo and the court officials to actively participate in the restoration of Joseon. 
Seonjo felt relieved, but when the Ming envoy asked about purchasing Joseon rice 
for the Ming troops (since it was quite an impossible task to supply the Ming 
troops in Joseon with rice shipped from China), the king immediately answered 
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that Joseon was such a small and poor country that it was not able to supply the 
Ming troops with any rice even if the Ming court was to pay for it. Seonjo then 
went on to explain why the Joseon troops were rapidly defeated by the Japanese: 
Ming had been protecting Joseon for 200 years, and this had led to the result that 
the Koreans no longer knew how to fight (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, 
p.376). 
 
To Seonjo, if there were any responsibilities that some parties were accounted for 
in this war, Japan was the first one – as the trouble-maker, who was charged with 
all the wrongdoings. Ming was the second one, as the trouble-shooter, who was 
responsible for saving the innocent (Joseon) and punishing the culprit (Japan). As 
for Joseon, it was simply a victim. Seonjo’s logic was simple: in the hierarchical 
structure of the Sinocentric system, China was the ultimate senior thus the judge; 
Joseon and Japan were the junior and their behaviour was subject to the judgment 
of China the senior. Provided that Joseon served Ming sincerely as a junior, Ming 
as a senior should protect Joseon. In this case, Joseon had done its part: Joseon 
had been serving Ming for two centuries and Seonjo did not collaborate with 
Japan from the beginning, nor surrender to Japan after being invaded. He added 
that it was exactly because of his refusal to partner with Hideyoshi in attacking 
Ming that had led to Joseon being brutally destroyed by the Japanese intruders, 
and Joseon actually sacrificed itself to protect Ming by taking a devastating hit 
from Japan for Ming – which just made it all the more unquestionable for Ming to 
rescue Joseon. 
 
However, the Ming court officials refuted Seonjo’s theory. They argued that 
Japan did not have to attack Joseon if it attempted to invade Ming; the Japanese 
could have crossed the sea and launched their attack in the Chinese coastal areas. 
It was out of Wanli Emperor’s humaneness and graciousness that Ming troops 
were sent to rescue Joseon, to which Joseon should be eternally obliged – so in 
early January 1593, they demanded that Seonjo and his court officials should 
immediately stop making such ungrateful claim. Seonjo had no choice but to 
accept the reprimand, but he was so upset that a week later, he announced his 
intention to abdicate and left the throne to his son (who had not yet received the 
investiture from Wanli Emperor), and he quietened down only when his court 
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officials begged him to give up the thought at such critical moment (RDAK, vol. 
27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.436, pp.445–6). 
 
The Ming troops regained the control of a number of areas in the peninsula after a 
series of battles, but by early 1593 they came to a stand-off with the Japanese: 
both sides had their own logistical problems of supply. A truce was then 
negotiated between Ming and Japan, to which Seonjo was strongly opposed. The 
king criticised Ming’s decision with three reasons: first, he had not got his 
revenge for what the Japanese had done to Joseon; the Japanese must be crushed 
and expelled completely from the Korean Peninsula. Second, to him, negotiating 
with a bandit implied overlooking the crimes the bandit had committed. It would 
not be fair to the good child (Joseon) if the parents (Ming) were not to punish the 
bad child (Japan) after the bad had assaulted the good. Third, he believed that to 
China, Joseon was an important line of defence (‘the fence’ in Seonjo’s words) 
against any aggression from Japan hence it was Ming’s duty to safeguard Joseon. 
In other words, if Japan was to invade China, it would definitely annex Joseon 
first. For self-protection, China should defend Joseon from Japanese aggression 
(RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.513, pp.522–3, pp.578–81). While the first 
reason appeared to be rather emotional and the second one sounded a bit related to 
the Confucian value on family education, the third reason was certainly a strategic 
concern and a pragmatic proposition. This had been a consistent view of Seonjo 
and the rationalists, though not particularly welcomed by the Ming court (that 
usually placed an emphasis on Ming’s concern of righteousness to look after the 
benefits of its vassals). 
 
While the Ming troops were about to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula after 
the agreement of ceasefire took effect, Song Yingchang, the Chief Administrator 
of Ming’s Military Campaign against Japanese Invasion of Joseon, wrote to 
Seonjo about three issues on 16 November 1593: first, Song proposed four 
measures to improve Joseon’s national defence. Second, Song asked the king to 
seriously reflect upon himself about how his incompetent rule had caused the 
failure in safeguarding his country and people. Third, it was the kindness of Wanli 
Emperor and the two centuries of Joseon’s faithful Sadae that had led to the 
rescue of Joseon. A reminder was added in the letter that if Seonjo failed to 
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review and correct what went wrong in his rule, the Japanese would soon invade 
Joseon again – but Ming would not help Joseon again. Seonjo was so upset that he 
emotionally talked about abdication again – and this time he was silenced by 
Wanli Emperor’s edict a month later: the emperor basically repeated what Song 
Yingchang had said, only with an emphasis placed on the duty of Seonjo, not of 
Wanli Emperor, to protect Joseon, because it was not realistic to make it a 
common and frequent practice for Ming troops to rescue Joseon anytime it got 
into trouble (RDAK, vol. 27, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.682, pp.704–5). 
 
As the negotiation gone awry later in 1596, Seonjo came to be certain that 
Hideyoshi would not easily give up his ambition to conquer China. The king did 
not believe that the Japanese troops would withdraw from the Korean Peninsula 
simply because of a title the Ming court conferred to Hideyoshi. With the 
imminent peril of a second invasion coming from Japan and the future danger of 
being attacked by an increasingly powerful Jurchen to the north of Joseon’s 
border, Seonjo hence foresaw that, in the coming decade and beyond, Joseon 
would not be able to escape from wars. With the rational approach adopted in his 
analysis of interstate relations, plus his painful experience during the two-year 
Japanese invasion, Seonjo kept reminding the court officials of the paramount 
importance of strengthening national defence (RDAK, vol. 28, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, 
pp.446–7, p.451). 
 
As Seonjo expected, Hideyoshi launched the second invasion in early 1597. In the 
Ming court, most of the officials were opposed to rescuing Joseon again, but 
Wanli Emperor and a couple of the senior court officials believed that Ming 
should help this loyal vassal one more time (RDAK, vol. 29, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, 
pp.48–49). On 24 October 1597, Wanli Emperor’s edict arrived in the Joseon 
court: the emperor was sending troops again to rescue Joseon. However, the 
emperor severely criticised the king and his officials for their extremely poor 
performance to strengthen national defence and to boost morale among the 
Koreans during the inter-war years. Seonjo found it difficult to accept the 
reprimand, and he raised the issue of abdication for the third time. Consoled by 
the court officials, he agreed to put it aside; there were more pressing issues to be 
dealt with such as manoeuvring the Joseon troops and coordinating the logistical 
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supply in order to cooperate with the Ming forces (RDAK, vol. 29, Seonjo Sillok, 
1961, pp.186–7, pp.195–8). 
 
In fighting off the Japanese second invasion, the Ming–Joseon relations 
experienced another up-and-down. On 1 July 1598, Seonjo sent a special envoy to 
the Ming court to defend Yang Hao, the head of Ming’s troops in Joseon and a 
military commander whom Seonjo felt comfortable to work with, was impeached 
by a Ming court official Ding Yingtai for misconduct. Seonjo offered Yang a 
helping hand because the king did not wish to manage another Ming commander 
with whom he might not be able to work harmoniously. However, Seonjo’s action 
enraged Ding Yingtai. Ding began to collect evidence about Joseon’s association 
with Japan. Among other information, Ding came to acquire a copy of 
Haedongchegukki, (Account of the Various Countries of the Eastern Sea, ੇܿፏ
୯इ), a book written by Shin Suk-ju (1417–75, Yeonguijeong during Sejo’s reign) 
that documented the activities of interaction between Joseon and Japan. In 
September 1598, Ding wrote to the Ming court and accused Joseon for 
collaborating with Japan (RDAK, vol. 29, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.310, pp.321–2, 
pp.359–60). 
 
Though the war was still going on, Seonjo had to handle the issue right away. He 
ordered to prepare a carefully written letter to defend Joseon, and presented the 
letter (signed in the name of all Joseon court officials) to the investigators 
dispatched by Wanli Emperor on 5 October 1598. Seonjo later sent a special 
mission to Ming on 21 October 1598 to defend Joseon. The accusation against 
Joseon was finally cleared on 29 October 1598 (RDAK, vol. 29, Seonjo Sillok, 
1961, pp.380–1, pp.386–7, pp.390–1). Though the matter was resolved within 
four months, considering the critical moments during wartime, the impact on 
Joseon–Ming cooperation was significant. Moreover, the low level of trust 
between the two countries was clearly evident in the incident. This might be 
attributed to the pro-pragmatism orientation of Seonjo and the rationalists, which 
allowed the strategic concerns to frequently overpower the ethical principles of 
righteousness. When pragmatic thoughts championed, level of trust was 
discounted accordingly. 
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The above evidence, therefore, depicted the factor that Joseon would consider in a 
political reality: national interest, as reflected in the country’s survival. To the 
rationalists, ethical behaviour conforming to Confucianism did not necessarily 
bring material benefits that would genuinely address the country’s needs. ‘What 
worked’, to the rationalists, hence turned out to be much important than ‘what 
should be’. In the face of a superpower (i.e. Ming), Joseon had to act with 
prudence. Even though Joseon was supposed to be protected by Ming within the 
Sinocentric system, the national interest of Joseon would have to be secured with 
more than just an ideational faith for Sadae; it also required a pragmatic mentality 
of Yongdae. 
 
In short, the practice of Sadae during the reigns of these nine Joseon kings, 
according to the different levels of thoroughness, is summarised in the following 
table: 
 
Years High Medium Low 
of Reign (as Filial Piety) (as Obligation) (as Strategy) 
1392-1398 ġ  ġ  Taejo 
1400-1418 ġ  ġ  Taejong 
1418-1450 ġ  Sejong ġ  
1455-1468 ġ  ġ  Sejo 
1469-1494 ġ  Seongjong ġ  
1494-1506 ġ  ġ  Yeonsan-gun 
1506-1544 Jungjong ġ  ġ  
1545-1567 ġ  ġ  Myeongjong 
1567-1608 ġ  ġ  Seonjo 
 
Among the above nine Joseon kings, the reign of Jungjong was the only period 
that had witnessed the most obvious tendency of the key Joseon policymakers to 
serve the great considerably based on Confucian propriety instead of Ming’s 
material power. Apart from Jungjong’s era, no other kings’ reign during this 
period can be classified as the ‘pro-righteousness’. The majority of the other eight 
Joseon kings’ reign belonged to the category of the ‘pro-pragmatism’, which 
includes the ruling years of six Joseon kings, all of whom carried out the Sadae 
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policy towards Ming but merely using it as a means to achieve other ends. The 
political elites did not intend to challenge the Sinocentric order and its tribute 
system, only that they focused more on the benefits of themselves and/or those of 
Joseon and its people. Sadae thus appeared to them as a strategy rather than a duty 
in the interaction with Ming China. 
 
As for the remaining two Joseon kings’ reign, they were segmented to the 
category labeled the ‘in-between (the pro-righteousness and the pro-pragmatism)’. 
These two Joseon kings had been struggling to achieve a balance between serving 
the great and securing Joseon’s benefits. Unfortunately, in many cases, the 
national interests of these two countries turned out to be divergent. Although it 
was rather clear that the gain of Ming meant the loss of Joseon in those cases, they 
found that they were trapped in the dilemma of whether they should adhere to the 
Confucian ethics of Sadae (but sacrificing Joseon’s interests) or they should 
discharge their duties as the national leader to safeguard Joseon’s interests (but 
violating the Confucian principles of righteousness). They wished to achieve both; 
however, they had to choose one between the two, painfully most of the time. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
Distribution of power in Northeast Asia from the late 14th to the early 17th century 
undoubtedly indicated the hegemonic status of Ming with its superior material 
forces. Joseon, bordered Ming in the Northwest and profoundly influenced by the 
Chinese culture of Confucianism, adopted the Sadae policy and served Ming as its 
vassal. The historical evidence invoked in this chapter questioned the belief that 
Joseon had always served Ming devotedly in a Confucian way of filial piety 
between a son and his father. It also questioned the assertion that Joseon had 
served Ming purely out of strategic calculation in the sense that the wisdom of 
pragmatism always ruled. Significance of the ideational and material factors 
varied from time to time, from place to place, from actor to actor, and from issue 
to issue. The outcome therefore, was not to be pre-determined either by Confucian 
classics or realist theories alone. Even in a clear-cut case of Ming’s unipolar order, 
diversity could be found in the Joseon–great power relations. 
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The next chapter is to examine the complexity of Joseon’s Sadae during the 
period from 1608 to 1800 that experienced a genuine bipolar order, an imaginary 
bipolar order, and a new unipolar order. Compared with the Ming unipolar order 
studied in this chapter, results produced by circumstances interwoven with both 
the ideational and material factors in Northeast Asia during these two centuries 
appeared to be much more unexpected – if they were analysed solely from a 
constructivist or a realist perspective. To fully understand the rationale of Joseon’s 
Sadae towards the great power(s), a constructivist-cum-realist approach therefore 
would be needed again. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Sadae in the Era of Changing Polarity (1608–1800): 
a Bipolar, an Imaginary Bipolar, and a Unipolar Order 
 
Following the illustration of Joseon’s Sadae in the unipolar order of Ming’s 
dominance (1392–1608) in the previous chapter, this chapter moves on to the 
period of 1608–1800. Based on the evidence drawn from the ruling years of two 
Joseon kings, the first section of this chapter examines Sadae in a bipolar order 
where the rising Manchu and the declining Ming competed for domination in 
Northeast Asia (1608–1649). In the second section of this chapter, the analysis 
turns to the records of the ruling years of four Joseon kings from 1649 to 1776, a 
period in which an imaginary bipolar order existed due to Joseon’s reverence for 
the fallen Ming and refusal to accept Qing as the new great. In the third section of 
this chapter, the discussion of Sadae focuses on the reign of one Joseon king 
(1776–1800) to explain how the Joseon political elites eventually came to accept 
Qing’s unipolar order and began to serve Qing as the only real great in the 
Sinocentric system. 
 
According to the realist theories, a clear distribution of power can be identified in 
Northeast Asia from 1608 to 1800. By applying the Power Transition Theory to 
this case, Ming was the existing dominant power while Manchu (Qing) was the 
revisionist power. The two conditions were also obvious to explain why Manchu 
challenged Ming: first, power disparity between Ming and Manchu was shrinking 
during the late 1500s and early 1600s. Second, Manchu was not satisfied with the 
status quo as Nurhaci aimed to overthrow Ming and establish his own empire. The 
result was also hardly out of one’s expectation: war broke out between the two 
and Manchu defeated Ming. Qing replaced Ming and became the hegemon in 
Northeast Asia, staying at the apex of the Sinocentric order until the end of the 
18th century. 
 
From the realist perspective, a minor power like Joseon would take either one of 
the two actions: 1) to assist Ming to balance against Manchu, if Joseon believed in 
Ming’s power to preserve its hegemonic status; 2) to ally with Manchu against 
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Ming, if Joseon believed in Manchu’s capability to replace Ming and become the 
dominant great power. After Ming was defeated and Qing became the only 
superpower, to the realists, Joseon should be left with simply one choice in such a 
clear-cut situation: to bandwagon with Qing. Alternatively, if the Joseon political 
elites strictly follow the Confucian principles of righteousness, the outcome would 
have been even simpler: Joseon would have stood by the side of Ming to fight off 
the aggressor, Manchu, even when Manchu appeared to be much more powerful 
than Ming. When Ming was eliminated by Qing, Joseon should die with Ming as a 
loyal minister ought to do for his prince. However, Joseon’s decisions were 
different from either the realists or the Confucian scholars would have expected. 
Joseon’s behaviour during these two centuries looked complicated: they were 
heavily influenced by the state ideology of Confucianism, yet they were also 
invariably restricted by the political reality at the time. 
 
5.1 Joseon between Ming and Manchu 
 
Joseon under the rules of Gwanghaegun and Injo was caught between the fight of 
two ‘whales’ in Northeast Asia: Ming and Manchu. In such a bipolar order that 
was unprecedented in Joseon’s history, competition between the ideational forces 
that valued righteousness and the material forces that advocated pragmatism also 
reached an intensive level that was never seen before. Wrestling with each other, 
the loyalists and the rationalists attempted to control the making of Joseon’s 
policy towards the great powers. 
 
5.1.1 The Reign of Gwanghaegun (1608–23) 
 
Gwanghaegun had been an unwavering rationalist throughout his reign, and his 
motto of not to infuriate either Ming or Manchu had been a consistent principle 
for him to fight off the loyalists, most of the time single-handedly, when 
managing the Joseon–Ming–Manchu relations. He prioritised the protection of 
Joseon’s interests, yet unlike the Ming’s unipolar order in which a 
pro-pragmatism Joseon court could simply perform its Sadae duties perfunctorily 
towards one great, the king would have to deal with two conflicting great powers. 
In order not to enrage Manchu, Joseon had to serve Ming half-heartedly, which 
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would in turn infuriate Ming (and vice versa). Gwanghaegun therefore had to 
handle the delicate issues in the trilateral relations cautiously and skillfully. 
 
Gwanghaegun was the second son of Seonjo, and his father’s request of the 
imperial investiture to make him the crown prince was rejected by the Ming court 
four times: September 1595 (RDAK, vol. 28, Seonjo Sillok, 1961, pp.372–3), May 
1603, the intercalary September of 1604, and November 1604 (RDAK, vol. 30, 
Seonjo Sillok, 1961, p.152, p.349, p.379–82). The reason was simple: 
Gwanghaegun was not the eldest son of Seonjo (Seonjo’s eldest son, Imhaegun, 
was alive and healthy at the time, but Gwanghaegun was favoured by Seonjo), 
thus to the Ming court appointing Gwanghaegun as the crown prince was a 
violation of Confucian propriety. In May 1608, the Ming court even refused to 
send investiture for Gwanghaegun’s enthronement (RDAK, vol. 32, Gwanghaegun 
Diaries, 1962, p.54). There was no evidence in historical record to establish a 
direct link between this unpleasant experience of Gwanghaegun and his less 
enthusiastic attitude to serve Ming, but speculation on this was not completely 
unreasonable. 
 
The pragmatic approach of Gwanghaegun could be typically found between 1618 
and 1622, during which the Battle of Sarhu (1619), involving Joseon, Ming, and 
Manchu, took place. In this battle, the Ming–Joseon allied forces were totally 
defeated by Manchu and it became a turning point to confirm that Ming was no 
longer capable of keeping its hegemonic status from Manchu’s powerful military 
aggression. In fact, Gwanghaegun expressed his doubt on Ming’s ability to 
withstand Manchu’s attack even before the Battle of Sarhu. As early as in March 
1618, Nurhaci wrote a letter to a Joseon court official, in which Nurhaci stated his 
grievance against Ming and announced his intention to attack Ming. He also 
hoped Joseon would understand his reasons to revolt against Ming (RDAK, vol. 33, 
Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.353). Until 27 April 1618, only at the request of 
Bibyeonsa (Council of Border Defence, ഢᜐљ), Gwanghaegun agreed to report 
to the Ming court about Nurhaci’s letter (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 
1962, p.377). 
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Less than a month later, Li Weifan, Ming’s Grand Coordinator and Provincial 
Governor of Liaodong, informed the Joseon court that Ming had received 
information about Nurhaci’s plan to assault Fushun in Liaodong. Li thus 
specifically asked for 7,000 Joseon gunners to stand by for joining Ming’s 
military operation in due course (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, 
p.386). Two weeks later, news arrived in Joseon that the Ming troops in Liaodong 
were defeated and Fushun was captured by the Manchu. Wang Keshou, Deputy 
Minister of Ming’s Ministry of Defence, wrote to Gwanghaegun directly and 
asked for a Joseon force of at least 30,000 soldiers to collaborate with Ming’s 
regiments in the coming military campaign against Manchu. In the letter, Wang 
also reminded Gwanghaegun of the favour Joseon owed Ming in the Imjin War. 
However, based on his analysis on Manchu’s victory in Fushun, Gwanghaegun 
did not think that the Ming’s following campaign to attack Manchu would be 
successful. The king then ordered to gather more intelligence before making any 
decisions (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.399–400). 
 
In the following month, the Joseon court went through a debate between the 
loyalists and the rationalists. The loyalists insisted that Joseon should send the 
exact amount of soldiers required by Ming otherwise Joseon would be accused of 
being ungrateful to Ming’s efforts that saved Joseon during the Imjin War – 
Joseon could not afford to have its reputation as a faithful Confucian nation 
tainted by such accusation. The rationalists, headed by Gwanghaegun, argued 
with three points: 1) as a result of the Imjin War, millions of Koreans lost their 
lives and this had caused severe shortage of manpower in the military forces, for 
which it was impossible for Joseon to spare 30,000 soldiers to assist Ming; 2) 
Joseon had to deploy its limited number of military personnel in border defence 
against Japan and Manchu simultaneously; and 3) Joseon military forces were 
made of peasants who were only conscripted during wartime; they were not 
professional soldiers. They were poorly trained and would become a burden 
instead of assistance to the Ming forces when fighting the ferocious Manchu in 
battle. 
 
The two sides kept debating almost every day for a month, and the rationalists 
compromised with the number of 7,000 soldiers as initially requested by Li 
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Weifan. Further pressed by the loyalists, Gwanghaegun eventually agreed to 
increase the number to 10,000, but he set the condition that he would send the 
troops only when he received Wanli Emperor’s edict. This decision was soon 
criticised by the commander of the Ming forces for being perfunctory because the 
king was thought to be deliberately vague about dispatching the troops – for there 
was no mentioning of the names of the senior commanding officers, the detailed 
breakdown of infantry and cavalry, the current location of the troops, and how the 
troops were drilled and prepared for combats on the battlefield (RDAK, vol. 33, 
Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.402–18). 
 
On 29 May 1618, the Joseon court received the report from the military governor 
of Pyongan Province: two weeks ago, Nurhaci sent a letter directly to 
Gwanghaegun, in which he openly announced his decision to rebel against Ming. 
More importantly to the Joseon court was that this time it was not Joseon’s 
understanding that Nurhaci asked for; he warned Joseon not to provide Ming with 
any military support, even if ordered by Ming. Otherwise, he would attack Joseon. 
The loyalists took this as a serious offence to Ming and pushed the king to 
assemble troops to be sent to Ming. However, Gwanghaegun forbade any official 
announcement of conscription with four reasons: 1) it would cause chaotic fear 
among the Koreans; 2) Joseon would be in grave danger if Manchu knew about 
Joseon’s intention to assist Ming; 3) he was sceptical about Ming’s chance to 
defeat Manchu; and 4) the emperor had not issued any edict yet to Joseon (RDAK, 
vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.414, pp.419–20, pp.422–4, pp.426–7, 
pp.429–30, pp.434–5, pp.438–9, p.442, p.466, pp.504–5). 
 
On 19 June 1618, Yang Hao, commander of the Ming troops, wrote to 
Gwanghaegun and seriously criticised the king for sitting on the fence, being 
ungrateful to Ming and unfaithful in Sadae. Yang said that Ming’s military 
campaign against Manchu also aimed to help clear the danger that Manchu had 
been and would be bringing to Joseon, for which Gwanghaegun ought to send a 
regiment of 10,000 soldiers to assist Ming. Due to Yang’s efforts to rescue Joseon 
during the Imjin War, Gwanghaegun could not ignore Yang’s letter and on 4 July 
1618, he replied to Yang with the usual excuses, but informed Yang the names of 
the commanding officers, the breakdown of gunner, archer, and commando of the 
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10,000 soldiers, and their current locations from where they would be conscripted 
and assembled (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.432–3, 
pp.450–1). 
 
From early June 1618 to mid February 1619, the debate on conscription/dispatch 
of troops between the loyalists and the rationalists in the Joseon court continued 
without a pause. However, Gwanghaegun did not just immerse himself in the tug 
of war with the loyalists; he kept issuing detailed orders to strengthen national 
defence from mid May 1618. In fact, Gwanghaegun was deeply worried about 
Joseon’s security, and he had not been able to dine and rest properly for a long 
while. He even attempted to relay an appeasing message to Manchu indirectly by 
way of asking the governor of Hamgyong Province (Joseon’s province that 
bordered Manchu) to write a letter to Nurhaci in October 1618. In the letter, it was 
mentioned that Ming had been kind to Manchu for years, for which Manchu 
should not rebel against Ming simply because of some minor grievances. Joseon 
ought to condemn Manchu’s behaviour and refuse to collaborate with Manchu 
according to Confucian ethics, yet Joseon as a great country understood Manchu’s 
motive and decision. It would be fortunate to both Manchu and Joseon if Manchu 
was willing to abandon the idea of rebelling against Ming and to serve Ming 
faithfully, and amity between Manchu and Joseon would be preserved (RDAK, vol. 
33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.415–6, p.425, pp.433–4, pp.440–1, p.466, 
p.502, p.506). 
 
Nevertheless, no matter how hard the Joseon rationalists had tried to stay as a 
by-stander, they had to give in when Wanli Emperor’s edict finally arrived on 13 
February 1619, ordering the dispatch of at least 10,000 Joseon soldiers to assist 
Ming’s operation (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.535). 
Gwanghaegun had no choice but to follow the imperial order, and a regiment of 
13,000 Joseon soldiers crossed the Yalu River on 21 February to meet with the 
Ming troops (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p536). 
 
Before departure, Gwanghaegun said to General Gang Hong-rip (1560–1627), 
commander-in-chief of the Joseon regiment, that with Joseon troops joining the 
Ming force, appeasement with Manchu would no longer work. The king 
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instructed Gang that the general’s mission was to ensure the safety of the Joseon 
soldiers, for which he did not have to follow every order of the Ming commanders 
on the battlefield (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.532). Besides, 
the appointment of Gang was a questionable decision: Gang once begged 
Gwanghaegun for not to appoint him as commander-in-chief with the excuse that 
he had to take care of his sick mother (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 
1962, p.536). After departure, Gang kept sending reports to Gwanghaegun every 
day, but the king became increasingly worried by knowing the adverse situation 
of the Joseon troops, especially when he received no further reports from Gang as 
of 3 March (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.539). Eventually on 
12 March 1619, as the king expected, news arrived that the Joseon expeditionary 
force, along with the Ming troops, were crushed by the Manchu forces. Many 
Joseon officers and soldiers fought to death, while Gang and his deputy 
surrendered to Manchu (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.542). 
 
After the Battle of Sarhu, distribution of power in Northeast Asia was becoming 
clear: Ming turned much weaker in its competition with the increasingly stronger 
Manchu. In the Joseon court, Gwanghaegun and the rationalists became more 
convinced that Joseon should appease Manchu, while the loyalists continued to 
advocate fighting against Manchu and claimed they were ready to die for Ming. 
The wrestle between the two focused initially on whether or not Gang Hon-rip 
and other senior officers who surrendered to Manchu should be punished. In a 
letter sent from Manchu to the Joseon court on 2 April 1619, Gang’s confession 
was mentioned, which implied that his surrender was pre-arranged and he never 
intended to truly engage the Manchu troops. The loyalists thus repeatedly called 
for imprisoning the family members of Gang and the other senior officers, while 
Gwanghaegun firmly refused to do so and he also severely criticised the loyalists 
for being reckless, short-sighted, and good at merely talking nobly but without 
any effective actions to protect Joseon (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 
1962, pp.547–52). 
 
However, the more pressing issue to the Joseon court at that moment was how to 
reply the Manchu letter. The loyalists insisted that Joseon should seriously 
condemn Manchu for rebelling against Ming according to Confucian ethics, but 
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Gwanghaegun called for everyone’s attention to the reality, saying that if Joseon 
was militarily capable to withstand Manchu’s assaults, he would adopt the 
loyalists’ ideas of burning the letter and denouncing Manchu. However, he did not 
think Joseon possessed any defensive capability against Manchu. The king 
invoked the example of the Imjin War – in his view, Joseon’s thoughtless 
rejection to Hideyoshi’s letter at the very beginning was exactly the cause that had 
led to the disastrous Japanese invasion. Joseon should not have turned down Japan 
because Joseon was incapable of defending itself against Japan – and the loyalists 
were about to repeat the same mistake. Gwanghaegun explained to them what 
Joseon needed at this critical moment was not the abstract principle of 
righteousness; Joseon needed time – time to postpone the coming of the greatest 
peril to Joseon (i.e. demise of the country) so that Joseon could urgently improve 
its military capability for national defence (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 
1962, pp.552–3). 
 
The king finally gained the upper hand in the heated debate that lasted for nearly 
three weeks, and a reply letter was sent on 21 April 1619 to Manchu. In the letter, 
explanation was provided: Joseon dared not disobey Ming’s order because the 
Ming–Joseon relationship was one of father–son. Though bearing Confucian 
ethics in mind, Joseon always had the good will to befriend Manchu. Hence 
Joseon believed that as long as Manchu returned to the right track of serving Ming, 
Ming would forgive what Manchu had done. Joseon also truly wished that 
Manchu would not take any aggressive moves in future so that friendship between 
Joseon and Manchu could be maintained (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 
1962, p.555). 
 
This was a typical reflection of Gwanghaegun’s principle of not to infuriate either 
Ming or Manchu. Even if the Ming court knew about this letter, Gwanghaegun 
might stand a good chance to escape Ming’s reprimand. However, Nurhaci simply 
had no intention to leave Gwanghaegun as he wished. On 14 July 1619, Nurhaci 
wrote to Gwanghaegun directly, saying that: 1) he hated those words about 
serving Ming in the letter, as Manchu would never serve Ming anymore; 2) in his 
view, Gwanghaegun was sitting on the fence; 3) Nurhaci suggested that 
Gwanghaegun should sign a pact with Manchu by swearing a blood oath if 
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Gwanghaegun truly wished to convince him of Joseon’s choice to ally with 
Manchu; and 4) he would leave Gwanghaegun to decide whether Joseon was to 
rebel against Ming as well (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.570). 
 
Gwanghaegun believed that the letter must be answered as soon as possible in 
order to demonstrate Joseon’s good faith towards Manchu, but the king insisted 
that it was not necessary to sign any pact (he invoked the example of Japan, 
asserting that Joseon never asked Japan to sign any agreement after the Imjin War 
and messages were simply relayed by local officials in Busan). Gwanghaegun 
further explained his view to the state councillors that towards Ming, Joseon must 
practice Sadae cautiously; yet when handling Manchu, Joseon must act as 
pragmatically as possible – because Joseon was unable to defend itself against 
Manchu (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.571, p.580). As the 
loyalists were strongly opposed to communicating with Manchu for the fear that 
Gwanghaegun might gradually yield to Nurhaci’s demands, another month-long 
debate took place between the loyalists and the rationalists. This time 
Gwanghaegun gave in, though reluctantly: a decision was made on 14 August 
1619 that the Joseon court was not to reply Nurhaci’s letter – but the king warned 
that Joseon would be eliminated by Manchu, and the loyalists would be 
responsible for the future demise of Joseon. Gwanghaegun said that he held no 
objection to righteousness, but he was convinced that it would not be wise to 
abandon pragmatism (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.581–2). 
 
Although Gwanghaegun did not reply Nurhaci’s letter, the Ming court learned 
about the previous communication between Joseon and Manchu. Plus the 
suspicious surrender of Gang Hon-rip in the Battle of Sarhu, some Ming court 
officials began to suspect that Joseon was collaborating with Manchu against 
Ming. Xu Guangqi proposed to Wanli Emperor that a senior court official of Ming 
should be appointed as the guardian of Joseon so as to monitor the Joseon court, 
ensuring that Joseon would not betray Ming and collaborate with Manchu. When 
the Joseon tribute missions reported this to Gwanghaegun on 3 October 1619, 
Xu’s suggestion indeed shocked everyone in the Joseon court: if implemented, it 
was to become an unprecedented practice by which China would directly interfere 
with Joseon’s policymaking. In order to safeguard Joseon’s reputation, the 
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loyalists anxiously urged Gwanghaegun to: 1) imprison the family members of the 
senior officers who surrendered to Manchu in the Battle of Sarhu; 2) cease 
correspondence with Manchu immediately; 3) execute the pro-Manchu Joseon 
interpreters who had been frequently travelling between Joseon and Manchu. 
However, Gwanghaegun refused to carry out any of these suggestions (RDAK, vol. 
33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.595–7) – and the king actually had his 
reasons. 
 
By late 1619, Gwanghaegun became convinced that Ming was moving towards its 
end because it was worn out by years of fighting against Manchu. He foresaw that 
domestic unrest (i.e. peasant revolts) would speed up Ming’s decline, and Manchu 
would take over the rule of China soon. After expressing this view openly in the 
court on 22 December 1619, Gwanghaegun asserted that a long-term strategy to 
ensure Joseon’s security was a mix of appeasement with Manchu on one hand and 
at the same time, self-strengthening on the other (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun 
Diaries, 1962, p.611). Gwanghaegun’s view in fact signaled the change of his 
equal focus on both Ming and Manchu in the past; now his focus was tilting 
towards Manchu – it became more important for Joseon not to infuriate Manchu. 
According to his analysis, the great that Joseon would have to serve in future was 
Manchu, not Ming. The king’s advocate of self-strengthening also indicated his 
waning confidence in Ming to rescue Joseon: he kept ordering his subordinates to 
enhance border defence and he even attempted to ‘separate soldiers from 
peasants’ for the goal of establishing a system to train professional servicemen 
(RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.396, p.618). 
 
On 4 February 1621, when Gwanghaegun heard about Manchu’s attack in 
Liaodong, he openly commented that Manchu’s military power was hundred 
times’ stronger than that of Japan, and he forecasted that Mukden would be soon 
captured by Manchu (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.690). The 
loyalists kept calling for people’s conscience to rescue Ming – they were aware of 
the difference in military power between the vulnerable Joseon and the mighty 
Manchu, yet they would not desert their ‘father’ (i.e. Ming) and they were willing 
to sacrifice Joseon for the sake of righteousness (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun 
Diaries, 1962, p.690). Before long, as Gwanghaegun expected, the Ming forces of 
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300,000 soldiers were defeated and Mukden fell into the hands of Manchu in June 
1621. Gwanghaegun foresaw that Ming would collapse soon, and once again he 
warned the loyalists that the only strategy left for Joseon was his combination of 
appeasement and self-strengthening (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, 
p.705). 
 
In view of Manchu’s overwhelming power after its victory in Liaodong thus its 
possible intention to invade Joseon, on 10 September 1621, Gwanghaegun sent 
General Jeong Chung-sin to Manchu for peace negotiation. However, Nurhaci 
clearly understood that Gwanghaegun was not ready to openly rebel against Ming. 
To detach Joseon from Ming, Nurhaci demanded a written agreement to be signed 
by Gwanghaegun. Once again, Gwanghaegun refused to do so and insisted that 
correspondence between local officials in the border region or exchange of 
interpreters would be sufficient to maintain peaceful relations between Joseon and 
Manchu (RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.727–9, p.777, p.799). 
 
By this time, Gwanghaegun’s dual tactics were also known to some Ming officials. 
On 18 May 1622, Liang Zhiyuan, inspector-general of the Ming troops, wrote to 
the Joseon court with rather harsh words and severely criticised Joseon for 
frequently being ambiguous in its attitude and vague of its stance, like ‘a rat 
looking to both ways’. Due to its disregard of righteousness, Joseon would not be 
able to face people in the world, even those of generations to come in future 
(RDAK, vol. 33, Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, p.779). The loyalists felt utterly 
shameful and thought that Gwanghaegun had completely disgraced Joseon. They 
could not tolerate the treasonable behaviour of Gwanghaegun anymore, and they 
eventually had him dethroned through a coup on 14 March 1623. The queen 
dowager announced a list of crimes Gwanghaegun committed during his reign – 
being unfaithful when serving Ming was a major one (RDAK, vol. 33, 
Gwanghaegun Diaries, 1962, pp.823–5). 
 
Undoubtedly, Gwanghaegun was a rationalist who favoured pragmatic thinking. 
The year of 1618 was the start of a turbulent period in Northeast Asia due to the 
revisionist behaviour of the rising Manchu. Gwanghaegun’s insightful analyses 
were partly resulted from his experience in the Imjin War, through which he 
132 
 
gained first-hand knowledge about Ming’s military capability and combat strategy. 
Yet above all, it had been his pragmatic mentality that guided him to understand 
and foresee the interstate relations clearly and accurately, and to take the 
what-would-work actions based on his rational thus realistic cost–benefit 
calculations. His pragmatic strategy could have saved Joseon from being crushed 
in the fight of two ‘whales’ – his strategy could be a factor that helped to postpone 
the catastrophic Manchu invasions – had he been able to completely abandon the 
Confucian ethics of propriety. However, four years after the Battle of Sarhu by 
which power disparity between Ming and Manchu had become crystal clear, 
Gwanghaegun in 1622 was still attached to the Confucian ethics and hesitated to 
sign a pact with Nurhaci. The fact that he was deposed by the loyalists was simply 
a proof to confirm that the ideational forces did matter in Joseon–great power(s) 
relations, sometimes even to the extent of overpowering the material forces. 
 
5.1.2 The Reign of Injo (1623–49) 
 
The 28-year-old Injo ascended the throne in March 1623 as Gwanghaegun was 
deposed by the loyalists. During Injo’s reign, Joseon experienced two Manchu 
invasions: Jeongmyo Horan (1627, ΍юच໶) and Byeongja Horan (1636–7, Ч
ηच໶). Both invasions brought Joseon devastating damages, and as a result of 
Byeongja Horan, Joseon was forced to submit to Hong Taiji (son of Nurhaci, 
emperor of Qing) in January 1637 and became a vassal state of Qing instead of 
Ming ever since. The ruling years of Injo witnessed the climax of the 
loyalist–rationalist struggle, which greatly influenced Injo’s thinking and made 
the king change his stance of Sadae from time to time by shifting between the two 
extremes of pro-righteousness and pro-pragmatism. 
 
At the beginning of his rule, Injo appeared to be determined in Sadae faithfully. 
When meeting a lieutenant of Mao Wenlong (military leader of a Ming division to 
battle against Manchu from bases inside Joseon) on 22 March 1623 (i.e. one week 
after his enthronement), Injo apologised again for what Gwanghaegun did and 
pledged to assist Ming in the fight against Manchu (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 
1962, p.12). On 8 April 1623, Injo apologised to a Ming envoy once more about 
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Gwanghaegun’s ungratefulness to Ming. The king promised that he would do his 
utmost to serve Ming and Joseon would fully cooperate with Ming in the military 
campaign against Manchu (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.22). Before 
Jeongmyo Horan in 1627, Injo was perfectly clear about his pro-Ming, 
anti-Manchu stance. This was appreciated by the Ming court, and the 
Joseon–Ming relations turned cordial again. In October 1625, after the birth of his 
son, Tianqi Emperor issued an edict to the Joseon court, saying that he wished to 
share his joy with Injo because the king had been serving Ming sincerely. This 
was highly unusual because Joseon was merely a vassal to Ming, and the emperor 
should only inform heads of the local authorities within China of such matter 
(RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.303–4). What Tianqi Emperor did hence 
could be deemed as a proof that the poor Joseon–Ming relations resulted from 
Gwanghaegun’s pro-pragmatism behaviour basically had reached an end; the 
harmonious ‘senior–junior’ relationship between the two emerged again. 
 
The turning point of Injo’s attitude was Jeongmyo Horan. While Nurhaci had 
been prudent in handling the Manchu–Joseon relations and mainly aimed to deter 
Joseon from supporting Ming in the fight between Manchu and Ming, his son, 
Hong Taiji appeared to be much more aggressive. He believed that the sequence 
for Manchu’s expansion should be: to conquer Joseon before attacking Ming – by 
eliminating the possibility of Joseon’s support to Ming, Manchu could concentrate 
on the assaults against Ming (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.343–4). In 
January 1627, Manchu troops invaded Joseon without prior notice. Overrunning 
the weak resistance of the Joseon forces, the Manchu army besieged Uiju (near 
the border) on 13 January and captured Pyongyang on 24 January. Injo was 
shocked by the rapid advance of the Manchu troops and fled to Ganghwado on 1 
February (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.356, p.361, p.364). The next day, 
Amin (commander-in-chief of the Manchu forces) sent a letter to Injo, saying that 
if Joseon wished to have peace with Manchu, it would have to sever its 
relationship with Ming and to become a ‘younger brother’ of Manchu. Amin also 
mentioned that if Ming was enraged by Joseon’s alliance with Manchu, Joseon 
should have nothing to fear: because Manchu, as the ‘elder brother’, would protect 
Joseon (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.364). 
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Injo did not forget the Confucian ethics, yet he did not abandon the use of 
pragmatic solution either. Two days after receiving Amin’s letter, the rationalists 
proposed the idea of peace-negotiation. The loyalists fiercely condemned such 
idea, considering it a great shame to appease Manchu for survival. They praised 
those officials who killed themselves instead of surrendering to Manchu and 
suggested that every Korean fight against Manchu until his last breath. However, 
Injo explained to the loyalists that negotiation was merely a tactic to stall off the 
enemy, and he even issued an edict to all Joseon subjects on 4 February to clarify 
his intention. The king then sent a letter to Amin on 5 February, saying that 
Joseon had been serving Ming for over two centuries, for which Joseon as a 
Confucian nation of propriety found it unethical to rebel against Ming. However, 
Injo did not see serving Ming and befriending Manchu as incompatible; serving 
Ming would not forbid Joseon to maintain amity with Manchu. Two days later, 
Amin replied, saying that he did not think Injo truly wished to negotiate. He 
asserted that there would not be any peace talk between the two if Joseon was not 
to end its relation with Ming. He threatened that the Manchu troops would occupy 
Hanseong for at least one year (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.365–6, 
p.368). 
 
From 7 February to 2 March, the debate between the loyalists and the rationalists 
did not pause for a single day. The loyalists, led by Yun Hwang (1571–1639) and 
Chang Yu (1587–1638), insisted that Joseon had a moral obligation towards Ming 
thus Joseon would commit the greatest sin if it ceased to serve Ming. Acceptance 
of Manchu’s condition would completely destroy Joseon’s reputation earned by 
their ancestors’ tireless efforts. They believed that negotiation was no different 
from surrender, and by Confucian ethics, the king and every Joseon subject should 
fight Manchu to death if necessary. They accused those who advocated 
negotiation with Manchu for having committed the crime of treason and asked 
Injo to have them executed. 
 
However, the rationalists, headed by Choe Myung-kil (1586–1647) and Yi Kwi 
(1557–1633), considered negotiation as the only option to resolve the current 
crisis. They severely criticised the loyalists for producing nothing substantial to 
fight off the enemy but only empty rhetoric that sounded admirable. The standoff 
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between the two gradually changed to a situation in which the rationalists started 
to gain the upper hand – mainly due to Injo’s tilt towards pro-pragmatism. In view 
of the critical situation at the moment, Injo believed that Joseon could survive 
only if Amin was willing to withdraw the Manchu army. For such reason, Injo did 
not find it humiliating to accept the terms of: to send his brother as hostage to 
Manchu; to send tribute payment of gold and other precious goods to Manchu (but 
not as a vassal to Manchu); and to use the era name of Later Jin instead of Ming in 
the Joseon–Manchu correspondence (but not sever Joseon’s relationship with 
Ming). Though strongly opposed by the loyalists, Injo even chose to ignore the 
Confucian principles of propriety and met with the Manchu messenger in person 
(RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.368–78). 
 
Eventually on 3 March 1627, a treaty of mutual non-aggression was signed 
between the two, by which Joseon would recognise Manchu as its ‘elder brother’ 
and agree to perform the duties required (hostage, tribute payment, and era name, 
etc.). Subsequently, the Manchu army withdrew, the rationalists felt relieved 
about the end of a national crisis, and the loyalists insisted to punish the 
rationalists but again denied by Injo (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.378–9). 
On 1 April, Injo wrote a lengthy memorial to the throne and explained to Tianqi 
Emperor in detail about the Manchu invasion. The king said he was full of 
remorse for Joseon’s failure to resist subjugation by the powerful Manchu, and 
with great shame like a son who failed to perform his filial duties to the parents, 
Injo sincerely begged for Ming’s understanding, mercy, and forgiveness (RDAK, 
vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.387–9). 
 
Nevertheless, during the decade between the two Manchu invasions (1627–36), 
the influence of the loyalists grew again in the Joseon court. This was resulted 
from: 1) the Koreans in general (scholar officials in particular) who valued 
Confucian ethics found it difficult to accept the humiliation of negotiating peace 
with Manchu, the barbarian with a culture inferior to that of Joseon; 2) by the 
treaty signed at the end of Jeongmyo Horan, Manchu demanded more tribute 
payment year after year, adding tremendous burden on Joseon; and 3) Injo 
appeared to be indecisive in choosing his stance between pro-righteousness and 
pro-pragmatism. 
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After Jeongmyo Horan, Injo’s thinking was no longer confined to the Confucian 
ethics; he became open to pragmatic ideas, for he experienced the moment of life 
and death when pragmatic solutions proved to be the only guarantee for survival. 
Nevertheless, Injo did not forget the Confucian ethics, particularly about Joseon’s 
duty to serve Ming. Apart from the reason of being educated by Confucian 
classics, why he was crowned at the very beginning (Gwanghaegun was toppled 
exactly because of his failure in Sadae) and the persistent presence of the 
loyalists’ powerful influence were also factors that had been keeping Injo from 
joining the rationalists. Consequently, Injo exhibited a trace of shifting towards 
the stance of pro-righteousness during this period. 
 
A week after Injo returned to the capital city from Ganghwado, the loyalists began 
to take action. Jeong Gyeong-se (1563–1633, a mild loyalist), persuaded Injo to 
reinstate Yun Hwang as the head of Saganwon on 19 April 1627 – for Injo told 
Jeong in the court that he regretted to have been too harsh in punishing Yun 
Hwang (during Jeongmyo Horan in February, Yun Hwang openly criticised that 
Injo’s plan to negotiate with Manchu was the same as surrendering to the enemy, 
for which he was charged of smearing the king and was removed from the 
position of head of Saganwon) (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.392). 
 
On 23 August 1629, Gim Sang-hon (1570–1652), one of the prominent loyalists, 
wrote to Injo and asked the king to reject the increasing Manchu demands. He 
reminded Injo that the peace treaty was signed as a temporary tactic to avoid more 
bloodshed; it was not a permanent solution. The more obedient Joseon was to 
Manchu, the more aggressive Manchu was to Joseon. In Gim’s view, Joseon 
should not keep yielding to Manchu because Manchu was a barbaric tribe that 
could not be reasoned with; Joseon must stop to fulfil Manchu’s endless greed. In 
addition, Gim pointed to the fact that Injo had been less open to the loyalists’ 
ideas in recent years, of which Gim believed to be the reason that had made 
people confused about right and wrong. He encouraged Injo to be determined 
when taking actions to reform and strengthen Joseon. Injo’s response to Gim’s 
words was rather positive: the king appreciated Gim’s advice and promised to 
keep it in mind (RDAK, vol. 34, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.542–3). 
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On 13 November 1632, Yi Chun (1560–1635), a senior official of Yejo, wrote to 
Injo and asked the king not to be complacent about the brief period of peace 
resulted from appeasement with Manchu; appeasement would turn out to be 
merely an expedient solution to the present problems but it would bring a lot more 
troubles and dangers to Joseon in future. Yi believed that Joseon should say no to 
Manchu and Joseon would have nothing to fear – as long as Injo had the 
resolution to fight Manchu, morale among the Joseon soldiers would be 
effectively boosted. After all, the view that Manchu was invincible was just a 
fallacy. Again, Injo highly praised Yi’s opinion and agreed to adopt it in 
policymaking (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.42). 
 
Another example of Injo’s changing attitude towards pro-righteousness was his 
response to the request of Bibyeonsa in 1633. On 29 January, Bibyeonsa asked 
Injo, for the sake of righteousness, to officially reject Manchu’s demands for more 
tribute payment. The reason was that Manchu threatened to increase its demands 
by more than ten times if they were not satisfied with Joseon’s tribute payment. In 
fact, what Joseon had sent to Manchu in the past years had placed enormous 
burden to the Koreans. Bibyeonsa argued that if the option of appeasement with 
Manchu in 1627 was adopted for the benefits of the Koreans, its effect at the 
moment had completely deviated from the original purpose. 
 
Hence Bibyeonsa believed that, by upholding the Confucian principles of 
righteousness, all Koreans would support Injo in the fight against Manchu. To 
respond to Bibyeonsa’s request, Injo immediately issued an edict: the Joseon court 
was to condemn Manchu for breaching the 1627 agreement and to reject their 
unreasonable demands. Injo reiterated that the peace treaty was meant to appease 
the enemy such that the nation could be saved and the Koreans would not be 
slaughtered. However, the greedy and cunning Manchu took it as an opportunity 
to exploit the Koreans, for which the king was going to stop it. Injo then went on 
to warn that, as the barbarians had no knowledge about reason and sense of 
righteousness, border skirmishes would be inevitable and imminent. At the end of 
the edict, the king appealed to every Joseon subject to unite and to prepare for 
fighting the enemy (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.49). In general, the 
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inter-war period was charged with the pro-righteousness, anti-Manchu passion 
that ran high in Joseon. 
 
What triggered the outbreak of Byeongja Horan happened in early 1636. Hong 
Taiji sent an envoy to Joseon in February 1636 and informed the Joseon court that 
the name of his kingdom was changed from ‘Later Jin’ to ‘Qing’, and his title was 
elevated from ‘Great Khan’ to ‘Emperor’. The loyalists were shocked and enraged 
by such changes, which in their eyes was an open defiance and blasphemy to 
Ming. Hong Ik-han (1586–1637) severely condemned Hong Taiji and he believed 
that Joseon would become an eternal sinner to the world if the Joseon court were 
to acknowledge Hong Taiji as an emperor. He was convinced that the evil purpose 
of Hong Taiji was to make Joseon the first country within the Sinic world to 
recognise his new status. If Joseon, a vassal that had been most faithfully serving 
Ming for over two centuries, acknowledged his emperorship, all other countries 
would follow suit. Hence Hong Ik-han proposed to execute the Qing envoy, send 
the Qing letter to the Ming court, and rebuke Hong Taiji – he insisted that this was 
the only way to prove Joseon’s allegiance to Ming and devotion to Confucian 
ethics. 
 
Injo praised Hong Ik-han for his loyalty, but thought that it was not yet the right 
time to execute the Qing envoy. At the same time, scholars from the royal 
academy also wrote to Injo with a proposal similar to that of Hong Ik-han. They 
believed that the most important thing to Joseon at the moment was to announce 
to the world that Joseon had been and would always be a nation of Confucian 
ethics, and Joseon would never do anything against the Confucian principles of 
righteousness even at the cost of being eliminated by the barbarian. Injo also 
showed appreciation to their loyalty, and promised to bear their proposal in mind. 
At the request of Bibyeonsa, on 21 February 1636, Injo decided not to receive the 
Qing envoy (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.162–3). 
 
When the Qing envoy arrived in Hanseong on 24 February, they were denied 
access to the royal palace; furthermore, they were chastised face-to-face by the 
loyalists. At the same time, Jeong On (1569–1641, then head of Saganwon) urged 
Injo to be determined when denouncing Qing. He insisted that the wording must 
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not be ambiguous, otherwise it would be misinterpreted and Joseon’s reputation 
would be ruined. Injo praised Jeong and agreed with his idea. The next day, 138 
students of Taehak (the highest educational institution in Joseon, ϼᏢ) wrote to 
Injo collectively and asked the king to execute the Qing envoy and burn the Qing 
letter so as to manifest Joseon’s pro-righteousness stance. Although Choe 
Myung-kil, head of the rationalists, suggested Injo to meet with the Qing envoy 
for the sake of not to enrage Hong Taiji, the Qing envoy left Hanseong on 26 
February due to the surging anti-Qing sentiment in the capital city. When they 
exited through the city gate, they were humiliated by surrounding Koreans, with 
children throwing roof tiles at them (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.163–4). 
 
On 1 March, Injo issued an edict to inform all Joseon subjects of the rejection of 
Qing envoy and the burning of Qing letter, and such decision was made by the 
Joseon court for the purpose of upholding the Confucian principles of 
righteousness, in spite of Joseon’s weakness and the possible demise of the 
country. Injo then made an impassioned appeal to his people to prepare for 
defending the country against the coming Qing invasion. With Bibyeonsa 
deploying troops for defence in the following months, on 17 June 1636, the 
Joseon court sent a letter to Qing, accusing Qing for breaching the 1627 treaty. By 
invoking the example of Joseon’s rejection of Hideyoshi’s proposal five decades 
ago, Injo reiterated that Joseon had always revered and served Ming faithfully 
thus it was impossible for Joseon to rebel against Ming. In the letter, the king 
admitted that Joseon had neither powerful forces nor sufficient resources to resist 
Qing’s invasion; the only possession of Joseon was Confucian ethics, with which 
Joseon would not be intimidated and subjugated by Qing (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo 
Sillok, 1962, pp.164–71, pp.173–4). 
 
Until the dispatch of this letter, Joseon had reached the point of no return: the 
decade-long peace with the Manchu came to an end. Yet from late August to early 
December, the Joseon court was once again stormed by vehement arguments 
between the loyalists and the rationalists (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, 
pp.182–95). The focus of debate was firstly placed on whether Joseon should 
choose to fight or continue to appease Qing. Same as before, the loyalists insisted 
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that this was an issue of morality, while the rationalist believed that this was a 
matter of strategy. As war would much likely bring Joseon to its end (as expected 
and prepared for by the loyalists) but appeasement seemed more promising to 
assure Joseon’s survival (as repeatedly mentioned by the rationalists), Injo began 
to gradually shift from the camp of pro-righteousness to that of pro-pragmatism. 
 
An obvious change of Injo’s attitude could be seen in the argument of whether 
Joseon should address Manchu as Qing. The loyalists were strongly opposed to 
using the word ‘Qing’ because it was the name of an empire, and the very 
existence of this empire was illegitimate according to the tenets of Confucianism. 
It thus would be immoral for Joseon to use the word of ‘Qing’ in its 
correspondence with Manchu; moreover, it would also imply Joseon’s willingness 
to submit to the barbarians. However, Injo, in support of Choe Myung-kil’s 
suggestion to permanently use the word of ‘Qing’ in all official documents, 
openly expressed his view on 19 September that he had no objection to addressing 
Manchu as Qing (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.187). 
 
Consequently, the loyalists, most of whom were young court officials, turned to 
condemn the rationalists for betraying Joseon. They demanded that the rationalists, 
Choe Myung-kil in particular, to be punished. Yet in contrary to the loyalists’ 
appeal, Injo defended Choe, praising him as a man of action who had always been 
loyal to Joseon. The king punished those who openly criticised Choe, including 
Yun Jip (1606–37) and O Dal-jae (1609–37). With the change of Injo’s attitude, 
the rationalists started to gain the upper hand in the debate from mid November. 
The king endorsed Choe Myung-kil’s plan to appease Qing, and Gim Ryu 
(1571–1648, then Yeonguijeong) publicly said in court that he would ensure the 
implementation of the appeasement policy despite that it was deemed by the 
people an act that violated Confucian ethics. From mid November to early 
December, Injo simply rejected any idea/advice of the loyalists (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.188–95). 
 
While the endless debate continued in the Joseon court, Hong Taiji launched 
another invasion and soon captured Anju (in Pyongan Province) on 13 December 
1636 – Byeongja Horan began. On 14 December, knowing that Kaesong (in 
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Hwanghae Province) had fallen in Qing’s hands, Injo was astonished by the swift 
advance of the enemy and decided to take refuge in Ganghwado again. However, 
when Injo’s entourage was about to leave Hanseong in the evening, to their horror, 
they saw Qing’s vanguard troops already arriving at the gate of the capital city. 
Injo had no choice but to enter Namhansanseong (South Han Mountain Fortress, a 
bastion to the immediate southeast of Hanseong). After a failed attempt to leave 
Namhansanseong for Ganghwado on 15 December due to heavy snow, it became 
clear that the king and his court officials would be trapped in the fortress (RDAK, 
vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.196). 
 
From 15 December 1636 to 29 January 1637, although besieged by the Qing 
troops and the reserves of food and ammunition gradually running out, the 
confrontation between the loyalists and the rationalists continued (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.196–211). For the loyalists, they kept condemning the 
rationalists, pled Injo not to surrender, asked the king to execute the leading 
figures of the rationalists (particularly Choe Myung-kil), led the remaining Joseon 
troops in the fortress to fight off the Qing attacks, and volunteered to be sent to 
Qing to be executed by Hong Taiji (as Hong Taiji ordered Injo to send those 
pro-Ming, anti-Qing loyalists to Qing such that he would feel less enraged by 
having them executed) – many loyalists even committed suicide as a 
manifestation of their loyalty to Ming. 
 
As for the rationalists, they kept criticising the loyalists for being incapable of 
saving the country. They persuaded Injo to surrender with the claim that a vassal 
state should not die for its suzerain. Meanwhile, they travelled back and forth 
between the fortress and the Qing camp to negotiate the terms and coordinate the 
arrangement for Joseon’s surrender. They even prepared the documents of 
Joseon’s surrender to the satisfaction of the Qing emperor (the documents were 
revised several times to be as humble as possible to please Hong Taiji). Besides, 
they urged Injo to send the loyalists to the Qing camp to be executed by Hong 
Taiji as soon as possible in order to end the crisis. 
 
At this critical moment, Injo turned into a leader of contradicting behaviour: 
sometimes he supported the loyalists with his determination to resist Qing, but 
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sometimes he agreed with the rationalists to submit to Qing so that Joseon could 
avoid the fate of being eliminated. For several times, Injo commented that both 
pro-righteousness and pro-pragmatism were right and he could not reject either 
one of them – the king was apparently trapped in the dilemma of not knowing 
which option to choose: he fully understood his moral obligation to uphold the 
Confucian principles of ethics, yet he also clearly saw the merits of pragmatism to 
assure Joseon’s survival. As a matter of fact, Injo often cried openly in front of the 
court officials during this period. Although he even kept performing the Sadae 
ritual in the fortress by bowing towards the direction of the imperial palace in 
Beijing on the Ming emperor’s birthday and the New Year’s Day (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, p.198, p.201), when he received report after report that the 
Joseon forces from other regions coming to their rescue were all defeated by the 
Qing troops, Injo realised that the situation became hopeless. 
 
On 29 January, Injo, with painful grief, sent the three loyalists of Hong Ik-han, 
Yun Jip and O Dal-jae (later revered as ‘the three martyrs of Byeongja Horan’) to 
Qing to be executed. A letter in the name of the Joseon court was also sent to 
Hong Taiji, informing him of Joseon’s decision to surrender. On 30 January 1637, 
Injo and the Joseon court officials exited Namhansanseong and surrendered to 
Hong Taiji in the nearby Samjeondo. In the ceremony of submission, Injo 
kowtowed to Hong Taiji in the fashion of a vassal towards its suzerain to show 
reverence for Qing (i.e. Injo knelt down before Hong Taiji, bowed so low until his 
forehead touched the ground three times, and stood up. The king then repeated 
this set of ritual consecutively for two more times) – which was considered an 
extreme humiliation to the loyalists (and the king himself as well). By the 
agreement, Joseon would sever its relationship with Ming and acknowledge Qing 
as its suzerain with immediate effect. The first two sons of Injo were ordered to be 
sent to Qing as hostages, and Joseon began to pay tribute to Qing the same way it 
did for Ming (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.212). 
 
Nonetheless, the rationalists considered the ending of Byeongja Horan as their 
victory over the loyalists, whom they called ‘stubborn and incompetent’, and 
credited themselves as Joseon’s saviour (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, 
pp.228–30). From February 1637 to the end of Injo’s reign in 1649, the 
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rationalists controlled the making of Joseon’s foreign policy. With no objection 
from Injo, they even decided to assist Qing in its war against Ming, although it 
was fiercely opposed to by the loyalists (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, 
pp.285–6, pp.318–9, p.329). In June 1646, after Qing returned General Im 
Gyeong Eop (a pro-Ming Joseon military commander who continued to fight 
Qing after Byeongja Horan and was later captured by Qing) to Joseon to be 
executed by the rationalists, Gim Ja-jeom (1588–1651, Yeonguijeong at the time, 
a leading rationalist) suggested to Injo that a special tribute mission should be sent 
to Qing in order to show Joseon’s gratitude to Qing, saying that this was the true 
way of faithful Sadae (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.535–7). 
 
As for Injo, he found it difficult to accept the humiliation to submit to the barbaric 
Qing, and he also expressed sympathy when Saheonbu redressed the issue 
regarding those loyalists who died for upholding Confucian ethics during 
Byeongja Horan on 5 May 1638 (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.272–3). 
However, he realised it was now more important for Joseon to serve Qing 
cautiously because Qing’s military power was simply overwhelming. He then 
decided to show his allegiance to Qing: 
 
y On 23 June 1641, Injo sent Qing a gift – the precious gold that had been 
preserved since the days of Silla. This voluntary act of Injo pleased 
Hong Taiji, who later issued an edict to praise Injo for his sincere Sadae 
towards Qing (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.372–3). 
y When the shocking news that Chongzhen Emperor committed suicide in 
Beijing arrived at the Joseon court on 7 May 1644, many people in the 
royal palace (even the servants) wept for the demise of Ming; yet with 
Injo’s endorsement, a congratulatory mission was sent to Qing on 21 
May (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, pp.439–40). 
y On 4 July 1644, Injo dispatched another congratulatory mission to Qing 
for the relocation of its capital from Mukden to Beijing (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, p.444). 
y In October 1644, the loyalists proposed to organise mourning 
ceremonies for Chongzhen Emperor, saying that it was necessary 
according to Confucian ethics (to show that Joseon was not an 
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ungrateful nation to what Ming had done for it). Injo did not reject the 
idea, but he asked the court officials to discuss the proposal among them 
covertly. Eventually, the proposal was not materialised (RDAK, vol. 35, 
Injo Sillok, 1962, p.451). 
y When Choe Myung-kil, the leading rationalist who was despised and 
loathed by the loyalists, died on 17 May 1647, Injo sadly mourned for 
his death and highly praised him for his ability and loyalty to Joseon 
(RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.558). 
 
In sum, while the debates between the loyalists and the rationalists in the past 
were limited to rhetoric, the two camps confronted with each other in real actions 
during the reigns of Gwanghaegun and Injo, and in the end pragmatism triumphed 
over morality in the making of Joseon’s foreign policies. Had it not been for the 
powerful influence of ideational forces, the trajectory of Joseon history would 
have been much simpler: a straight line instead of a zigzag path as seen in the first 
half of the 17th century. 
 
Power transition from Ming to Qing in Northeast Asia occurred and completed 
within three decades, however, the competition between the camps of 
pro-righteousness and pro-pragmatism persisted even after the collapse of Ming. 
This time it was the loyalists that gained the upper hand in its rivalry against the 
rationalists. For around 120 years, Joseon chose to serve the fallen Ming as the 
great, although Joseon was officially a vassal state of Qing and Qing’s military 
supremacy in the region was unquestionable. Therefore, a unique period of an 
imaginary bipolar order emerged. 
 
5.2 Joseon between the Fallen Ming and Qing 
 
After Ming’s collapse in 1644, distribution of power in Northeast Asia indicated 
that although there were sporadic unrests within China proper or along its 
periphery, no country in the region was in the same league of Qing in terms of 
military capability. A unipolar order re-emerged, only with Qing replacing Ming. 
However, to the Joseon loyalists who pledged their eternal allegiance to Ming 
according to Confucian ethics, the transition of power did not necessarily take 
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place. In their eyes, Qing has risen to become a pole of material power, but in no 
way it could replace Ming as the centre of the civilised Sinocentric world; the 
Manchu were nothing but a tribe of barbarians after all. Hence, an imaginary 
bipolar order came to exist in the mind of the loyalists. This might appear to be an 
illusion to the rationalists, but the loyalists, for a substantial amount of time, 
maintained the perception that the fallen Ming coexisted with Qing – and it was 
their moral obligation to keep revering Ming, whereby Joseon would be able to 
continuously serve the great they recognised. Furthermore, to those loyalists who 
were radical in their approach, the right way to serve Ming was Bukbeol (Northern 
Expedition, чҵ): to punish the Manchu by taking military actions against Qing. 
 
This was a period that witnessed the loyalists’ domination in the making of Joseon 
foreign policy – either by the radical or the moderate loyalists. While the radical 
loyalists aimed to launch Bukbeol against Qing as vengeance on the Manchu for 
what they had done to Ming and Joseon, the moderate loyalists however opted for 
conservative tactics to implicitly express their reverence for Ming and disdain for 
Qing. Yet by either way, the overarching discourse at the time was Jonju Yangyi 
(respecting the Zhou Dynasty and resisting the barbarians, ൧ڬᝎӮ, with Zhou 
being referred to Ming and the barbarian being hinted as Qing), which was 
derived from the Confucian ethics of propriety. 
 
The loyalists’ triumph over the rationalists was attributed to Joseon’s submission 
to Qing in 1637 and the rationalists’ unrestrained pro-Qing behaviour, which 
gradually generated the anti-Qing nationalistic sentiment among the Joseon 
intellectuals. They came to believe that the Koreans must regain their national 
pride, and this goal was to be achieved by enhancing Joseon’s identity, Sojunghwa, 
such that Joseon could become the sole legitimate heir to Chinese culture – for 
culture was the only aspect Joseon could overpower Qing, the formidable yet 
ignorant barbarian. Therefore, by highlighting Joseon’s allegiance to Ming and its 
faithful adherence to Confucian propriety (in other words, by practicing Sadae 
towards Ming sincerely), Joseon’s cultural superiority could be manifested, which 
would appear to be in stark contrast to the rebellious and savage behaviour of the 
Manchu. 
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5.2.1 The Reign of Hyojong (1649–59) 
 
Hyojong was the second son of Injo. He was sent to Mukden together with his 
elder brother, Crown Prince Sohyeon, as hostages on 8 February 1637 according 
to the treaty signed between Joseon and Qing at the end of Byeongja Horan. Eight 
years later, Hyojong was released on 26 March 1645 by the order of Shunzhi 
Emperor of Qing. Crown Prince Sohyeon returned to Joseon on an earlier day, but 
he died on 26 April 1645 due to illness. Hyojong arrived in Joseon on 14 May, 
and he was made the crown prince on 27 September. Four years later, he ascended 
the throne on 8 May 1649 (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.213, pp.471–2, 
p.477, pp.496–7). 
 
During their captive years in Mukden, the two brothers behaved quite differently. 
Crown Prince Sohyeon got along well with the Manchu and gradually blended in 
with them, soon abandoning the study of Confucian classics and joining the Qing 
military officers and soldiers in their daily entertainments such as hunting – and 
the Qing court officials scoffed at his weak will to be assimilated without any 
difficulties (RDAK, vol. 35, Injo Sillok, 1962, p.472). However, Hyojong was a 
totally different case to the Manchu. After the princes arrived in Mukden, the 
Manchu sent them gold, jade, and precious clothing. While Crown Prince Sohyeon 
accepted the gifts, Hyojong rejected them. Instead of treasures, Hyojong told the 
Manchu that he would rather receive Joseon soldiers who were seized by Qing as 
prisoners of war (so that he could send them home). The Manchu came to respect 
Hyojong and released the captured Joseon soldiers according to his request 
(RDAK, vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, p.1). 
 
Throughout his reign, Hyojong had been a determined loyalist. He began to plan 
for Bukbeol right after his enthronement. Yet Hyojong was not a reckless loyalist; 
he had been very cautious in the process of planning Bukbeol: he never made any 
official announcement in the court about the expedition, but he frequently 
discussed with the loyalists about the planning and heavily involved himself in the 
improvement of Joseon’s military capability. In June 1649, Hyojong invited the 
79-year-old Gim Sang-hon (the leading loyalist during Injo’s reign) to the royal 
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palace for a private meeting. Two months later, the loyalists proposed to the king 
that the era name of Qing should not be used in any internal official documents 
and records. Hyojong then issued a secret order to the court officials and 
instructed them to discuss the proposal at home instead of openly in the court. 
Consensus was reached and the proposal was approved for implementation 
(RDAK, vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, p.14, pp.21–22). 
 
Hyojong also actively involved himself in issues related to national defence. He 
kept reminding the military generals of the importance of training the soldiers on 
a daily basis, and he even offered the backyard of Changdeokgung (one of the 
major royal palaces) for military drilling exercise. Through observation, Hyojong 
detected a problem of the Joseon cavalry: the Koreans would not (and in fact they 
could not, due to lack of training) bend and stay close to the saddle when they 
were riding on the battleground, for which they were easily killed by the Manchu 
arrows. This had become a laughingstock to the Manchu, thus Hyojong helped the 
Joseon soldiers to solve this problem through military training. Moreover, 
Hyojong also improved the design of swords, bows and arrows, and military 
uniforms, making the equipment more functionally effective in combat on the 
battlefield. 
 
As a matter of fact, Hyojong’s knowledge of weaponry and fighting-skill came 
from his experience during Byeongja Horan and his stay as hostage in Mukden, 
and he was probably one of the earliest proponents of Silhak, who advocated the 
learning of Qing’s superior combat tactics – the king said, as he witnessed in 
person, this was what the Manchu did and this was how they won. In order to 
have a better chance to defeat the Qing troops on the battleground, Hyojong was 
willing to put aside the prejudice against Qing that was commonly found among 
the Koreans and to emulate the military techniques of the Manchu – for he 
believed that Joseon could learn from the barbarian so as to fight the barbarian. In 
fact, it was recorded that every time when Hyojong worked on the issues related 
to military affairs, the king would tirelessly discuss the planning with court 
officials from the Ministry of Defence day and night. When alone, Hyojong would 
often lose himself in meditation and end up with many sleepless nights (RDAK, 
vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, pp.207–8, pp.334–5). 
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Although Hyojong had been intentionally keeping a low profile on the issues 
related to Bukbeol, sometimes he simply could not help expressing his anti-Qing, 
pro-righteousness sentiment explicitly. The king once emotionally criticised Qing 
in October 1650 for ordering Joseon to send young girls to China to work as maid 
in the royal palace, condemning this as an act of ‘inhumanely seizing Joseon’s 
innocent subjects’ (RDAK, vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, p.90). On 26 June 1652, 
Gim Sang-hon passed away. Before his death, Gim wrote to Hyojong and 
encouraged the king to pursuit the goal of liberating Joseon from Qing’s control. 
Different from his father, Injo, who mourned for the decease of Choe Myung-kil 
(the leading rationalist) in 1647, Hyojong lamented the death of Gim Sang-hon 
with great sorrow, lauding him for his absolute loyalty and righteousness (RDAK, 
vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, pp.199–200). 
 
However, the radical loyalists were not satisfied with what Hyojong had done. 
They expected to see some concrete and explicit actions to be taken by the king. 
Song Si-yeol (1607–88) wrote to Hyojong on 16 August 1657 and criticised the 
king for not taking any encouraging actions in years. Song proposed to ally with 
the regime of Southern Ming such that a coalition force could be formed to fight 
against Qing; at the age of 50, he even volunteered to be the messenger (RDAK, 
vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, pp.440–1). Song Jun-gil (1606–72), another radical 
loyalist, suggested to Hyojong that Jeju Island, due to its location (Chinese 
merchants who travelled to Japan would usually stop by the island), should be 
turned into a base from which the Joseon court was to contact Ming’s royal 
descendants for taking further anti-Qing actions. He also reminded the king of the 
importance of military preparation (RDAK, vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, 
pp.454–5, p.473). 
 
Hyojong gave positive replies to Song Si-yeol and Song Jun-gil, explaining to 
them that he had been working diligently to prepare for the expedition throughout 
the years because his determination to resist Qing and to revive Ming never 
changed. According to information he obtained from Uuijeong Sim Ji-won 
(1593–1662) who led the Joseon tribute mission to Beijing in early 1654, the 
omen of Qing’s demise could be seen by its lack of military preparation (RDAK, 
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vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, p.309). Hyojong thus was convinced that as long as 
the Joseon soldiers were trained to form a crack regiment, the military campaign 
against Qing would be successful. In his confident words, Joseon’s victory was 
not a matter of concern; what needed to be worried about was whether Joseon had 
the resolution to launch the military campaign. Hyojong asserted that by 
upholding the Confucian principles of righteousness he would have no regret even 
if the campaign were to fail. The king said that he was fully aware of his 
responsibility, and the target he set for himself was to complete the mission in 10 
years of time (RDAK, vol. 38, Revised Sillok of Hyeonjong, 1964, pp.26–27). 
 
However, Hyojong died on 4 May 1659 at the age of only 40, much to the 
loyalists’ sadness and regret (RDAK, vol. 36, Hyojong Sillok, 1963, p.526). What 
Hyojong had done was a result of his faithful belief in the Confucian principles of 
righteousness. He always viewed Joseon’s status as a vassal of Ming in the 
Sinocentric world, and his understanding of Joseon’s obligation to serve Ming 
whole-heartedly never changed even after its fall. Throughout his reign, the only 
national interest Hyojong perceived was to rebel against Qing for the restoration 
of Ming. Consequently, Hyojong had been unequivocally planning for Bukbeol 
since his enthronement, in spite of Qing’s supremacy. From his prudent planning, 
it indicated that the king was not blind to the power disparity between Joseon and 
Qing; yet he carried on with the mission for a full decade completely out of his 
faith in Confucian ethics. 
 
His behaviour might go beyond the comprehension of the rationalists, who saw 
the interstate relations through the lens of power politics. However, Sadae as a 
powerful ideational force did motivate Hyojong to shoulder the challenging 
responsibility of avenging the demise of Ming. In general, with the influence 
exerted by the Confucian discourse of Jonju Yangyi (which actually referred to 
‘respecting Ming and resisting Qing’), there emerged in the Joseon society the 
sort of fervour that Joseon should and could defy Qing, as advocated by the 
radical loyalists. In their understanding, Ming did not fall – and therefore they 
should continue to serve Ming (by restoring Ming) in this imaginary bipolar 
order – even at the risk of losing their lives and their country. In this sense, their 
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level of sincerity in the practice of Sadae was even higher than that of Jungjong 
during the era of Ming’s dominance. 
 
5.2.2 The Reign of Hyeonjong (1659–74) 
 
Hyeonjong was crowned when he was only 18, and he died in 1674 at the age of 
33. During his 15 years of reign, Hyeonjong appeared to be a moderate loyalist, 
which was rather different from his father. Though he tried to make it clear to the 
loyalists that despite his youth, he dared not forget the humiliation his forefathers 
suffered, the loyalists were rather disappointed that Hyeonjong hardly accepted 
any of their suggestions (RDAK, vol. 38, Revised Sillok of Hyeonjong, 1964, 
p.290). As a result, the loyalists had to take a step back: instead of pushing 
Hyeonjong to take anti-Qing actions, they tried to change his mind first – and 
what they did next was to convince the young king that it was feasible to resist 
Qing because Qing, according to the information they had in hand, was 
‘declining’. 
 
Such information included: the bad omens of seeing comet and having earthquake 
in China, the Mongols’ rebellion against Qing, Kangxi Emperor at his early teens, 
the luxury life the Manchu had been leading, lack of military preparation, and the 
poor and harsh treatment of the Han-Chinese. This was the kind of intelligence the 
loyalists were able to gather from 1665 to 1669, mainly from those tribute mission 
members who stayed for a few months in China. The loyalists were rejoiced; they 
found these portents greatly encouraging, which indicated that Qing was doomed 
to collapse. They presented their analysis to Hyeonjong and reminded the king to 
learn a lesson from the ‘failure’ of Qing, and suggested that Hyeonjong, in order 
to make Joseon strong enough to defeat Qing, should do exactly the opposite of 
what the Manchu had been doing (RDAK, vol. 37, Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, 
pp.253–4, p.394, p.419). 
 
However, Hyeonjong’s response was less enthusiastic, and he often appeared to 
be ambiguous on anti-Qing issues. In general, his behaviour was hugely different 
from that of Hyojong, who was always clear in his pro-righteousness stance. The 
changing disposition from Hyojong to Hyeonjong thus provided the rationalists 
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with a chance to rise again. When the loyalists proposed to build a temple on 8 
June 1667 in memory of Wanli Emperor, Yang Hao, and Li Rusong, for their 
good will and efforts to rescue Joseon during the Imjin War, the rationalists, 
supported by Hyeonjong, overruled the proposal with the reason that there was no 
precedent that a temple was ever built in a vassal state to honour the emperor 
(RDAK, vol. 37, Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, p.355). Five years later, the loyalists 
raised the proposal again. Same as before, the rationalists were opposed to such 
idea; and this time they added another reason: with the presence of a powerful 
Qing, it would not be feasible for Joseon to carry out such plan (RDAK, vol. 37, 
Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, pp.532–3). 
 
Another example took place in June 1667. On 21 June, a ship carrying 95 
Han-Chinese, who claimed to be merchants from the Fujian Province of China en 
route to Japan, wrecked by storm at sea and was found beached on Joseon’s coast. 
It became an issue that drew the attention of the Joseon court by the question of 
whether Joseon should send these Han-Chinese to Beijing – for they did not obey 
the Queue Order of Qing and still retained the hairstyle of Ming (as a gesture to 
show their anti-Qing stance, but they would be executed for treason if caught by 
the Manchu). Knowing for certain that these Han-Chinese would be killed when 
they reached Beijing, the loyalists pled with Hyeonjong not to send them back to 
China. However, the rationalists reminded the king of what Joseon had suffered 
during Byeongja Horan, and insisted that even though it looked cruel and 
inhumane, Joseon should safeguard its national interest by obeying Qing’s order – 
for Joseon was too weak to withstand any attack from Qing. The political reality 
emphasised by the rationalists eventually cleared Hyeonjong’s hesitation, and he 
decided to send all those Han-Chinese to Beijing on 23 June 1667 (RDAK, vol. 37, 
Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, pp.355–6). 
 
On 2 March 1674, Joseon embassy sent a report to Hyeonjong from Beijing to 
inform the king of the revolt of Wu Sangui (a Han-Chinese warlord) against Qing 
in China. To the radical loyalists, this was a long-awaited opportunity. They wrote 
to Hyeonjong on 16 May, saying that with Wu Sangui in the south and the 
Mongols in the north, the time for revenge had finally come and Joseon should 
immediately launch military attacks against Qing. However, Hyeonjong 
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responded coldly: the king felt so annoyed with their proposals that he simply did 
not bother to give any reply (RDAK, vol. 37, Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, p.572, 
p.576). 
 
On 1 July 1674, Yun Hyu (1617–80, the leading radical loyalist) wrote to 
Hyeonjong and urged the king to take immediate action at the time when Qing 
had to cope with the rebellion of Wu Sangui. After a detailed illustration of the 
Confucian ethics of righteousness, Yun further suggested that, in order to defeat 
Qing, Joseon should forge alliance with Zheng Jing (Head of the Kingdom of 
Formosa) in Taiwan such that the attacks could be launched from both land and 
sea. Yun’s words gave the rationalists uneasiness, for they feared that the king 
might be influenced by their opponents. As a result, they even attempted to 
intercept those memorials to the throne written by the radical loyalists so that the 
king would not have the chance to read about their suggestions (RDAK, vol. 37, 
Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, pp.579–80). 
 
What made Hyeongjong behave this differently from his father could be attributed 
to his physical condition. After being criticised by Song Si-yeol for his inaction on 
anti-Qing issues, Hyeongjong explained to Song on 30 October 1668 that he was 
not unwilling to carry on with the unfinished anti-Qing business left by Hyojong. 
The king said the reason was that he had been troubled with a disease, for which 
he became very depressed. Song Si-yeol was not pleased with the reason 
Hyeonjong provided, and he asked the king to do whatever that could be done at 
the moment such that his life would not be wasted – yet Hyeonjong only 
responded with silence (RDAK, vol. 37, Hyeonjong Sillok, 1963, pp.396–7). 
Anyway, Hyeongjong died on 18 August 1674 (RDAK, vol. 37, Hyeonjong Sillok, 
1963, p.591). Whether his health was truly the cause that had made such 
difference, his ambiguity on the anti-Qing issues did lend support to the 
resurgence of the rationalists in Joseon politics. After a decade of domination by 
the loyalists with the Confucian discourse of Jonju Yangyi prevailing in the 
Joseon society, political reality and merits of prudence returned to the mindset of 
the Joseon elites, and prevented the loyalists (radical loyalists in particular) from 
making unrealistic decisions and taking thoughtless actions that would likely 
jeopardise Joseon’s survival. 
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5.2.3 The Reign of Sukjong (1674–1720) 
 
Sukjong was enthroned at the age of 13. During his 46-year reign, the sentiment to 
revere the fallen Ming changed from being radically manifested to becoming 
cautiously expressed. With the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories (1673–81) 
going on in China, competition in the Joseon court was mainly found between the 
moderate and the radical loyalists during the first decade of Sukjong’s rule – for 
the event looked so promising to achieve the loyalists’ goal of defeating Qing and 
reviving Ming, which to some extent silenced the rationalists. However, the 
failure of the revolt in 1681 and the demise of the Kingdom of Formosa in 1683 
ended Joseon’s plan of Bukbeol for good, and the radical loyalists gradually 
merged with the moderate loyalists. Meanwhile, with the Manchu triumphantly 
marching onto their zenith, the era of ‘High Qing’, their attitude towards Joseon 
transformed from being merciless and harsh to becoming understanding and 
accommodating. Such changes in the macro-situation reinforced the status of the 
moderate loyalists, who never abandoned the Confucian principles of 
righteousness but only dared to challenge Qing covertly. Headed by the king, the 
moderate loyalists adopted a special approach to honour Ming and resist Qing 
during the final two decades of Sukjong’s reign. 
 
The quick rise of the radical loyalists in Joseon politics during the early years of 
Sukjong’s rule was the result of two factors: inaction of Hyeonjong on anti-Qing 
issue for 15 years, and the social unrest in China caused by the Rebellion of the 
Three Feudatories. While the loyalists’ anti-Qing enthusiasm was driven to its 
peak by Hyojong’s resolution and action to fight against the Manchu but then it 
had to be repressed throughout Hyeonjong’s reign, its comeback turned out to be a 
much stronger version of its previous form. The radical loyalists began to develop 
a belief that Joseon should take up a leading role in the region-wide anti-Qing 
campaign to restore the Sinocentric order that was destroyed by the Manchu. 
More importantly, they were convinced that the Joseon troops, especially the 
artillery forces, were powerful enough to defeat the Qing army (RDAK, vol. 39, 
Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.28). 
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On 9 February 1675, Yun Hyu, the leading radical loyalist, asserted that there 
were only three issues to be concerned in Joseon’s foreign relations: 1) to launch 
Bukbeol; 2) to forge alliance with Zheng Jing’s Kingdom of Formosa; and 3) to 
sever Joseon’s relationship with Qing. On 9 November 1677, Yun Hyu said to 
Sukjong that Qing had become exhausted in suppressing the Rebellion of the 
Three Feudatories. On the contrary, Joseon was in its full strength – and Yun 
believed that by having righteousness on Joseon’s side, Qing would be defeated 
and eliminated. In fact, the pro-Ming, anti-Qing sentiment was running very high 
in the Joseon society at the time. Those who used Qing’s era name in their 
writings, as in the example of Gim Su-hong (1598–1681), were despised as 
traitors who betrayed Joseon and Ming (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, 
pp.38–39, pp.56–57, p.168, p.344). 
 
The 14-year-old Sukjong praised the integrity and courage of the radical loyalists, 
but the young king said although he also wished to avenge Ming’s demise, he was 
clearly aware of the power disparity between Joseon and Qing (RDAK, vol. 39, 
Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.84). As the radical loyalists were not able to gain 
Sukjong’s support, the moderate loyalists took this opportunity to reinforce their 
influence in the Joseon court. Basically, they were not opposed to the discourse of 
Jonju Yangyi – as they claimed that Ming’s kindness to Joseon (particularly 
during the Imjin War) should never be forgotten. However, they did not concur 
with the radical loyalists on the issue of Bukbeol: they did not think it was the 
right time for vengeance, and they even questioned whether Joseon was up to the 
level of competing with Qing militarily. 
 
As they criticised the radical loyalists for pursuing abstract reputation for their 
own by putting the country in grave danger, the moderate loyalists proposed to 
repeat the practice during Hyeonjong’s reign: to keep the memorials to the throne 
written by the radical loyalists from being read by Sukjong – and the king 
approved their suggestion. By having swung the king to their side, the moderate 
loyalists opted for methods to resist Qing covertly under the leadership of 
Yeonguijeong Heo Jeok (1610–80). For example, Heo proposed to Sukjong on 24 
January 1676 that if any Han-Chinese from the Kingdom of Formosa were found 
in Joseon, they would not be sent to Beijing. Instead, the Joseon court would offer 
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them seagoing vessels (and made it appear to be stolen by the Han-Chinese). If 
questioned by Beijing, the Joseon court would simply pretend that it had no 
knowledge about the trace of these Han-Chinese. Basically, the moderate loyalists 
would count on the signal sent from Heaven: for instance, earthquake in China in 
1679 was interpreted by them as a bad omen to indicate Qing’s decline. Hence 
Joseon, as they believed, should keep training itself to become an exemplar 
country of Confucian ethics; and meanwhile, except waiting, Joseon should not 
take any reckless actions (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.112, p.115, 
p.222). 
 
The final victory of the moderate loyalists over the radical loyalists came at the 
moment when the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories in China was crushed by 
Kangxi Emperor. On 29 April 1683, Uuijeong Gim Seog-ju (1634–84, one of the 
moderate loyalists), who just returned from China, reported to Sukjong the failure 
of the revolt. By describing his observation in China, he commented that China 
was well administered by the Manchu, Qing’s military power was not weak at all, 
and more importantly, the Han-Chinese seemed to have forgotten Ming (RDAK, 
vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.437). This turned out to be a convincing message 
to Sukjong and everyone else in the Joseon court: the consolidation of Qing’s 
power through the suppression of the revolt had confirmed the impossibility for 
Joseon to take any military actions against Qing. The radical loyalists no longer 
raised any ideas of Bukbeol, and they gradually turned over to join the moderate 
loyalists. However, the disappearing of radical loyalists did not necessarily 
provide the rationalists with an opportunity to control Joseon’s relations with 
Qing. The loyalists, though being moderate in their approach, continued to 
dominate the Joseon court in the following years. 
 
This was the result of Qing’s harsh attitude towards Joseon during the decade 
after Kangxi Emperor repressed the revolts in China, and the Qing–Joseon 
relations plummeted during the period from late 1685 to early 1686. In 1685, the 
practice of some Koreans crossing the Qing–Joseon border illegally to collect 
ginseng caught the attention of Kangxi Emperor, and he sent two court officials to 
Joseon in October to investigate such cases. With a number of Korean commoners 
apprehended, the trial was conducted on 1 December 1685. At the Qing officials’ 
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insistence, Sukjong had to attend the tribunal in person. Those Koreans were 
sentenced guilty after the trial, and some local Joseon officials were also punished 
for their failure to prevent such crime from happening. In March 1686, the Qing 
Ministry of Rite even decided to penalise Sukjong with the charge of malpractice, 
and the king was eventually fined 20,000 taels of silver for having connived at 
such illegal activities (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.553, pp.556–7, 
p.567). 
 
This was the very first time in 300 years that a Joseon king was punished by its 
suzerain. The Joseon court officials, especially the loyalists, considered this as the 
greatest humiliation since Injo’s surrender to Qing in 1637. They were worried 
about the future fate of Joseon under the peremptory rule of Qing, and hence they 
urged Sukjong to think and act as a decisive leader like Hyojong such that Joseon 
could rise to get its revenge on Qing (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, 
pp.573–4). Soon the anti-Qing sentiment in Joseon grew stronger: it reached the 
height that even the Joseon court’s decision to accept the rice provided by Qing as 
famine relief in 1697–8 was criticised by the loyalists as an act of self-humiliation. 
Although Sukjong explained that the decision was made for the purpose of saving 
the lives of the starving Koreans across the country, Jeong Ho (1648–1736, one of 
the leading loyalists and future Yeonguijeong during Yeongjo’s reign) fiercely 
condemned those who raised and supported the idea of asking Qing for help, and 
he lamented that by accepting the Qing’s rice, the Confucian ethics was totally 
abandoned and Joseon’s national identity was reduced to a barbaric state (RDAK, 
vol. 40, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.253, pp.258–9). 
 
As for Sukjong, his attitude had been changing as well. With a personal 
experience of being humiliated in the ginseng case (1685–6), Sukjong began to 
openly express his anti-Qing feeling in the court – no affirmative statement about 
resisting Qing however, only some softly made remarks that he was deeply 
grateful to Wanli Emperor for saving Joseon during the Imjin War, for which he 
was much regretful about not being able to avenge Ming’s demise due to Joseon’s 
weak military capability (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, p.590, p598). 
Meanwhile, the loyalists kept influencing Sukjong with the discourse of Jonju 
Yangyi. By describing to Sukjong how Hyojong had been unwaveringly and 
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bravely upholding the Confucian principles of righteousness even during his 
detention in Mukden as hostage (in Mukden, Hyojong wrote a letter to inform the 
Joseon court of the military assault Qing launched against Ming, calling Qing’s 
action as ‘unrighteous invasion’), the loyalists encouraged the king to carry on 
with the spirit of his grandfather so as to truly understand the meaning of 
righteousness and to resist Qing determinedly (RDAK, vol. 39, Sukjong Sillok, 
1964, p.484). The loyalists’ efforts were not fruitless. With their influence and the 
king’s own experience, the ideational forces gained the upper hand in its wrestle 
with the material forces. Sukjong decided to take a bold yet cautious action in 
early 1704. 
 
By his knowledge about the Imjin War, Sukjong came to believe that Wanli 
Emperor was instrumental in the making of the decision to dispatch Ming troops 
to rescue Joseon. Had it not been the emperor’s greatest humaneness, Joseon 
would have been eliminated by Japan. Moreover, according to Sukjong’s 
deduction, it must have cost Ming an enormous amount of resources. Hence, 
Ming’s rapid decline could be attributed, to a certain extent, to the exhaustion 
caused by Ming’s involvement in the Imjin War. In other words, Joseon was 
indirectly responsible for Ming’s collapse. Sukjong therefore concluded that Ming 
saved the life of Joseon at the expense of its own, for which Joseon was eternally 
in Ming’s debt. 
 
In order to express Joseon’s deepest gratitude towards Ming, on 10 January 1704 
(60 years after Ming’s collapse), Sukjong suggested that a temple be constructed 
in Joseon to honour Wanli Emperor. This was indeed a bold decision, as it would 
definitely be known by the Manchu when the temple was built. In the following 
discussions among the Joseon court officials, the risk was considered, but the fear 
was overcome – the loyalists were convinced that the most powerful weapon they 
possessed was the Confucian ethics of righteousness. However, at the advice of 
the rationalists, in order not to explicitly provoke the Manchu, on 7 March 1704, 
the original idea of building a temple was changed to erecting an altar. To be even 
more cautious, the king and the court officials finally decided the location for the 
altar: the backyard of the royal palace. On 19 March, the day Chongzhen Emperor 
committed suicide in Beijing six decades ago that marked the end of Ming, 
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Sukjong, with the presence of all court officials who dressed in black, held a 
memorial ceremony for Chongzhen Emperor at the highest level that was 
equivalent to worshipping Heaven. Throughout the entire process, Sukjong wept 
ceaselessly (RDAK, vol. 40, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, pp.540–2, pp.549–51). 
 
On 21 December 1704, construction of the altar was completed. It was named 
Daebodan (Altar for Great Recompense, εൔᏝ). The memorial tablet of Wanli 
Emperor was placed at the centre of the altar. The annual memorial ceremony was 
set to be held in March, and the rituals were to be performed strictly according to 
the tradition of Ming China. In particular, Qing’s era name was not to be used in 
the elegiac address. On 9 March 1705, Sukjong arrived at Daebodan at midnight 
to hold the memorial ceremony for the first time. An elegiac address was read, 
with every sentence showing Joseon’s gratitude towards Ming. Afterwards 
Sukjong said regrettably that an altar instead of a temple was eventually built due 
to considerations based upon the political reality, which was against his wish. 
However, Sukjong believed that since the altar was erected, as long as Joseon 
existed, he and the future kings should hold the memorial ceremony every year 
(RDAK, vol. 40, Sukjong Sillok, 1964, pp.600–1, pp.621–2). 
 
Building Daebodan and holding memorial ceremonies to enshrine and honour a 
departed emperor of Ming was as far as Sukjong and the loyalists could go at that 
time. In a bipolar order, though an imaginary one, this could be described as an 
eclectic way to balance the principles of morality and the concerns of reality. 
Consequently, Sukjong and the loyalists chose to serve both great powers at the 
same time: officially, the Joseon court continued to perform its duty of Sadae 
towards Qing routinely – not only the regular tribute missions but also the ad hoc 
missions were dispatched to Qing by the same pattern as during the Ming era. To 
the Joseon court, serving Qing was still an acceptable practice not only because of 
Qing’s supremacy but also due to the changing attitude of Qing towards Joseon 
from being offensive to becoming peaceful after the ginseng case – for instance, 
Kangxi Emperor ordered the reduction of Joseon’s tribute goods in November 
1711 while the Joseon court never raised such request (RDAK, vol. 41, Sukjong 
Sillok, 1965, p.239). 
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Unofficially, Sukjong and the loyalists still secretly shouldered the responsibility 
of resisting Qing, and the reason for sustaining such enthusiasm was their 
understanding of and firm belief in Confucian ethics: Joseon was always a vassal 
of Ming, and because the senior performed its duty to take care of the junior until 
its final moment, the junior would continue to revere and serve the senior 
faithfully (even though the senior no longer existed). This explained why Sukjong 
and the loyalists felt that they were greatly encouraged whenever they obtained 
more evidence/information about Ming’s efforts to rescue Joseon during the Imjin 
War (RDAK, vol. 41, Sukjong Sillok, 1965, p.288). As a matter of fact, the duality 
of Joseon’s Sadae continued to exist during Yeongjo’s reign. 
 
5.2.4 The Reign of Yeongjo (1724–76) 
 
Yeongjo was crowned at the age of 30, and he stayed on the throne for 52 years, 
which was the longest reign among all Joseon kings. Yeongjo’s ruling years 
coincided with the period of ‘High Qing’ in China, when Qing’s power reached its 
peak and the distribution of power was never clearer in Northeast Asia since Qing 
replaced Ming in 1644. However, the rationalists were never able to decisively 
overpower the loyalists. A crucial factor was Yeongjo; he never clearly took the 
side of the rationalists – he was a loyalist at heart after all, for which he was 
frequently torn between the thoughts of pro-righteousness and pro-pragmatism 
throughout his reign. In addition, Qing’s Joseon policy during this period also 
became more pacifying, which to a great extent neutralised the anti-Qing 
sentiment of the loyalists. 
 
In general, the prevailing idea at the time in Joseon was still Jonju Yangyi after 
Yeongjo ascended the throne in 1724. To the Koreans, Joseon’s national identity 
had always been Sojunghwa – especially after the fall of Ming, Joseon became the 
only and true heir to the Chinese civilisation. As Joseon had been emulating China 
for centuries, the Chinese way of doing things (i.e. political systems, social norms, 
cultural practices, etc.), as the Koreans claimed, could now be found only in 
Joseon. Moreover, they even proudly believed that the Manchu respected the 
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Koreans because of the Chinese traditions that Joseon loyally preserved (RDAK, 
vol. 42, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.395). 
 
In particular, the loyalists continued with their anti-Qing mission, although 
passively and secretly. Their actions were basically confined to cheering for the 
bad omens (such as earthquake) happening in China, with which they concluded 
that the Manchu’s rule of China would not exceed a century, and forbidding the 
use of Qing’s era name in any internal official documents (RDAK, vol. 43, 
Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.236, pp.389–90). As for Yeongjo, he actually did more to 
uphold the principle of Jonju Yangyi: throughout his reign, Yeongjo hosted the 
memorial ceremony at Daebodan every year in honour of Wanli Emperor (RDAK, 
vol. 46, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, pp.430–47) – except in 1736, he was not able to 
hold the ceremony due to the arrival of a Qing embassy on 4 March that coincided 
with the day of the ceremony, for which Yeongjo openly expressed his 
disappointment and sadness later in the court (RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 
1965, p.32). 
 
Moreover, Yeongjo would often remind himself of Ming’s kindness to Joseon by 
writing poems, trying to contact the descendents of Ming General Li Rusong (who 
had allegedly settled down in Korea after Ming’s fall), and purchasing the 
writings of Ming General Yang Hao (RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.196). 
Particularly, Yeongjo rewarded the descendents of the loyalists who refuted 
appeasement with the Manchu during Injo’s reign (such as Gim Sang-yong, Gim 
Sang-hon, and the ‘three martyrs of Byeongja Horan’), and highly praised their 
loyalty that had safeguarded Joseon’s reputation (RDAK, vol. 46, Yeongjo Sillok, 
1965, p.299). Yet above all these, Yeongjo had made a significant contribution to 
the anti-Qing sentiment in Joseon: in 1749, Yeongjo ordered to expand Daebodan 
so as to accommodate the additional enshrinements of Hongwu Emperor and 
Chongzhen Emperor. 
 
On 1 March 1749, Yeongjo came to know, from Ming’s historical record, that 
Chongzhen Emperor, upon receiving Joseon’s message to ask Ming for military 
assistance in January 1637, ordered the dispatch of Ming troops to rescue Joseon. 
Yet before departure, the Ming expedition forces received the information about 
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Joseon’s surrender and the rescue mission was halted. Chongzhen Emperor 
scolded the Ming commander for failing to save Joseon, but mentioning not a 
single word to reprimand Joseon for its submission to the Manchu. Considering 
Ming’s situation at the time (i.e. fighting Qing’s invasion in Northeast China and 
suppressing peasant revolts in the heartland), which was as difficult as that of 
Joseon, Yeongjo felt deeply touched by Chongzhen Emperor’s kindness to Joseon. 
Two weeks later, the king proposed in the court to add the memorial tablet of 
Chongzhen Emperor to Daebodan. In spite of objections raised by the rationalists, 
Yeongjo decided on 23 March to carry on with his plan. He even added the tablet 
of Hongwu Emperor to the altar, justifying his decision by what Hongwu Emperor 
had done for Joseon: naming the country (RDAK, vol. 45, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, 
pp.57–58, pp.60–61). 
 
On 10 and 11 April 1749, Yeongjo held the memorial ceremony for all three Ming 
emperors simultaneously for the first time, expressing Joseon’s profound gratitude 
towards Ming. Not only a ceremony with larger scale was organised annually in 
March ever since, Yeongjo also decided to hold memorial ceremonies on the 
birthdays of the three Ming emperors because Ming, in his words, still existed in 
Joseon (RDAK, vol. 45, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, pp.62–63, p.124). In 1763, the year 
before the 120th anniversary of Ming’s demise, Yeongjo lamented over Ming’s 
fate and ordered to suspend all ceremonial activities in Joseon (RDAK, vol. 46, 
Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.22, p.34). On 19 March 1764, Yeongjo held the annual 
memorial ceremony for the three Ming emperors. Thinking of Ming’s collapse 
120 years ago, the king wept so sadly that he was not able to eat anything – and he 
wrote down words to demonstrate his pledge to carry on with Ming’s spirit in 
Joseon (RDAK, vol. 46, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.43). 
 
In spite of the aforementioned examples, however, it would not be appropriate to 
label Yeongjo as a loyalist. On many other issues, Yeongjo appeared to be more 
like a rationalist – because he was not blind to the political reality. According to 
the reports of the state councillors and embassy members who travelled to China 
in 1738 and 1748, it was observed that the Manchu actually behaved in a civilised 
manner no different from that of the Han-Chinese. China was well administered 
by the Manchu, and the Han-Chinese seemed to have few complaints about 
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Qing’s flexible rule. Hence, Yeongjo came to realise that Qing was not going to 
fall in the foreseeable future (RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, pp.124–5; 
RDAK, vol. 45, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.14). 
 
Submitting to the reality in which the power disparity between Joseon and Qing 
was crystal clear, Yeongjo was being very cautious in the official interactions 
between Joseon and Qing. Every time when a Qing embassy arrived in Joseon, the 
king would host a welcoming banquet to receive the Qing officials. However, in 
order to show his pro-Ming conviction to the loyalists, Yeongjo defended his 
behaviour that he was merely following the Confucian principles of propriety to 
perform the duties of Sadae as a civilised head of state should do, even in the case 
of receiving the embassy of a barbaric country. The king invoked the example of 
Sukjong, who would personally meet with the Qing embassy in the suburbs of 
Hanseong even in poor weather (RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.90). 
Besides, the budget allocated for the welcoming reception for Qing embassy was 
reduced by half, if compared with the amount assigned for receiving the Ming 
embassy in the past. Yeongjo emphasised that this was a way of 
self-strengthening: by faithfully practicing the Confucian propriety, Joseon would 
be able to maintain and enhance its cultural supremacy over Qing (RDAK, vol. 45, 
Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.68). 
 
Another example was Joseon’s endeavour to clear Injo’s reputation. In the Joseon 
history written by Qing court officials, Injo’s enthronement was described as an 
illegal one through a coup. Hence for 13 years, the Joseon court spent so many 
efforts, tirelessly and humbly, in self-defence and clarification (even bribery) to 
have it corrected. When the rectified version of Injo’s history finally arrived in 
Joseon on 2 February 1739, Yeongjo held a grand ceremony to receive the 
volumes and ordered to celebrate their success in the temples of Injo, Hyojong, 
Hyeonjong, Sukjong, and Gyeongjong. However, the loyalists criticised that it 
was a humiliation to beg the barbarians to correct the mistake they made when 
writing the history of a civilised country, for which there was nothing worth being 
celebrated. Yeongjo responded angrily to the loyalists that unless they knew how 
to defeat the Manchu, otherwise their comments were simply nonsense (RDAK, 
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vol. 42, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, pp.465–6; RDAK, vol. 43, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, 
pp.288–9, p.307; RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.139, p.153, p.155). 
 
Apart from Qing’s supremacy that had changed Yeongjo’s attitude, Qing’s 
pacifying attitude towards Joseon also exerted significant influence on the king’s 
view. Yeongjo once admitted openly in the court that Qing had not made any 
unreasonable demands on Joseon since his enthronement. Besides, Qing had been 
treating Joseon courteously: the Joseon embassy members were assigned to 
priority seats in the Chinese imperial palace, followed by embassy members from 
other vassals (RDAK, vol. 45, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.321, p.397). Starting from 
the moment when Joseon was no longer bullied and exploited by Qing (and even 
being politely treated by Qing), Yeongjo realised that fewer reasons were left to 
resist Qing. Therefore, when being asked by the rationalists about when Joseon 
should abandon the idea of vengeance on 21 August 1764 (120 years after the fall 
of Ming), the king stated that he believed five generations would be the limit – 
meaning Joseon should wait until 1794 (i.e. 150 years after Ming’s fall) to 
normalise its relations with Qing, implying that although it was not happening 
during his lifetime (he was born in 1694), it would be inevitable for Joseon to 
admit and to serve Qing as the great eventually (RDAK, vol. 46, Yeongjo Sillok, 
1965, p.58). 
 
In fact, Yeongjo foresaw this inevitability three decades ago: on 17 November 
1730, the king said to the loyalists (who were cheering in the court about the 
earthquake in China) that the reason why Joseon had been enjoying peace was 
because of Qing’s protection. He viewed the Joseon–Qing relationship as that of 
‘teeth and lips’: teeth would be cold without the protection of lips (an ancient 
Chinese analogy). Hence he believed that if Qing collapsed, Joseon would soon 
become the prey of the Mongols and/or the Japanese (RDAK, vol. 43, Yeongjo 
Sillok, 1965, pp.237–8). 
 
In sum, Yeongjo could be considered as an insightful strategist with long-term 
visions, yet he was also bound by the Confucian ethics that prevailed in East Asia 
at the time. Throughout his 52 years of reign, the imaginary bipolar order 
persisted – for which Joseon served Qing officially but kept serving the fallen 
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Ming secretly. Understandably, Joseon’s attitude to serve Qing and the fallen 
Ming was different: towards the fallen Ming, Joseon remained consistently 
faithful, as prescribed in the Confucian classics. As towards Qing, Yeongjo’s 
statement on 27 October 1772 to summarise his 48-year of experience in 
managing the Joseon–Qing relations was the best description: he said that there 
was no such thing called sincerity in Joseon’s Sadae towards Qing. However, 
(being an exemplar country of Confucianism), Joseon would never abandon the 
Confucian principle of propriety when serving Qing (RDAK, vol. 46, Yeongjo 
Sillok, 1965, p.322). Consequently, Joseon did not serve Qing as sincerely as it 
did to Ming until the reign of the next king: Jeongjo. 
 
5.3 Joseon: Accepting Qing as the Only Great (from 1776) 
 
The turning point of Joseon–Qing relations occurred during Jeongjo’s reign. 
Joseon finally accepted Qing as the only true great because: 1) Qing changed its 
Joseon strategy: different from the earlier years, Qing started to implement 
pacifying policies towards Joseon. Coupled with Qianlong’s personal overtures, it 
successfully turned an imposed hierarchy into a benign hierarchy that appealed to 
Joseon and the Koreans’ hatred towards Qing gradually waned and faded; 2) in 
terms of material power, Qing’s economic prosperity and military capability 
proved to Joseon its unquestionable status of a hegemon; 3) in terms of ideational 
power, Qing inherited, instead of rejected, Confucianism by having the Manchu 
assimilated into the culture of the Han-Chinese, thereby reducing the conflicts 
between the two ethnic groups; and 4) time proved to be an effective solution: as 
the Manchu invasions and Ming’s collapse were history five generations ago, the 
passion for vengeance on Qing had lost its appeal and momentum. In addition, the 
emergence of Silhak in Joseon in the 18th century might have also contributed to 
the transformation of Joseon–Qing relations. 
 
The Reign of Jeongjo (1776–1800) 
Jeongjo became the king of Joseon at the time when Qianlong Emperor’s rule in 
China reached its zenith. Although Jeongjo did not tolerate anyone who criticised 
the staunch proponents of Confucian ethics such as Song Si-yeol, and he also held 
the memorial ceremony at Daebodan to honour the Ming emperors (though not 
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every year) (RDAK, vol. 47, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, pp.11–12, p.304, p.366, 
pp.508–9; RDAK, vol. 49, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, p.264), the king had been rational 
in the issue about revering the fallen Ming. Different from Yeongjo, on 5 
November 1778 (only two years after his enthronement) Jeongjo publicly praised 
Choe Myung-kil (the leading rationalist during Injo’s reign) for his loyalty to 
Joseon at the time of the two Manchu invasions, giving credit to Choe Myung-kil 
for his efforts that saved Joseon from being eliminated by the Manchu (RDAK, vol. 
47, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, p.218). 
 
During his reign, Jeongjo sent tribute missions to Qing a lot more frequently than 
his predecessors, for which on 16 October 1780 the king was criticised by Gim 
Ha-jae (1745–84, then head of Saheonbu). The huge amount of tribute goods, 
Gim said, would become a financial burden to Joseon in the long run. Besides, he 
reminded Jeongjo that paying tribute to Qing was merely for the purpose of 
ensuring Joseon’s survival; serving Qing with such passion would contradict the 
Confucian principles of propriety upheld by the king’s forefathers. However, 
Jeongjo simply did not agree with Gim’s opinions (RDAK, vol. 47, Jeongjo Sillok, 
1966, p.339). He continued his Sadae practice sincerely towards Qing. 
 
Jeongjo’s enthusiastic Sadae actually proved to be effective and gladly received 
by Qianlong Emperor, who also intended to normalise the Qing–Joseon 
relationship by turning it into a cordial one similar to that of Ming–Joseon. The 
approach Qianlong Emperor adopted was to make use of the state ideology shared 
by the two countries: Confucianism. To enhance the ideational elements in the 
senior–junior relationship between Qing and Joseon, as prescribed in 
Confucianism, Qianlong Emperor took up the role of a loving father that 
affectionately cared for the well-being of Jeongjo and his subjects. Among others, 
the emperor had been repeatedly treating the Joseon embassy members 
exceptionally well as distinguished guests from overseas. 
 
In August 1778, Qianlong Emperor visited Mukden and unexpectedly, he was 
greeted by a special mission sent by Jeongjo. Delighted by Jeongjo’s sincerity, the 
emperor highly commended Jeongjo for his allegiance to Qing. To reward Joseon, 
the emperor approved special treatment for the Joseon embassy members during 
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their stay in China, kindly conversed with them in person, and even personally 
wrote words of blessing on a piece of precious silk as a gift for Joseon. When 
Jeongjo came to know about such unusual favour Qianlong Emperor offered to 
Joseon, the king immediately dispatched another special mission to China on 11 
September 1778 to express his profound gratitude towards the emperor (RDAK, 
vol. 47, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, p.211). 
 
In January 1785, a golden Jubilee was held in Beijing to celebrate the 50th 
anniversary of the accession of Qianlong Emperor to the throne. Both Jeongjo and 
Qianlong Emperor made use of this event to enhance the Joseon–Qing 
relationship. In Beijing, members of the Joseon congratulatory mission sent by 
Jeongjo were warmly received by the emperor himself. In all occasions, they were 
arranged in seats that indicated more prestigious status than embassy members 
from any other vassals. Besides, the Joseon embassy members received many 
gifts from the emperor, and they were highly precious in value. As an unusual 
practice, Qianlong Emperor from time to time talked to the Joseon embassy 
members in person, inquiring after Jeongjo and even the health of the embassy 
members. Throughout their stay in Beijing, the Joseon embassy members received 
a lot more and far better treatments than those of the other vassals. On 24 
February 1785, Qianlong Emperor issued an edict to the Joseon court to show his 
appreciation to Joseon’s enduring and faithful Sadae towards Qing. However, 
Jeongjo had sent too many tribute goods to Qing. Although the emperor was 
extraordinarily pleased by Jeongjo’s sincerity in Sadae, he would like to perform 
his duty as the senior to look after the well-being of Joseon, for which he decided 
that no more tribute goods would be brought to China by the ad hoc missions 
from Joseon in future (RDAK, vol. 48, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, pp.8–9). 
 
The year of 1790 marked the 80th birthday of Qianlong Emperor, and both Jeongjo 
and Qianlong Emperor took this opportunity to elevate the Joseon–Qing 
relationship from being cordial to becoming amicable. In December 1789, Jeongjo 
dispatched a Winter Solstice Embassy to Beijing and instructed the embassy 
members to congratulate the emperor’s birthday in advance. Qianlong Emperor 
was greatly delighted, and as before, the Joseon embassy members received 
exceptionally high level of treatment – only this time Qianlong Emperor went 
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even further: in addition to inquiring after Jeongjo’s health, he asked the Joseon 
envoy a personal question of Jeongjo about whether the king had a son yet. 
Knowing that Jeongjo and the Koreans had been praying for the birth of the crown 
prince, Qianlong Emperor, again most unusually, personally wrote the Chinese 
character of Fu (meaning blessing and happiness) and sent it to Jeongjo as a gift, 
wishing him to have a son as soon as possible (RDAK, vol. 48, Jeongjo Sillok, 
1966, p.319). What Qianlong Emperor aimed to establish was a personal 
relationship with Jeongjo: a relationship not only between a suzerain emperor and 
a vassal king, but also between a father and a son (in fact Qianlong Emperor was 
41 years older than Jeongjo). In front of the Joseon envoy, the emperor behaved 
so kindly like a caring father who expressed a paternal concern about the king’s 
personal life. As a result, Jeongjo and the Joseon court officials were 
overwhelmed by the emperor’s graciousness, taking this as an unprecedented 
example of Qing’s lavish kindness to Joseon (RDAK, vol. 48, Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, 
p.335). 
 
Qianlong Emperor’s strategy was therefore an indispensible factor that turned 
Joseon’s Sadae back into a mode of filial piety that was seen in the case of 
Jungjong towards the Ming emperor. At the state banquet held in the imperial 
palace that celebrated his 80th birthday on 27 September 1790, Qianlong Emperor, 
again most unusually, asked the Joseon congratulatory envoy about Jeongjo and 
came to know that the crown prince was born on 18 June. He became deliriously 
happy, saying that this was such a piece of joyful news to him. The emperor then 
showed the memorial to the imperial throne prepared by the Joseon court to the 
king of Vietnam, openly praising Joseon as a nation that had long been faithfully 
practicing Confucian propriety, for which Joseon should be considered as an 
exemplar to all other vassals of Qing. Same as before, the Joseon embassy 
members were treated as the most distinguished guests among those from other 
vassals throughout their stay in Beijing. Upon receiving the report sent by the 
Joseon envoy, Jeongjo was so delighted and he immediately dispatch another 
special mission to Qing to show how gratified he was to Qianlong Emperor’s 
kindness and generosity. Besides, Jeongjo ordered to promote the study of 
Manchu in Joseon, as he believed that it had become more practical for the 
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Koreans to learn the language of Manchu instead of Chinese (RDAK, vol. 48, 
Jeongjo Sillok, 1966, pp.396–8, pp.401–2). 
 
Jeongjo continued his Sadae practice with great sincerity even after Qianlong 
Emperor’s abdication in 1795. The king openly expressed his deep admiration for 
Qianlong Emperor, whom he highly regarded as the greatest emperor in China’s 
history with his glorious reign of six decades. As for Qianlong Emperor, with his 
title changed to Taishang Huang (‘Retired Emperor’), he kept praising Jeongjo’s 
faithful Sadae in front of Jiaqing Emperor so as to maintain the harmonious 
Qing–Joseon relationship during his son’s reign (RDAK, vol. 49, Jeongjo Sillok, 
1966, p.230, p.265). By this time, with Jeongjo’s efforts and the impact of Qing’s 
pacifying Joseon policy, the two countries had eventually normalised their 
vassal–suzerain relations. 
 
Another factor that was associated with the normalisation of Joseon–Qing 
relations was Silhak in Joseon that emerged in the 18th century. This was a school 
of thought that placed an emphasis on the search of practical solutions to Joseon’s 
social problems instead of clinging to abstract discussions on Confucian principles 
that disconnected people from reality. Proponents of Silhak thus exhibited a trace 
of pragmatism similar to the rationalists. Hong Dae-yong (1731–83), one of the 
leading scholars of Silhak, criticised the senseless civilisation–barbarian 
dichotomy, for he believed that human beings were equal among each other, and 
so were countries – hence there was no such thing about a country being superior 
to another (Hong, 1999, p.99). Another prominent scholar of Silhak, Pak Ji-won 
(1737–83), described Qing’s prosperity based on his personal observation during 
his trip to China and appealed to the Koreans to learn whatever useful from Qing 
in order to strengthen Joseon’s national power, even though the Koreans despised 
the Manchu as barbarians (Pak, 2008, p.109, p.177). 
 
However, although they had written books about Silhak, none of the Silhak 
scholars ever served as senior court officials and directly involved in the making 
of Joseon’s policy towards Qing. The closest case was Yu Su-won (1694–1755), 
an early Silhak scholar who was received by Yeongjo on 8 February 1741 to 
present his idea about reforming the Joseon bureaucratic structure. During the 
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meeting, Yu explained to Yeongjo that although the Manchu were barbarians, 
they learned from Ming and adopted the practice of the Han-Chinese. This was 
the reason why the Manchu were able to administer China for a full century 
without any problems. Yeongjo concurred with Yu and his proposal was 
implemented two months later (RDAK, vol. 44, Yeongjo Sillok, 1965, p.235, 
p.242). Nevertheless, although a direct link between Silhak and the changing 
perception of the Koreans towards Qing may not be established according to the 
official historical records, it would still be reasonable to deduce that the Silhak 
scholars’ writings might have disseminated the pragmatic theme of Silhak and 
influenced the thinking of Joseon political elites to a certain extent. 
 
In addition, an important factor that had changed the Koreans’ view towards Qing 
was the Manchu: evidently, had it not been their will and ability to assimilate 
themselves into the Confucian culture of the Han-Chinese, the line traditionally 
drawn between civilisation and barbarian would never have disappeared in the 
mind of the Koreans. While the Koreans perceived Joseon as the only legitimate 
heir to the Chinese culture, the Manchu also followed the Confucian principle of 
‘transformation through Sinicisation’ to legitimise their succession to Ming’s rule 
of China and the Sinocentric world. Therefore, this strategy of culturally 
transforming the Manchu into the Han-Chinese (whereby an intersubjective 
culture between Qing and Joseon re-emerged), coupled with Qing’s material 
power (i.e. military capability and economic prosperity), convinced the Joseon 
policymakers (including Jeongjo and his court officials) that Qing was the only 
true great in the unipolar order. Since Qing was playing the role of a caring senior, 
it was Joseon’s obligation to take up the role of a faithful junior in its Sadae 
towards Qing. 
 
In short, the practice of Sadae during the reigns of these seven Joseon kings, 
although complicated by issues derived from the change of polarity, is 
summarised in the following table according to the different levels of 
thoroughness: 
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Years High Medium Low 
of Reign (as Filial Piety) (as Obligation) (as Strategy) 
1608-1623 ġ  Gwanghae-gun (to Ming) 
1623-1627 Injo (to Ming) ġ  
1627-1637 Injo (to Ming) ġ  
1637-1649 Injo (to Qing) ġ  
1649-1659 Hyojong (to the Fallen Ming) ġ  
1659-1674 ġ  Hyeonjong (to the Fallen Ming) ġ  
1674-1720 Sukjong (to the Fallen Ming) ġ  
1724-1776 Yeongjo (to the Fallen Ming) ġ  
1776-1800 Jeongjo (to Qing) ġ  ġ  
 
Factors that had influenced the orientation and the degree of eagerness in Joseon’s 
Sadae came from all three aspects of system, unit, and individual simultaneously: 
the regional power structure was changing, Confucianism remained as the state 
ideology of the culturally strong (but militarily weak) Joseon, and the 
policymakers had their own sets of personal traits, experience, and value that 
determined their pro-righteousness or pro-pragmatism behaviour. When the 
combined effect of the system factor (i.e. national security) and the 
pro-pragmatism individual factors became stronger than the others, Sadae became 
a strategy to use the great; but when the joint influence of the unit factor (i.e. the 
state ideology of Confucianism) and the pro-righteousness individual factors 
overpowered the others, Sadae was faithfully implemented towards the great. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter illustrates Joseon’s practice of Sadae in a period that witnessed the 
change of dominance from Ming to Qing in Northeast Asia. If based on realist 
assertions, Joseon’s behaviour ought to be determined by this clear transition of 
power and rational policy should be made to bandwagon with the new great of 
Qing. However, Joseon entangled itself in a much more complicated situation. For 
almost two centuries, Joseon political elites struggled between righteousness and 
pragmatism, putting the country between an imaginary great and a real great. 
Though eventually Joseon came to acknowledge Qing as the only hegemon in the 
Sinocentric world, Joseon’s Sadae during this period proved again that the 
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Joseon–great power(s) relations in the pre-modern era was driven by the 
interactions between the ideational and the material forces. 
 
The next chapter moves on to the modern era (1800–1910). Firstly, it is to 
illustrate Joseon’s Sadae towards Qing during the first seven decades of the 19th 
century. As a result of the Western intrusion, the focus of Joseon’s Sadae was 
switched to resisting Western powers. Secondly, it is to examine the reasons that 
had caused the decline of ideational Sadae during the period from 1874 to 
mid-1884. Changes within the Sinocentric order and influences from the outside 
world that altered the rationale of Sadae would be analysed. Thirdly, it is to 
discuss the continuation of the pragmatic Yongdae that had provided Joseon with 
a strategy to deal with the great powers in a multipolar order from mid-1884 to 
1910. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Sadae in the Modern Era (1800–1910): 
the End of Ideational Sadae and the Continuation of Material Yongdae 
 
As chapter 4 and 5 discussed Joseon’s Sadae in the pre-modern period 
(1392–1800), this chapter moves on to the modern era (1800–1910), and it is 
composed of three parts: the first section is to illustrate Joseon’s Sadae policy 
towards Qing from 1800 to 1873, a period that was characterised by a new feature 
of Joseon’s foreign relations – to resist the ‘barbarians’ from the West. The 
second section is to explain the decline of ideational Sadae that took place in the 
period from 1874 to mid-1884. The third section is to examine Yongdae, the 
strategy adopted by the reformists who advocated enlightenment and 
modernisation in the Western way from mid-1884 to 1910, during which Joseon 
used one great against another, driving Qing and Russia out of the Korean 
Peninsula in tandem by 1905 – but in 1910, Joseon was annexed by Japan, the 
final great that was left in Northeast Asia. 
 
The Western intrusion in the 19th century gave a new meaning to the ideational 
aspect of Sadae: while the original task for Joseon was to respect China and to 
resist the barbarians within the Sinocentric world, the new barbarians Joseon had 
to resist were coming from a world unknown to the Koreans. Like their loyal 
ancestors, the conservative Joseon political elites faithfully upheld the Confucian 
principle of propriety and righteousness: they served Qing with sincerity and 
fought off the Westerners with utmost determination. For seven decades, they 
kept the British, the French, the Russian, and the American out of Joseon, no 
matter the intruders came as merchant, missionary, or military personnel. 
However, by the time when the Japanese attempted to break into the ‘Hermit 
Kingdom’, the Koreans realised that they had been and very likely would be 
fighting off the foreigners alone – for Qing did not and was not going to protect 
Joseon as a suzerain ought to do. 
 
Not only did Qing offer little assistance to Joseon, the Qing court even suggested 
Joseon to ally with the alien powers of France and America to balance against 
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Japan in 1874. Five years later, the Qing court gave Joseon the similar advice (to 
collaborate with Japan and America to resist Russian aggression) when Russia 
demonstrated territorial ambition in Northeast Asia and posed a threat to Joseon. 
To many Joseon political elites, Qing as the senior failed to perform its duty to 
look after Joseon’s well-being. The worse was, the Qing court changed the 
centuries-old tradition of non-interference towards Joseon during and after the 
military uprising in 1882 and started to meddle in the Joseon domestic politics. 
The ideational Sadae thus began to decline as the anti-Qing sentiment was 
brewing in Joseon. 
 
Meanwhile, the European sovereign-state system that promoted equality and 
autonomy looked strongly appealing to those who considered it a shame for 
Joseon to be a vassal of China (no matter it was ruled by the Han-Chinese or the 
Manchu). They soon became the reformists who aimed to build a modern Korean 
state independent from China. After the ideational Sadae reached its end when 
Gojong proclaimed the termination of Joseon’s tribute relation with Qing in 1894, 
the pragmatic Yongdae remained a viable option for Joseon to survive in the fights 
among the great powers; the strategy of ‘using one great against another’ worked 
well in the sense that the Chinese and the Russians were driven off the Korean 
Peninsula in the following decade. 
 
Historical evidence is mainly drawn from the original records documented in The 
Ri Dynasty Annals of Korea. In addition, diaries, letters, and memoirs written by 
the key policymakers of Joseon foreign relations are also used as the primary 
source of material in the following analyses. 
 
6.1 Joseon: Resisting the New ‘Barbarians’ – the Western Powers (1800–73) 
 
This section covers a period of 73 years from Sungjo’s enthronement to the first 
decade of Gojong’s reign during which Daewongun (Gojong’s biological father) 
ruled as Regent on behalf of the under-aged king. Throughout these seven decades, 
the Joseon court faithfully abided by the Confucian doctrine of Jonhwa Yangyi 
(respecting China and resisting the barbarians, ൧๮ᝎӮ) and determinedly 
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resisted the Western intrusion in all of its three forms of expansion: missionary, 
merchant, and military. 
 
From Sungjo to Cheoljong: 1800–63 
This period witnessed the continuation of Sadae towards Qing. All of the usual 
practices of Sadae were duly carried out, such as the annual dispatch of tribute 
missions to Beijing. In addition, special missions were also sent occasionally. For 
instance, knowing that Jiaqing Emperor was planning a trip of ancestral 
veneration to Mukden, Sungjo dispatched a special mission to inquire after the 
emperor in June 1818. When the emperor was greeted by the Joseon embassies in 
Mukden on 5 September, he was so delighted that he highly praised Joseon’s 
loyalty towards Qing (RDAK, vol. 51, Sungjo Sillok, 1966, p.87, p.92, p.95). 
 
Another example took place in 1861, the year after the Second Opium War 
(1856–60). When Cheoljong came to know that Qing was dreadfully suffering 
from foreign invasions and domestic unrests simultaneously, he sent a special 
mission to China in January 1861 to inquire after Xianfeng Emperor, saying that it 
was Joseon’s moral obligation to do so according to Confucian ethics. Joseon’s 
allegiance to Qing was highly commended by the emperor – because no other 
vassals of Qing ever sent a mission to inquire after the emperor at this critical 
moment of their suzerain (RDAK, vol. 52, Heonjong/Cheoljong Sillok, 1967, 
p.219, p.221). Hence, although the level of enthusiasm in Joseon’s Sadae was not 
as high as what was seen during Jeongjo’s reign in the late 1700s, Joseon’s 
reverence for Qing during this period, generally speaking, was considered as 
matching up with the basic requirements of Sadae. However, Joseon’s persistence 
to resist the Western powers was truly commendable according to Confucian 
standards. 
 
Only one year after Sungjo’s enthronement, Sinyu Bakhae (the Catholic 
Persecution of 1801, ٌ٘ॐ্) took place, during which many Korean Catholics 
were imprisoned, exiled, or executed by the Joseon court. In his memorial to the 
throne on 27 October, Sungjo reported the incident to Jiaqing Emperor and stated 
that Joseon, since its founding, had been faithfully upholding Confucian values, 
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for which the Joseon court would unwaveringly reject any ideas imported from 
the West. In his edict issued to all Joseon subjects on 22 December, Sungjo 
stressed that Confucianism had been and would be Joseon’s state ideology and 
Jonhwa Yangyi was the only way to safeguard Joseon’s reputation as a nation of 
Confucian propriety and righteousness. To accept heretical ideas from the West 
was to invite Western intrusion, for which Joseon’s security would be jeopardised. 
Thus an imperative task to keep Joseon intact as Sojunghwa was to prohibit the 
spread of Western religions in the country (RDAK, vol. 50, Sungjo Sillok, 1966, 
pp.51–52, p.87, pp.95–97). 
 
In August 1839, another similar incident occurred: Gihae Bakhae (the Catholic 
Persecution of 1839, ρҮॐ্) – only this time those being executed included 
three French clergymen. In response to the persecution, the French government 
sent a letter to the Joseon court in July 1846, demanding an explanation to the 
incident and warning that Joseon would suffer catastrophic consequences if any 
innocent French citizens were killed on Korean soil again in future. The Joseon 
court considered this as an act of threatening, and a detailed report was sent to the 
Qing Ministry of Rites in August 1847 to explain the incident. In the report, the 
Joseon court also requested Qing to stop French penetration in its country (RDAK, 
vol. 52, Heonjong/Cheoljong Sillok, 1967, p.37, pp.87–88, p.95). 
 
In addition, the Joseon court also strictly refused to open the country to trade with 
the Western powers. In June 1832, a British ship arrived in Joseon and the 
Englishmen on board requested to trade with the locals. However, the request was 
immediately rebuffed by the Joseon court. In its report to the Qing Ministry of 
Rites on 21 July, Sungjo explained that Joseon’s repudiation to the British request 
was based on Confucian ethics: a vassal state should not have relations with any 
foreign countries. Joseon was a vassal of Qing, thus it was improper for Joseon to 
interact directly with a foreign country like Britain (RDAK, vol. 51, Sungjo Sillok, 
1966, pp.341–2). Nevertheless, two British vessels arrived in Jeju in December 
1840, firing guns to intimidate the locals and looting livestock. In June 1845, the 
southern coastal area of Joseon was disturbed again by a British surveying vessel. 
The Joseon court kept refusing to discuss any matter with the Englishmen directly; 
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instead it reported the incidents to the Qing Ministry of Rites on 5 July, asking the 
Qing court to inform Britain that Joseon would not open itself to foreign trade 
(RDAK, vol. 52, Heonjong/Cheoljong Sillok, 1967, p.51, p.78). It should be 
noticed that at the end of the above incidents, the Joseon court reported what 
happened to Qing and raised a similar request: Joseon expected Qing, as its 
suzerain, to deal with the foreign powers directly so as to protect Joseon from 
their intrusions – and such expectation was absolutely reasonable based on the 
Confucian tenets and the usual practice in Joseon–Ming/Qing history. 
 
Gojong (with Daewongun as Regent): 1863–73 
Gojong was enthroned at the age of 11, and his biological father, Daewongun, was 
the de facto controller of the Joseon court. During the decade under Daewongun’s 
rule, the anti-foreigner sentiment in Joseon reached its peak. The making of 
foreign policy in the Joseon court was fully charged with ideational concerns, and 
resisting the barbarians was no longer confined to the policies of expelling 
missionaries and rejecting foreign trades: with resolution to drive the barbarians 
off the country, the Koreans prepared to confront the Western intruders militarily. 
It was not a reckless decision though; the military power of the West was known 
in the Joseon court – in March 1861, Joseon embassies returned from China and 
reported to Cheoljong that Qing was defeated by the Anglo-French coalition 
forces and was coerced into signing a treaty in favour of British and French 
interests (RDAK, vol. 52, Heonjong/Cheoljong Sillok, 1967, p.220). While Qing, 
with much stronger military forces than those of Joseon, was not able to withstand 
the Western aggression, the chance for Joseon to confront the West successfully 
would be minimal by any rational calculations. However, Daewongun and the 
loyalists still determinedly opted for fighting against the Western powers. This 
proved again that Joseon foreign relations were influenced not solely by material 
but also by ideational forces. 
 
The decade of Daewongun’s rule witnessed a remarkable record of Joseon’s 
resistance against Russia, France, and America. In February 1864, some Russians 
crossed the Joseon border at Tumen River and asked for trade with Joseon – their 
demand was instantly rejected by the local Joseon officials. The Joseon court 
received the report and viewed it as a threat to border security, thus ordered to 
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strengthen the border defence by strictly prohibiting any trading activities with the 
Russians to prevent Russian aggression towards Joseon (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.139). 
 
As for the French, the Joseon–France relations remained less cordial due to the 
ongoing issue of missionaries, and tension between the two countries reached a 
new height in Byeongin Bakhae (Catholic Persecution of 1866, Ч஋ॐ্), 
during which four French missionaries were executed by the Joseon court in 
January 1866 for dissemination of heretical ideas. However this time, among 
those being executed, there were a number of Joseon court officials who 
advocated the forging of alliance with France in order to deter Russian aggression, 
for which they were charged with the crimes of subversion and treason (RDAK, 
vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.205–6). 
 
This became the cause of Byeongin Yangyo (Western Disturbance in the Byeongin 
Year, Ч஋ࢩᘋ): in September 1866, the French government sent an expedition 
force to Joseon in retaliation for what the Joseon court had done in Byeongin 
Bakhae. Although the French claimed that they would kill 9,000 Koreans for the 
nine Frenchmen killed in Joseon, Daewongun did not back off; he warned that 
appeasement with the Western powers would only encourage the barbarians to be 
more aggressive. On 11 September, Daewongun openly called for the unity of all 
Koreans to resist the French intruders. He vowed that he would never negotiate 
peace and sign treaty with the barbarians, and he would never abandon Hanseong 
for he intended to defend the capital city with his life (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, pp.234–5). 
 
Daewongun was not alone in the Joseon court; he was strongly supported by the 
loyalists. Among others, Yi Hang-no (1792–1868), one of the leading 
Confucianists, wrote twice to Gojong on 12 September and 4 October with the 
appeals that: 1) negotiation for peace should never be considered an option 
because barbarians should be expelled by force; 2) heretical ideas from the West 
should be banned permanently such that Confucianism could be preserved in 
Joseon; and 3) Gojong should burn all the materials used in royal palaces that 
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were imported from the West and prohibit the use of Western products in Joseon, 
thereby the West would have nothing to trade with the Koreans (RDAK, vol. 53, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.235–6, pp.241–2). 
 
For around six weeks of time, troops of the two nations engaged in several battles. 
The French seized Ganghwado, but its advancement towards Hanseong was 
checked by the Joseon army. With little hope of securing a decisive victory over 
Joseon, the French troops finally withdrew on 15 October. France later raised its 
demand to Qing (as Qing was Joseon’s suzerain), insisting that Qing should order 
the opening of Joseon to French trade and missionaries. However, the Qing court 
replied to the French that China never interfered with the policymaking process of 
its vassals. Meanwhile, it informed the Joseon court about the intention of France 
to sign treaty with Joseon, yet the Joseon court refused to negotiate with the 
French, declaring that it was impossible for Joseon to sign treaty with an alien 
power (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.232–45, p.259). 
 
In addition to the Russians and the French, the Americans were also rebuffed by 
the Koreans when they attempted to break into Joseon. The first encounter of the 
two countries was the General Sherman incident: in July 1866, an armed 
American merchant vessel, General Sherman, sailed along the Taedong River 
towards Pyongyang. After detaining a Joseon local official, General Sherman 
opened fire and killed some local Koreans. The Joseon troops and civilians then 
fought back, killed all on board, and burned the ship (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.226) – this incident subsequently triggered Shinmi Yangyo 
(Western Disturbance in the Shinmi Year, ٌ҂ࢩᘋ) 
 
In April 1871, the American government launched an expedition to punish Joseon 
for its refusal to apologise for attacking American vessels. In his letter to the 
American commander on 17 April, Daewongun stated that Joseon had not directly 
associated with any foreign countries for five centuries, and it was Joseon’s 
intention to preserve such tradition in future. He pointed to the different systems 
of belief between the East and the West, saying that the two should not interfere 
with each other, for which the American should not have come to Joseon. 
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Meanwhile, Daewongun ordered to have stelae erected in the major cities 
nationwide, with inscriptions of words that refuted the idea of negotiating peace 
with the barbarians and denounced it as an act of treason. Military conflicts broke 
out on 6 April and lasted for over 40 days. The American troops, in spite of 
gaining the upper hand in the battles, left the peninsula on 16 May because the 
Joseon court signalled no intention to comply with any American demands 
(RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.360–6). 
 
Based on the historical evidence mentioned above, Joseon’s determination to 
resist the Western powers could be described as extraordinary. The Koreans 
therefore were generally depicted as a stubborn, conservative, and xenophobic 
people that advocated isolationism (Wright, 1958, p.364) or exclusionism (Kim, 
2012, p.281). However, it is equally reasonable to understand the Koreans at that 
time as a nation of people who were devout believers of Confucianism fully 
committed to obeying the Confucian code of ethics. Jonhwa Yangyi derived from 
the core of Sinocentrism, and it was the application of the Confucian principle of 
propriety in international relations. Strict adherence to Jonhwa Yangyi, in spite of 
the commercial opportunities that looked tempting and the armed invasions that 
appeared intimidating, was undoubtedly a demonstration of the Koreans’ devotion 
to Confucianism that they chose to sustain their ideational world. Instead of 
projecting the Joseon political elites (such as Daewongun) as nationalists (Nahm, 
1988, p.146), considering the Joseon society that had been Sinicised for nearly 
five centuries, it would be more appropriate to describe them as Confucian 
loyalists. 
 
Like an earnest young son who would not associate with an outsider without the 
permission of his father, Joseon simply entrusted its foreign relations to its 
suzerain – not only that it did so according to the Confucian propriety, but also 
that it had faith in its senior to perform the duty of looking after its benefits. 
However, when Joseon began to sense the unwillingness and inability of Qing to 
take care of its most loyal vassal against the barbarians in the following decade, 
the very foundation of Sadae became shaky. 
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6.2 Decline of Joseon’s Ideational Sadae towards Qing (1874 – mid-1884) 
 
The reasons that caused the decline of Joseon’s ideational Sadae towards Qing 
can be understood from the system, unit, and individual levels. At the system level, 
distribution of power in the world was not in favour of East Asia – the 
agriculture-based Sinocentric system in the region was no match for the European 
sovereign-state system supported by rapid industrialisation. At the unit level, 
Joseon was experiencing a transformation from a vassal of Qing that was not 
supposed to conduct foreign affairs to some sort of a pseudo-independent state 
(Joseon was still officially a vassal of Qing) that had to deal with the foreign 
powers on its own. Qing’s failure to perform its duties as a suzerain expected by 
its vassal led to the decline of Joseon’s faith in Sadae. At the individual level, 
after taking over the ruling power from Daewongun in 1874, Gojong exhibited 
interest in opening up Joseon to the West in general and desire to develop bilateral 
relations with Japan in particular. Factors of all these three levels can be found in 
the historical evidence discussed in the following sections. 
 
Opening Up to Japan: Joseon’s First Experience of Modern Diplomacy (1874–8) 
Gojong declared to exercise his rule directly in November 1873 when he reached 
21 (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.422–4). On 24 June 1874, Gojong 
received a classified dispatch from the Qing Ministry of Rite: the Qing court 
obtained the information that Japan, after its intrusion on Taiwan in May, planned 
to invade Joseon. While Joseon had not resolved its conflicts with France and 
America at the time, Qing forecasted that the two Western powers would ally with 
Japan in its assault on Joseon and Joseon would not be able to resist all three 
countries at the same time. The Qing court had reasons to believe the genuineness 
of the information because in 1867 a Hong Kong newspaper published similar 
information released by a Japanese named Hachinohe Hiromitsu about Japan’s 
intention to invade Joseon (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p. 260). 
 
Hence the Qing court suggested that Joseon should consider signing treaties with 
France and America to open the country to French and American trades, so that 
Japan’s aggression would be deterred by Joseon’s alliance with France and 
America. However, Yeonguijeong Yi Yu-won (1814–88) did not appreciate 
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Qing’s advice. On the contrary, he found it unpleasantly confusing. He thought 
that the Qing court should inform Joseon of Japan’s scheme without making such 
suggestion, for which he even suspected that Qing was using the situation to lure 
Joseon to sign treaties with the Western powers. Therefore, he tended to ignore 
Qing’s suggestion and focus on the strengthening of border defence. Moreover, 
Gojong and Yi Yu-won agreed to tighten up the prohibition on Western religion, 
for they were convinced that this was the most effective way to eliminate moles in 
Joseon (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.464–5). 
 
In fact, the Joseon–Japan relations had remained stagnant since 1868 as a result of 
disputes over letters that the newly reformed Japanese government sent to the 
Joseon court. The issue was controversial for three reasons in brief: 1) wording 
was deemed unacceptable as the Japanese monarch used those terms that were 
exclusively reserved for the Chinese emperor; 2) the letters were dispatched 
directly from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was different from 
the traditional practice by which correspondence was sent from the Tsushima 
Domain (which was a semi-autonomous region and not subject to the direct rule 
of the bakufu shogun); and 3) the traditional rituals were changed to those of the 
Western diplomacy. 
 
Consequently, the court officials split into two groups with contrasting views: the 
rationalists believed that the letters should be duly accepted and politely answered 
because it helped to avoid war if Joseon could maintain a peaceful relationship 
with the militarily powerful Japan. While Yi Yu-won was open to the option of 
accepting the letters, the leading figure was indeed Uuijeong Pak Gyu-su 
(1807–77), who was the grandson of Pak Ji-won, the renowned scholar of Silhak. 
Pak Gyu-su wrote to Daewongun five times and expressed his opinion that the 
changes were simply the result of Japan’s Meiji Restoration, which were beyond 
Joseon’s control. However, not accepting the Japanese letters was a breach of 
modern diplomatic protocol, which would provide Japan with an excuse to launch 
attack against Joseon – hence accepting the letters, in spite of the deceptive nature 
of the Japanese, would reduce an enemy that Joseon had to deal with. Moreover, 
he urged that the letters should be accepted as soon as possible – for it would be 
humiliating if Joseon had to accept them at gunpoint when the Japanese warships 
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arrived (Pak, 1999, pp.502–6). He also tried to convince Gojong with his 
pragmatic ideas in court on 29 June 1874, and Gojong appeared to be agreeable, 
even showing interest in learning more about Japan by communicating with the 
Japanese government (RDAK, vol. 53, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.466). 
 
The loyalists, however, held the view that the letters should be straightly rejected. 
They were headed by Jwauijeong Yi Choe-eung (1815–82), the elder brother of 
Daewongun. They considered such dramatic changes as an act of disrespect to 
China and an attempt to raise Japan’s status to a level that was higher than that of 
Joseon. On 10 May 1875, when Pak Gyu-su attempted to persuade Gojong to 
accept the letters so as not to provoke Japan, Yi Choe-eung insisted that Joseon 
should not violate the Confucian principles of propriety and therefore the letters 
must not be accepted. As a result, Yi Yu-won gave in, and Gojong had no choice 
but to endorse his uncle’s decision (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.10). 
 
Unyo-ho Sageon (the Unyo Incident, ໦ඦဦ٣ҹ) took place in 1875. Without 
notifying the Joseon court, the Japanese warship Unyo sailed to Ganghwado on 22 
August in the name of surveying coastal waters. Unyo then fired shells at Joseon 
local garrison and civilians, occupied towns on the island, and set fire on them. 
The Japanese troops withdrew on 29 August (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.16–17). Yi Choe-eung was furious about the incident, and on 15 November he 
reiterated in the Joseon court that simply rejecting the Japanese letters was not 
sufficient; Joseon should send the letters to the Qing court as evidence of Japan’s 
arrogance and audacity, with which China could punish Japan in due course. 
Gojong approved Yi’s proposal, but instructed to condemn only those points that 
the Joseon court disapproved of (meaning not everything about the letters). On 16 
November, Japanese warships invaded Joseon again: in Busan, 58 Japanese 
marines wounded 12 Koreans with swords and firearms (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, pp.20–21). 
 
Until this point, Qing had not directly involved itself in the discord/conflict 
between Joseon and Japan to protect its vassal. As a matter of fact, the 
Sino-Japanese Friendship and Trade Treaty signed in 1871 elevated Japan’s status 
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to the level equivalent to that of China, whereby Joseon’s status was lowered 
compared with that of Japan. More importantly, in the article that stipulated 
mutual non-aggression between Qing and Japan, Joseon was not explicitly 
mentioned as Qing’s vassal that Japan should not attack; ‘nations and territories’ 
was the term used in the treaty – although Li Hongzhang (Northern 
Superintendent of Trade at the time in charge of Qing’s foreign affairs, 
plenipotentiary that represented Qing to sign the 1871 treaty) later verbally 
explained to Mori Yurei (Japanese special envoy) that the word ‘nations’ implied 
Qing’s vassals and that included Joseon (Lin, 1935/1936, pp.208–10). With 
Qing’s assistance nowhere in sight, the Joseon court would have to deal with 
Japan directly on its own – and it started with negotiations between the two 
countries in a modern diplomatic fashion in January 1876. 
 
The Joseon–Japan negotiations began on 19 January, with topics including the 
disputes on the Japanese letters, Unyo-ho Sageon, and the information about 
Japan’s plan to invade Joseon provided by Hachinohe Hiromitsu in the Hong 
Kong newspaper. While General Shin Heon (1810–84), the Joseon plenipotentiary, 
accused Japan for violating the traditional practice of correspondence, Kuroda 
Kiyotaka, plenipotentiary of Japan, simply responded that it was because of the 
fact that Japan had undergone a transformation and become a modernised country, 
and Joseon’s refusal to accept the letters was the cause that had led to Unyo-ho 
Sageon. Moreover, Kiyotaka said that Hachinohe Hiromitsu was not a 
government official, thus the Japanese government did not have to be accounted 
for whatever Hiromitsu had said in the newspaper. On 21 January, Kiyotaka stated 
that Japan intended to sign treaty of amity and commerce with Joseon according 
to international law, and Joseon would regret if it refused Japan’s proposal – for 
war between Joseon and Japan would be inevitable. Shin Heon criticised Japan for 
lack of respect and sincerity, saying that the foundation of building Joseon–Japan 
relations should be propriety, not threatening by force (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, pp.27–29). 
 
Negotiations with Japan aroused rage among the loyalists in Joseon. Choi 
Ik-hyeon (1834–1906), one of the leading Confucian scholar-officials, wrote to 
Gojong on 23 January and asked the king to abandon the idea of negotiating with 
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Japan because Japan had been Westernised and it was Joseon’s moral obligation 
to resist the barbarians. Signing treaty with the barbaric Japanese was no different 
from inviting a greedy enemy to Joseon – soon the country would be reduced to 
chaos and eventually it would be eliminated by Japan. Choi said he was repeating 
what Jo Heon did in December 1587 (Jo Heon asked Seonjo to stop associating 
with Japan) – yet what happened to Choi was not the same as what Seonjo did to 
Jo Heon: Jo Heon was refuted by Seonjo but Choi was arrested by Gojong’s order. 
Gojong not only silenced the loyalists, in the reply the Joseon court sent to 
Kuroda Kiyotaka on 25 January regarding the next step of signing the treaty, the 
words chosen were quite modest and the tone appeared to be rather humble 
(which was different from those affirmative words Shin Heon used during the 
negotiations). More importantly, Gojong expressed his will to maintain peaceful 
and amicable relations with Japan permanently, in spite of whatever unpleasant 
happened before between the two countries (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.29–31). 
 
On 3 February 1876, Ganghwado Joyak (Treaty of Ganghwa Island, Ԣ๮৞చऊ) 
was signed and Joseon was opened up for the first time in centuries. Not only that 
several ports were opened for Japanese trade and extraterritoriality was granted to 
Japan, but also that Joseon’s status was altered in the treaty: in Article One, 
Joseon was mentioned as an autonomous state that enjoyed the rights equivalent 
to those of Japan (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.32–34). There might be 
terms in the treaty that were in favour of Japan, but what was mentioned in Article 
One did look encouraging to those who advocated enlightenment (although it 
appeared treacherous to the loyalists). As for Qing, even with Joseon being 
mentioned as an autonomous state in Ganghwado Joyak, the Qing court did not 
raise any objection to the clause – in fact it did not perceive it as anything new or 
special at all: the Qing court claimed that Joseon had been controlling and 
managing its own affairs for centuries and China never interfered – this was a fact 
known worldwide (Lin, 1935/1936, pp.216–8). Qing’s inaction on the issue thus 
seriously disappointed those in Joseon who had strong faith in Sadae. 
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Gojong nonetheless appeared to be very optimistic about the future Joseon–Japan 
relations. Two days after signing Ganghwado Joyak, Gojong calmed down the 
grumbling Yi Choe-eung (now Yeonguijeong, who was opposed to accepting the 
Japanese letters the year before) in court by saying that it was no longer necessary 
to argue about whether Joseon should associate with foreigners because Japan was 
merely resuming its friendship with Joseon. When Shin Heon reported to Gojong 
about the negotiation process on 6 February, the general mentioned that the 
Japanese noticed the weaknesses of Joseon troops and suggested that Joseon 
should enrich the country and strengthen the military. Gojong’s response was that 
he believed in Japan’s sincerity to establish friendly relationship with Joseon 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.34). On 22 February, Gojong appointed 
Kim Ki-su as Susinsa (Trust Cultivating Envoy, অߞ٬) and sent him to Japan. 
Before his departure on 4 April, Kim was summoned to the royal palace and 
Gojong instructed him to record everything he was to observe in Japan. Two 
months later, Gojong met with Kim and anxiously inquired the development of 
modern technology in Japan (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.35, p.37, 
pp.39–40). 
 
Qing’s Advice: ‘Using Barbarians to Control Barbarians’ (1879 – April 1882) 
A crucial moment then came in 1879 that profoundly changed the Joseon’s faith 
in Sadae: the change of Qing’s Joseon policy. Qing had been staying away from 
Joseon’s conflicts with the Western powers and Japan, but after Japan annexed 
Ryukyu in the spring of 1879, Qing decided to change its role from being merely 
a bystander to become a string-puller, which was evident in the correspondence 
between two senior government officials in July 1879: Li Hongzhang of Qing and 
Yi Yu-won of Joseon. 
 
In the letter, Li pointed out that Joseon should stay alert to the dangers posed by 
Japan and Russia because both countries had territorial ambition in Northeast Asia. 
The Qing court decided that, rather to rescue Joseon in future, it would be wise to 
plan for Joseon’s foreign policy at present in order to prevent future crises from 
occurring at all. Li proposed the strategy of ‘using the barbarians to control the 
barbarians’: Joseon should sign treaties of commerce with the Western powers 
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according to international laws, by which the Japanese and Russian aggressions 
would be checked and deterred. At the same time, Joseon should strengthen its 
military power secretly for national defence. Li attempted to persuade Joseon to 
take proactive actions to ally with the European powers and America by invoking 
China’s painful experience with the West, in which China was forced to sign 
unequal treaties with terms in favour of the West. 
 
Nevertheless, in his reply to Li’s letter, Yi rejected to adopt the strategy Li 
proposed because: 1) Joseon had been a vassal state for centuries, for which the 
Joseon court knew nothing about foreign affairs; 2) Joseon had been a 
Confucianised country since its foundation, for which the Koreans feared thus 
resisted Western ideas; and 3) the Joseon court did not believe in international 
laws, as evident in the case of Ryukyu that no international laws could stop Japan 
from annexing Ryukyu. Yi said that the Japan’s aggression had already been 
checked by the 1876 treaty, and he was also convinced that with the link 
established between Joseon and Japan, the Russian would abandon the thought of 
encroaching upon the Korean Peninsula. It was worth noticing that Yi mentioned 
twice in the letter that Joseon would have nothing to fear as long as Qing 
protected Joseon against the barbarians (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.111–2). This could be a reiteration of the relationship between Joseon and 
Qing as vassal and suzerain; yet it could also be deemed as an expression of 
discontent on the Joseon side towards Qing – considering what Qing should have 
done for Joseon but did not do in such an unprecedented situation that Joseon was 
threatened by several barbarians. 
 
The advice of the Qing court was therefore perceived by the Koreans as a proof to 
confirm Qing’s unwillingness to protect Joseon from foreign encroachment. It did 
not produce the impact as the Qing court expected; it only accelerated Gojong’s 
growing disbelief in Sadae and reinforced the king’s pragmatic stance in 
designing Joseon’s future. To improve Joseon’s military capability, Gojong sent 
apprentices to Tianjin, China in July 1880 to study the crafts of manufacturing 
modern weaponry and the knowledge of modern warfare (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.129). Meanwhile, to elevate Joseon’s international status, Gojong 
established a new ministry, Tongnigimuamun (Office for Extraordinary State 
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Affairs, ಍౛ᐒ୍ဲߐ), on 21 December 1880 to supervise the operation of a 
number of departments that included Sadaesa (department in charge of Sadae 
towards China, ٣εљ) and Kyorinsa (department responsible for supervising 
neighbourly relations, Ҭ䆚љ). This on the one hand lowered the status of the 
Qing–Joseon relationships to the level that was equivalent to Joseon’s 
relationships with any other countries (Japan in particular, for it was Joseon’s 
immediate neighbour); on the other hand, Joseon’s days of ‘vassals should not 
have foreign relations’ came to an end – by Gojong’s order, the head of 
Tongnigimuamun was to co-work with Uijeongbu in making foreign policies 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.141). In less than a year, Sadaesa and 
Kyorinsa were combined on 9 November 1881 into a new department: 
Dongmunsa (Department of Diplomatic Affairs, ӕЎљ) – the prestigious status 
of Qing was further undermined and Joseon’s autonomy to manage its foreign 
affairs was explicitly professed (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.170–1). 
 
The other step Gojong took was to study modern interstate relations so that Joseon 
would be capable to handle its foreign relations, and he chose to learn about the 
Japanese experience of Westernisation and modernisation. On 23 March 1880, 
Gojong sent Kim Hong-jip (1842–96) as Susinsa to Japan (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.124). After Kim Hong-jip returned from Japan, he was summoned 
by the king and they had a long conversation on 28 August that covered four 
topics: 1) Gojong asked detailed questions about Japan’s reform in domestic rule 
and foreign relations, and Kim reported to the king with information he collected 
and his approving comments – because Kim was greatly stunned by the 
modernising progress the Japanese had achieved; 2) They talked about Russia, 
and they found it uncertain about Russia’s intention towards Joseon; 3) They 
discussed Qing’s concern. Kim believed that it was Russia that Qing was deeply 
worried about, for which Qing reminded Joseon of the imperative task of 
self-strengthening. However, Gojong disdained Qing’s advice – for he viewed 
such advice as Qing shirking its obligations to protect Joseon, concluding that 
Qing could not be trusted; and 4) Gojong asked about the possibility of reviving 
the kingdom of Ryukyu, and Kim reported that Ryukyu had already been 
downgraded to a prefecture of Japan (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.131). 
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It was obvious that these four topics reflected Gojong’s eagerness to learn about 
the greater world and his declining faith in Sadae and confidence in Qing. This 
conversation also signalled the emergence of the pro-Japan, moderate reformists 
like Kim Hong-jip (who believed in modernising Joseon through progressive 
reform by the Japanese model). In addition to the information he collected in 
Japan, Kim also brought back a booklet titled Joseon Chaengnyak (Joseon 
Strategy, රᗲ฼ౣ) written by Huang Zunxian (1848–1905, a Qing diplomat 
famous for his vision in interstate affairs), which significantly enlightened some 
but also enraged many in the ‘Hermit Kingdom’. 
 
In brief, the core strategy proposed for Joseon in Huang’s booklet was to guard 
against Russia, which was the top priority in Joseon’s foreign relations, by staying 
close to China, allying with Japan, and joining with America. In the Joseon court, 
Gojong and Yi Choe-eung (then Yeonguijeong) appeared rather positive towards 
Huang’s analyses and proposals – in their conversation on 8 September 1880, they 
agreed with Huang’s view on Russia’s territorial ambitions in Northeast Asia, for 
which there would be great power rivalries between Japan and Russia in the 
region, and Joseon must prepare for self-defence in order to survive in the fight 
between the ‘whales’. Yi Choe-eung even expressed his view that whatever 
mentioned in Huang’s booklet that could be trusted should be adopted. 
 
Moreover, Joseon Chaengnyak also changed Gojong’s perception of the Western 
powers: the king came to believe that it was indeed unnecessary for Joseon to 
resist foreign countries like America, for China had already opened the country to 
foreign trade and missionary. He added that it was the Koreans’ total ignorance 
about the West thus groundless fear for the modern world that had caused the 
conflicts in 1866 with France and in 1871 with America. Nonetheless, the most 
important impact of Huang’s booklet on Gojong was: the king became convinced 
that Joseon should ally with Japan. On 26 November 1880, Gojong met with 
Hanabusa Yoshitada, the Japanese minister to Joseon who came to present the 
letter of credence. It was evident that Gojong displayed not even a trace of 
discontent although the Japanese emperor referred to himself as ‘I, the sovereign’ 
189 
 
and addressed Gojong as ‘you, the king’ in the letter, which apparently placed 
Japan above Joseon. In mid January 1881, Gojong even secretly dispatched a 
special delegation to Japan to observe and study the Japanese experience in 
modernisation (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.132–3, p.140, p.174). 
 
However, the loyalists in Joseon were shocked and furious about what was 
illustrated in Joseon Chaengnyak, and the first wave of Wijeong Cheoksa 
(Movement of Defending Orthodoxy and Rejecting Heterodoxy, ፁ҅Ѿٕ) 
began in October 1880: on 1 October, a court official from Byeongjo wrote to 
Gojong and severely criticised Huang’s appeal to learn from the West. Two days 
later, Kim Hong-jip wrote to Gojong saying that he was willing to resign from his 
current position in the Ministry of Personnel as a punishment for having discussed 
interstate affairs with Huang Zunxian in Japan and brought his booklet back to 
Joseon. The king immediately defended Kim against the accusation and forbade 
him to resign (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.135–6). 
 
Yet in February 1881, the second wave of the movement started. It began with a 
letter to Gojong written and signed by 10,000 Confucian scholars in Joseon. They 
basically condemned Kim Hong-jip and Huang Zunxian with three points: 1) 
learning from the West would disgrace Joseon’s reputation as a nation of 
Confucian propriety and righteousness, and the Joseon court should follow the 
successful practice of the Joseon kings in history instead of the West; 2) Russia, 
America, and Japan were all barbarians, and they all had evil intentions towards 
Joseon; and 3) if Joseon signed treaties with Japan and America according to 
international laws, other foreign countries would follow suit and the consequences 
would be unthinkable. By then, Joseon would either enrage the foreign 
governments if it was to refuse their demands, or be dismantled and annexed by 
the foreign powers if Joseon had to sign treaties with all of them – hence signing 
treaties was a trap to ‘invite bandits’. Gojong, however, refuted the opinions of the 
Confucian scholars and accused them for slandering the court (RDAK, vol. 54, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.145). 
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In the following six months, more criticisms were raised against the idea of 
collaborating with Japan or any foreign powers. The loyalists, including court 
officials and civilian scholars, fiercely condemned Li Hongzhang’s letter and 
Huang Zunxian’s booklet for their violation of Confucian ethics. They proposed 
to charge Yi Yu-won and Kim Hong-jip with the crime of deceiving the public 
and destabilising the country, and to burn all the books about learning the West 
such as Joseon Chaengnyak and Manguk Gongbeop (International Law, ࿤୯Ϧ
ݤ). Determination and perseverance of the loyalists were expected, yet it was no 
match for Gojong’s toughness and resolution to open up the country and to 
socialise with foreign countries: the king ordered to arrest those who wrote to him 
about their assertion of Wijeong Cheoksa – they were eventually either 
imprisoned or expelled. On the contrary, Gojong highly praised the pragmatists, 
such as Gwak Gi-rak, who believed that it was unnecessary to reject everything 
from the West; anything that was beneficial to Joseon could be adopted (RDAK, 
vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.147–9, p.154, pp.156–9). 
 
By early 1880s, it became rather obvious that Gojong was much enthusiastic 
about associating with Japan. Meanwhile, he was also developing positive views 
about the Western powers. Consequently, the United States, among others, was 
considered an acceptable option for Joseon’s experiment to socialise with the 
West – but negotiations with the American would have to be conducted by the 
Qing court. What led to such decision were the efforts of Pak Gyu-su (1807–77), 
one of the early pro-enlightenment reformists, and Kim Yun-sik (1835–1922), the 
leading figure of the pro-Qing faction. Kim Yun-sik was the student of Pak 
Gyu-su, and both of them shared the same belief that Joseon should open up and 
learn to survive in the international society. However, they differed in the 
approach: Pak viewed it necessary for Joseon to deal with foreign powers directly, 
but Kim considered it imperative for Joseon to stay close to Qing and follow 
Qing’s advice to deal with foreign powers – by Pak’s idea, Joseon was to embark 
on a journey to independence; by Kim’s idea however, Joseon would remain a 
vassal of Qing. 
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Back in 1871 after Shinmi Yangyo, Pak Gyu-su (then Uuijeong) told Kim Yun-sik 
that it was not wise for Joseon to turn down the Americans. He noticed the 
anarchical nature of the international system, in which the strong would prey on 
the weak, and he could sense the imminent danger that was looming on Joseon 
because of its strategic location in Northeast Asia. Pak strongly believed that 
Joseon was in urgent need of an ally such that it would not be isolated in world 
politics. Among the foreign powers, Pak was certain that the United States was an 
ideal partner for Joseon: America was immensely wealthy thus did not possess 
territorial ambitions, for which the country was famous for its principle of fairness 
in managing interstate affairs (Pak, 1999, pp.428–31). 
 
As for Kim Yun-sik, he was also aware that states (Western powers in particular) 
in the modern international system were deterring each other by military force and 
checking each other by international laws (Kim, 1999, pp.365–6). Kim agreed 
with Pak’s view on forging alliance with America, for he was also convinced that 
America could play the role of an arbitrator if Joseon was bullied by other foreign 
powers. However, Kim also firmly believed that Qing would protect Joseon if 
Joseon could maintain a close relationship with Qing – by serving Qing faithfully. 
He described the Joseon–Qing relationship as one between ‘teeth and lips’, by 
which he stressed the paramount importance of sustaining the suzerain–vassal 
relationship between the two countries in the face of foreign encroachment (Kim, 
1999, pp.488–9, pp.559–63). As the Qing court was suggesting Joseon to ‘use the 
barbarians to control the barbarians’, Kim was certain that following Qing’s 
instruction would be the best policy for Joseon. Since both Li Hongzhang’s letter 
and Huang Zunxian’s booklet mentioned the strategy of making alliance with 
America, coupled with his and Pak Gyu-su’s positive perception towards America, 
when the opportunity came for negotiations between Joseon and America, Kim 
Yun-sik became an ideal candidate to represent Joseon. In September 1881, Kim 
went to the Chinese city of Tianjin as a special emissary appointed by Gojong 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.160, p.165, p.170). 
 
During his stay in China, Kim Yun-sik wrote diaries to record his close 
communications with Li Hongzhang, which included the points of: 1) he 
confirmed with Li that Gojong would no longer endorse the policy of resisting 
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foreigners, and Gojong was positive on the issue of negotiating with America 
because the fair treaty to be signed between the two countries could serve as a 
template for future treaties that Joseon would sign with other countries; 2) in spite 
of Gojong’s will, some court officials and many Joseon commoners were still 
antagonistic about the idea of collaborating with foreigners, for which Gojong 
would like to ask Li to negotiate on behalf of Joseon with the American 
government, thereby the domestic opponents would be silenced; and 3) Gojong 
would prefer Li to act as subtly as possible in front of the Americans – implying 
that Gojong intended to prevent the Americans from noticing that Joseon was 
indeed controlled by Qing – which reflected Gojong’s concern to project an 
autonomous image of Joseon in the international community (Kim, 1999, 
pp.432–4). 
 
This, however, created a dilemma for the Qing court: while there were good 
reasons for Qing to involve in the Joseon–America negotiation (e.g. to remind 
Joseon of its vassalage to Qing, to assure that Joseon was not going to fall in the 
hands of the West such that China’s border defence could be secured), negotiating 
on behalf of Joseon might also lead to a future consequence that the West would 
hold Qing accountable for everything related to Joseon’s foreign policy. 
Eventually, the Qing court agreed to involve in the negotiations but merely as an 
advisor, a facilitator, and a coordinator – yet Qing’s suzerainty over Joseon was 
reiterated to both Joseon and America in supplementary documents, although it 
was not mentioned in the official treaty (Lin, 1935/1936, pp.222–5; RDAK, vol. 
54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.184). On 6 April 1882, Jomi Suho Tongsang Joyak 
(Korea–United States Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce and Navigation, රऍ
অӳ೯୘చऊ) was officially signed between Joseon and the United States 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.187–9). 
 
By this time, it became clear to Gojong and the Joseon reformists that what Qing 
was willing to do for Joseon was to play the role of a string-puller at best and that 
of a bystander at least – yet most certainly not the role of a protector, as Qing 
would not be willing to actively protect Joseon from any foreign encroachment. In 
dealing with foreign affairs, all that Joseon would receive from Qing was only 
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advice. However, to those who endeavoured to elevate Joseon’s status in the 
international society, Qing’s retreat was not totally negative after all; Joseon now 
enjoyed a higher degree of autonomy in managing its foreign relations. However, 
when the Qing court changed the century-old tradition of non-intervention in 
Joseon’s politics, it aroused discontent among the Joseon political elites and 
accelerated the declining process of Joseon’s ideational Sadae towards Qing. 
 
Change of Qing’s Korea Policy (June 1882 – mid-1884) 
Imo Gullan (Military Uprising in 1882, Ϲϱै໶) could be considered the event 
that signalled Qing’s change of its laissez-faire policy regarding Joseon’s politics. 
To illustrate the incident in brief, Joseon soldiers stationing in Hanseong revolted 
on 9 June 1882 due to a 13-month delay of their wages. The outburst of their 
anger also ignited the Korean commoners’ anti-Japanese sentiments and their 
resentment towards those court officials who advocated collaboration with the 
Japanese: the Japanese legation was attacked, and some Japanese were killed. The 
rioting soldiers attacked the royal palace the next day and killed a number of court 
officials, including Yi Choe-eung (former Yeonguijeong). Queen Min also fled 
from the palace (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.193–4). 
 
On 12 June, Yeonguijeong Hong Sun-mok (1816–84) suggested that both Qing 
and Japan must be notified about the incident and Gojong approved his suggestion. 
Qing then sent a troop of soldiers to Hanseong in July to suppress the uprising. 
Since Daewongun was suspected to have instigated the riot, the Qing generals 
seized Daewongun on 13 July and took him to the Chinese city of Tianjin. Gojong 
then dispatched a special mission to China on 16 July to convey Joseon’s 
gratitude towards Qing’s assistance, yet the envoy also raised Gojong’s request to 
return Daewongun. However, Daewongun was not released until August 1885 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.194, p.198, p.351). 
 
As for Japan, the Japanese government demanded the Joseon court to apprehend 
those who were responsible for the killing of the Japanese personnel within 20 
days (otherwise the Japanese authority would take over the case), to compensate 
the families of the victims and the Japanese government by paying 500,000 yen as 
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reparations (to be settled within five years), and to allow Japanese troops to 
station in Hanseong for the purpose of safeguarding the Japanese legation – and 
all of these demands were put in Jemulpo Joyak (Treaty of Jemulpo, ᔮނ੅చऊ) 
that was signed between Joseon and Japan on 17 July 1882. While many Koreans 
found it shocking to permit Japanese soldiers stationing in the capital city, Gojong 
openly commented on 1 August that it was absolutely normal because Joseon was 
simply honouring the provisions agreed in its treaty with Japan (RDAK, vol. 54, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.198–9, p.201). 
 
On 5 August, Gojong issued an edict to all Joseon subjects, explaining that the 
power of Western countries had surmounted that of Qing thus resisting the West 
would not be a rational option for Joseon. Gojong advocated that Joseon should 
associate with foreign countries according to international practice and law. 
Although Western religions ought to be repudiated, Joseon should learn any 
Western technologies that would benefit Joseon. Moreover, he stressed that the 
Japanese were a nation of benevolent people thus it would be the Koreans’ fault to 
question their good faith. Considering that Joseon had opened to foreign countries, 
Gojong also ordered the removal of all the stelae erected in 1871 with inscribed 
words of refuting the idea of negotiating peace with the barbarians. In the 
following months, whenever there were pragmatic suggestions raised by the 
reformists to learn about the Western technologies (including those of Japan) for 
the purpose of Joseon’s self-strengthening, Gojong would highly praised and 
immediately endorsed the ideas (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.202, 
pp.205–6, p.214, p.223). 
 
Joseon was therefore gradually drifting away from Qing, although the 
suzerain–vassal relationship still existed between the two countries – but this was 
not what the Qing court would like to see; Joseon was still strategically important 
to Qing: 1) as its vassal state to sustain the Sinocentric world with the Qing 
Empire at its core; and 2) as its defensive fence to resist possible Japanese and/or 
Russian intrusions towards Northeastern China. The Qing court thus made use of 
Gojong’s request to abandon the policy of ‘Sea Ban’ between Joseon and Qing in 
February 1882 (on the ground that Joseon was now opened to Japanese trades, 
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hence Joseon should also be opened to Chinese trades) and signed a treaty with 
Joseon on 17 October 1882. In Jocheong Sangmin Suryuk Muyeok Jangjeong 
(Regulations for Maritime and Overland Trade between Joseon and Qing, ύර୘
҇Нഌຩܰകำ ), provisions related to extraterritoriality were stipulated 
apparently in favour of Qing, and it was stressed that whatever Qing was to offer 
Joseon by this treaty was a special privilege Qing granted to its vassal, for which 
none of such privilege would be enjoyed by other foreign countries that had 
signed or would sign treaties with Joseon. Meanwhile, in order to control Joseon’s 
increasing diplomatic and commercial interactions with foreign powers, Li 
Hongzhang sent Paul Georg von Möllendorff (1847–1901, former German 
vice-consul based in China) and Ma Jianchang (1840–1939) to Joseon as advisors 
to assist Gojong in managing foreign affairs. The king met with both, and 
Möllendorff was assigned to the Office for General Control of Diplomatic and 
Commercial Matters, while Ma was assigned to Uijeongbu (RDAK, vol. 54, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.182, pp.215–7, pp.222–3). 
 
Qing’s intervention in Imo Gullan and its attempt to affect Joseon’s diplomatic 
interaction with foreign countries by the 1882 Qing–Joseon treaty actually caused 
discontent in the Joseon court. Joseon was not pulled back to the Sinocentric 
sphere; on the contrary, Joseon was pushed away from Qing with declining faith 
in Sadae. Meanwhile, Joseon was drawn to the modern sovereignty system, in 
which Gojong and the reformists found greater opportunities for Joseon to elevate 
its status in the international society. From 1883 to 1884, the Joseon court signed 
treaties respectively with Britain, Germany, Italy, and Russia (RDAK, vol. 54, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.182, pp.258–67, pp.290–9). 
 
As shown in the abovementioned historical evidence, Qing’s evasion on the issue 
of protecting Joseon from foreign encroachment left few choices to the Koreans; 
they had to be self-interested and rely on their own resources to assure Joseon’s 
survival. The world in which Joseon could seek protection from China no long 
existed; it was replaced by one that self-help was the only solution to any 
problems, for which Joseon, like other nation-states, would have to look 
ultimately to their material power for survival. In the eyes of the Koreans, the 
196 
 
situation was different from the one two centuries ago: Ming was still willing to 
rescue Joseon during Qing’s invasion in 1636–7 even though it no longer 
possessed the ability to protect Joseon. However, what Qing did this time proved 
to the Koreans that Qing was not willing to protect Joseon at all (and it was 
already clear that Qing did not have the ability, as evident in Qing’s experience 
with the West). 
 
This generated profound impact on the Koreans’ understanding of Sadae. It was 
an intersubjective concept that was commonly shared between the suzerain and 
the vassal: it was like a bridge that needed two piers for support; collapse of either 
pier would bring down the entire bridge. As Qing failed to discharge its duties to 
look after Joseon’s well-being, the foundation of Sadae simply ceased to exist. 
While the emphasis was traditionally placed on the ‘pull factors’ (i.e. the liberal 
influence and the sovereignty system in the West) that looked so appealing to the 
Joseon political elites thus inspired their pursuit for enlightenment and eventually 
national independence (Lee, 1984, pp.267–99), the ‘push factors’ (i.e. Qing’s 
failure to perform the duties of a suzerain towards its vassals) were equally 
important in arousing Joseon’s desire to disconnect itself from the Sinocentric 
order. The ‘push factors’ also explained why the Koreans revered Ming for over a 
hundred years even after its fall, but Joseon wished to detach itself from Qing 
although the empire was still standing. 
 
With the combined effects produced by both the ‘push’ and the ‘pull’ factors, the 
ideational Sadae was approaching its end – although the material Yongdae 
remained a strategy for Joseon in its following quest for independence among 
great power competitions on the Korean Peninsula. 
 
6.3 Yongdae: Joseon’s Strategy to Seek Independence in a Multipolar Order 
(mid-1884 – 1910) 
 
As explained in the previous section, ideational Sadae declined as the result of 
two reasons: 1) within the Sinocentric system, Joseon witnessed Qing’s failure to 
perform its duties as a suzerain towards its vassals, as evident in Qing’s evasive 
attitude to protect Joseon from foreign encroachment and its intervention in 
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Joseon’s politics; and 2) outside the Sinocentric world, the European sovereignty 
system overpowered the Confucian tributary system, as proved by its military 
supremacy and its advocacy of equality and rule-of-law that profoundly appealed 
to Joseon. 
 
In this section, the historical evidence during the period from mid-1884 to August 
1910 will be examined in order to illustrate the final decade of Joseon’s ideational 
Sadae towards China and how Joseon implemented the strategic Yongdae on its 
road to independence. The analysis is to focus on the impact of five pivotal events 
during the period: 1) Gapsin Jeongbyeon (Gapsin Coup, Ҙҙࡹᡂ, 1884) that 
attempted to sever Joseon’s tributary relations with Qing by using the power of 
Japan; 2) Geomundo Sageon (Geomun Island Incident, ѮЎ৞٣ҹ, 1885) by 
which Joseon learned to ‘use foreign powers to control foreign powers’; 3) 
Joseon–Russia covert diplomacy (1885–6) with the attempt of using Russia 
against Qing; 4) the First Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) by which Joseon used 
Japan to terminate its tie with Qing and gained independence; and 5) Eulmi 
Sabyeon (Eulmi Incident, Ό҂٣ᡂ, 1895) that led to the Russo–Japanese War 
and the withdrawal of Russian aggression from the Korean Peninsula (1904–5). 
 
Gapsin Jeongbyeon (1884) 
The radical reformists in the Joseon court, headed by Kim Ok-gyun (1851–94), 
Pak Yeong-hyo (1861–1939), Hong Yeong-sik (1855–84) and some other 
pro-Japanese court officials, launched Gapsin Jeongbyeon in October 1884. By 
using Japan’s power, the coup was meant to seize control of the Joseon court and 
to eliminate the pro-Qing faction. This was the first attempt of the Joseon 
reformists to use a foreign power against Qing, although hastily and loosely 
organised. 
 
On 17 October, the coup leaders first took hold of Gojong, and Kim Ok-gyun 
issued a royal order in the king’s name to seek military support from the Japanese 
legation. The Japanese troops soon marched into the royal palace late in the 
evening. On 18 October, Kim Ok-gyun ordered to kill a number of pro-Qing 
officials, and the coup leaders were then appointed to key positions in the court. 
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However, Gojong managed to escape to the military camp of the Qing garrison 
based in Hanseong on 19 October. The Qing troops, led by Yuan Shikai 
(1859–1916), then charged into the royal palace to attack the Japanese. In the 
battle, the Joseon palace guards also followed the Chinese to fight the Japanese. 
As a result, the Japanese troops were defeated and retreated from the royal palace; 
Hong Yeong-sik was killed by the Joseon soldiers, Kim Ok-gyun and Pak 
Yeong-hyo later fled to Japan, and a good number of Japanese were killed or 
wounded by raging Korean soldiers and civilians who deeply resented the 
Japanese. 
 
On 23 October, Gojong, escorted by Yuan Shikai, returned to the royal palace and 
resumed his control of power. Nevertheless, the following actions Gojong took 
did warrant a special mention: 1) Gojong issued an order to arrest only the coup 
leaders, despite that many court officials asked the king to severely punish all of 
those who involved in plotting the revolt; 2) Gojong promoted Kim Hong-jip, the 
leading moderate reformist who shared a clear pro-Japan stance that was no 
different from that of the coup leaders, to Jwauijeong; 3) apart from the Qing 
court, Gojong also directly reported the incident to the Japanese government; and 
4) Gojong agreed to sign Hanseong Joyak (Treaty of Hanseong, ᅇࠤచऊ) with 
the Japanese government on 24 November 1884, by which the Joseon court was 
required to apologise to the Japanese government, and Joseon was held 
accountable for compensating the families of the victims and the Japanese 
government for the damages to the Japanese legation in Hanseong by paying 
310,000 yen as reparations (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.316–20). 
 
As a matter of fact, although the Japan-backed coup failed within three days, the 
Japanese did not lose much: first, Gojong’s pro-Japan stance did not change. 
Second, the Japanese secured an agreement with the Qing court – the Tientsin 
Convention on 4 March 1885, whereby both Qing and Japan would withdraw 
their troops from the Korean soil within four months, neither country would send 
military trainers to Joseon (and the Joseon court was to employ instructors from 
other foreign countries), and in future both countries should notify each other 
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before dispatching troops to Joseon once the country was in a state of unrest 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.332–3). 
 
The Qing court signed the convention based on the consideration of two factors: 1) 
Qing was not ready to confront Japan militarily at the time; yet 2) Qing was not 
willing to give up its suzerainty over Joseon and let it fall into the hands of the 
Japanese (Lin, 1935/1936, pp.228–32). However, the Tientsin Convention had 
unquestionably undermined Qing’s influence on Joseon, for Japan’s status was 
elevated to the level equivalent to that of Qing regarding the control of Joseon by 
the convention. In other words, by setting Qing and Japan in direct competition, 
Gojong and the moderate reformists had achieved, though partially, what the 
radical reformists failed to achieve: using one great against another (i.e. using 
Japan against Qing, which was a practice of Yongdae) – and Joseon was on its 
way to detach itself from Qing. 
 
Geomundo Sageon (1885–7) 
The mid 1880s was a period that witnessed the competition among great powers 
in the Far East, and Geomundo Sageon was a result of the rivalry between Britain 
and Russia for dominance in Afghanistan: in response to the deployment of 
Russian warships in Vladivostok, British navy occupied Geomundo of Joseon on 
1 March 1885 without obtaining the consent of the Joseon court – this was an 
attempt of the British government to block Russia’ southbound expansion in East 
Asia whereby the growing influence of Russia in the Far East could be checked. 
 
In brief, the reaction of the foreign powers could be summarised as: 1) Qing 
strongly suggested that Joseon should not lease or sell the island to the British, as 
Qing believed that if Joseon gave up an island with strategic importance this 
easily, other foreign powers would immediately follow suit and Joseon would be 
dismantled; 2) Japan was firmly opposed to the British occupation as the Japanese 
considered it a threat to their national interest in the region. Japan thus urged 
Joseon to confirm that the British occupation was not endorsed by Joseon so that 
all other foreign countries that had signed treaties with Joseon would jointly 
arbitrate on the issue; 3) Germany believed that the British occupation was a 
breach of the Joseon–Britain treaty, and it suggested that the Joseon court should 
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ask the British government to withdraw its troops from the island and notify other 
foreign powers about the incident so that they would not have the 
misunderstanding that the British occupation was approved by Joseon. As for the 
two competing powers, Britain vaguely explained its action with its intention to 
balance against Russia, and Russia asserted that it would occupy another 
important port of Joseon, such as Weonsan, as an act of retaliation to the British 
occupation of Geomundo. 
 
During the following months, the Joseon court employed the strategy of Yongdae, 
using other great powers to back its demand on the British withdrawal when 
interacting with the British government according to the protocol of modern 
diplomacy. Kim Yun-sik was in charge of the negotiation from the capital city, 
while Paul Georg von Möllendorff took up the role of negotiator in the field. Over 
a year later, pressed by other foreign powers and having settled with Russia on the 
issue of Afghanistan, the British navy eventually withdrew from Geomundo on 17 
April 1887 (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.335–7, pp.340–1, p.408). The 
incident, therefore, provided Gojong and the reformists with an opportunity to 
experience the implementation of Yongdae; it proved itself as a viable strategy for 
Joseon to survive in the fights among ‘whales’. To a certain extent, the incident 
encouraged Gojong to be proactive in the management of foreign affairs: in the 
modern international society that was supported by diplomacy and treaty, Joseon 
did not have to be controlled by the barbarians; on the contrary, Joseon could use 
a barbarian to control another barbarian. More importantly, Joseon could even use 
a foreign barbarian to reduce or eliminate Qing’s influence on Joseon – by this 
time it was becoming obvious to Gojong that there was an alternative great power, 
in addition to Japan, that could be used against Qing: Russia. 
 
Joseon–Russia Covert Diplomacy (1885–6) 
By the mid-1880s, the emergence of a multipolar order in Northeast Asia became 
obvious. During the time when Qing and Japan competed with each other over the 
control of Joseon, Russia was also planning its expansion southwards, targeting 
areas including the Korean Peninsula (which triggered Geomundo Sageon). 
However, Russia did not encroach upon Joseon by force; it was indeed by 
invitation – which was a result of Gojong’s strategy of allying with Russia to 
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resist Qing. This was another attempt of Gojong to disconnect Joseon from Qing 
by the idea of Yongdae, and consequently two rounds of Joseon–Russia covert 
diplomacy took place during 1885–6. 
 
The first attempt was initiated by Gojong and coordinated by Paul Georg von 
Möllendorff during the first half of 1885. As the Qing and the Japanese troops 
were to withdraw from Joseon according to the Tientsin Convention while the 
appointed American military instructor had not arrived in Joseon, Gojong secretly 
dispatched a special envoy to Russia, conveying his request for the Russian 
government to send 20 military instructors to Joseon. However, information of 
this covert mission later leaked out and Kim Yun-sik (who was in charge of 
Joseon foreign affairs at the time) took the liberty to notify both Qing and 
Japanese governments. Pressed by Qing and Japan to investigate the secret 
diplomacy between Joseon and Russia, Gojong chose to deny his involvement in 
the incident and put the blame on Möllendorff alone. Demanded by the Japanese 
government, Möllendorff, as a scapegoat, was later dismissed from his job in July 
by Li Hongzhang, who also believed that the German had disgraced and betrayed 
Qing (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.340–1; Yi, 1967, pp.301–8). 
 
The incident hence reminded Qing of the necessity to enhance its control over 
Joseon, and the solution was to send someone who knew Joseon well and was 
much tougher in the approach to deal with Gojong and the court officials who 
supported Queen Min (who was revealed to be the one who advocated the idea of 
partnering with Russia). The Japanese government also shared similar view with 
the Qing court, and the candidate turned out to be Yuan Shikai, who was one of 
the leading commanders of the Qing troops in both Imo Gullan (1882) and Gapsin 
Jeongbyeon (1884). Appointed by Li Hongzhang, Yuan Shikai, with the title of 
‘Director-General Resident in Korea of Diplomatic and Commercial Relations’, 
escorted Daewongun back to Joseon in August 1885. Since then, Yuan Shikai had 
been closely monitoring the policymaking process in the Joseon court. 
 
Yuan Shikai’s active intervention in Joseon politics and his swaggering attitude 
towards Gojong was evident in his analysis on Joseon politics that he sent to the 
Joseon court on 29 July 1886. In sum, Yuan Shikai reminded Gojong of a few 
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points: 1) Joseon had always been a vassal of China; to abandon China would 
completely ruin Joseon’s reputation because this was no different from a son 
ungratefully abandoning his parents; 2) if Joseon was to seek protection from a 
great power, Qing was the only option to Gojong because no other countries 
would genuinely look after Joseon’s well-being – and he illustrated a cost–benefit 
calculation to support his view; 3) independence only looked nice on paper, but 
indeed Joseon would be bullied by foreign powers without Qing’s protection; and 
4) if Joseon was determined to sever its tie with China, rather than letting other 
foreign powers to take over Joseon, Qing would immediately dispatch troops to 
the Korean Peninsula and occupy Joseon. Yuan Shikai further proposed ten 
policies for Gojong that covered basically every major aspect of Joseon politics. 
In particular, he stressed that there was no need to hunt down Kim Ok-gyun in 
Japan; it was much more important to prevent the emergence of other traitors like 
Kim Ok-gyun within Joseon (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.385–8). 
What Yuan did in Joseon was clear evidence that effectively countered the view 
of Hae-jong Chun that the Qing court basically chose not to interfere with 
Joseon’s politics (Chun, 1997, p.237). 
 
To Gojong, Yuan Shikai was practically lecturing, warning, and threatening the 
king. However, Gojong became more convinced that Joseon must achieve its 
independence, and seeking help from Russia was still a feasible option. This time 
he wrote a letter and had it secretly sent to the Russian government (but in the 
name of the head of Joseon government), expressing Joseon’s determination to 
become independent from China. The problem, however, would be that Qing 
would not accept the situation in which Joseon achieved an equal status as those 
of all other countries. Hence, the Joseon government wished that Russia would 
dispatch warships as military assistance to Joseon. Different from the previous 
secret mission that the king only asked for Russian military instructors, this time 
Gojong specifically raised his request for Russian military forces to resist Qing. 
 
Nevertheless, the serious implication of this letter even alerted a member of the 
Queen’s faction, Min Yeong-ik (1860–1914), who was opposed to any reckless 
actions in the name of allying Russia to resist Qing: he reported the incident to 
Yuan Shikai with a copy of the letter. Yuan was then convinced that Gojong was 
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to rebel against Qing, thus he proposed to Li Hongzhang that Qing should 
dethrone Gojong and arrest all the members of the Queen’s faction. Li Hongzhang 
then sent some naval forces over to Joseon to stand by, but he instructed Yuan to 
refrain from taking aggressive actions. When Gojong was later questioned about 
the letter, he again denied his acknowledgement and claimed that the letter was 
forged. As Min Yeong-ik also fled to Hong Kong (which made investigation more 
difficult without human testimony), plus the Russian government also denied the 
receipt of such letter, the Qing court decided to close the case (Yi, 1967, 
pp.318–31). 
 
In spite of these fruitless attempts, Gojong continued his efforts to invite Russian 
presence in Joseon. Following the previous practice of negotiating treaties with 
other foreign powers, the Joseon court signed Joro Yungno Tongsang Joyak 
(Overland Trade Agreement between Joseon and Russia, ර߮ഌၡ೯୘చऊ) 
with the Russian government on 13 July 1888, by which the Russians were 
offered the privileges such as ports for Russian trades and extraterritoriality 
(RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.438–41). By late 1880s, Joseon had 
basically secured its tie with Russia through the formal establishment of a modern 
diplomatic relationship. 
 
Using Japan against Qing to Pursue Independence (1894–5) 
In addition to Russia, the Joseon court kept on negotiating with other foreign 
powers as an autonomous country, signing treaties with the French government on 
3 May 1886 (RDAK, vol. 54, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.376–80), and with the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire on 29 May 1892 (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.103–8). Besides, Gojong enthusiastically acquired more information of foreign 
countries and more knowledge about the modern international relations, as 
evident in his detailed conversation with Park Jeong-yang (1841–1904, Joseon 
minister to the United States at the time) on 24 July 1889 after Park returned from 
America (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.10–11). While Gojong’s desire 
for independence was growing strongly, an opportunity came in February 1894: 
the outbreak of Donghak Nongmin Undong (Donghak Peasant Movement, ܿᏢ
ၭ҇ၮ୏) in Joseon (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.167). 
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The revolt appeared to be so overwhelming in its early phase that the government 
was simply not able to handle it. Upon Joseon’s request for help, Qing dispatched 
troops to the Korean Peninsula on 1 May 1894. The Qing garrison advanced to the 
Chungcheong Province of Joseon and stationed in Asan on 14 June (RDAK, vol. 
55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.179). As for the Japanese government, according to the 
Tientsin Convention (1885), it also sent troops to Joseon. However, different from 
the Qing garrison, the Japanese soldiers marched directly into the royal palace in 
Hanseong on 21 June. When the palace guards fired at the invading Japanese 
troops, Gojong ordered them to cease fire. The Japanese soldiers then took control 
of all the palace gates and disarmed all the palace guards (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.180). 
 
What happened next in the royal palace was the announcement of launching Gabo 
Gaehyeok (Gabo Reform, Ҙϱ׳஭) (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.182–6, pp.188–93): 
 
y On 25 June, Gojong promoted Kim Hong-jip, the leading pro-Japan 
moderate reformist, to Yeonguijeong and set up Gunguk Gimucheo 
(Deliberative Council, ै୯ᐒ୍ೀ). 
 
y In the following two weeks, Gojong approved a series of proposals raised 
by Gunguk Gimucheo, which included: 
¾ To adopt Western calendar in all official documents nationwide 
(28 June); 
¾ To make an announcement to all Joseon subjects that the stationing 
of Japanese troops in Joseon was to guard against the Qing garrison 
and they meant no harm to the Koreans (1 July); 
¾ To abolish the centuries-old system of Gwageo, the Chinese-styled 
system of national civil service examination (3 July); 
¾ To set the Korean language as Joseon’s official language, although 
still keeping the Chinese language in use (12 July); 
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¾ To select talented young Koreans and send them to study abroad 
(13 July). 
 
y Gojong announced the detailed action plan that he had endorsed to reform 
all government departments (i.e. restructuring the Joseon government 
according to the principles of modern public administration adopted in the 
West) on 14 July. 
 
y Gojong changed the titles of the major court officials to those popularly 
used in the West on 15 July. For instance, Kim Hong-jip was re-titled to 
Prime Minister, and Kim Yun-sik became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
 
Supported by the presence of Japanese troops, Gojong went even further to 
distance Joseon from Qing. On 22 July, the Joseon government openly signed a 
covenant with the Japanese government to establish a state-to-state alliance for 
two purposes in general: 1) Joseon would entrust Japan with the job to modernise 
the country in various aspects; and 2) in order to consolidate Joseon’s 
independence and autonomy, and to safeguard the shared interests of Joseon and 
Japan, the two partners would join hands to drive Qing forces out of Korean 
Peninsula. In less than a week, Gojong’s assertion to take side with Japan against 
Qing ignited the First Sino-Japanese War (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
p.197, p.200, p.202). 
 
In spite of the objections raised by the loyalists to question Japan’s true motive in 
its efforts to help Joseon against Qing, Gojong wasted no time in preparing for the 
declaration of Joseon’s independence – especially during November, when it was 
becoming clear that there was little hope for Qing to win the war. He gradually 
changed the terms that Joseon kings had been using (e.g. the words for addressing 
the king himself and the edicts the king issued) to those used by the Chinese 
emperor. He also announced to the Qing merchants in Joseon that the 
Joseon–Qing treaty signed in 1882 was nullified – but Gojong, out of his kindness, 
was still willing to look after their well-being in Joseon. Moreover, the king even 
issued edicts and laws in Korean instead of Chinese (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.211, pp.215–8). 
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A month later, Gojong took the final steps to sever Joseon’s tie with Qing. On 12 
December 1894, he went to the royal ancestral temple to pledge that, in front of 
the spirit tablets of the previous kings, he would make Joseon powerful and 
prosperous in the coming years – and this required the change of traditional 
thinking of serving a great power and relying on its protection. This was the 
reason that he was now declaring the independence of Joseon. Gojong then 
announced Hongbeom Sibsajo (Fourteen Articles of Legal Norms, ࢫጄΜѤచ), 
with the first article of proclaiming the end of Korea’s millennium-old tribute 
relationship with China, which meant that Korea became an independent 
sovereign state. The king then issued an edict to all Joseon subjects regarding 
Korea’s independence (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.220). 
 
Although Gojong declared Korea’s independence, his firm pro-Japan stance made 
Korea closely stand on the Japanese side in the Qing–Japan rivalry. This was 
evident in his decision to appoint some of the leaders of Gapsin Jeongbyeon in 
1884 to key positions in the new government, such as Pak Yeong-hyo (becoming 
Minister of Internal Affairs) and Seo Gwang-beom (1859–97, appointed as 
Minister of Justice). Besides, Gojong also approved the suggestion raised by the 
pro-Japan government officials to enhance border defence against Qing – because 
Qing was now considered the enemy of Korea (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 
1967, p.221, p.225). When Japan finally defeated Qing in the First Sino-Japanese 
War in early 1895, Korea’s independence from Qing became officially recognised 
in the world – it was stated in the first clause of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which 
was signed between Japan and Qing on 23 March, 1895. When the Korean 
government received the news on 10 May, Gojong issued an edict to celebrate the 
event across the country (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.252). 
 
What followed next was the acceleration of de-Sinicisation in Korea. Mandatory 
policies from the government (i.e. top-down) included Danballyeong (Order to 
Cut off Male Topknots, ᘐᎳз, issued on 15 November 1895) in order to change 
the traditional Chinese attire (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.264), while 
spontaneous actions from the society (i.e. bottom-up) could be found in the 
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building of Dongnipmun (Independence Gate, ᐱҥߐ) on 21 November 1896 in 
order to replace Yeongeunmun (Gate of Welcoming Imperial Grace from China, 
߆ৱߐ, built in 1539) – a project sponsored by Dongnip Hyophoe (Independence 
Club, ᐱҥڐ཮), an organisation founded by the pro-enlightenment activists 
(RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, p.295).  
 
However, Gojong was not completely satisfied with what Joseon had achieved up 
to this moment. He had been embarking on the journey of ‘anti-Serving Qing’, 
and he intended to defy Qing to the extreme: to elevate his own status from being 
a king to becoming an emperor, thereby Korea’s identity would be changed from 
a kingdom to an empire, which was equal to that of Qing. Gojong and his 
supporters on such idea then came up with the theory that Korea, instead of Qing, 
should be the true heir to the imperial dynasties of Han, Tang, Song, and Ming in 
China according to the Confucian civilisation–barbarian dichotomy. Hence, in 
view that Korea had declared independent from Qing and emperorship was 
popularly seen in foreign countries, Gojong’s title was therefore changed from 
king to emperor. 
 
On 12 October 1897, Gojong ascended to the throne of Gwangmu Emperor, and 
the name of the country was subsequently changed to Daehan Jeguk (the Great 
Korean Empire, εᗬࡆ୯) on 13 October (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.324–31). By this time, the Qing court had no choice but to admit the 
legitimacy of the new empire: on 1 February 1899, Xu Shoupeng as the Qing 
Minister to Korea arrived in Hanseong and presented the letter of credence to 
Gwangmu Emperor, and Hancheong Tongsang Joyak (Treaty of Commerce 
between Korea and Qing, ᗬ㯽೯୘చऊ) was later signed between Korea and 
Qing as two sovereign states on 11 September 1899 (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong 
Sillok, 1967, p.409, pp.437–9). 
 
The Futile Attempt to Use Russia against Japan (1895–1905) 
With Japan’s victory in the First Sino-Japanese War, Qing’s control over Korea 
was ceased permanently as of 1895. However, Korea’s politics, domestic or 
foreign, had been heavily interfered by the Japanese government ever since. The 
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situation was becoming similar to that during the days when Yuan Shikai was 
posted in Joseon, which made Gojong realise the necessity to seek help from 
another great power to balance against Japan on issues related to Korea. Queen 
Min had been advocating pro-Russia policies since the Joseon–Russia covert 
diplomacy a decade ago, and the strategic idea of Yongdae was once again 
adopted by Gojong and the Queen’s faction to use Russia against Japan – and this 
became the cause that led to Eulmi Sabyeon in August, 1895, as the Japanese 
government came to view the queen as an obstacle for Japan to exercise full 
control over Korea. 
 
On 19 August 1895, a team of Japanese soldier-assassins penetrated into the 
Korean royal palace and killed Queen Min. The Japanese then forced Gojong to 
issue an edict to announce the queen’s crimes – unsanctioned involvement in and 
vicious manipulation of policymaking, for which she was condemned and 
demoted to a commoner (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.258–9, p.267). 
As for Gojong, he was practically put to house arrest in the royal palace guarded 
by the Japanese soldiers. Assisted by some pro-Russia government officials, 
Gojong and the crown prince later escaped from captivity and fled to the Russian 
Legation on 11 February 1896. The king then stayed in the legation for a year, and 
the incident, known as Agwan Pacheon (Gojong’s Refuge at the Russian Legation, 
߮ᓔኞᎂ), brought Russia and Japan to the arena to compete with each other 
face-to-face over the control of Korea (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, 
p.266). 
 
Before Gojong left the Russian Legation on 20 Feb 1897, the Japanese and the 
Russian governments engaged in a few rounds of negotiation and signed the 
Komura–Waeber Memorandum (14 May 1896) and the Yamagata–Lobanov 
Agreement (9 June 1896). Together with the Nishi–Rosen Agreement signed on 
25 April 1898, all three pacts granted equal amount of rights to Japan and Russia 
in their control of Korea (RDAK, vol. 55, Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.276–7, p.305, 
p.358). However, when Russian troops occupied Yongampo (a Korean city by the 
Yalu River) in April 1903 and refused to leave, tensions between Russia and 
Japan escalated: Russia ignored Japan’s protest, and more Russian soldiers were 
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sent over to Korea. The two countries then ceased diplomatic relations on 6 
February 1904, and declared war against each other four days later. 
 
On 23 February 1904, Hanil Uijeongseo (Korea–Japan Protocol, ᗬВ᝼ۓਜ) 
was signed, by which Korea was required to provide Japan with full support when 
Japan fought against any foreign encroachment aiming at Korea. The 
Russo-Japanese War lasted until 10 March 1905, reaching its end with Japan’s 
victory over Russia. Six months later, the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed on 5 
September 1905, by which Russia admitted that Japan was entitled to exercise 
complete control over Korea and any Russian intervention would be prohibited 
(RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, pp.177–8, p.238, p.257). This time, 
Gojong’s strategy of Yongdae did not maintain a balance of power in the Korean 
Peninsula: Japan’s power was not checked, and the Russians were driven off the 
Korean soil. 
 
Although there was now only one great (i.e. Japan) left in the region, it turned out 
that this was the one great that Korea was not able to handle. Facilitated by the 
pro-Japan government officials, Korea signed Je-il-cha Han-il Hyeop-yak 
(Japan–Korea Agreement, ಃ΋ԛᗬВڐऊ) with Japan on 22 August 1904, by 
which Korea could only appoint financial and diplomatic advisers recommended 
by Japan, and Korea was not allowed to make treaties with any foreign countries 
without consulting Japan (RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, 
pp.203–4). After defeating Russia, Japan then forced Korea to sign Eulsa Joyak 
(Eulsa Treaty, Όσచऊ) on 17 November 1905, officially turning Korea into 
Japan’s protectorate (RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, p.264). 
 
After the ‘Hague Secret Emissary Affair’, Gojong was forced to abdicate on 19 
July 1907 by Ito Hirobumi, Japanese Resident-General of Korea (Yi, 1961, 
pp.465–70; RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, p.335). On 24 July 1907, 
Korea signed Je-sam-cha Han-il Hyeop-yak (Japan–Korea Treaty, ಃΟԛᗬВڐ
ऊ) with Japan, by which the administration of internal affairs of the Korean 
government was brought under the control of the Japanese Resident-General 
(RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, p.354). Eventually, on 22 August 
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1910, Il-Han Byeonghap Joyak (Japan–Korea Annexation Treaty, Вᗬٳӝచऊ) 
was signed between the two governments, according to which Korea was 
officially annexed by Japan (RDAK, vol. 56, Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, p.419). 
 
In short, the practice of Sadae during the final century of the Joseon Dynasty, with 
the emergence of a multipolar order, is summarised in the following table 
according to the different levels of thoroughness: 
 
Years High Medium Low 
of Reign (as Filial Piety) (as Obligation) (as Strategy) 
1800-1834 Sungjo ġ  
1834-1849 Heonjong ġ  
1849-1863 Cheoljong ġ  
1863-1873 
Gojong  
(Daewongun as Regent)  
ġ  
1873-1907 ġ  ġ  
Gojong  
(in Control of Policymaking) 
 
During the reigns of Sungjo, Heonjong, Cheoljong, and Daewongun (as regent), 
the loyalists were able to practice Sadae with strict adherence to Confucian ethics 
(as manifested in Joseon’s resistance to the West) due to the reasons of: 1) the 
persistent influence of the Confucian principles of righteousness in the Joseon 
society; 2) it was still the general belief in Joseon that Qing would be able, or at 
least willing, to take care of Joseon; and 3) Western values that the Koreans came 
to be in contact with were still limited in the issues of free trade and religious 
belief. However, during Gojong’s reign from 1873, the monarch and the 
reformists employed the strategy of ‘using one great against the other’ to 
modernise Joseon and to pursuit national independence as a result of: 1) Qing 
proved itself to be unable and unwilling to protect Joseon from foreign 
encroachment; 2) Qing, in order to protect its own interest, broke the precedent 
and interfered with Joseon’s politics; and 3) the liberal ideas of the West such as 
national autonomy, equality in interstate relations, and the sovereign right of 
self-determination began to permeate into the ‘Hermit Kingdom’, which had 
greatly facilitated the enlightenment movement in Korea. 
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Chapter Summary 
 
When Qing was eventually defeated by the Westernised Japan in the First 
Sino-Japanese War (1894–5), centuries of the Chinese hegemony was officially 
ended and Joseon detached itself from the Sinocentric system. Japan’s triumph 
over China not only signalled a transition of material power in Northeast Asia; it 
also indicated that the Sinocentric order was unable to withstand the impact of the 
European sovereign-state system: 1) in the ideational aspect, the Sinocentric order 
had been sustained by the rule of Confucian propriety that emphasised hierarchy, 
while the European sovereign-state system was supported by the liberal ideas of 
equality. The Western model was more appealing to China’s vassals (like Joseon), 
because autonomy could be obtained and national pride would be fostered; and 2) 
in the material aspect, the Sinocentric order was empowered by the ideational 
force of Confucian ethics, while the European sovereign-state system was charged 
by the material power derived from industrialisation. Failure of East Asia when 
colliding with the West was simply a proof of the social Darwinist doctrine of 
‘survival the fittest’. Therefore, as Sadae after all was a product of the Sinocentric 
order that was constructed upon the Confucian understanding of a senior–junior 
hierarchical relationship, when the Sinocentric order came to an end, ideational 
Sadae also came to an end. 
 
Based on the examples illustrated in this chapter, a comparison of the major 
differences between the pre-modern tributary system of China and the modern 
sovereign system in the West is depicted in the following table: 
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Although the pro-Confucianism loyalists, headed by Choi Ik-hyeon (1834–1906) 
and Yu In-seok (1842–1915), attempted to uphold the Confucian ethics during the 
final years of Korea, their influence, even with Uibyeong (Righteous Army, ကծ) 
to resist Japan, was no match for the power of the pro-Japan rationalists such as: 
Lee Wan-yong (1858–1926) and Kwon Jung-hyon (1854–1934) who controlled 
the Korean government according to Japan’s will, and Yi Yong-gu (1868–1912) 
and Song Byeong-jun (1858–1925) who founded Iljinhoe (΋຾཮ ), a 
non-governmental pro-Japan organisation (with nearly a million members 
nationwide) that actively called for merging Korea with Japan (RDAK, vol. 55, 
Gojong Sillok, 1967, pp.269–70, pp.332–3, pp.398–400; RDAK, vol. 56, 
Gojong/Sunjong Sillok, 1967, p.209, pp.224–7, pp.230–1, pp.271–3, pp.409–11). 
In any event, since the inferior Qing failed to perform its duties as Joseon’s 
suzerain while at the same time the superior West (including Japan) had been 
stimulating Joseon’s desire for independence, decline of ideational Sadae was 
obviously unstoppable and its demise was only a matter of time. 
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If there was anything left from Sadae, it would be ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae. 
‘Serving the great’ became an ideational taboo to be condemned, but ‘using the 
great’ remained a pragmatic strategy to serve national interests. In the century 
after 1910, ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae were still evident in Korea’s foreign 
relations with great powers – and the following chapter is to examine these 
legacies of Sadae, during the periods of Korean independence movement, the 
Cold War, and the post-Cold War years. The analyses of relevant events during 
these periods will be used to discuss how the legacies of Sadae continue to 
influence the contemporary Korea–great power(s) relations. 
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Chapter 7 
 
‘Anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae: the Legacies of Sadae 
in the Contemporary Era (1910 – Present) 
 
While the previous chapter examines the factors that had led to the end of Sadae, 
this chapter looks into the legacies of Sadae in the contemporary era from the time 
when Korea was annexed by Japan in 1910 to the present. As mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the political elites of Korea (including King Gojong), who believed in 
modernising their country through de-Sinicisation and Westernisation, advocated 
the cessation of the century-long tribute relation with China. ‘anti-Serving China’ 
was certainly an expression of ‘anti-Sadae’, one of the legacies of Sadae. 
However, it ought to be noticed that ‘anti-Serving China’ at that time was still not 
yet a mature manifestation of ‘anti-Sadae’. As a nationalistic sentiment, 
‘anti-Sadae’ continued to grow in Korea throughout the 35 colonial years during 
which the Koreans were completely deprived of their nation, identity, and dignity 
by Japan, a ‘better great’ (than China) that the Korean political elites once revered 
and chose to serve. 
 
Nonetheless, it was not until after the end of the Second World War that 
‘anti-Sadae’ began to be transformed from a popular sentiment to a political 
ideology. As Korea was divided into two countries at the discretion of the USA 
and the USSR against the will of the Koreans between 1945 and 1948, serving the 
great powers that intended to manipulate the politics of Korea became an 
unacceptable behaviour that was to be condemned by the Koreans. To express 
their paramount concern of their right to determine the fate of their own countries, 
‘anti-Sadae’ was then developed into Juche (self-reliance, Ьᡏ ) of the 
Kimilsungism in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and into the South 
Korean version of anti-Americanism in the Republic of Korea respectively. 
Nevertheless, refusal to serve the great subserviently does not necessarily mean 
that they should totally cut off all the ties with the great powers; the strategic 
Yongdae, as another legacy of Sadae, continued to be practiced by both Korean 
governments during the Cold War and still remained a fundamentally important 
215 
 
foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. Yongdae has not been disapproved 
of by the Koreans because: 1) it exhibits their political wisdom by which their 
dignity is enhanced, and 2) it is of strategic necessity for smaller countries to 
survive and (even thrive) in the rivalry between the great powers. 
 
This chapter consists of two sections: the first one is to reveal the underpinned 
logic of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae, and the second one is to discuss the combined 
application of these two legacies of Sadae in the two Korean states’ foreign 
relations with the great powers respectively during the Cold War and the 
post-Cold War years. While ‘anti-Sadae’ is an ideational concept that needs to be 
understood with a constructivist perspective, and Yongdae is a material concept 
that matches with the view of the realists, these two concepts are therefore 
analysed with the constructivist-cum-realist approach as proposed in this research. 
In general, materials from secondary sources written mainly by Korean scholars 
on contemporary Korean history are employed to support the analyses in this 
chapter. 
 
7.1 The Rationale of ‘Anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae 
 
In order to understand how the principles of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae have been 
co-shaping the two Korean states’ relations with the great powers, it is essential to 
examine the rationale of these two legacies of Sadae. The three stages through 
which ‘anti-Sadae’ evolved are explained in the first half of this section according 
to the background that stimulated its growth, the goal it intended to achieve, and 
the approach it adopted. As for Yongdae, the reasons it survived the demise of 
Sadae, its end and means, and the indispensible condition that sustains its vitality 
as an effective foreign policy are discussed in the second half of this section. 
 
‘Anti-Sadae’ 
The notion of ‘anti-Sadae’ was closely associated with Korean nationalism. While 
it was commonly believed that 1) it was the Koreans’ resistance to the Japanese 
during the colonial period that cultivated nationalism in Korea, and 2) it was the 
division of Korea imposed by the USA and the USSR at the end of the Second 
World War that escalated Korean nationalism (Park, 1966, pp.41–42; Shin & 
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Chang, 2004, pp.121–4; Pyle, 2007, pp.33–35). This research, based on the 
Joseon–China (Ming and Qing) relations, suggests that the historical root of 
Korean nationalism could be further traced back to the modern era – for the 
reason that before ‘anti-Serving Japan’ and ‘anti-Serving Any Greats’, there was 
‘anti-Serving China’. 
 
The phenomenon of ‘anti-Serving China’ in Joseon Korea during the final 
decades of the 19th century may be considered as an early expression of 
‘anti-Sadae’. It stared in 1876, the year that witnessed the signing of the Treaty of 
Ganghwa between Joseon and Japan. King Gojong obviously supported the idea 
of changing the status of Joseon, as mentioned in Article One of the treaty, to an 
autonomous state that enjoyed the rights equivalent to those of Japan. Eight years 
later, the radical reformists in the Joseon court launched the Gapsin Coup in 1884 
with an attempt to turn Joseon into an autonomous modern state by severing 
Korea’s tributary relation with China. A decade later, together with the moderate 
reformists, King Gojong initiated the Gabo Reform in July 1894, during which the 
Chinese lunar calendar was replaced by the Western calendar in all official 
documents nationwide, the centuries-old Chinese-styled system of national civil 
service examination was abolished, and the official language was changed from 
Chinese to Korean. Still three months before the end of the First Sino-Japanese 
War, King Gojong issued the Fourteen-point of Exemplary Rules in December 
1894 to proclaim the end of Korea’s tributary relation with China. During the 
following two years, the de-Sinicisation process was carried out in the Korean 
society, including the changing of the traditional Chinese attire and the 
dismantling of the Gate of Welcoming Imperial Grace (from China) – in a sense, 
it was apparent that ‘anti-Sadae’ at the time was largely articulated as 
‘anti-Serving China’. However, ‘anti-Serving China’ did not necessarily mean 
‘anti-Sadae’. 
 
‘Anti-Serving China’ during these two decades was merely the means adopted by 
the pro-enlightenment reformists to achieve the end of modernising Korea. They 
firmly believed that, with a suzerain like Qing China that was unwilling and 
unable to look after the well-being of its vassal states in the face of Western 
intrusion, Korea must be strengthened through modernisation, and the only way to 
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modernise Korea was to Westernise Korea, as proved highly effective in Japan. 
Chinese ideas and practices, in their eyes, symbolled backwardness and obstructed 
the progress of Korean modernisation. ‘Anti-Serving China’ was indeed opposed 
to the traditional way of thinking in East Asia, which happened to be represented 
by Confucianism, a philosophy produced in China. Those who advocated 
‘anti-Serving China’ and de-Sinicisation at that time in Korea actually refused to 
serve a technically backward China – yet they did not signal their intention not to 
serve any other great powers. Their belief in Japan’s successful Westernisation, 
their call for Korea to emulate Japan, their willingness to accommodate Japan’s 
demands, and their obedience to follow the Japanese government’s instructions 
were simply undeniable pieces of evidence to prove that they actually did not 
reject the concept of Sadae: serving a technically advanced great power such as 
Japan was never a humiliating idea that should be criticised. 
 
Nonetheless, if ‘anti-Serving China’ during this period is to be viewed as the 
embryonic stage of ‘anti-Sadae’, the focus needs to be placed on the 
pro-enlightenment reformists’ (in particular King Gojong’s) strive to elevate the 
national status of Korea in the international community. The tributary relation 
with China implied an unequal interstate relation between the two countries, thus 
it was the only obstacle in Korea’s way to become a genuine member of the 
international community where equality was claimed to be the fundamental 
principle of modern international relations – and this obstacle had to be removed 
if Korea was to become a sovereign state that was truly autonomous. Therefore, 
‘anti-Serving China’ during this stage was still not a complete version of 
‘anti-Sadae’: the Koreans at that time were opposed to serving one great power 
only, which was China, for the reasons that: 1) Korea’s opportunities to modernise 
itself was stifled by China’s influence, and 2) Korea’s aspiration to enjoy an equal 
status along with other countries in the world looked hopeless as Korea was 
locked in the Sinocentric tributary system. 
 
The second stage that witnessed the growth of ‘anti-Sadae’ was around the 
colonial era, from the signing of the Japan–Korea Agreement in August 1904 by 
which Japan took over the supervision of Korea’s foreign relations, to the ending 
of Japanese occupation when Japan announced its surrender to the Allies in 
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August 1945. Before the official annexation in 1910, the three treaties signed 
between Korea and Japan (i.e. the Japan–Korea Agreement in August 1904, the 
Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty in November 1905, and the Japan–Korea Treaty 
in July 1907) enabled Japan to control Korea’s internal and foreign affairs and to 
make Korea a protectorate of Japan. These treaties seriously violated the national 
sovereignty of Korea, and they immediately aroused the ‘anti-Sadae’ sentiment in 
Korea again – though it was expressed as ‘anti-Serving Japan’ this time. 
 
Korea, albeit with several changes of dynasties, had never been entirely annexed 
by foreign countries throughout its history. In East Asian traditional thinking, a 
country being annexed is equivalent to being eliminated (mangguk in Korean). 
This is usually considered the greatest shame to the people who have lost their 
country to foreign invaders because consequently, they will lose their identity and 
be subjugated by the conquerors. To the Koreans at that time, this was a lot worse 
than dwarfing themselves to serve China within the Sinocentric tributary system – 
they never lost their country to China (even after being completely defeated by 
Qing in 1637, Joseon was preserved as an autonomous kingdom only paying 
tributes to a new suzerain), but they lost their country this time to Japan, an alien 
power – and this was utterly humiliating. 
 
For Korea, according to the international order in modern time, the country lost its 
sovereignty. For the Koreans, they lost their homeland, by which they also lost 
their identity, as the Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese names, to speak 
Japanese instead of Korean, and to worship the Japanese religion of Shinto (Lee, 
1997, pp.153–4). Yet the worst of all was their loss of dignity, both national and 
personal. Such unprecedented trauma was extremely unbearable to the Koreans 
because, unlike the Imjin War during the late 16th century, Japan this time did not 
invade Korea with military forces; it actually came by the invitation of the 
pro-Japanese Korean political elites. 
 
Consequently, the depression and fury of the Korean populace was directed 
towards those who were responsible for selling out the country. Those Koreans 
who collaborated with the Imperial Japanese government were branded as traitors, 
such as I Wan-yong (1858–1926) and Bak Je-sun (1858–1916), who advocated 
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the signing of the Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty in 1905 and the Japan–Korea 
Annexation Treaty in 1910, Song Byeong-jun (1858–1925) and Yi Yong-gu 
(1868–1912), who founded the Iljinhoe, a pro-Japanese organisation that 
promoted the merger of Korea and Japan (Kim, 2005, pp.120–3). 
 
It should be noted that all these Korean pro-Japanese collaborators shared one 
common feature: their enthusiasm to serve the Japan government, as seen in their 
tireless efforts to facilitate the annexation. Their Chinil (pro-Japan, ᒃВ ) 
political stance subsequently, together with the repressive policies of the Japanese 
colonial government that deprived the Koreans of their basic rights and exploited 
Korea’s resources in the later years, turned Japan into the target of ‘anti-Sadae’. 
During this stage, ‘anti-Sadae’ was added another dimension on top of 
‘anti-Serving China’ that was seen in the first stage: ‘anti-Serving Japan’. 
 
However, neither ‘anti-Serving China’ nor ‘anti-Serving Japan’ aimed to reject 
serving just any great powers. While the goal of ‘anti-Serving China’ was to 
modernise Korea, the goal of ‘anti-Serving Japan’ was to restore Korea as a 
sovereign state. While the means to modernise Korea was de-Sinicisation, the 
means to restore Korea was nationalistic independence movement. During this 
stage, although ‘anti-Sadae’ was expressed mainly as ‘anti-Serving Japan’, the 
dimension of ‘anti-Serving China’ persisted – for the notion that it was China that 
made Korea weak and backward was still deeply implanted in the mindset of the 
Koreans. Moreover, the Japanese colonial government actively offered titles of 
nobility and pensions to Korean Confucian scholar officials in order to enlist the 
support of the intellectual leaders in the country (Han, 1971, pp.466–7), which 
also helped to sustain the ‘anti-Serving China’ sentiment in Korea. 
 
Nevertheless, ‘anti-Serving Japan’ had become the core of ‘anti-Sadae’ this time, 
because it was Japan that took everything away from the Koreans. The March 
First Movement, most noticeably, and other resistant movements (such as student 
protests, worker strikes, campaigns to boycott Japanese products, and righteous 
armies that fought against the Japanese police and troops) were all fuelled with 
strong nationalistic sentiment, aiming to expel the Japanese from Korea and to 
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revive their country. Apart from resistance against the Japanese government 
personnel in Korea, the Korean independence movement also witnessed that 
Korean political elites, both the rightists and the leftists, actively sought help from 
the great powers to restore the sovereignty of Korea. With Syngman Rhee 
(1875–1965) soliciting support of the USA and Kim Il-sung (1948–94) turning to 
the USSR for assistance, it could be said that the idea of dependence on the great 
powers was still not rejected by the Koreans. ‘anti-Sadae’ during this stage was 
extended to Japan (in addition to China), but it was still limited at a ‘case-by-case’ 
instead of a conceptual level. 
 
Since the free Korea was later divided by the USA and the USSR with not even a 
single Korean being consulted after the Japanese surrender in 1945 (Han, 1971, 
pp.498–500), ‘anti-Sadae’ began its third stage during which it evolved to a 
mature level. The goal of ‘anti-Sadae’ at this level was becoming clear: it was 
Jaju (self-determination, ԾЬ), the right that the Koreans would never be able to 
secure by serving any great powers. To the Koreans, self-determination was 
different from independence: independence meant self-rule, but not necessarily 
with self-determination – because an independent state could still be manipulated 
by other state(s). Within the Sinocentric tribute system, Korea was a vassal state 
and it was not independent (although it was allowed a fair amount of autonomy in 
managing its domestic affairs). As a colony of Japan, Korea was not independent 
and its autonomy was completely deprived. 
 
With Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Korea was no longer a colony and 
regained its nationhood as an independent sovereign state. However, although 
self-rule was achieved, the Koreans were not conferred the right of 
self-determination: a free Korea was calved into two political entities by alien 
powers against the will of the free Korean people. Therefore, having been 
unreasonably and disrespectfully treated by the great powers, the infuriated 
Korean people then joined the anti-trusteeship movement at the end of 1945, 
demanding not merely independence but also the right to determine the destiny of 
their country (Lee, 1984, pp.373–6). 
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Unquestionable historical evidence had proved that the two great powers at the 
time, the United States and the Soviet Union, were responsible for creating the 
Korean case of ‘one nation, two countries’. The political leaders of both Korean 
states had been firmly aligned themselves with these two great powers 
respectively starting as early as from the colonial period, yet neither of these two 
superpowers truly concerned about the hope of the Koreans to restore a sovereign 
Korean state in which they could exercise self-rule and self-determination. As the 
Koreans were not given the right to determine their own fate as other people of 
any sovereign states deserved, and the ones responsible for such tragic unfairness 
were the great powers their leaders chose to serve, not to serve any great powers 
thus became the very goal of ‘anti-Sadae’ during the third stage to obtain and 
secure the right of self-determination – ‘anti-Sadae’ had finally attained its 
complete meaning of ‘anti-Serving Any Greats’. 
 
‘Anti-Sadae’ therefore implies Korea’s refusal to subserviently serve, at the 
expense of acquiescently yielding the right of self-determination, all great powers, 
irrespective of their material capability (both economic and military strength) and 
the ideational orientation (Left or Right). It is not about rejecting the great power 
per se; it is about denouncing those who slavishly obey the will of the great 
power – hence when Park (2013, p.299) equated ‘anti-Sadae’ with ‘anti-Great 
Powerism’, the complete meaning of ‘anti-Sadae’ might not be correctly 
interpreted. By the same token, ‘anti-Sadae’ is not to be confused with 
‘anti-Imperialism’ as well, since ‘anti-Sadae’ is not ‘anti-Dae’. No matter such 
‘dae’ (i.e. great power) is a benign non-expansionist great power or a vicious 
expansionist great power, ‘anti-Sadae’ thus advocated that Korea should not 
blindly serve any great powers. 
 
To ensure that the Koreans were able to determine the making of their national 
policies, both domestic and foreign, ‘anti-Sadae’ was carried out by way of 
projecting the image of their country (both Korean states) as one with equal status 
to other member states of the international community. Especially for the great 
powers, Korea was to interact with them on an equal basis, although the feature of 
asymmetry in reality could be obviously seen in the bilateral relationship (Kim, 
1993, pp.323–4). In North Korea, to further safeguard the right of 
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self-determination, Kim Il-sung developed the ideology of Juche in the mid-1950s 
to serve as a guiding principle for making foreign policy (Koh, 1965/1966, p.294; 
Park, 1987, pp.30–39), with which North Korea stood against the Soviet Union or 
China on various issues during the Cold War – even though it received 
tremendous amounts of assistance provided by these two great powers who 
eagerly solicited the support of North Korea to compete with each other. After the 
end of the Cold War when China became the only powerful ally to North Korea, 
Pyongyang did not dance to the tune of Beijing all the time – most noticeably on 
the issue of nuclear weapon development (Scobell, 2003, pp.276–7). 
 
As in South Korea, although there had been no systematically developed ideology 
to conceptualise ‘anti-Sadae’, anti-Americanism gained significant momentum 
from time to time in spite of the American aids that South Korea had been heavily 
relying on since the Korean War (Kim, Parker & Choi, 2006, p.427). Even after 
the economic ties between South Korea and China had been so closely established 
during the first decade after normalisation between the two countries in 1992, 
‘anti-Serving China’ sentiment was aroused when the Korean populace sensed 
China’s chauvinistic attitude towards South Korea through its Northeast Project 
from 2002 to 2007 (Song, 2004, pp.118–20). 
 
‘Anti-Sadae’, as a maturely developed concept through an evolving process of 
more than a century, has become a cornerstone principle of both Korean states’ 
foreign policy – for this was a lesson the Koreans had learned in a painfully hard 
way. Although ‘anti-Sadae’ is not explicitly used as an official term in either 
Korean state, Sadae as a stigmatised label has been closely associated with the 
behaviour of those politicians who ingratiate themselves with the great powers by 
submissively sacrificing the national interest of Korea. Sadae has become such a 
political taboo that it turns ‘anti-Sadae’ into an effective tool to monitor and check 
the foreign relations of Korea with the great powers. 
 
Essentially, ‘anti-Sadae’ consists of some elements of nationalism, such as its 
emphasis on the right of national self-determination (as promulgated in liberal 
nationalism), and its opposition to hegemonic powers (as advocated in 
anti-colonial nationalism). Yet ‘anti-Sadae’ is more than nationalism: it harbours 
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strong resistance to hierarchical and unequal relations with the great powers, in 
spite of power disparity in reality and deep distrust of the great powers. This is 
resulted from Korea’s past experience with China, Japan, the Soviet Union, and 
the United States. 
 
However, ‘anti-Sadae’ is not as xenophobic as the insular conservative 
nationalism – for it does not reject the idea of socialising with the great powers. 
Therefore, ‘anti-Sadae’ is not used alone (if so, both Korean states would have 
been reduced to the situation of ‘Hermit kingdom’ again); it is employed in 
combination with Yongdae. The modus operandi of these two legacies of Sadae in 
the two Korean states’ foreign relations with the great powers is to be discussed in 
the second section of this chapter. 
 
To summarise what has been explained in the first half of this section, the 
evolutionary process of ‘anti-Sadae’ is summarised in the following table: 
 
ġ  Background End Means Nature 
Stage 1 
Since the mid 19th century, Qing 
China was unwilling and unable to 
look after the well-being of Joseon 
Korea, and Korea was attracted to 
the Western interstate relations that 
were constructed on equal basis. 
To modernise Korea 
and to make Korea a 
sovereign state in the 
international community 
To de-Sinicise Korea 
and to sever the 
tributary relation with 
China 
Anti-Serving 
China 
Stage 2 
Since the early 20th century, Japan 
had been planning to annex Korea, 
and Korea was made a colony of 
Japan from 1910 to 1945. 
To restore Korea as a 
sovereign state 
To expel the Japanese 
from Korea 
Anti-Serving 
Japan 
Stage 3 
Korea was divided into two 
countries by the USA and the 
USSR against the will of the 
Korean people after Japanese 
surrender in August 1945. 
To achieve and protect 
the right of 
self-determination 
To reject subserviently 
following the great 
powers, and to interact 
with all countries on 
equal basis 
Anti-Serving 
Any Greats 
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Yongdae 
As evident in the five-century long history of Joseon’s tributary relation with 
China, Yongdae had been one of the three dimensions of Sadae that was practiced 
by a number of Joseon kings and court officials. While the other two dimensions 
of Sadae (i.e. Sadae as filial piety and as obligation to the suzerain) ceased to 
exist as Sadae reached its end in May 1895 when Korea’s tributary relation with 
China was officially severed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, the concept of 
Yongdae continued to be a viable option frequently adopted by the Korean 
political elites. There are three reasons to explain the continuation of Yongdae: 
first, Yongdae had always been a pragmatic strategy that was free from the moral 
principles of Confucianism. It was different from the other two dimensions: 
Joseon as a junior was allowed to serve one senior only (i.e. Ming, and later Qing 
China); serving more than one senior was considered an unethical behaviour – 
disloyalty was strictly prohibited in Confucianism thus serving more than one 
great was simply not an option to be considered by a vassal state like Joseon. 
However, with the decline of Qing China and the rise of a number of Western 
powers (including Japan), as discussed in the previous chapter, Korea might have 
to serve several great powers to achieve its policy goals in a multipolar world 
order. After detaching itself from the Chinese tribute system, Korea was free to 
interact with more than one great – ‘serving several great powers’ used to be 
unthinkable in the Sinocentric order, yet ‘using several great powers’ was not 
unacceptable in the modern world. The amoral and pragmatic strategy of Yongdae 
simply outlived the East Asian traditional principle of ‘rule by propriety’ in the 
modern interstate system that was ruled by treaties. To a great extent, Yongdae 
was a concept heavily characterised by realist thinking. According to the doctrines 
of realism, in the contemporary world order that claimed equality as the fabric that 
bound all the sovereign states together, using others (including the great powers) 
to pursuit one’s national interest was basically a common practice that would be 
endorsed by any countries. 
 
Second, as Korea was situated in an area where more than one great usually 
competed for regional domination, Yongdae appeared to be an effective strategy 
for Korea to use one great against another for the purposes of not to become a 
victim (‘the shrimp that got crushed’) of the fights between great powers (‘the 
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whales’), and hopefully to obtain as many gains as possible for itself. Due to the 
strategically important location of the Korean Peninsula, it was very unlikely that 
Korea would be able to keep itself clear from the rivalries between and among the 
great powers. This has been the situation since the late 19th century until present 
time. Rather than passively taking whatever it is given, Yongdae would place 
Korea in a proactive position, enabling it to seek and secure its national interest. 
By using the United States (in the form of obtaining American aids), South Korea 
was able to recover from the devastating Korean War, and four decades later it 
thrived to become one of the OECD members. By using one great against another, 
North Korea was able to maximise its gain in the rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and China during the Cold War – these are merely two of the numerous 
examples to illustrate the necessity of Yongdae in Korea’s relations with the great 
powers. 
 
Third, successful or not, Yongdae was practiced so many times before. In the 
history of Joseon, a good number of examples can be found during the reigns of 
Taejo, Taejong, Sejo, Yeonsangun, Myeongjong, and Seonjo for reference of 
using one great. For examples of using more than one great in Joseon history, the 
reigns of Gwanghaegun and Gojong certainly can provide ample references. In a 
sense, Korea did not lack the experience of Yongdae. Exactly because some of 
them succeeded while others failed, there are plenty of lessons to learn from. In 
fact, comparing the examples during the pre-modern, modern, and contemporary 
eras, it is noticed that the Korean political elites are becoming more thoughtful 
and skilful to practice Yongdae, particularly in the case of ‘using more than one 
great simultaneously’. The trilateral relations that South Korea (ROK, USA, and 
PRC) and North Korea (DPRK, PRC, and USA) have been managing respectively 
are convincing examples to prove that Yongdae has become another indispensible 
pillar to Korea’s relations with the great powers nowadays. 
 
Nevertheless, to make the strategy of Yongdae work, an imperative condition 
must be available: reciprocity. Yongdae will not work if it is to be adopted 
according to a one-sided wish or calculation of Korea; Korea has to offer 
something with value in the eyes of the great powers to their policy goals – there 
have to be some incentives for the great powers to engage in such quid pro quo 
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exchanges with Korea. Yongdae works best when both sides achieve what they 
desire, for instance, North Korea received handsome amount of material aids from 
the Soviet Union and China while these two great powers gained North Korea’s 
support when they were at odds with each other during the Cold War. South 
Korea survived the Korean War with the military support provided by the United 
States, and in return the United States was able to halt the advance of the 
communist camp in Northeast Asia by having South Korea posted at the front 
against North Korea, securing a balance of power in the region. 
 
Hence, according to the condition of reciprocity, it should be noted that Yongdae 
would not work well in three types of situations: first, one-sidedness – referring to 
the cases that Korea employed the strategy based on its own will and failed to see 
the fact that the great power would indeed gain very little in the exchange. For 
example, after the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941, Syngman Rhee attempted to gain 
Washington’s support to recognise the legitimacy of the Korean Provisional 
Government, yet his lobbying efforts turned out to be in vain as the American 
government did not anticipate any substantial gain that would be useful to its Far 
East policy by granting recognition to a government in exile at the time when 
America was unexpectedly dragged into the war with Japan (Nahm, 1993, p.205). 
To ensure a successful Yongdae, ‘to use the great’ and ‘to be used by the great’ 
basically have to go hand-in-hand together. 
 
The second situation is caused by a mismatching reciprocal exchange: the great 
agreed to engage in the exchange, but Korea’s goal to use the great did not 
converge with the intended outcome of the great as to be used by Korea. For 
instance, after the Korean War, Syngman Rhee planned to unify the Korean 
Peninsula by using military forces that was to be supported by the American 
government. However, although it was the policy of Washington to provide South 
Korea with any assistance it could to help the war-torn country, the United States 
wished to maintain a stable relationship with the Soviet Union thus any move that 
would disturb the status quo of the divided Korea was not preferred – and Rhee 
suffered the consequence of making such mistake: he was not rescued by the 
American government when the April Revolution broke out in 1960 with 
nationwide protests to demand his resignation. Washington decided to give up 
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Rhee exactly because his administration was not using America for the purpose 
America wished to be used, and this was proved later by the official documents 
declassified by the American government (Ma, 2009, pp.32–33). Due to the 
power parity between Korea and the great, the result of wrongly using the great is 
usually not in favour of the weaker Korea. 
 
The third situation is resulted from failure or inability to foresee the variables that 
would change the goal of the great power – the original ‘give and take’ that was 
mutually accepted by both parties could be changed later on, making Yongdae less 
or even not effective. An example to illustrate this type of situation is North 
Korea’s strategy to use China during the era of Kim Jong-il. His goal to secure 
China’s support (material aids in particular) was set initially on the basis that in 
the face of Sino-American rivalry China had no choice but to keep its only 
ideological ally, North Korea, safe and strong as a buffer zone against the 
America-led coalition. As a result, he repeatedly adopted his brinkmanship tactics 
to maintain the tension on the peninsula during the second half of the 2000s. 
However, some variables were not anticipated: 1) while China and America 
competed against each other and their views and policy goals diverged on a 
number of issues, both governments had chosen to avoid military conflict so far; 2) 
while Sino-ROK relation experienced ups and downs since 1992, restraint, 
accommodation, and communication still prevailed between Beijing and Seoul; 
and 3) considering the paramount importance of economic development, Beijing 
might not feel insecure if a pro-China South Korea led the unification of the 
peninsula – as Beijing has grown frustrated with the behaviour of the Kim Jong-il 
regime that acted like a ‘spoiled child’ (The Guardian, 2010). In consequence, the 
warmth in Sino-DPRK relation remained unseen ever since. While changes may 
be inevitable, strategic insight is indispensible. Changes may affect the loss-gain 
balance that used to be optimal, and the reciprocal relation has to be reassessed 
and probably even reconstructed. In other words, Korea’s Yongdae, if not 
constantly evaluated and modified in response to changes occurring in the 
region/world, is unlikely to produce the outcome as it is planned for. 
 
Nonetheless, compared with how Yongdae was immaturely practiced during the 
final decades of the Joseon Dynasty (i.e. using Japan against China and Russia, 
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but eventually annexed by Japan), both Korean states have been using the strategy 
of Yongdae much more successfully in the contemporary time. Among others, a 
key to such success is the combined application of Yongdae and ‘anti-Sadae’. 
 
7.2 The Combined Application of ‘Anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae 
 
Articles have been written about the strategy of both Korean states adopted in 
their relations with the great powers. In the case of ROK-US relations, many 
scholars found it confusing about why the country has been depending so much 
on the United States for half a century, yet anti-Americanism remained such a 
significant social phenomenon in South Korea. They criticised the South Korea’s 
American policy as ‘inconsistent’ (Hyon, 2014, pp.91–97), attributing the reasons 
to ambivalence in human nature that had caused the dilemma in policymaking 
(Shin & Izatt, 2011, p.1116), or believing it to be a kind of new nationalism 
resulted from South Korea’s growing economic power (Shin, 1996, p.802; Kim & 
Lim, 2007, pp.72–73), or blaming the changing American policies (particularly 
those of the Bush Administration, 2001–8) that had placed South Korea at risk 
instead of in peace (Kim, 2002/2003, pp.109–10). As for North Korea, Kim 
Il-sung’s decision to swing tactically between Moscow and Beijing was described 
as ‘Pyongyang walked on a tight rope between the two Communist masters, 
adroitly preserving a precarious balance’ (Kim, 1993, p.490). This research, 
however, intends to offer another explanation: it was the combined application of 
‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae that had been guiding the formation of both Korean 
states’ relations with the great powers in the contemporary era. 
 
These two legacies of Sadae are not contradicting to each other because 
‘anti-Sadae’ after all is not ‘anti-Yongdae’. In practice, they have been applied 
organically together because: 1) ‘anti-Sadae’ without Yongdae would isolate 
Korea from interaction with the great powers, which is not practical or desirable – 
even Kim Il-sung interpreted the Juche economy as the one that should be 
‘opposed to the economic domination and subordination by other countries, but 
does not reject international economic cooperation’, and North Korea was in 
active search for foreign capital from France, Italy, Canada, and even Japan in the 
mid-1980s (Park, 1987, p.32); and 2) Yongdae without ‘anti-Sadae’ would place 
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Korea at a position so close to the great powers that eventually Korean politics 
(both domestic and foreign) would be shadowed under the influence of the great 
powers – Korea’s right of self-determination would be jeopardised and ultimately 
sacrificed. 
 
Therefore, Yongdae, understood as a realist concept to pursue national interest, is 
employed to seek and maximise gain from the interaction with the great powers. 
The strategy is implemented based on a rational cost–benefit calculation: when 
the benefits Korea receives exceed the costs it has to bear, Yongdae will 
continue – and a close relationship with the great powers will be accepted. 
However, when the benefits Korea receives cannot cover the costs it has to bear, 
‘anti-Sadae’, like an alarm, will go off – Yongdae will stop and Korea will 
distance itself from the great powers. Until the cost–benefit balance return to an 
optimal level that is accepted by both Korea and the great powers, ‘anti-Sadae’ 
will abate and Yongdae will be adopted again. 
 
In other words, the nationalistic ‘anti-Sadae’ on one hand will basically give way 
to the material needs (including both economic and military) that is to be achieved 
via Yongdae; on the other hand, this ideational element never disappears from 
Korea’s foreign relations – it served as the bulwark to safeguard Korean people’s 
dignity that had been hurt for centuries – and ‘anti-Sadae’ keeps reminding the 
Korean political elites of the important need to protect the nation’s right of 
self-determination in contemporary time. This logic, which is necessary to be 
understood from a constructivist-cum-realist perspective, helps to explain the 
‘very complex, a mixture of national pride and realism’ (Kim, 1994, p.43) in the 
Korean behaviour towards the great powers during and after the Cold War. 
 
During the Cold War 
The ROK-US relations during the Cold War can be depicted as a typical example 
of the combined application of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae. By using the assistance 
provided by the United States, South Korea survived the Korean War, rebuilt the 
country from debris, developed its economy and accelerated the pace of 
industrialisation with American financial aids and trade policies, protected South 
Korea from being invaded by North Korea again with the American military 
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support – South Korea had gained so many benefits that these had made the costs 
looked negligible thus fairly acceptable – and those costs, to name a few, included 
the financial burden and the social costs incurred from the American troops 
stationing in South Korea, violation of national sovereignty due to 
extraterritoriality, sacrifice of South Korean’s lives and resources for American’s 
wars in Vietnam and Iraq, obstacles to the development of democratisation in 
South Korea. 
 
Among others, President Park Chung-hee (1917–79) was a South Korean political 
leader who was very well verse in managing the operation of ‘anti-Sadae’ and 
Yongdae in South Korea’s relations with the United States. To make Yongdae 
look effective, Park Chung-hee launched nationwide propaganda as a form of 
thought-control to demonstrate the tremendous amount of gain South Korea had 
received from the United States, thus it was the country’s indebtedness owed to 
America that South Korea was obliged to assist the great power in its time of need. 
Meanwhile, he flew to Washington in November 1961 and initiated the offer to 
President Kennedy of dispatching South Korean troops to Vietnam – subsequently, 
320,000 South Korean military personnel were sent to Vietnam, and the total 
casualty by March 1973 amounted to 5,000 dead and 10,000 wounded (Han, 2003, 
pp.248–52). However, the alarm of ‘anti-Sadae’ did not go off, as American aids 
were urgently needed to support the economy of South Korea in the 1960s – it 
even made his coup d'état in May 1961 and the subsequent rule of his junta appear 
tolerable to the South Korean populace, and their dissatisfaction with the 
American endorsement on Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian rule did not surface 
until the late 1970s. 
 
Nevertheless, the Koreans demonstrated a very different attitude towards General 
Chun Doo-hwan (1931– ) when he launched a coup d'état to seize the government 
power in December 1979 and became an unelected president in September 1980. 
The Gwangju Democratization Movement in May 1980 witnessed the rising 
demand of the Korean populace to democratise the country and the growing 
hostility towards the American government (as they believed that Chun’s decision 
to brutally suppress the movement was endorsed by Washington). Both Park 
Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan came to power via illegitimate means and both 
231 
 
stayed in power by utilising the support of the American government, for which 
they closely followed the will of Washington – the two administrations’ 
relationships with the United States could literally be described as a modern 
version of Sadae – yet Chun’s regime was severely criticised for its close link 
with America. 
 
By a cost–benefit calculation, while the economy of South Korea had grown 
substantially during the 1960s and the 1970s, the importance of American aids 
gradually waned. In other words, the benefits that South Korea gained from the 
United States began to fall short of the costs South Korea had to bear resulted 
from its dependence on America. All the costs as mentioned earlier started to 
surface and became the primary concern of the populace, and ‘anti-Sadae’ soon 
ascended to the centre stage of South Korea’s foreign relations with the 
superpower in the form of ‘anti-Americanism’. No matter it was viewed as a well 
developed ideology (Park, 2007, p.179) or merely an emotional sentiment (Kim, 
1994, pp.38–39), the goal of ‘anti-Americanism’ was about not to depend on 
America and not to follow the will of the American government, whether the 
United States was an imperialist hegemon or simply a great power that had done 
something unpopular to its junior ally, such that South Korea’s right to determine 
its own fate would not be infringed upon. 
 
As for North Korea, the combined application of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae was 
skilfully managed by Kim Il-sung with a style of pendulum in the DPRK-USSR 
and DPRK-PRC relations. As early as in 1949, Kim approached Stalin first 
regarding his intention to invade South Korea, planning to use the USSR to 
accomplish his version of peninsular unification. It was due to Stalin’s rejection 
(which is an early case of North Korea’s failure in Yongdae, as the Soviet Union 
refused to be used by North Korea at the time to confront the United States 
militarily) and his suggestion that Kim eventually turned to China in early 
October 1950 after United Nation forces drove the North Korean troops towards 
the DPRK-PRC border at the Yalu River in September that year. However, 
although China came to North Korea’s rescue with tremendous costs during the 
Korean War, Kim Il-sung did not enthusiastically welcome the Chinese, as seen in 
the discord between the two during the war (Shen, 2012, p.4), and the political 
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purge Kim undertook against members of the pro-China Yan’an Faction in the 
Korean Workers’ Party that included the high-ranking party members such as Mu 
Jong, Pak Il-u, and Bang Ho-san (Shen, 2010, p.34). 
 
Kim Il-sung would not have come to power without Moscow’s support after the 
mid-1940s, and staying too close to China would not benefit North Korea in its 
relations with the Soviet Union – the leading power of the communist bloc that 
North Korea depended upon at the time. However, when Khrushchev succeeded 
Stalin and launched the campaign against the cultivation of personal cult in party 
leadership at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 
February 1956, a new interstate relation emerged in the region. By a cost–benefit 
calculation, Kim Il-sung realised that his regime would lose more than gain from 
the USSR if it continued to stay close to Moscow. Subsequently, with the 
nationalism-charged doctrine of Juche, Kim Il-sung distanced North Korea from 
the Soviet Union based on the reason that it was not necessary for his country to 
blindly follow the lead of the USSR (Kim, 1993, p.488) – to the North Korean 
populace, Kim’s decision to halt his Yongdae on the Soviet Union was backed by 
the alarm of ‘anti-Sadae’ that Kim set off by himself. 
 
Kim Il-sung later chose to applied Yongdae on China for the benefits of enlisting 
Beijing’s staunch support to Pyongyang’s hardline policy towards South Korea 
(while Moscow opted for peaceful co-existence with the West under Khrushchev) 
and extending North Korea’s diplomatic relations with other Third World 
countries via the network of China (Kim, 1993, pp.491–2). However, when 
Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964 and China started to descend into the 
catastrophic Cultural Revolution in May 1966, Kim Il-sung adjusted his foreign 
policy with the same approach again – only this time aiming at China: an editorial 
titled ‘Let Us Defend Our Independence’ was published in Nodong Sinmun (the 
organ of the Korean Workers’ Party) on 12 August 1966, asserting that the North 
Korean people should rely on their own by embracing the spirit of Juche and 
reject the policies of other big communist parties that were imposed upon North 
Korea (Koh, 1969, pp.955–6). Once again, ‘anti-Sadae’ was invoked to provide 
the rationale for Kim Il-sung to cease the Yongdae policy towards the great power. 
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With a number of other examples that had caused a series of re-adjustments in 
North Korea’s relations with the two great powers (such as responding to détente 
between America and the Soviet Union in 1969, China’s pragmatic switch to the 
focus on reform and opening up to the West that was preceded by the 
Sino-American rapprochement in 1972 and the Sino-Japanese normalisation in 
1978), the combined application of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae was repeated 
whenever Kim Il-sung deemed strategically necessary such that North Korea was 
able to gain maximum amount of material benefits from the competition between 
China and the Soviet Union – while at the same time, having successfully 
preserved North Korea’s right of self-determination and effectively enhanced the 
national dignity. 
 
After the Cold War 
South Korea began to manage two sets of Korea–great power relations in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, which was much more challenging compared with 
what Seoul had to deal with during the previous decades. The end of the Cold War 
might have caused structural changes in the regional interstate relations that 
compelled Northeast Asian states to adjust their foreign policies, yet it was worth 
noticing that it was South Korean president Roh Tae-woo who initiated the 
foreign policy of Bukbang Jeongchaek (Northern Policy, чБࡹ฼) during the 
period of 1983–88. This was a move of vision and ambition, and it also 
demonstrated that the South Korean political elites were confident in their skill to 
apply the combined strategy of Yongdae and ‘anti-Sadae’ in managing more than 
one great in the new era. 
 
Looking back at South Korea’s relations with the great powers during the fifteen 
years between 1993 and 2008 under Kim Young-sam, Kim Dae-jung, and Roh 
Moo-hyun, it could be found that the ROK-US relation was gradually cooling off 
in spite of the continuation of the ROK-US alliance that both sides claimed to be 
as important as ever before. With the previous authoritarian pro-America regimes 
that suppressed the Koreans’ demand to democratise the country leaving the Blue 
House, those political activists who used to be political dissidents and survived 
the Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980 and the June Democracy 
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Movement in 1987 were now in control of the government power. They aroused 
the nationalistic sentiment of ‘anti-Sadae’ in the Korean society, criticised the 
attitude of Chinmi (pro-America, ᒃऍ), and played down the importance of 
Yongmi (using America, Ҕऍ ) with reasons also based on a cost–benefit 
calculation: 
 
y The economic tie between the two countries did not provide the 
significant amount of help to South Korea since its economy had grown 
to a level commensurate with that of a developed country. Besides, 
South Korean began to gain less in its trades with the United States; 
 
y Both the material and the social costs associated with the presence of 
the American forces in South Korea became prominent (and the Yangju 
highway incident on 13 June 2002 pushed the anti-Americanism 
sentiment to its climax). This was resulted from the decreasing strategic 
value of the American forces in the country to deter North Korea – as 
the inter-Korean tension was substantially eased with the effect of the 
‘Sunshine Policy’ implemented by the progressive administrations of 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun towards Pyongyang; 
 
y The policy goal of Seoul did not match with that of Washington after 
the September 11 Attack on the United States in 2001: the Bush 
Administration publicly labelled North Korea as one of the rogue states 
of the ‘evil axis’ that would put the Free World in grave danger; but the 
progressive government of South Korea endeavoured to project North 
Korea as a brother sharing the same ancestry with the South to be 
embraced and reunited with. 
 
In other words, while Seoul was avoiding conflicts in its plan to unify the 
peninsula peacefully, Washington was focusing on counter-terrorism in the 
Middle East yet inconsiderately bringing instability to the region (and putting 
South Korea at risk). In sum, the losses that South Korea suffered obviously 
outweighed the gains it received from using America, and further aligning itself 
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with the United States would only belittle South Korea, as it kept serving the great 
but in fact for not much in return – self-determination would be discounted and 
the national dignity of South Korea would be damaged in such an unequal 
partnership. 
 
Hence Yongdae was checked by ‘anti-Sadae’, and one of the examples was the 
South Korean public’s strong objection to Seoul’s decision to deploy troops to 
join American forces in the war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003 (Hyon, 
2014, p.95). By the end of the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the ROK-US 
relations reached a fairly low point that had made South Korea a ‘runaway ally’ in 
the eyes of the Americans (Kim & Lim, 2007, p.78). In fact, South Korea was not 
suffering from ‘historical amnesia’ in the words of Hillary Clinton (Kim & Lim, 
2007, p.71); American policymakers simply were not aware of the logic that the 
distance between Seoul and Washington, to the South Korean, was determined by 
the operation of Yongdae and ‘anti-Sadae’. 
 
With the perception that America simply replaced Ming/Qing China and became 
the contemporary ‘senior’ to Korea after the Korean War (albeit in the absence of 
an official hierarchical structure, i.e. the tribute system) still prevailed in the South 
Korean society, pro-Americanism was simply considered a modern version of 
Sadae with South Korea serving the United States and in return, expecting the 
great to look after the well-being of the ‘junior’ (Kim, 1989, pp.751–2). When 
such expectations were not adequately met, pro-Americanism would be 
condemned and the bilateral relations would cool down. 
 
This situation remained until the mid 2000s, when Kim Jong-il’s brinkmanship 
strategy sharply increased the level of tension via a series of aggressive moves 
that threatened the national security of South Korea (such as the two nuclear tests 
in 2006 and 2009, the sinking of ROKS Cheonan and the bombardment of 
Yeonpyeong Island in 2010), making the presence of American forces in South 
Korea more valuable again as a crucial deterrent. While Washington at the time 
also perceived that it was necessary to safeguard America’s strategic interest in 
the region against North Korea’s assertiveness, the converging objective of the 
two countries helped to rejuvenate the ROK–US alliance (Kim, 2015). By a new 
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cost–benefit calculation in the post-Cold War era, using America became 
important again when the need to ensure national security outweighed all other 
concerns. Correspondingly, ‘anti-Sadae’ backed down and the anti-Americanism 
sentiment became silent in the South Korean society. However, Mo (2007, p.52) 
believed that in response to the demand of the younger Koreans who were prone 
to nationalistic political assertion, the government would have to adopt a realist 
nationalist approach again to make South Korea more independent from the 
United States and reshape the U.S.–Korean alliance into a more equal 
relationship. 
 
On the other hand, the fifteen years from 1993 to 2008 also witnessed the ups and 
downs in the ROK-PRC relations. Whereas the two countries did enjoy nearly a 
decade of honeymoon relationship after their normalisation in 1992, during which 
the former ideological opponents turned close economic partners, South Korea 
had been using China for obtaining more business opportunities but without 
giving up the alarm of ‘anti-Sadae’ in case the mentality of the old-time 
‘suzerain–vassal’ relation re-emerged in the bilateral relation. This explained why 
the South Korean reaction was so unusually strong when the issue of the 
Goguryeo controversies resulted from China’s ‘Northeast Project’ (2002–7) 
occurred during the early 2000s that seriously affected the amity between the two 
countries (Jang, Song & Hwang, 2009, pp.121–2). To the surprise of many 
Chinese policymakers who were accustomed to the Chinese view that Korea had 
always been a loyal follower to China the ‘senior’ for centuries in history, the 
South Korean reacted explosively with the nationalistic ‘anti-Sadae’ spirit, 
condemning the Chinese chauvinistic attitude towards South Korea (Gries, 2005, 
pp.8–14). In the following years, Beijing expressed its dissatisfaction about the 
discourse in the South Korean society that emphasised Joseon’s unequal relation 
with Ming/Qing, denied cultural affinity with the Chinese, and facilitated the 
growth of nationalism, and even demanded Seoul to contain the nationalistic 
discourse in the South Korean mass media (Guo & Liu, 2014, p.35; Cai, 2015, 
pp.2–4; Xu & Qi, 2013, pp.29–30; Han, 2015, pp.64–67) – it generated little 
effect; and to make matters worse, it amplified the differences in political value 
between the two countries. Over a decade, through its efforts in non-material issue 
areas, Seoul successfully retained its control in steering the development of the 
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bilateral relation for the benefits of South Korea. China was not able to decisively 
influence South Korea’s foreign policy even though with its tremendous economic 
power. 
 
Towards the end of Lee Myung-bak’s term in the early 2010s, economic 
development and national security co-emerged as the dominant issues on South 
Korea’s foreign relations with the great power – as a result of the 2008–9 Global 
Financial Crisis and the succession of power in North Korea due to Kim Jong-il’s 
sudden death in December 2011. Different from Kim Il-sung’s juggling during the 
Cold War, Seoul had to use both great powers – the USA (for security) and China 
(for commerce) simultaneously. ‘Anti-Sadae’ thus served to ensure the 
independence of South Korea by avoiding over-reliance on either great power, 
protecting its right of self-determination. 
 
Consequently, South Korea has been projecting itself as a middle power playing 
an important role in regional and even global affairs, particularly as a balancer of 
power to mediate the rivalry between America and China, to build trust among the 
Northeast Asian states, and to bring peace and development to the region and the 
rest of the world (Bae, 2007, pp.460–2). In a sense, South Korea has been trying 
very hard to elevate its national status even in front of the obvious great powers in 
Northeast Asia – and this is effectively helpful to the ruling government to escape 
the accusation of Sadae by the South Korean populace – although the benefits 
South Korea received from these two countries are more than sufficient to justify 
Seoul’s Yongdae strategy towards both great powers. 
 
As for North Korea, the end of the Cold War also ended the four-decade long 
scenario that Pyongyang gained benefits by swinging between the two competing 
great powers of the Soviet Union and China. Unlike the setting in the old days that 
the two great powers actually belonged to the same ideological bloc that North 
Korea also sworn its allegiance to, the two great powers that Pyongyang had to 
deal with after the Cold War included one that was the leader of the long-time 
antagonistic opposite camp (i.e. America) and the other one that was a ‘revisionist 
member’ (in the eyes of the North Korea) of the communist bloc (i.e. China). 
238 
 
More challenging to the political wisdom of Pyongyang was the relationship of 
these two great powers: competing but also cooperating with each other. 
 
North Korea hence tried to orchestrate a trilateral relation with the two great 
powers but still applying the Yongdae-cum-‘anti-Sadae’ strategy: provoking 
America to threaten the peace in the Korean Peninsula, by which China would 
have to support North Korea to deter any aggressive move from the ROK-US 
alliance. This was how North Korea used China – indirectly, because North Korea 
would not simply follow the will of Beijing and remain a junior partner of China: 
serving China was no different from yielding North Korea’s right of 
self-determination to China, for it was so obvious that North Korea would have no 
choice but to depend on China for its survival. This would fatally jeopardise the 
regime security of the Kims – North Korea would become a puppet state of China, 
and following the China’s approach to reform the country was equivalent to 
denying Kimilsungism and subsequently the legitimacy of the Kims’ rule. 
 
Pyongyang had also tried to use America by seeking benefits via direct interaction 
with Washington during the post-Cold War years; yet either the ‘hard’ (military 
threat) or the ‘soft’ (diplomatic negotiation) approach worked only temporarily – 
because fighting against the ‘Imperialist America’ was part of the foundation of 
Juche that had been propagated by the Kims in North Korea for decades. 
Basically, it perpetuates the hostility between the two countries irrespective of 
how Yongdae is implemented; a breakthrough therefore is very unlikely as long as 
the Kims stay in power. This helps to explain why to Pyongyang, using China is a 
more feasible option. 
 
However, no matter how North Korea uses China to gain benefits, Pyongyang 
would not simply dance to the tune of Beijing – and this is the same in the case of 
South Korea: Seoul would not blindly follow the will of Washington or Beijing 
when South Korea uses them to serve its national interests. To explain such 
behaviour of both Korean states, simply employing the terms such as ‘soft 
balancing’ (Pape, 2005, pp.9–10; Paul, 2005, pp.58–59), ‘hedging’ (Kuik, 2008, 
pp.163–5), and ‘accommodating’ (Kang, 2009, p.7) would not be sufficient. These 
terms, largely based on the influence of material factors, are good to indicate the 
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different positions adopted by the middle countries towards a great power along 
the spectrum with its two ends representing balancing against and bandwagoning 
with the great. The rationale behind the interplay of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae, 
however, is able to offer understanding at a deeper level as to reveal why and how 
these two ‘hands’ of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae are moving Korea along this 
spectrum under the influence of both material and non-material factors. Apart 
from pointing to a certain position Korea chooses in its relations with the great 
power (as the terms of ‘soft balancing’, ‘hedging’, and ‘accommodating’ have 
indicated), the mechanism of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae explains and predicts why 
the position will change, when the position will change, towards which direction 
the position is moving, and until which point the moving will cease. 
Comprehension of the combined application of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae 
therefore would be able to offer useful insights for both academic research and 
policy making to better understand the Korea–great power(s) relations at present 
and in future. 
 
Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter examines the two legacies of Sadae (i.e. ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae) 
in Korea’s relations with the great powers during the contemporary era. While all 
the events mentioned in this chapter have been made publicly known to those IR 
scholars who specialise in Northeast Asian interstate affairs, it is not the intention 
of this research to simply repeat what happened or to argue against the views of 
those who studied both Korean states’ contemporary relations with the great 
powers. This research, based on the examination of Joseon Korea’s 500 years of 
Sadae towards Ming/Qing China, aims to provide another analytical tool, that is, a 
combined application of ‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae, to explain the policies of 
Seoul and Pyongyang from a different perspective, whereby offering answers in 
addition to ‘ambivalence’ and ‘opportunism’. 
 
Although Yongdae as a pragmatic strategy appears to be easily comprehensible 
according to the realist view (such as bandwagoning), the logic that Yongdae is 
checked by a nationalistic concept of ‘anti-Sadae’ makes the case rather unique 
for a middle power such as either North or South Korea to deal with the great 
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powers. After all, what Korea has experienced is nothing short of uniqueness for 
over six centuries since the late 14th century, and what happened in history still 
persistently generates profound impacts on both Korean states’ relations with the 
great powers in present time. 
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Chapter 8 
 
Conclusion: Sadae, History and Culture, and Contemporary Northeast Asian 
International Relations 
 
This concluding chapter summarises the findings of this thesis by briefly 
reviewing the rise and fall of Sadae. On this basis, it presents a framework to 
understand the three dimensions of Sadae. The implications of studying Sadae are 
then discussed with the emphasis placed on the future order in Northeast Asia. It 
is suggested that a pre-modern Sinocentric order is not returning to the region due 
to the lack of an objective condition (i.e. hierarchy has been substituted by 
equality in contemporary interstate relations) and a subjective condition (i.e. no 
intersubjective ideology that is commonly shared between China and other 
countries). Although it implies that Sadae as an official policy no longer exists, 
the Koreans’ diplomatic skills and insights resulted from centuries of practicing 
Sadae are still relevant to the understanding of Korean foreign policy towards 
America and China in the contemporary world. During the process of a power 
transition in a region with abundantly rich historical and cultural legacies, both the 
non-material and material factors, which share equal importance, should not be 
ignored. 
 
In respect to the contribution of this research, it is anticipated that this study can 
inspire the policymakers of the middle powers in the sense that, by referring to the 
Korean experience in dealing with great powers, they may consider developing 
new arenas other than those of the material concerns to interact with the great 
powers. While the material concerns tend to lock the middle powers in a fixed 
position (i.e. secondary to the great powers), the non-material arenas will free the 
middle powers from the constraint of material capabilities and broaden the scope 
of their policy options, thereby enabling them to deal with the great powers at 
least on a closer-to-equality basis. Theoretically, it is hoped that the 
constructivist-cum-realist approach proposed can provide scholars who specialise 
in the IR of Northeast Asia with a comprehensive and a balanced analytical 
framework for future studies. 
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At the end of this chapter, some suggestions are made for future studies, with the 
hope that this research can become one of the building blocks to develop a school 
of thought for the study of Northeast Asian IR, whereby the general discipline of 
IR study can be enriched. 
 
8.1 The Three Faces of Sadae 
 
A Recap of the Rise and Fall of Sadae 
Sadae, a word of political taboo in either Korean state nowadays, was a strategy 
adopted by ancient Korea in managing its relations with China, the only great 
power in Northeast Asia. It was in the year of 1392, when the Joseon Dynasty was 
founded, that Sadae, a concept of Confucianism, was set to be the official policy 
of Joseon towards Ming by Taejo Yi Seong-gye, and became institutionalised by 
the Sinocentric tribute system in which the Joseon court chose to participate. 
 
In the five-century history of Joseon, Sadae was practiced during the reign of 
every Joseon king – although with different motives: a few served the Chinese 
emperor with utmost respect, sincerity, and even affection of a son to his father, 
some performed the duties as a vassal state ought to do according to the 
Confucian principles of propriety – but not in the cases that the national interests 
of Joseon were to be sacrificed. As for the rest, they simply made use of the 
tribute system to obtain various sorts of material benefits from China – yet 
without a trace of faithfulness in serving the great. Whether it was out of 
admiration of things advanced (culture, technology, etc.) of the great, or due to 
fear of being invaded by the great, or aiming to pursue gains from a quid pro quo 
relationship with the great, the practice of Sadae was not forcefully imposed on 
Joseon – it was Joseon who made the choice of Sadae. 
 
In spite of the changing power polarity in Northeast Asia in history, Joseon’s 
Sadae never stopped: Joseon served Ming from 1392 to 1608 in a unipolar order 
with Ming as the hegemon, served both the declining Ming and the rising Manchu 
from 1608 to 1644 in a bipolar order, served Qing in name only (and served the 
fallen Ming in reality) from 1644 to 1776 in an imaginary bipolar order, served 
Qing from 1776 to 1873 in a unipolar order with Qing as the new hegemon that 
243 
 
was truly accepted by Joseon, and served Qing in name only again (and served 
Japan, Russia, and Japan again in reality) from 1873 to 1910 in a multipolar order. 
However, Sadae was carried out differently during the above mentioned periods. 
 
Even when Ming was the dominant power, the Joseon political elites served the 
great in different ways. Some had ‘done more than one should’, as they viewed 
Ming as a paternal figure to Joseon and served Ming wholeheartedly by 
enthusiastically practicing the Confucian doctrines of propriety (e.g. Jungjong). 
However, some had ‘done no more but sometimes less than one should’, as they 
served Ming by performing their duties according to the requirement put forth to a 
vassal state, but struggled in dilemma when they found that in some cases 
Joseon’s national interests would be compromised if serving Ming inflexibly – 
and they eventually bent the rules to protect the well-being of Joseon (e.g. Sejong 
and Seongjong). As for the rest, they had ‘done less than one should’, as they 
served Ming as a pragmatic strategy to use the great, and they never concealed 
their purpose to serve Ming: to gain and to secure the national interests of 
Joseon – in their eyes, the tribute system was merely an exchange of a favour for a 
favour with the great (e.g. Taejo, Taejong, Sejo, Yeonsangun, Myeongjong, and 
Seonjo). 
 
During the period of power transition when Ming was challenged and eventually 
replaced by Qing, the multi-dimensional nature of Sadae revealed itself again. 
Some chose to pragmatically serve (in fact, use) two great powers at the same 
time with tactics of deception in order to protect Joseon (e.g. Gwanghaegun), 
while some served the great with exceptionally high level of loyalty: Injo (before 
1637) served Ming at the expense of having Joseon be conquered by Qing, 
Hyojong actively planned for the Northern Expedition to revive the fallen Ming, 
Sukjong and Yeongjo built and expanded the Altar for Great Recompense to 
honour the departed Ming emperors. After Qing became the indisputable 
hegemon in the region, Jeongjo served Qing faithfully due to his admiration of 
and affection for Qianlong Emperor. 
 
Sadae came to its final decades after Qing was repeatedly defeated by the West 
during the 19th century. Joseon’s decision to stay close to Japan and Russia and to 
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use them against China was a result of a pair of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors: within 
the Sinocentric world, it was the unwillingness and inability of Qing to look after 
the national interests of Joseon that ‘pushed’ Joseon out of the tribute system. 
Outside of the Sinocentric world, Joseon was exposed to the advent of the 
sovereign-state system that was introduced by the West. Its principles of equality 
and autonomy became so appealing to Joseon when compared with the Confucian 
tribute system of hierarchy that Joseon was ‘pulled’ away from the Sinic sphere. 
This eventually led to the official end of Sadae. 
 
Reviewing the history of Joseon from 1392 to 1910, it can be found that no matter 
how many benefits Joseon had received from implementing the policy of Sadae, 
the role of Joseon in its relations with the great powers had always been the 
‘junior’ with various costs to bear. Within the hierarchy-based Sinocentric world, 
Joseon was assigned the role of a vassal state (i.e. a ‘junior’) by Imperial China 
before 1895; after 1895, within the equality-based Westphalian system, Joseon 
was still treated as a junior by the great powers. Even after Korea’s sovereignty 
was restored with the Japanese surrender in 1945, Korea as a free nation-state and 
the will of the free Korean people were still not respected by the great powers as it 
was supposed to be. 
 
While independence, representing only self-rule, was achieved with the founding 
of both Korean states in 1948, the quest for self-determination began in South 
Korea and North Korea with the combined application of the principles of 
‘anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae in their relations with the great powers throughout the 
Cold War and well into the post-Cold War era. The unpleasant (and sometimes 
even painful) experience in the past and the unresolved issue at present (i.e. the 
nation-state of Korea remains divided) that was left from the past eventually turn 
both Korean states into a pair of middle powers that have been interacting with the 
great powers in ways that are not seen elsewhere in the world. 
 
Different Dimensions of Sadae 
Sadae can be considered as a mentality or an attitude, which actually exhibits the 
nationalistic emotion of the perceiver instead of the perceived – the sentiment of 
‘anti-Sadae’ is a proof. However, in the study of International Relations, Sadae 
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should be understood as a policy without bias. In the historical context, it is an 
undeniable fact that Sadae as a policy was adopted by the Joseon court towards 
China, the dominant power of the world the Koreans knew of at the time. Joseon 
did not create the concept of Sadae; it was a Confucian idea brought up by 
Mencius, the Chinese philosopher. Joseon did not create the Sinocentric tribute 
system; it was an international system constructed by the Chinese based on the 
Confucian rule of propriety. The policy of ‘serving the great’ was simply an 
option, among others, for any countries smaller than China in pre-modern East 
Asia to consider when building relationship with China. Some chose to implement 
the policy, such as Joseon, Ryukyu and Annam, while some refused, as seen in the 
case of Japan. 
 
Therefore, as a product of Korean history, Sadae at least deserves a descriptive, 
‘what is’ definition that is free of the ‘why’ and the ‘how’. Sadae thus refers to: 
 
Within the Sinocentric order during the era of Ming and Qing China, the 
policy adopted by Joseon Korea that accepted the role of a vassal state in a 
hierarchical relationship with China that entailed a set of political, economic, 
military, diplomatic, and cultural duties for Joseon Korea to perform within 
the tribute system, thereby serving China as its suzerain. 
 
Nevertheless, by omitting the ‘why’ and the ‘how’ related to the concept, Sadae 
tends to be vaguely generalised either by some Chinese scholars as serving the 
great enthusiastically, or by some Korean scholars as using the great strategically. 
Hence Sadae needs to be understood at a deeper level according to the different 
motives of the Joseon policymaker(s) when he/they chose to adopt the policy – 
and these were determined by the interplay among the factors of the three levels 
of system (i.e. distribution of power in Northeast Asia that affected Joseon’s 
national security), unit (i.e. the state ideology of Confucianism that made Joseon a 
culturally strong but militarily weak nation), and individual (i.e. personal value 
and experience that nurtured the pro-righteousness or pro-pragmatism orientation). 
These were the causes that had led to the effects as seen in the different ways of 
practicing Sadae. 
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Therefore, based on the findings of this research, Sadae is further described as: 
 
1) Sadae with filial piety, by which Joseon served Ming/Qing loyally in the 
way resembling a son respected and loved his father wholeheartedly and 
unconditionally. This was the result brought by the powerful effect of a 
combination of the pro-righteousness policymakers and the state ideology 
of Confucianism that excluded the influence of the rationalists and the 
concern of Joseon’s national security (see Figure 8.1). 
 
(Figure 8.1) 
 
2) Sadae as an obligation, by which Joseon performed the duties as required 
for a vassal state, but not at the expense of the national interests of Joseon. 
This could be considered a point of equilibrium that had balanced the 
influence of all factors – although not without a painful decision-making 
process in many cases (see Figure 8.2). 
 
(Figure 8.2) 
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3) Sadae as a disguise of the pragmatic Yongdae (using the great), by which 
Joseon strategically used China to serve its national interests. This was 
caused by the effect of a combination of the pro-pragmatism policymakers 
and the national security that overpowered the influence of the loyalists and 
the principles of Confucian ethics – mainly in response to a changing power 
distribution in the region strategically (see Figure 8.3). 
 
(Figure 8.3) 
 
These three different ways of practicing Sadae indicate that Sadae is not a 
homogeneous concept. As a dependent variable, Sadae was practiced in a certain 
way that corresponded to the result of the competition among the independent 
variables derived from the system, unit, and individual levels: 1) when the 
pro-righteousness loyalists controlled the making of foreign policy in a strongly 
Confucianised Joseon, as seen in the ruling years of Injo before the first Manchu 
invasion in 1627 for instance, the fact that Manchu had overpowered Ming and 
the clout the pro-pragmatism rationalists at the time were able to wield in the 
making of foreign policy were no match for the ideational forces of Confucian 
ethics. Sadae thus was practiced in the way that a son with filial piety served his 
father; 2) When the impact generated by the factors of all three levels reached an 
equilibrium, as during the reign of Sejong (Ming’s dominant power in reality had 
drawn the Koreans’ attention to the security of Joseon, but Confucianism was at 
its peak to shape the ethical norms in the Korean society. Moreover, the 
rationalists and the loyalists were well-matched in strength at the Joseon court), 
Sadae became an obligation for Joseon to serve the great power but not at the cost 
of Joseon’s benefits, demonstrating the intention of the Joseon elites to achieve a 
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balance in proecting the interests of both Joseon and the great power; and 3) 
When the rationalists gained the upper hand at the Joseon court in a time when the 
power of the great was unquestionable, as in the example of Yeonsangun’s rule, 
Confucian ethics and the loyalists simply could not bring sufficient impact to 
uphold the moral principle of righteousness in the making of foreign policy, and 
Sadae became a pragmatic strategy for Joseon to pursue its national interest. 
 
Therefore, Sadae could be subjectively interpreted at the will of the interpreter if 
the heterogeneous manifestations of the concept were not fully revealed, and the 
chance to understand the true nature of the bilateral relations between the two 
countries would be unfortunately reduced. To avoid the situation in which history 
is presented for the purpose of serving the political needs at present time, 
historical concepts like Sadae have to be studied via in-depth analysis based on 
detailed historical evidence. 
 
8.2 Implications 
 
The study of Sadae has two implications: 1) the possibility for a re-emergence of 
Sinocentric order in Asia–Pacific in the coming future is minimal, and middle 
powers such as the two Korean states will consider China as a great power instead 
of a regional leader; and 2) the Korean experience of managing its relations with 
the great power(s) is relevant to the middle powers that face a trilateral quandary 
as a result of the Sino-US competition. 
 
China is on its way to become a regional superpower, yet a Sinocentric order is 
unlikely to re-surface for two reasons: first, the suzerain–vassal relationship is a 
historical phenomenon. Today there is a rising China with its centrality no less 
significant than what it used to be in pre-modern time, but China is now a member 
of the international community that is sustained by the modern sovereign-state 
system based on equality. Unofficially, there may be unequal relationship between 
two states due to their power disparity; yet officially there is no more hierarchical 
relationship between any two states – because in terms of status, all nation-states 
are independent and equal to each other. After all, it is a social progress for a 
liberal international order to replace a hierarchical one, and history is rather 
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unlikely to regress to its distant past. In consequence, Sadae as an official policy 
no longer exists in the contemporary world – because the very element that 
presupposes the existence of Sadae, that is, the Sinocentric tribute system based 
on hierarchy, has gone. 
 
Second, the Sinocentric order is unlikely to re-emerge even in the face of a rapidly 
rising China because there is a lack of ideational foundation commonly shared 
between China and other countries in the region. Centuries ago there was 
Confucianism, an intersubjective philosophy that was willingly shared by the 
Chinese and the Koreans and eventually produced the Korean policy of Sadae. 
However, at the moment and in near future, what China can offer is only material 
benefits; there is no ideational ‘magnet’, as Confucianism in history, that will look 
appealing to the middle powers and turn them into followers of China. 
Multi-billion-dollar commercial contracts merely indicate the establishment of a 
quid pro quo relationship between China and a middle power. This is why China, 
on the way to revive its ancient glories, will become a great power again – but not 
necessarily a leader, for no countries will serve China as a leader the way Joseon 
served Ming/Qing in history. 
 
Whether a leader–follower relationship exists between China and a middle power 
therefore has to be justified from the perspective of the middle power rather than 
that of China. A leader will be recognised only when followers are identified. 
China may have the ability to wield its economic influence on the traditional 
followers of America, but China is not able to swing them over to its side: they 
would rather entrust their national security in the hands of America because there 
is lack of common ground to build confidence and cultivate mutual trust between 
them and China. Hence, it is difficult for China to become a leader in the region – 
not because of insufficient material power, but simply due to the lack of 
followers. 
 
In regards to the second implication of studying Sadae, it needs to be emphasised 
that although Sadae was a foreign policy that resided in the distant past, it still has 
its diplomatic value at the present-day interstate relations. For over 500 years until 
the early 1900s, the Koreans implemented the policy of Sadae in different ways 
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towards Ming/Qing China, and they came to develop, from their successes and 
failures, a fine set of skills to deal with the great power(s). It is true that neither 
Korean state chooses to practice Sadae officially in contemporary time, yet its 
legacies still heavily characterise their foreign relations with the great power(s). 
While the idea of serving the great subserviently was labelled a political taboo, 
using the great pragmatically remained a viable strategy to pursue national 
interests – as evident in the Korea–great power(s) relations since the end of the 
Second World War. ‘Anti-Sadae’ and Yongdae were combined to form a 
mechanism that have ensured both Korean states’ survival and even brought them 
substantial gains when being involved in the fights between great powers. The 
Korean foreign policy in the past seven decades towards the great powers may be 
described as ambivalent or opportunistic, but it can also be commended as 
sophisticated and effective – for it demonstrates the wisdom of a middle power in 
the practice of contemporary diplomacy when interacting with one great or more 
than one great at the same time. 
 
Briefly speaking, the Korean experience is about creating more controllable 
variables in the non-material aspects to increase strategic flexibilities in its 
relations with the great powers. It can serve as a source of inspiration for other 
middle powers in Asia–Pacific to resolve their dilemma of making a difficult 
choice between America and China at present and in future. Since the turn of the 
century, the economies of many traditional allies of America in the region have 
become highly dependent on China. They cannot afford to choose the clear-cut 
option of siding with America as Australia does – as Australia’s economic relation 
with China is one-dimensional and substitutable, for which Canberra does not 
think China can exercise economic pressure on Australia (Bisley, 2014, 
pp.310–311). Nonetheless, the decision of simply allying with America in the 
Sino-US rivalry, as in the case of Australia, appears over-optimistic in the belief 
that the growing aggressiveness of China will be neutralised by perpetual 
American supremacy, and it contributes little to maintaining stability in the region 
via multilateral institutions in the long run (Bisley, 2014, pp.317–318; Bisley, 
2015, p.259). This makes the Korean experience all the more valuable to other 
middle powers in Asia–Pacific when they deal with the great powers, especially 
within a bipolar regional order. 
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8.3 Contributions 
 
Political Contribution 
With the example of the Korean experience of managing relations with great 
powers, it is hopeful that the detailed study of history and culture conducted in 
this research can provide the foreign policymakers in middle powers with some 
insightful ideas to interact with the great powers. That is, the middle powers may 
consider opening up new arenas to deal with the great powers on non-material 
issues. By such strategy, the middle powers will be able to gain two advantages: 1) 
greater possibility to interact with the great powers on an equal or nearly equal 
basis; and 2) greater flexibility to deal with the great powers with more policy 
options. 
 
First, in the arena of non-material issues, the middle powers do not have to appear 
weaker in front of the great powers – because the great powers may not have the 
superiority over others on issues irrelevant to military and economic capabilities. 
On material concerns, the middle powers can hardly place themselves in a 
position that is equal to that of the great powers. Unless the middle powers can 
offer something useful to the great powers, their dignity may not be respected, 
their voices may not be heard, and their interests may not be protected. On the 
contrary, issues related to history and culture can settle the asymmetry to ensure 
the middle powers not be disadvantaged in their relations with the great powers. 
 
As in the case of the ROK–US relations, South Korea has been trying to 
beneficially interact with the superpower not only in the material arena but also in 
the non-material arena of history and culture (in spite of the relatively short 
history of the United States that is slightly over 200 years): South Korea can 
choose to stay close to America by praising its impartiality and generosity during 
early 1880s, America’s military support that rescued South Korea in the Korean 
War and deterred further aggressions from the North ever since, and America’s 
economic aid that transformed South Korea into an industrialised country. 
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Alternatively, South Korea can also choose to keep a greater distance between 
itself and America by amplifying the Taft–Katsura agreement in 1905 (America 
recognised Japan's dominance in Korea for the return of Japan’s recognition of 
America’s control of the Philippines, by which America was viewed as 
unethically sacrificing Korea’s sovereignty for its self-interest), America’s 
decision to split the country in halves without considering the will of the Koreans, 
and Washington’s support for the authoritarian regimes that suppressed the South 
Koreans’ demand for democracy. While the fact that the national security and 
economic benefits South Korea has been receiving by bandwagoning with 
America is crystal clear, South Korea has in fact not been a weak and passive 
junior partner at all in its alliance with the world superpower. In a non-material 
arena, South Korea is able to manage the bilateral relations with America on an 
fairly equal basis, producing the result that America has never been able to place 
the alliance under its total control – while South Korea has been continuously 
obtaining both material benefits and non-material gains (i.e. self-determination, 
international status, and national dignity) from the ROK–US alliance. 
 
Second, by opening up arenas other than those concerning only military and 
economic issues, the middle powers will be able to increase their policy options to 
interact with the great powers. In other words, if the middle powers constrain 
themselves in the material arena, they will be left with two choices only: to 
bandwagon with the great powers, or to prepare for being bullied by the great 
powers. To draw an analogy, military and economic issues are like the two rails 
that make the track. The great powers tend to build such track with the two rails of 
military and economic issues in which their greatest capabilities reside, and if the 
middle powers can only act like a train with wheels that fit on nothing but the two 
rails of security and trade, then they will have to run in either of the two directions 
(forwards or backwards) on the rail-track built by the great powers – and the 
outcome is obvious: the middle powers are left with the minimum amount of 
autonomy in controlling their foreign relations with the great powers, and their 
behaviours are highly predictable thus it will become much easier for the great 
powers to manipulate the middle powers. 
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This is evident in the PRC–ROK relations: by highlighting the importance of the 
economic value of China to South Korea, Beijing repeatedly hints to Seoul that 
South Korea should free itself from the ROK–US alliance and turn to lean on 
China, as China can manage and control North Korea and provide South Korea 
with abundant commercial opportunities (Men & Liu, 2013, p.72). However, 
South Korea responded to China in a non-material arena of history and culture, 
without which South Korea would not have been able to: 1) maintain equidistance 
with China and with America, in the face of China’s valid claim about providing 
South Korea with both security and prosperity on one hand and South Korea’s 
long-time (thus more reliable) alliance with America on the other; and 2) protect 
its right of self-determination, international status, and national dignity by not 
always saying ‘yes’ to either the incumbent or the rising great. Compared with 
people from other nations, the Koreans have been able to subtly yet more 
effectively deal with the great powers because with their centuries of experience 
dealing with the great powers, they have acquired and refined their knowledge 
and skill to handle the great powers with a ‘lever’: by using a fulcrum made of 
non-material factors, a middle power enables itself with the capability to manage 
a beneficial relationship with the great powers. Rather than entangling itself in the 
material arena with an ‘either-or’ mentality, the Koreans freed themselves from 
the intellectually limited strategies of balancing and bandwagoning, and 
proactively employed the mechanism of Yongdae-plus-‘anti-Sadae’ when 
juggling both material and non-material factors, thus having achieved the optimal 
outcome from their relations with the great powers. 
 
Academic Contribution 
With the study of Sadae in this research, it is found that there has been more than 
power politics in Northeast Asian interstate relations: factors related to history and 
culture can influence the making of foreign policy to the extent that the material 
concerns may have to give way to accommodate the non-material demands (at 
least for a certain period of time). To better understand the logic that determines 
the interplay of the material and non-material forces in Northeast Asia, a region 
that is rather different from the others due to its unique historical background but 
at the same time is strategically important for the current rivalry between the top 
two great powers, it is necessary for the IR scholars to adopt a combined method 
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of a realist view with a constructivist approach to analyse the relations between 
and among the Northeast Asian states. 
 
While realism and Constructivism are usually considered IR theories belonging to 
two different schools of thought, the two indeed can be applied together. Realism 
is the theory about the view that international relations are basically dominated by 
rivalries for material power between and among states that pursue their national 
interests in an anarchical world, while constructivism is the theory about the 
approach to study world politics by way of examining the non-material factors 
that can generate impacts on states’ behaviour and the system structure. Realism 
and constructivism are not opposite to each other: the opposite of realism is 
idealism, and the opposite of constructivism is rationalism – hence realism and 
constructivism is not a pair of incompatible theories. As discussed in the study of 
Barkin (2003, p.326), ‘a realist constructivism (or, for that matter, a constructivist 
realism) is epistemologically, methodologically, and paradigmatically viable’. 
 
Secondly, they should be applied together in the study of Northeast Asian 
interstate relations. Employing the realist view alone is not sufficient for policy 
analysis. As in the case of the American strategy of ‘hub-and-spokes’ in East Asia, 
the discord between South Korea and Japan will look incomprehensible if the 
impacts generated from the non-material factors (historical disputes and cultural 
frictions) are underestimated. Similar situation can be found in the example of 
ROK–PRC relations during the 2000s. The dramatic ‘cooling down’ in the 
bilateral relationship cannot be explained if the focus is placed only on economic 
and military concerns. At the same time, a constructivist approach is needed to 
identify the non-material factors that function as a key variable to such changes, 
for which the IR scholars would have to search deeper for the reasons behind 
within the historical and cultural contexts – areas where the realists tend to 
overlook. These two examples, along with others mentioned in the previous 
chapters, illustrate the reason why IR scholars cannot afford to ignore the need to 
study the non-material factors that make the interstate relations in Northeast Asia 
much more complex than the realists have anticipated. 
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8.4 Suggestions for Further Research 
 
The analyses of historical records in this research related to the 
Joseon–Ming/Qing relations were mainly based on the Ri Dynasty Annals of 
Korea (also known as Joseon Wangjo Sillok). As the annals are generally 
considered the most comprehensive historical records of the Joseon Dynasty, it 
took a tremendous amount of time to search and study every single entry pertinent 
to the Korea–China relations in the nearly 2,000 volumes of the annals. However, 
the study of Northeast Asia in the past, which still influences Northeast Asia at 
present, requires a complete and correct understanding of the interstate relations 
centuries ago. In order to examine the historical complexity and cultural nuance, 
more historical materials of primary source should have been studied. Hence, it 
would have been complementary to the study of the annals if information of these 
primary materials were also analysed: 1) Seungjeongwon Ilgi (Journal of the 
Royal Secretariat), the daily record of the Royal Secretariat that documented the 
monarch’s public activities and his interactions with the court officials on a daily 
basis from 1623 to 1910; 2) Ilseongnok (Diary of Self-examination), the daily 
record of the kings’ reflection upon the events at court for better governance, 
which covered the period from 1760 to 1910; and 3) Bibyeonsa Deungnok 
(Records of the Border Defense Council), the minutes of the meetings held 
between 1617 and 1892 by the Border Defense Council, the supreme 
administrative organ responsible for national security since the Japanese invasions 
during the final decade of the 16th century. All of these materials contain 
information that is of great help to the study of Sadae and other topics related to 
Korea–China relations in pre-modern and modern history. 
 
Since most of these historical materials were written in vast number of volumes, 
to study all of these historical records requires a lot of time and research 
manpower. That is why it is suggested that the future study of Northeast Asian IR 
should be carried out as series of research projects by teams of IR scholars from 
China, both Korea states, and Japan, preferably supported by historians and 
linguists (as the majority of the historical records were written in ancient Chinese). 
Although it looks challenging, it can serve as a starting point to give a positive 
answer to the question of ‘Why is there no non-Western international relations 
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theory? (Acharya & Buzan, 2007, p.287)’ if concerted scholarly efforts can be 
made. Hopefully, this research on Sadae can inspire current and future IR scholars 
(and also practitioners) for the development of a school of thoughts tailored for 
the study of Northeast Asian (and probably East Asian or Asian) interstate 
relations – so as to achieve the ultimate goal of enriching the discipline of 
International Relations Studies. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Glossary of Key Terms 
 
Romanised Korean Chinese  English Explanation 
 
Bibyeonsa ഢᜐљ! Council of Border Defence 
Bukbeol чҵ! Northern Expedition 
Byeongja Horan Чηच໶! Manchu Invasion 
(1636-37) 
Cheonchusa ίࣿ٬! Joseon Tribute Mission (to 
celebrate the birthday of 
China’s crown prince) 
Daebodan εൔᏝ! Altar for Great 
Recompense 
Dongyi ܿӮ! Barbarians in the East 
Ganghwado Joyak Ԣ๮৞చऊ! Treaty of Ganghwa Island 
Gwageo ࣽᖐ! Civil Service Examination 
Hangul  ᗬӷ! Korean Alphabet 
Imo Gullan Ϲϱै໶! Military Uprising (1882) 
Jeongjosa ҅ර٬! Joseon Tribute Mission (to 
pay respect to the Chinese 
emperor on New Year’s 
Day) 
Jeongmyo Horan ΍юच໶! Manchu Invasion (1627) 
Jonhwa Yangyi ൧๮ᝎӮ! Respecting China and 
Resisting the barbarians 
Jonju Yangyi ൧ڬᝎӮ! Respecting the Zhou 
Dynasty and Resisting the 
barbarians 
Joseon Chaengnyak රᗲ฼ౣ! Joseon Strategy 
Juche Ьᡏ! Self-reliance 
Jwauijeong Ѱ᝼ࡹ! First Associate State 
Councillor 
Mohwa ኀ๮! Admiring China 
Sadae ٣ε! Serving the Great 
Saganwon љᒇଣ! Office of Censors 
Saheonbu љᏦ۬! Office of Inspector General 
Silhak ჴᏢ! Practical Learning 
Sojunghwa λύ๮! Little China 
Uijeongbu ᝼ࡹ۬! State Council 
Unyo-ho Sageon ໦ඦဦ٣ҹ! Unyo Incident 
Uuijeong ѓ᝼ࡹ! Second Associate State 
Councillor 
Yejo ᘶఆ! Joseon Ministry of Rites 
Yeonguijeong ሦ᝼ࡹ! Chief State Councillor 
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Yongdae Ҕε! Using the Great 
Yukjo Ϥఆ! The Six Ministries of 
Joseon 
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Appendix 2 
 
Monarchs of Joseon and China (Ming and Qing) 
 
Joseon King (Reign)      Ming Emperor (Reign) 
 
Hongwu, ࢫݓ (1368-98) 
Taejo, ϼ઒ (1392-98) 
Jeongjong, ۓے (1398-1400) 
Jianwen, ࡌЎ (1398-1402) 
Taejong, ϼے (1400-18) 
Yongle, ҉኷ (1402-24) 
Sejong, Шے (1418-50) 
Hongxi, ࢫᅚ (1424-25) 
Xuande, ࠹ቺ (1425-35) 
Zhengtong, ҅಍ (1435-49) 
Jingtai, ඳੀ (1449-57) 
Munjong, Ўے (1450-52) 
Danjong, ᆄے (1452-55) 
Sejo, Ш઒ (1455-68) 
Tianshun, Ϻ໩ (1457-64) 
Chenghua, ԋϯ (1464-87) 
Yejong, ᅴے (1468-69) 
Seongjong, ԋے (1469-94) 
Hongzhi, Ѷݯ (1487-1505) 
Yeonsangun, ᐪξ։ (1494-1506) 
Zhengde, ҅ቺ (1505-21) 
Jungjong, ύے (1506-44) 
Jiajing, ჏Ⴀ (1521-67) 
Injong, Ϙے (1544-45) 
Myeongjong, ܴے (1545-67) 
Longqing, ໜቼ (1567-72) 
Seonjo, ࠹઒ (1567-1608) 
Wanli, ࿤᏿ (1572-1620) 
Gwanghaegun, Ӏੇ։ (1608-23) 
Taichang, ੀܱ (Aug-Sep 1620) 
Tianqi, Ϻ௴ (1620-27) 
Injo, Ϙ઒ (1623-49) 
Chongzhen, ஖ᅼ (1627-44) 
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Joseon King (Reign)       Qing Emperor (Reign) 
 
 
Gwanghaegun, Ӏੇ։ (1608-23) 
Nurhaci, ոᅟࠖه (1616-26) 
Injo, Ϙ઒ (1623-49) 
Hong Taiji, ࣤϼཱུ (1626-43) 
Shunzhi, ໩ݯ (1643-61) 
Hyojong, ֵے (1649-59) 
Hyeonjong, ᡉے (1659-74) 
Kangxi, நᅚ (1661-1722) 
Sukjong, ๘ے (1674-1720) 
Gyeongjong, ඳے (1720-24) 
Yongzheng, ႘҅ (1722-35) 
Yeongjo, म઒ (1724-76) 
Qianlong, ଳໜ (1735-96) 
Jeongjo, ҅઒ (1776-1800) 
Jiaqing, ჏ቼ (1796-1820) 
Sungjo, પ઒ (1800-34) 
Daoguang, ၰӀ (1820-50) 
Heonjong, Ꮶے (1834-49) 
Cheoljong, ণے (1849-63) 
Xianfeng, ࠍᙦ (1850-61) 
Tongzhi, ӕݯ (1861-75) 
Gojong, ଯے (1863-1907) 
Guangxu, Ӏᆣ (1875-1908) 
Sunjong, પے (1907-10) 
Xuantong, ࠹಍ (1908-12) 
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Massachusetts. 
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Lee, K 1984, Han’guksa sillon (A new history of Korea), Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
 
